Managing health care market in developing countries : a case-study of selective contracting for hospital services in South Africa by Broomberg, J
LSHTM Research Online
Broomberg, J; (1997) Managing health care market in developing countries : a case-study of selective
contracting for hospital services in South Africa. PhD thesis, London School of Hygiene & Tropical
Medicine. DOI: https://doi.org/10.17037/PUBS.04656017
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/id/eprint/4656017/
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17037/PUBS.04656017
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk
MANAGING THE HEALTH CARE MARKET IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF SELECTIVE CONTRACTING 
FOR HOSPITAL SERVICES IN SOUTH AFRICA
JONATHAN BROOMBERG
Thesis submitted to the University of London in 
fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty o f Science
March 1997
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the prospects for market type reforms within the public health 
systems o f developing countries, through a study of the impact of contracting out of the 
provision o f rural district hospital services in South Africa. The research objectives were 
to assess the impact of these contracts on hospital and local health system efficiency, to 
analyse the determinants of efficiency, and to determine the necessary conditions for 
efficiency gains from contracting out. Three contracted out hospitals, under contract to 
a single for-profit contractor, were each matched with a public and a private for-profit 
hospital, and the relative efficiency of these hospitals was assessed using step down unit 
cost analysis, data envelopment analysis, and a multi-dimensional assessment o f  quality 
o f care. The structure of the contracts and the contracting process, organisational 
management structures and systems, and the extent of competition for the contracts, 
were also evaluated.
These analyses demonstrate that the contracted out hospitals are able to produce most 
outputs o f  comparable quality at lower cost, primarily due to more efficient utilisation of 
staff resources, and to superior management structures and systems. However, when the 
government’s total costs are taken into account, including contract prices and 
transactions costs, contracted out services appear more costly than those produced in 
public hospitals, indicating that the contractor is able to capture most of its superior 
production efficiency in profits, and that these contracts result in some efficiency losses. 
Poor contract design is also shown to result in some systemic efficiency problems. 
These results are shown to be attributable to the government’s poor ability to design, 
negotiate and monitor contracts, as well as to the absence of competition or 
contestability. These findings suggest that contracting out has the potential to  generate 
significant efficiency gains, but only where certain critical conditions are in place, 
including government capacity to design, negotiate and monitor contracts, and some 
level o f  contestability or competition for the contracts. Where these conditions are 
absent, contracting out of hospital services is unlikely to generate efficiency gains, and 
may result in efficiency losses.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Recent health policy debates in both developed and developing countries have been 
strongly influenced by a trend towards ‘marketisation’, involving the selective 
introduction o f a range o f market mechanisms within the rubric o f the public health 
system (Hurst 1991, Saltman and von Otter 1996, Mills 1995, Saltman 1995, McPake 
and Ngalande Banda 1994, World Bank 1993, OECD 1992, Mills 1997). This is in part 
attributable to new trends in public sector management in many parts of the world 
(Walsh 1995, Moore 1996), as well as to accumulating evidence of the failure o f health 
care systems throughout the world to meet key objectives of efficiency, equity and 
responsiveness to users (Birdsall and James 1992, World Bank 1993, Mills 1995, 
Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996). ‘Marketisation' proposals and reform programmes 
have varied widely in terms of their scope, the components of the health system they 
address, and the specific mechanisms they rely upon. At their most ambitious, reforms 
have aimed to create full ‘internal markets’ within the health sector, with competition in 
either or both the funding and supply o f health care. Less ambitious reforms have aimed 
at introducing more limited market elements, such as contractual relations between 
purchasers and providers.
Reforms o f  this kind have been debated and, in some cases, implemented in numerous 
developed countries, including the majority of OECD states (OECD 1992, Saltman
1995). Some of the better known instances of reforms which have been debated and in 
many cases implemented in the last 5 years include those in the United States (Iglehart 
1993, Ellwood, Enthoven and Etheredge 1992), the UK (Great Britain Department of 
Health 1989, OECD 1992, Le Grand 1994), the Netherlands (van de Ven 1989), Sweden 
and Finland (Saltman and von Otter 1992, von Otter and Saltman 1991, Annel 1995; 
Diderichsen 1995) and New Zealand (Borren 1993, Ashton 1995).
While no middle or low income developing countries have to date implemented large 
scale structural reform along these lines, there are several reasons to believe that such an 
approach to policy reform will become increasingly relevant in the foreseeable future. 
The health systems o f  several middle income developing countries currently feature
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limited market elements, such as selective contracting (i.e. public sector purchasing of 
specific services from either public or private providers). This occurs in some social 
insurance systems in Latin America and Asia (McGreevey 1990, Briscoe 1989, Kim 
1987, Griffin 1990, De Geyndt 1990), and in several other countries in which public 
sector provision dominates, but where some services are contracted out to private sector 
providers (Price, Masobe and Booysen 1993, McPake and Ngalande Banda 1994, 
Bennett 1991, Chandiwana and Chiutsu 1993, Cruz and Zurita 1993, Bennett and Mills 
1993). In the Latin American context, Colombia is currently introducing more 
extensive reforms based on the introduction of a split between purchasers and providers, 
while Mexico is considering similar reforms (Gonzales-Sedano 199S, Mills, Hongoro 
and Broomberg 1997). Chile is also considering proposals to increase competition at the 
primary health care (PHC) level, by allowing private providers to participate in publicly 
funded provision (Jiminez 1993, Jimenez de la Jara and Bossert 1995). Similarly, most 
of the countries of the former Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe, including the Russian 
Federation, are experimenting to a lesser or greater extent with reforms of this kind 
(Robinson and Le Grand 1995, Sheiman 1995).
In Africa, Zambia has begun to implement proposals which envisage extensive 
decentralisation o f management authority, and a purchasing role for district health 
authorities (Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996), while South Africa is considering the 
introduction o f provider competition in the delivery of publicly funded PHC services 
(Department of Health, Republic of South Africa 1996), and already has extensive 
experience with selective contracting (see below). In several other countries (e.g. Ghana, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Nepal, Rwanda, Swaziland, South Africa) the public 
sector implicitly contracts with private (usually not-for-profit) providers, such as 
churches or other NGOs, to deliver health services, and meets all or some of their costs 
o f doing so through subsidies and grants (Gilson, Adusei, Arhin et al. 1997, Green 1987, 
Gilson, Dave Sen, Mohammed et al. 1994, Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 
1996a).
Numerous other developing countries also contract out the delivery of a range of 
clinical and non-clinical support services (Mills 1995, Mills, Hongoro and Broomberg
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1997, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996, McPake and Ngalande Banda 1994). Finally, 
there is emerging evidence o f a significant shift towards policies of this kind among 
influential donors and agencies in international health, which is likely to add impetus to 
such reform initiatives (Mills 199S, World Bank 1993, Cassels 1995, Kutzin 1995).
Despite the extensive debate and literature on these reforms, they have for the most part 
been advocated and implemented in the absence o f systematic data on their actual costs 
and benefits in  practice. As discussed in some detail in Chapter 2, there remains very 
limited information, from either developed or developing countries, on the impact of 
marketisation reforms on the efficiency of providers and of the health system more 
generally, on equity and other social objectives, as well as on the costs of these reforms.
This study w as intended to address this information gap in a limited way, and to make 
some contribution to the systematic analysis o f these approaches to health service 
delivery, through a case study of selective contracting for hospital services by 
government authorities in South Africa. This introduction provides the background to 
the case study; it begins with a brief review of the policy context for health care reform 
in South Africa, with a specific focus on the potential role of selective contracting or 
other forms o f  ‘marketisation’. It then provides more detailed background on relevant 
aspects of the  South African health sector, and on the current extent o f selective 
contracting fo r hospital services. It concludes with an outline of the research framework 
applied here, and of the structure of the thesis.
1.1. The policy context for health care reform in South Africa
There are several imperatives driving health care reform in South Africa, some o f which 
are unique to  the South African context, while others are common to other developing 
and, in some cases, developed countries. Specific features of the South African context 
include the profound impact o f apartheid policies on health care over the past 5 decades, 
and the relatively recent political transition. Apartheid policies led to massive inequities 
in resource distribution between race groups, geographic regions and components of the
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health care system, as well as to severe fragmentation and duplication of the health 
services, due to the effects of the ‘homelands’1 policy. As a result, the new authorities 
have inherited a legacy of poorly organised, inefficient and unresponsive health services 
(de Beer and Bloomberg 1990, McIntyre and Dorrington 1990).
The recent political transition has seen the installation of a new government which was 
voted in by a large majority, and the development o f nine new provinces (incorporating 
the former ‘homelands’ and provinces) each with their own health administrations. Not 
surprisingly, these changes have been accompanied by very strong popular expectations 
o f substantial improvements in health service delivery, and both politicians and health 
service bureaucrats currently feel pressure to deliver tangible improvements. These 
trends are reflected in the intense and urgent health policy debate which began some 
time before the political transition, and has since gained substantial momentum (African 
National Congress 1994, Department o f Health, Republic of South Africa 1996, 
Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996b).
The ability o f the South African government authorities to respond to these pressures is 
however seriously constrained by a number o f problems, many o f which are common to 
many developing countries (see Chapter 2 for further discussion). These include severe 
and growing financial resource constraints, shortages and maldistribution of key 
personnel resources, especially doctors and managerial staff, and severe inefficiencies 
within existing public bureaucracies (Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996b). 
These factors have led to an increasing recognition that public sector resources may be 
insufficient to meet total health sector needs in the country, and this has, in turn, led to a  
search for mechanisms by which private health sector resources might be harnessed to 
the ends o f  national health priorities (Department of Health, Republic of South Africa
1996).
The key mechanism envisaged here is that of selective contracting by the public sector, 
for services provided by either for-profit, or not-for-profit private providers. While
T h »  refers to the apartheid policy o f  creating independent o r quasi-independent ‘homelands' in specific regions 
o f  the country, for the purposes o f  removing the majority o f  the black population from so called ‘white areas'.
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selective contracting is currently limited to the hospital sector, recent policy proposals 
envisage extending this approach to the delivery of primary health care (PHC) services 
(Department of Health, Republic of South Africa 1996). This approach has been 
proposed for a number of related reasons, in addition to the general factors outlined 
above: firstly, it is argued that outside contractors may be able to provide a similar or 
higher quality service at a lower cost than the government, due to some combination of 
economies of scale, and greater production efficiency resulting from competition, 
expertise or technology. Secondly, contractors have capacity and resources not available 
to the government; for example, the public sector faces a major shortage o f skilled 
medical staff, and contracting is seen as a mechanism for drawing medical staff 
currently in the private sector into public service. Contractors are also believed to have 
greater expertise in the delivery of highly specialised services, such as equipment 
maintenance, management of specialised hospitals, or blood transfusion and pathology 
services. Finally, private providers may allow government authorities to overcome 
critical capital constraints on the development of needed facilities.
In addition to proposals on selective contracting, a recent review of the hospital system 
has proposed extensive decentralisation o f management authority in public hospitals, 
and the introduction o f ‘performance contracts’ (see Chapter 2) between public hospitals 
and government authorities. A s discussed further below, these approaches have been 
given specific impetus by South Africa’s uniquely extensive experience with selective 
contracting in the health sector, as well as by its well developed private health sector. It 
is also likely that these debates have been influenced by international trends in health 
policy, particularly in the UK, Europe and the US, since consultants from these two 
countries have played significant roles in recent policy initiatives in the country.2
These observations thus suggest that various forms of contracting already play an 
important role, and can be expected to become increasingly prevalent in the organisation 
of South Africa’s health sector. For these reasons, South Africa provides something of a
The European Union has seconded several consultants on a long term basis to the Department o f  Health in 
South Africa. In addition, two senior consultants from the UK and the US served as advisors in a  recent, high 
level policy making process - the Committee o f Inquity into a National Health Insurance System.
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natural laboratory for evaluating the impact of this approach to delivering health 
services in a developing country context
1.2. The role of selective contracting in South Africa’s health care 
system
This section provides some background on South Africa’s hospital system and the role 
o f selective contracting within that system. In addition to information on the publicly 
funded and operated hospital system, it provides some detail on the private hospital 
sector, including both not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals, with some focus on the 
latter group, due to the inclusion of three such hospitals in this study.
In 199S, South Africa had 392 publicly owned and operated hospitals, comprising 
112,979 beds (Hospital Strategy Project 1996b). These hospitals provide care for 
approximately 83% of the total population of 42 million (Health Systems Trust 1996), 
the remainder using private hospitals (see below). These hospitals are grouped into 
district, regional and central hospitals, based on the range of services they provide, and 
the level o f expertise available within the hospital. District hospitals, which represent the 
public hospitals included in this study, provide a  basic range o f in-patient and out­
patient services, and are usually staffed by general practitioners. These hospitals have 
traditionally been located in rural areas, as is the case with the hospitals in this study, 
although the government health authorities are intending to designate several formerly 
regional hospitals in the cities as district hospitals (Department o f Health, Republic of 
South Africa 1996). As described in more detail in Chapter 7, these hospitals are 
organised on the traditional lines o f  a public bureaucracy, with hospital management 
enjoying extremely limited authority, most of which is held at the centre, and with the 
majority o f employees, including medical staff, being full-time salaried public servants.
Alongside the public hospital system is a well developed private hospital sector, 
comprising both for-profit and not-for-profit institutions. In 1996, the for-profit sector 
comprised a total o f 255 hospitals, comprising 21,160 beds, the majority of which
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belonged to large hospital companies, with the residual being owned by individual 
shareholders or smaller companies (van der Merwe 1997). All of these hospitals operate 
on a fee-for-service reimbursement basis, and cater almost exclusively for the 
approximately 17% of the population which has access to private health insurance. 
Medical staff working in these hospitals are not employed by them, but are instead 
affiliated to one or more hospitals, implying that the doctor has a surgery within or close 
to the hospital, and refers and treats his patients in the hospital concerned. Affiliated 
doctors are also shareholders in the hospitals to which they are attached. The patterns of 
service provision in these hospitals differ substantially from those in public hospitals, 
due to the fact that majority of users of these hospitals are relatively affluent, and due to 
the use o f a fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism, which results in a bias towards 
high patient turnover, short hospital stays, and a strong emphasis on surgical and other 
technology intensive procedures (Broomberg, Chetty and Masobe 1992).
The not-for-profit hospital sector comprises two main groups, both of which operate on 
the basis of what may be termed ‘implicit contracts’ (see Chapter 2) with the 
government, in that they receive the majority of their operating budgets from public 
funds, and provide services to uninsured patients. The first of these is the South African 
National Tuberculosis Association (SANTA), which owns and operates 22 hospitals for 
the treatment o f patients with severe Tuberculosis (TB), comprising a total of 1938 beds 
and an annual budget of R72.8 million, and which receives 100% of its operating 
expenditure from the various government authorities (Hospital Strategy Project 
Consortium 1996a). The second group- the so called ‘province-aided hospitals’- 
comprises 30 autonomous acute care hospitals with a  total of 3193 beds, and annual 
expenditure o f R1.S2 billion. These were often established by religious orders, but are 
now run by independent Boards of Trustees. They provide care to a mix of insured and 
indigent patients, and generally receive 90% of their operating budget from public funds 
(Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996a). It is interesting to note, in the light of the 
policy developments described above, that the South African government authorities are 
now attempting to shift these ‘implicit contracts’ onto a more formal footing, with 
detailed, formal contracts being negotiated with SANTA, and with discussions along 
these lines proceeding with the province-aided hospitals (Ntsaluba 1996).
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Over and above these well developed examples o f implicit contracting, South Africa has 
extensive and long-standing experience of more formal selective contracting for both 
non-clinical and clinical services provided by a range of for-profit and not-for-profit 
private sector providers (Price, Masobe and Booysen 1993, Hospital Strategy Project 
Consortium 1996a). The extent and value o f these contracts in 1995 is illustrated in 
Table 1.1.
Table l .l;  Overview of contracts for hospital services in South Africa (199S)
No. of 
Contracts
Total Value 
(Rand million)
% Total
Hospital Budget
Clinical
Hospital Management 106 502.3 4.1%
Laboratories 9 236.4 1.9%
Blood Services 7 143.2 1.2%
Personnel 1 13.7 0.1%
Other’ 4 16.3 0.1%
Total 127 911.9 7.6%
Non-Clinical
Waste Removal 9 7.2 0.06%
Clinical Maintenance 99 3.3 0.02%
Gardening 18 3.9 0.03%
Security 152 28.0 0.2%
Pharm. Distribution 2 68.2 0.5%
Patient Transport 2 7 0.05%
Laundry 5 1.8 0.01%
Catering 53 97.1 0.08
Total 338 216.4 1.8%
Overall Total 467 1128 million 9.4%
Note: T h is  tab le does n o t include contracts fo r equipm ent m aintenance w hich  num ber in th e ir
thousands and a ccoun t fo r substantial expenditures.
D ifferences betw een  row  figures and  row  totals a re  d u e  to rounding.
*: Includes contracts fo r em ergency patient transport, and hom e oxygen  supplies. 
Source: Hospital S trategy P roject C onsortium  1996a.
The table indicates that in 1995, government authorities let 467 contracts with a total 
annual value of approximately R1.13 billion per year, equivalent to 9.4% of total
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hospital expenditure at that time.3 20% of the total expenditure was spent on 338 
contracts for a broad range of non-clinical services, while the remaining 80%, equivalent 
to R912 million, was spent on 127 contracts for a similarly broad range of clinical 
services. Further examination of the contracts for non-clinical services indicates the 
major expenditures in this category are on catering, pharmaceutical distribution, and 
security services, together accounting for 92% of expenditure on non-clinical services, 
with the remainder being spend on a range of other services, including waste removal 
and cleaning, equipment maintenance, gardening services, transport and laundry 
services.
Table 1.1 also shows that clinical contracts were awarded for a number of different 
services o f varying degrees of complexity. The most important category here is for 
hospital management services, for which there were 106 contracts, valued at R502.3 
million in 1995. Other important contracts include those for pathology services and 
provision o f blood products, while there were also a range of smaller expenditures on 
contracts for provision o f nursing and other personnel, as well as emergency transport 
services and home oxygen supplies.
The hospital management services category includes the two sets of ‘implicit contracts’ 
discussed above, as well as contracts with Lifecare Special Health Services (Pty) Ltd 
(Lifecare), a for-profit hospital management company, which holds the three contracts 
reviewed in this study. Table 1.2 indicates that in 1995, Lifecare held 33 hospital 
management contracts, comprising a total of 15,239 beds, and covering hospitals for 
long term and acute psychiatric patients (10,251 beds in 15 hospitals), TB patients 
(3,061 beds in 8 hospitals), frail care patients (1,319 beds in 8 hospitals) and the three 
district hospitals (comprising 608 beds) included in this study. The contracts between 
the South African government authorities and Lifecare take three main forms: the first 
are “build, operate and transfer” contracts, in which the contractor is required to fund the 
building o f the facility, in return for which it obtains a long term management contract, 
at the end o f which the ownership o f the facility passes back to the government. The
These contracts are specifically for services rendered, and exclude all purchases o f  goods, supplies and 
equipment
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second are ‘management contracts’ in which the contractor manages publicly owned 
facilities, while the third category consists of contracts in which the contractor provides 
services out o f  its own facilities or facilities leased from a third party. ‘Build operate 
and transfer contracts’ were used in two of the hospitals studied here, while a 
management contract was used in the third. These two contract types are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6.
Table 1.2; Hospital management contracts held by Lifecare
Psychiatric TB Frail
Care
Acute
District
Total
Hospitals 15 8 8 3 34
Beds 10351 3,061 1,319 608 15339
Value of contract 
(R millions)
141.3 66.2 31.7 37.7 276.9
Source: H ospital S trategy Project C onsortium  1996a
These data therefore bear out the observation that selective contracting of both clinical 
and non-clinical services plays a vital role in the delivery o f publicly funded hospital 
services in South Africa. Despite this long-standing and varied experience with selective 
contracting, and its important current and potential future role in South Africa, there has 
to date been no  formal evaluation o f the impact of contracting on efficiency or other 
health sector goals. In addition to contributing to international experience and 
understanding o f  these issues, this study was therefore also intended to address an 
important gap in  the information required by policymakers in South Africa.
13. Research framework
This section outlines the research framework used in this study. It begins with a 
summary of the  objectives o f  the study, then briefly reviews the methodology, including 
some background on the hospitals included in the study, and a review of the analytic
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approaches used. A full description of the methodology of the study is provided in 
Chapter 3.
13.1. Study objectives
Against the background of extensive use o f selective contracting in the absence of 
systematic evaluation o f its costs and benefits, the main objective of this study was to 
assess the relative efficiency o f contracted out4 and directly managed public hospitals, as 
well as the determinants of any observed differences in efficiency. Efficiency was 
broadly defined here to include assessments o f both unit costs, technical efficiency5 and 
quality o f care. On this approach, contracted out hospitals would be judged more 
efficient if they were able to produce services o f similar quality at a lower total cost to 
those produced in the public sector, or services o f higher quality at similar total costs. In 
this context, total cost to the public sector was defined to include both the contract price 
and any transactions costs incurred by the public sector, including costs of negotiating 
and monitoring the contract (see Chapter 2 for a definition and further discussion o f 
transactions costs).
More specifically, the study aimed to:
i. Compare the production efficiency of contracted out and directly provided services, 
including hospital utilisation patterns, production costs and quality of care.
ii. Assess the overall efficiency of contracting out, by comparing the total costs 
(including the contract price, transactions costs and any other costs) faced by the 
public sector in contracted out versus directly managed public sector hospitals.
*  Contracting out refera to  a  specific form o f selective contracting, in which providers outside o f government are 
awarded contracts. See Chapter 2 for fiirther discussion o f  this and other forms o f selective contracting.
3 Technical efficiency refers to the efficiency o f use o f  inputs in the production of outputs (see Chapter 2 for a  
more detailed definition).
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iii. Explain the impact of contracting on both production efficiency and overall 
contractual efficiency, and compare this with the effects of direct public sector 
provision, by examining the individual and collective effects of specific 
determinants of efficiency, including:
— the nature of the contract and the contracting process
— competition
— hospital ownership and managerial motivations
— the nature o f the relationship between public purchasers and contracted 
hospitals, including the extent o f  transparency in the contractual 
relationship, and the  extent o f decentralisation of management authority
— management structures and systems at hospital and administrative levels
iv. Determine the necessary conditions for successful implementation of selective 
contracting for hospital services, and the feasibility and applicability of extending 
these arrangements in South Africa and in other developing countries.
13.2. Overview of methodology
1.3.2.1. Study hospitals
At the time o f the study, two former ‘homeland’ governments, Gazankulu and Ciskei, 
had let contracts with Lifecare for the provision o f acute, district hospital services in 
three hospitals, Matikwana and Shiluvana (both in Gazankulu) and Hewu (in the 
Ciskei)6, and all three of these hospitals were included in the study. These hospitals are 
typical, medium sized, rural district hospitals (varying in size from 170 to 2S0 beds), 
providing a range of basic medical, surgical and obstetric care to in-patients and 
outpatients, and functioning within the public sector rural district health system. Further 
details on the history and nature o f  the contracts in force at each hospital are provided in 
Chapter 6.
Each o f the contracted out hospitals was matched with a public sector hospital, using 
size, service-mix, and geographical proximity as matching criteria. As shown in Table
1.3, the public hospitals selected were Letaba Hospital (matched with Shiluvana), and
The Gazankulu homeland was incorporated into the Northern Province after the election o f the new government 
in 1994, while the Ciskei was incorporated into the Eastern Cape Province. The study hospitals are thus now 
controlled by the health departments o f  these two provincial administrations.
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Tintswalo Hospital (matched with Matikwana), both of which were also under the 
control of the Gazankulu government at the time of the study, and Bisho Hospital 
(matched with Hewu), which was under the control of the Ciskei government.7 All three 
o f these hospitals are also typical rural district hospitals, offering a similar range of 
services to the contracted out hospitals, although all are somewhat larger than the latter 
hospitals, varying in size from 287 to 322 beds.
As also shown in Table 1.3, each pair o f hospitals was also matched with a private for- 
profit hospital, in order to allow additional assessment of the independent effects of 
ownership structure on efficiency. The selection of the matching private for-profit 
hospitals was based on geographical proximity only, since these hospitals differ 
substantially from the other hospitals in respect o f service-mix. Two o f the private 
hospitals, Pietersburg Private Hospital (matched with Shiluvana and Letaba) and 
Nelspruit Private Hospital (matched with Matikwana and Tintswalo) belong to one 
private hospital company, HospiPlan (Pty) Ltd., while the third- St. Dominies (matched 
with Hewu and Bisho) belongs to another, larger private hospital company, Afrox (Pty) 
Ltd. These hospitals are located in towns in relatively close proximity to the rural areas 
in which the other matched hospitals are located. All three are typical for-profit private 
hospitals catering to insured patients on a fee-for-service reimbursement basis, as 
described above. Chapter 4 provides more detail on the size, structure and patterns of 
service provision of the study hospitals.
Table 13; Study hospitals, grouped by geographic area
Northern
Province
(form erly  G azankulu/ 
N orthern  T ransvaal)
Northern
Province
(form erly G azankulu/ 
Eastern T ran sv aa l)
Eastern Cape
(form erly C iskei)
Contracted out Shiluvana Matikwana Hewu
Public sector Letaba Tintswalo Bisho
Private-for-
profit
Pietersburg Private 
Hospital
Nelspruit Private 
Hospital
St. Dominies
7 As with the contracted out hospitals, these hospitals are now under the control o f the health departments o f the 
Northern Province (Tintswalo and Lctaba) and the Eastern Cape (Bisho).
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J.3.2.2. Analysis
A number o f analytic approaches were used to m eet the study objectives. Production 
efficiency was measured using a combination of detailed unit cost analysis, analysis of 
the costs o f treating four specific tracer conditions,8 and analysis of technical efficiency 
using a  variety o f hospital utilisation statistics, as w ell as Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA), a non parametric, linear programming technique. Quality of care, also a 
component o f production efficiency, was assessed using a multidimensional approach, 
including evaluation of structural quality of care (SQOC), the process of nursing care, 
and evaluation o f the outcomes of care in samples of cases of the same four tracer 
conditions used in the cost analysis. Total contract costs9 were assessed using the 
information obtained in the cost analysis, into which contract prices and other 
transactions costs were incorporated. Information on the contracts, the contracting 
process, and other determinants of efficiency were obtained in interviews with hospital 
and a d m in is t r a t iv e  officials from the relevant hospitals, hospital companies and 
government departments. Full details of the methods used in each of these approaches 
are discussed in Chapter 3.
1.4. Structure of the thesis
Chapter Two: Literature review. This chapter reviews the recent literature on the 
theory and experience of marketisation reforms in developed and developing countries, 
with a  specific focus on the applicability of these reforms to developing countries. While 
reviewing these reforms broadly, it focusses specifically on selective contracting since 
this is the focus o f  the empirical work undertaken here.
Four tracer conditions • normal vaginal deliveries, caesarean sections, hernia repair and appendectomy cases - 
were included in the cost and quality o f care analyses in a n  effort to address the problems o f comparing
hospitals in the face o f differences in cascnttix and severity. T h ese  issues are discussed further in Chapter 3. 
Production costs refer to the total costs incurred in producing hospital services, while total contract cost refers to 
the total cost faced by the government in purchasing contracted hospital services, including the contract price 
and all transactions costs. These definitions are discussed in m o re  detail in Chapter 3.
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Chapter Three: Methodology. This chapter provides a detailed description of the 
methods used in the various analyses which comprise this study. Further details and 
methodological instruments are provided in several appendices.
Chapter Four: Results - Performance statistics, cost analysis and data envelopment
analysis. The chapter begins with a brief utilisation profile of the study hospitals, 
followed by the results o f  the analysis o f hospital utilisation statistics. It then presents 
the results of the general and tracer cost analyses, including the unit production costs, 
and a comparison of total contract costs with public sector production costs, as well as 
the results of the DEA analyses.
Chapter Five: Results - Evaluation o f quality of care. This chapter presents the 
results o f  the evaluations of various aspects of quality of care. It begins with the 
evaluation o f structural aspects o f quality of care, followed by the evaluation of the 
quality o f  nursing care, and of the quality of clinical record keeping, and then presents 
the results of the evaluation of the outcomes of care in the tracer conditions.
Chapter Six: Results -  Analysis of contracts and the contracting process. This 
chapter presents the results of an analysis o f the contracts and the contracting process in 
the three contracted out hospitals, and examines the historical reasons for the emergence 
of different contractual models, as well as the impact of these on efficiency.
Chapter Seven: Results - Analysis of management structures and systems, and the 
role of hospital ownership. This chapter reports the results o f the interviews which 
examined the management structures and systems in place in each of the groups, the 
impact o f  these on hospital efficiency, as well as the relationship between hospital 
ownership structures, motivations and efficiency.
Chapter Eight: Discussion. This chapter integrates the findings of the various 
components o f this study in order to address the study’s research objectives. It begins 
with an integrated analysis of the various components of efficiency, followed by an
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analysis o f the individual and combined impact of the various determinants of 
efficiency.
Chapter Nine: Conclusions, policy implications and research priorities. This 
chapter examines the key conclusions of the study in relation to the study objectives, as 
well as the policy implications o f  these conclusions, and suggests future research 
priorities.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
As outlined in  Chapter 1, numerous developed and developing countries are currently 
debating or implementing reforms aimed at varying degrees o f ‘marketisation’ of their 
publicly funded and operated health care systems. The ambitious and often radical 
nature of these reforms raises a series of questions regarding their feasibility and 
potential effects, the answers to which will be crucial before informed policy decisions 
can be taken. This literature review focusses on these questions in the context of 
developing countries. It begins with a  discussion o f the current policy context and the 
consequent objectives and mechanisms of these reforms. It then examines the main 
features of current reform initiatives, and explores in some detail their theoretical 
rationale and the available empirical evidence on their impact. It concludes by 
highlighting a  number of critical questions raised by the review, some of which this 
study attempts to address.
Although these reforms are examined broadly, the review highlights one specific 
dimension o f  ‘marketisation’, namely selective contracting, which involves public sector 
purchasing o f  services from either public or private providers. This focus follows firstly 
from the specific empirical work undertaken for this study, and secondly, from the fact 
that more limited reforms such as selective contracting are more likely to be 
implemented in developing countries than the more comprehensive ‘marketisation’ 
reforms envisaged in developed economies (Mills 1995, Mills 1997). While most of the 
comments and conclusions emerging from this review may be applicable throughout the 
health care system, the review focusses mainly on hospital services, again due to the 
specific content of the empirical work undertaken in this study.
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2.2. The policy context of ‘marketisation* reforms
The last decade has witnessed a dramatic re-evaluation of the structure and functions of 
government in relation to the delivery of public services (Walsh 1995, Jackson and Price 
1994, Mills 1995, Moore 1996). A central tenet of the new thinking, termed the ‘new 
public management’ (Hood 1991, Moore 1996), is that the traditional organisational 
form o f the public sector, hierarchical bureaucracy, is inherently inefficient, and that the 
introduction o f various market mechanisms will substantially enhance the efficiency of 
public service delivery. Two main schools o f thought underpin this analysis: the first, 
property rights theory, contends that the main source of inefficiency in the public sector 
is the weakening of property rights, so that decision makers face few incentives to 
allocate resources efficiently. This is contrasted with the incentives facing entrepreneurs 
or shareholders in the private sector (Mills 1997). The second critique of the public 
sector, argued by ‘public choice’ theorists, is that the politicians and bureaucrats who 
control public bureaucracies cannot be assumed to be acting in the public interest, since 
they are more likely to serve their own interests, or those of powerful interest groups 
(Walsh 1995).
In response to these analyses, the ‘new public management’ envisages the use of market 
mechanisms to generate appropriate price and demand signals, and to effectively 
weaken the influence o f politicians and professionals over public service delivery, thus 
ensuring that these services are more responsive to market signals and to customers 
(Walsh 1995, Jackson and Price 1994, Moore 1996). It is also argued that private 
organisations can bring the advantages of functional specialisation, as well as speed and 
flexibility in adjusting to changing factor prices, technology and demand conditions 
(McCombs and Christianson 1987, Mills 1997). A central theme of this thinking is thus 
the view o f the state as being responsible for enabling or ensuring service delivery, 
rather than for direct delivery o f services itself, except in certain identifiable 
circumstances (Vining and Weimer 1990, Moore 1996).
Since health care constitutes a major component of public services in most countries, it 
is not surprising that these new trends in public sector management have substantially
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influenced health policy debates (Mills 1995, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996). Health 
sector reform has also been stimulated and influenced by several important trends within 
health systems themselves, including often widespread inefficiencies, growing demands 
for the extension of consumer choice and influence, and increasing tension between 
limited resources and increasing demands on health care systems (Robinson and Le 
Grand 1995).
Over the past few decades, the health care systems of most OECD countries have 
achieved and maintained a relatively high degree of macro-economic efficiency, 
delivering comprehensive care o f  a reasonable standard to whole populations at 
relatively low cost (OECD 1992, Kings Fund Institute 1989). However, these systems 
are now widely perceived to exhibit both technical and allocative inefficiencies.10 In the 
UK National Health Service (NHS), for example, specific problems that have been 
identified include lack of flexibility of local management due to over-centralisation, 
domination o f the resource allocation process by providers, rigid control over the capital 
spending process and poor management information systems (Le Grand 1991, Kings 
Fund Institute 1989, OECD 1992, Akehurst, Brazier and Normand 1988, Enthoven 
1991). Similar problems have been identified in several other OECD countries (OECD
1992, Boufford 1991).
The health care systems of m ost developing countries face a very similar set of 
problems, as well as inequities in  resource distribution, poor responsiveness to the needs 
o f users, and poor quality of care (Birdsall and James 1992, Griffin 1989, World Bank
1993, Mills 1995, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996). Some o f the causes o f these 
problems, including rigid, overcentralised and poorly functioning bureaucracies, and 
domination o f the health care system by medical professionals, are similar to those in 
developed countries. However, developing countries also face a number of unique 
problems, including severe shortages of skilled managerial staff and severe resource
10 Technical or X efficiency refers to the  efficiency of use o f  inputs in the production o f outputs. A producer 
would be regarded as X-efficient i f  a  maximal quantity o f  outputs (of given quality) are produced at a  given 
level o f inputs, or when a  given ou tpu t is achieved with the  minimum possible quantity o f inputs. Allocative 
efficiency refen to the overall efficiency of allocation o f resources from a societal point o f view. In the case of 
hospital services, X-efficiency would be concerned with how well the hospital does what it does, whereas 
questiona o f  allocative efficiency w ould relate to whether the hospital ought to be doing what it is doing.
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constraints, which have aggravated the problems outlined here (Mills 1995, Bennett, 
Russell and Mills 1996).
Further analysis o f the relationship between public bureaucracies and these various 
problems suggests that problematic incentives faced by various agents within the health 
sector play a key role. Some of these are inherent in the large bureaucracies that 
characterise public health systems, which undermine management autonomy, 
responsibility and accountability, and create a profound lack of information and 
transparency of information (OECD 1992, Saltman and von Otter 1992, Mills 1995, 
Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996). Others are attributable to methods o f reimbursement, 
such as salaries, which are common to several public health systems (Ron, Abel-Smith 
and Tamburi 1990, Bodenheimer 1993).
A subset o f these incentive problems are, however, specific to the integration of the 
functions o f  financing and provision of health services within large public monopolies. 
One major consequence o f  this arrangement is a lack of awareness of the resource 
implications of allocation and consumption decisions, and a consequent failure to use 
explicit efficiency criteria in making such decisions. On the financing side, this leads to 
resources being allocated to provider institutions on the basis of historically determined 
global budgets, rather than on the basis of explicit efficiency criteria such as the needs of 
the population served and/or the costs o f provision. Similarly, providers face few 
incentives to focus on efficient production, since the use of global budgeting systems 
encourages managers to focus on the use o f inputs, rather than on efficient production of 
outputs (OECD 1992, Bamum and Kutzin 1993, Newbrander, Bamum and Kutzin 
1992). This budgeting system may also create an 'efficiency trap', in which efficient 
hospitals are penalised for their efficiency through reductions in subsequent budgets.
These problems are often aggravated by the dominance o f health professionals who 
seldom use explicit efficiency criteria in the hospital resource allocation process 
(Enthoven 1991, Culyer 1990, Mills 1995). The existence o f a monopoly situation on 
the provider side may itself aggravate inefficiency, even in the absence o f a profit 
motive. In this case, the lack o f financial pressure gives clinicians or managers the
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'managerial slack' to take utility maximising decisions which may unnecessarily 
increase costs. Examples would be expenditure on high technology equipment or 
buildings for their prestige value (Culyer 1990).
While these causes o f inefficiency have characterised public health systems in 
developed and developing countries for some decades, environmental factors o f  more 
recent origin have aggravated their effects. These include increased demand pressure on 
the health services, resulting from a combination o f demographic and epidemiological 
change, technological progress and changes in perceptions and expectations o f  public 
services (Saltman and von Otter 1992, Frenk 1993, Lewis, Sulvetta and La Forgia 
1991), and increasingly severe financial resource constraints. As will be obvious, the 
balance and significance o f these factors differs between developed and developing 
countries. In the latter case, the increased demand problems posed by the emerging 
epidemiological and demographic transition are of particular relevance (Omran 1971, 
Mosely, Jamison and Henderson 1990), as are the resource constraints imposed by poor 
economic growth and the introduction of macro economic stabilisation policies in 
several countries (Lee 1991, Sahn and Bernier 1993, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996). 
In many developing countries, these problems have been aggravated by poor 
governance, including unstable political environments and the lack of an effective legal 
and regulatory framework (Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996).
23. Objectives and mechanisms of reform
While there have been diverse responses to these various problems, it is nevertheless 
possible to identify a number o f common objectives and mechanisms in most health 
care reform initiatives. A critical common feature is the desire to address the multiple 
problems identified here while still retaining the perceived efficiency and equity 
advantages of public health systems, including maintenance o f  tight central control over 
global expenditure, provision of universal access to care, and maintenance o f  a central 
role for public policy in determination of need and resource allocation (OECD 1992, 
von Otter and Saltman 1992). A key consequence o f  these multiple commitments has
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been the perception that there should be a maintenance or assumption of public 
monopoly of the financing  of health care while the provision of services might be made 
more efficient through exposure to some element o f  market forces (Culyer 1990, 
Chemichovsky 1993, Chemichovsky 1995).
The efficiency and equity arguments for retaining a public monopoly of health care 
financing have been well rehearsed (Culyer 1990, Bennett 1991), and will only be 
briefly summarised here." From an efficiency perspective, public monopoly facilitates 
efficient resource allocation by overcoming the problems of individual consumer 
ignorance, by allocating sufficient resources to the production of public goods, and by 
ensuring that resources are allocated in accordance with public policy, rather than on the 
basis o f  willingness or ability to pay, or other criteria. It also facilitates the attainment of 
efficiency through overall control o f expenditures, the achievement of lower costs 
through monopsonistic purchasing power, and economies of scale in administration, as 
well as generally lower administration costs than in the case of multiple insurance or 
other financing agencies (Bodenheimer 1993, Abel-Smith 1985, Evans 1986). Public 
monopoly of finance also safeguards equitable resource allocation, again by ensuring 
that such allocations are determined by public policy, and by avoiding adverse selection 
and other risk selection failures inherent in private health insurance markets (Culyer 
1990).
In light o f these arguments, it is not surprising that that there is a strong consensus that 
‘marketisation’ reforms have much greater potential as an allocation mechanism on the 
provider side of the health care system (Saltman 1994, Saltman and von Otter 1996), 
and that o f 25 OECD countries currently experimenting with health care reform, only 
the United States and the Netherlands have focussed efforts on introducing competition 
on the financing side o f  the system (Saltman 1995). There is also mounting evidence 
that Dutch efforts to create managed competition within the health insurance market
W hile maintenance o f  public financing has been a common theme in most reforms. its virtues are still the 
subject o f  some debate, with some economists arguing that public finance should be restricted to the funding o f 
public and quasi-public goods only (Biidsall and James 1992).
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have been unsuccessful, and that they are having negative consequences for equity and 
in other areas (de Roo 1995).
Within the broad constraints o f a public monopoly of financing, a second critical 
objective is to change the incentive structures for key actors in the health care system. In 
this context, a key mechanism is the creation of a split between purchasers and providers 
of health care, and the establishment of some form of contractual relations between 
these two entities. The basic model underlying most initiatives thus comprises a public 
or quasi public (e.g. social or national health insurance) agency acting as a purchaser of 
health services, the contracts for which are awarded to a range o f providers, with or 
without some element o f competition. This replacement of hierarchy with a network of 
contractual relations between purchasers and providers is argued to meet the objective of 
altered incentive structures in various ways: firstly, politicians and political influence are 
removed from the process o f producing health services. This allows managers on the 
provider side to focus on producing efficiently without undue interference from the 
political level, while also allowing politicians to focus on their tasks o f setting policy 
and strategy, and to incorporate a diverse range o f interests in doing so. Several reform 
proposals go further in enhancing the autonomy of management at provider level, for 
example through the creation of fully independent hospitals under the control of Boards 
of Trustees, as with hospital trusts in the UK NHS reforms (Smee 1995).
Secondly, the problems o f provider domination of the resource allocation process are 
addressed by the increased power o f purchasers in the system (Saltman and von Otter 
1996). Thirdly, the establishment of contractual relations, with o r without provider 
competition, is argued to force purchasers to be explicit in their resource allocation 
decisions, as well as to force providers to respond to explicit goals and targets, thus 
introducing transparency into the resource allocation process (Culyer 1990, Bennett, 
Russell and Mills 1996).
Interestingly, Robinson and Le Grand (1995) argue that the purchaser-provider split can 
be seen as a mechanism to resolve two conflicting imperatives of health care reform - 
the decentralisation o f authority to lower levels o f the system, and the need for increased
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central control to enhance efficiency, both of which are themselves responses to the 
increasing tension between limited resources and a more demanding public. In a 
developing country context, an additional objective o f these reforms in some countries is 
to draw private providers into the provision o f publicly funded services, thus 
overcoming supply constraints in some areas (Bennett and Ngalande-Banda 1994, 
Kutzin 1995, Department of Health, Republic of South Africa 1996).
The analytic similarity of most reform initiatives notwithstanding, it is important to 
recognise that variations in structural details may be critical. Variations in factors such 
as which subsectors are exposed to competition, the nature of incentive structures and 
systems o f monitoring and control may produce substantially different models, with 
different effects on efficiency and other parameters (von Otter and Saltman 1992). von 
Otter and Saltman (1991, 1992) have suggested some useful distinctions which capture 
some of these variations. One of these is the balance between market competition and 
regulation. M ost proposals fall somewhere between what they term 'planned' and 
'regulated' markets. 'Planned' markets involve the relatively limited use o f market 
mechanisms within a framework o f public financing and production of health services. 
Constraints on  the market might cover exclusion o f  private providers, and reliance on 
non price mechanisms to balance supply and demand. In 'regulated' markets, on the 
other hand, greater reliance is placed on market mechanisms, with government 
regulation imposed only in order to prevent recognised market failures. Here, the market 
may be opened to private providers, and the price mechanism is a critical tool for 
balancing supply and demand.
Another distinction is based on the source of power in the resource allocation process. In 
one model (termed 'manager led’), power resides with a purchasing agency mandated to 
purchase care from competing providers on behalf of the populations they represent. 
This model thus implies an explicit trading relationship between the 
financing/purchasing agency and providers. In a second model ('patient led’), patients 
have the power over resource allocation since they make choices among providers 
competing fo r public market share, with financial allocations following patients. In this
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model, there is no explicit trading between public purchasers and providers, and 
purchasers play a passive role.
This variable range o f proposals and programmes has been accompanied by a range of 
overlapping terminology. Le Grand (1991) uses the term ‘quasi-markets' to capture the 
fact that while market forces have replaced bureaucratic allocation mechanisms, there 
remain crucial supply and demand side deviations from normal market mechanisms. 
Other terms include, ‘managed competition’ (Enthoven 1991, Enthoven 1988), 
‘provider markets’, and ‘internal markets’. This review will use the more general term 
‘marketisation’ to cover the full spectrum of reforms under discussion here.
2.4. The theory of'marketisation* reforms
Proponents o f ‘marketisation’ reforms argue that they will address most of the problems 
outlined above, and specifically that they will enhance efficiency, and consumer choice 
and influence over health services. This section reviews the theoretical arguments 
behind these broad claims, and then evaluates the available empirical evidence. It 
focuses particularly on issues of efficiency, with equity issues being explored to a more 
limited extent
Analysis o f the efficiency arguments for ‘marketisation’ reforms reveals three distinct 
though linked claims. The first is that the replacement of direct hierarchical 
management structures by contractual relationships between purchasers and providers 
will promote increased transparency of prices, quantities and quality in trading, as well 
as managerial decentralisation, both of which will enhance efficiency. The second is that 
these reforms will promote increased competition among providers, and that the 
increased level o f competition will in turn enhance supply side efficiency. The third, 
usually implicit, claim is that the overall benefits o f these reforms will outweigh the 
potentially substantial costs involved in their creation and maintenance.
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2.4.1. Contracting and efficiency
Public sector contracting for the provision of health services may take several forms 
(Walsh 1995, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996, Mills 1995). Contracts may be awarded 
competitively, or through direct negotiation with designated providers. In addition, 
contracts may be open to different types of bidders: ‘internal contracting’ refers to 
contracts between public purchasers and public providers only, as occurs in the UK 
internal market This term is also applicable to the introduction of explicit ‘performance 
contracts’ on a non-competitive basis between government authorities and autonomous 
public hospitals, a policy which is currently being debated and/or implemented in many 
developing countries (McPake 1996, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996, Cassels 1995, 
Mills 1997). ‘Competitive tendering’ (or market testing) differs from internal 
contracting, in that it opens up competition for the contract to both private and public 
providers, while ‘contracting out’ refers specifically to the use o f private providers.
‘Contracting out’ itself may take several forms (Mills 1995, Bennett, Russell and Mills 
1996): contracts may be with for-profit or not-for-profit providers, and they may be let 
for clinical or non-clinical support services; variations are also based on the extent o f the 
provider market envisaged, which may range from the development of a comprehensive 
provider market, at one extreme, to  the more limited application of selective contracts 
for designated services, on the other. Variations may also be based on the ownership of 
the assets involved in service delivery. For example, the hospital may remain in public 
ownership, in which case a hospital management contract would be let, or the assets 
may be owned by the private providers. Alternatively, ‘build, operate and transfer’ 
contracts, as described above, may be used.
Contracting by the public sector is argued to impact on efficiency in two main ways: 
firstly, through the incentive effects of the contract, and secondly, by promoting 
transparency in trading, and decentralisation of managerial responsibility. Although 
these factors are closely related to one another, they are discussed separately here for 
purposes o f clarity.
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2.4.1.1. The incentive structure o f contracts
There is an extensive literature on the theory o f contracts, and of particular relevance 
here, on the 'principal-agent' problem (Ross 1973, Stiglitz 1989, Harris and Raviv 1979, 
Hart 1989, Lazear 1989, Guesneri 1989, Ledyard 1989). This refers to the design of 
compensation mechanisms (contracts) which will induce an employee (the 'agent') to act 
in the interests of the employer (the principal), when the principal has imperfect 
information about the actions of the agent. Imperfect information can take several forms: 
it may concern actions o f  the agent which are not observable by the principal (hidden 
actions), or knowledge available to the agent, but not the principal (hidden knowledge), 
such that even where the agent's actions could be observed, the principal may not be in a 
position to know whether these are appropriate. Finally, even where the principal has 
sufficient information to observe and interpret the agent's actions, these may still not be 
verifiable by an outside party, such as a court o f law, thus rendering disputes hard to 
resolve (Guesneri 1989, Stiglitz 1989). Since payoffs to principals and agents are 
different, agents are likely to exploit these information problems for their own 
advantage. Information problems thus allow for opportunism on the part of agents, and 
the central focus o f 'principal-agent' theory is thus the design of contracts which will 
minimise such opportunism, and maximise the extent to which the principals interests 
are satisfied. Such contracts have been termed 'incentive compatible' (Ledyard 1989).
Public purchasers o f health services, and particularly hospital services, face all three 
types o f imperfect information outlined here, since the quantity and quality o f outputs 
are usually difficult to observe, interpret and verify (Akehurst, Brazier and Normand 
1988, Culyer, Maynard and Posnett 1990, Tatchell 1983, Soderlund 1993). As a result, 
such purchasers face serious problems o f  potential opportunism by profit (or quality or 
quantity) maximising providers (Bartlett 1991, Propper 1992b). Under these 
circumstances, purchasers12 may adopt different contractual strategies aimed at 
minimising opportunism and thus maximising provider efficiency (Propper 1992b). One
12 For the purposes o f  this discussion, purchasers are assumed to be concerned with maximising the quantity of 
services purchased within a  fixed budget, and to be significantly concerned about the quality o f those services.
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is to attempt to specify contracts as completely as possible, although the complexity of 
health care services suggests that this would be extremely difficult to achieve with any 
accuracy (Walsh 1995, Robinson and Le Grand 1995). Another is to undertake detailed 
monitoring o f provider compliance with all aspects o f  the contract, although this would 
again be both difficult and costly to achieve in the health care setting because of the 
complexity o f the services involved. Both of these strategies therefore imply high 
transactions costs (the costs involved in writing contracts, and in monitoring their 
implementation) for both purchasers and providers. Aside from causing substantial 
system-wide inefficiency (and potentially undermining the efficiency gains from 
contracting), high transactions costs may also reduce the number of providers (and 
especially small providers) willing to bid for contracts, since most of these would be 
unable to sustain the transactions costs involved.
Purchasers may also rely on a range of other mechanisms to ensure contractor 
compliance, although none of these are entirely satisfactory, and in practice, various 
combinations are generally applied (Walsh 1995). For example, contractors could post 
performance bonds or guarantees, although it is unlikely that these would compensate a 
public purchaser for poor performance by a contractor. Purchasers could also attempt to 
ensure that contractors have a good reputation which is at risk if compliance is poor, 
and/or that contractors share similar values to those of the purchaser (although this is 
likely to occur only where not-for-profit contractors are involved). Finally, purchasers 
may resort to the sanctions specified in the contract, although this route too is fraught 
with difficulty. For example, it may be rational for a contractor to accept a financial 
penalty since this may be ‘cheaper’ than full compliance; it may also be difficult to 
ascertain the level o f damages suffered by the purchaser and to prove liability, and the 
costs o f litigation or of administering penalties may be very high. Experience in the UK 
and the US also demonstrates that purchasers are reluctant to terminate contracts 
because o f the additional expenditure and effort involved in re-letting the contract 
(Walsh 1995).
There are thus trade-offs between constraining provider opportunism, transactions costs 
and the maintenance of an adequate level of competitive bidding, and efficient contracts
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will contain incentives which provide a balance between these factors. Mechanisms 
open to purchasers in seeking this balance include choices over which services to 
contract out, the mechanics o f the bidding process, and the design of the contract itself 
(Propper 1992b).
The appropriate design of contracts will vary with the contractual situation, and will 
depend on a number o f factors, the most important of which are the distribution o f risk 
in the transaction between purchasers and providers, and the attitudes o f the two parties 
to risk (Propper 1992b, McAfee and McMillan 1988). For purchasers, the major 
determinants o f risk are the predictability of total costs and the observability o f quality 
of care. For providers, on the other hand, major determinants are the predictability of 
costs, and the extent to which revenue can be guaranteed (Bartlett 1991, Propper 1992b). 
From the purchaser’s perspective, therefore, the ideal contract would place the provider 
at some financial risk (thus ensuring attention to productive efficiency), while also 
ensuring that adequate attention is paid to quality o f  care.
One o f  the key elements of contract design is therefore the reimbursement mechanism 
employed. Retrospective reimbursement at full cost (as occurs in fee-for-service 
payment) places full risk on the purchaser (who has to meet all costs, without being able 
to predict these in total) and none on the provider (who is guaranteed a return above full 
costs). Prospective payment systems, on the other hand, place varying degrees o f risk on 
the provider as well as the purchaser. The use o f a  fixed fee per case, or per patient day, 
for example, allows purchasers to predict total costs to some extent, and places providers 
at risk o f financial losses should costs overrun those fixed by the contract (Propper 
1992b, Donaldson and Gerard 1993).
Other factors affecting the distribution o f risk include the scale o f investment required 
on the part o f providers, the duration of the contract, the process o f contract review and 
renewal, the nature o f services for which contracts are let, and the method o f contract 
specification (Propper 1992b, Bartlett 1991, Walsh 1995, Mills 1997). Providers face 
greater risks when they are required to make substantial capital investments in order to 
participate in the contract, particularly when there is asset specificity (i.e. assets have
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only one specific use), as is the case with hospital services. These risks could be reduced 
by breaking up the contract into several smaller ones, each requiring smaller 
investments by providers. This might also have the advantage of increasing the number 
of small bidders competing for the contract. However, it would also substantially 
increase transactions costs for the purchaser. An alternative method o f reducing the scale 
of the investment risk for providers is through the use of asset leasing contracts, in 
which public sector assets are effectively leased to private providers. This is the nature 
of the contract used in the self-governing trust hospitals in the UK (Propper 1992b). 
Another advantage of this approach is that efficiency can be increased through 
competitive bidding for management contracts, in which inefficient managers can be 
replaced at the next round. The disadvantage o f this approach is that the scope and 
distribution of contracted services are limited by the availability o f public sector 
hospitals.
Investment risk to providers could also be reduced by offering longer contract periods, 
and/or by undertaking less frequent and less stringent performance reviews. In these 
situations, providers would be assured o f a longer period of returns on their investment 
prior to a  further bidding round, and would face lower transactions costs in meeting 
review requirements. Purchasers would also incur lower transactions costs, but they 
would also face increased risks of poor quality, coupled with delays in terminating 
contracts o f  poorly performing providers. The limitation of contract scope, for example, 
to those services with more predictable costs, and in which output quality was relatively 
easily observable would reduce risk for both purchasers and for providers. This is likely 
to be rare for most hospital services, although chronic care services meet these 
requirements to some extent
Finally, purchasers have the option of specifying contracts in terms o f specific outcomes 
required, or less specifically, in terms of activities or outputs to be undertaken or 
produced, or in terms o f  methods or inputs to be used (Walsh 1995). In the health care 
setting, contracts are very unlikely to be based on detailed specification of outcomes, 
because o f  the difficulty o f specifying and measuring these, and because this would 
substantially shift risk to the contractor.
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The responses o f  both parties to a contract will depend on their attitudes to risk. Much of 
the literature assumes that government purchasers are risk neutral (since they are large, 
and capable o f  risk spreading), and that providers are risk averse (Propper 1992b, 
McAfee and McMillan 1988). If this were the case, the number of bidders could clearly 
be increased by a contract design which distributed all or most of the risk to the 
purchaser. This would have the effect of increasing competition, which would itself 
countervail the tendency towards opportunism (McAfee and McMillan 1988). Propper 
(1992b) however argues that the assumption o f risk-neutral government purchasers in 
the health sector is incorrect in many cases, and cites the UK NHS, in which District 
Health Authorities (DHAs) operate on a decentralised (and limited) budget, and are held 
politically accountable, rendering them risk averse. Walsh (1995) corroborates this view, 
citing evidence from contracts for social services in the UK, in which risk averse 
government purchasers have insisted on tightly specified, fixed price contracts, which 
have resulted in them paying higher than efficient prices. In a managed health care 
market, both purchasers and providers are likely to be risk averse to some extent, with 
providers likely to be somewhat more so. In these circumstances, contracts which share 
risks will be most efficient
The complexities of efficient contract design are well illustrated by the different forms 
o f contract currently utilised within the UK NHS. In the early years of the NHS reforms, 
the majority o f  contracts were 'block contracts', in which purchasers paid hospitals a 
fixed annual fee, in return for which the hospital agrees to provide access to a defined 
range o f services for all those within the purchaser's district. Despite substantial efforts 
to specify detailed block contracts, these are necessarily incomplete and therefore open 
to opportunism. They also pose a high degree of risk to the provider, since levels of 
demand are hard to predict Although this provides an incentive for efficient 
performance, it may deter risk averse providers from entering into the contract without 
the payment o f  some premium to cover the risk.
‘Cost per case’ contracts involve payment o f a  specified amount for particular cases, and 
are used for cases not covered by block contracts. While these involve more detailed
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specification than block contracts, they remain incomplete to some extent, and 
information asymmetry still allows for some degree o f provider opportunism. This form 
of contract also involves a substantial shift o f risk to the purchaser, since it is difficult to 
predict the total volume of services that will be demanded, and therefore total costs to 
the purchaser, while the provider is assured o f having all costs met plus a margin above 
this (Bartlett 1991). These forms of contract have now largely been replaced by so called 
‘sophisticated block contracts’, which link activity and unit prices, based on projections 
o f both. In this case, departures from target activity levels trigger defined actions, such 
as data validation or re-negotiation, and the risks o f higher than planned activities are 
shared between both parties (Raftery, Robinson, Mulligan et al. 1996).
This analysis of the application of contracting in the health care setting clearly illustrates 
the complexity o f ensuring efficient contractor performance, while at the same time 
m in im is in g  transactions costs. In response to this, several analysts have applied 
Williamson’s (1985) analysis of markets and hierarchies to address the fundamental 
question of whether a contract based market structure is in fact the appropriate 
o rg a n is a t ion a l form for the health sector (Bartlett 1991, Robinson and Le Grand 1995). 
Williamson (1985) argued that under conditions o f uncertainty, bounded rationality, 
opportunism, asset specificity and small numbers, transactions costs may be so high that 
market transactions may become inherently inefficient, and that internalisation of 
transactions within some form of hierarchy may be more efficient. Several authors have 
argued that most o f  these conditions do apply to public sector contracting for health 
services, suggesting that an extensive, contract-based market in health care may incur 
such high transactions cost as to be less efficient than existing public sector 
bureaucracies (Robinson and Le Grand 1995, Walsh 1995, Bartlett 1991, Raftery, 
Robinson, Mulligan et al. 1996).
The inappropriateness of both classical markets and hierarchies to management of 
public services, including health care, has led to arguments for a shift towards an 
alternative contracting model, which relies on long term, trust based relationships 
captured in what are termed ‘soft’ or ‘relational’ contracts (Walsh 1995, Raftery, 
Robinson, Mulligan et al. 1996, Robinson and Le Grand 1995, Saltman and von Otter
1995). This approach recognises that the relationship between the contracting parties is 
an ‘iterative game’ in which contracts involve a sharing of rights, duties and obligations, 
and in which both parties share the same fate.13 Since trust is higher under these 
circumstances, the risks of opportunism are substantially reduced, as is the need for 
detailed contract specification and monitoring (Stiglitz 1989). As a result, transactions 
costs are substantially reduced. Long term, trust based contracts also have the advantage 
of being self-enforcing, thus overcoming the problems of relying on the courts or other 
sanctions to enforce compliance (Walsh 1995). Taken together, these arguments suggest 
that relational contracts of this kind may be the ideal way to find the appropriate balance 
between market forces and administrative methods in ensuring contractor compliance 
(Saltman and von Otter 1996, Annel 1995).
There is in fact fairly extensive evidence that relationships o f this kind do emerge in 
contracts for social and health care services, corroborating these theoretical analyses. An 
analysis o f several contracts for social services in the US found clear evidence of the 
emergence o f long term relationships, the consequent decline of competitive bidding, 
and a decreasing importance o f price as a criterion o f contract allocation after the initial 
contract round (Propper 1992b, McCall 1987). More specifically, in the case of human 
services, the evidence suggests that incumbent contract holders win most renewed 
contracts, with renewal often being automatic, and with new entrants competing only for 
new contracts (Propper 1992b, Schlesinger, Dorwart and Pul ice 1986, DeHoog 1985). 
Similar patterns have been observed in the process of selective contracting for hospital 
services in the states of California and Arizona in the US (Propper 1992b, McCall 
1987).
There is also evidence of increasing reliance on long term ‘soft contracts’ in several of 
the OECD health care systems in which these reforms have been implemented (Saltman 
and von Otter 1995). In the UK, for example, there is now fairly strong evidence that 
active competition is being supplanted by long term, co-operative relationships, as a 
result o f geographic monopolies, high transactions costs, and the instability and
U  By contrast, ‘discrete contracts' involve an instantaneous and once-ofT exchange o f rights and obligations, with 
no ongoing relationship.
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problems caused by market forces (Ham 1996a, Raftery, Robinson, Mulligan et al. 
1996). This is well illustrated by the increasing dominance of the ‘sophisticated block 
contract’ described above, which is a  good example of a relational contract, since it does 
not specify contract terms in great detail, instead relying on ex post collaboration and 
continuing negotiation between the parties to ensure a mutually satisfactory outcome 
(Raftery, Robinson, Mulligan et al. 1996). These developments parallel those in the 
private sector, in which there are numerous and increasing instances of long-term, co­
operative relationships between purchasers and suppliers (Walsh 1995). Interestingly, 
recent evidence from the UK also suggests the emergence of some elements of ‘spot 
purchasing’ by GP fundholders, although this is argued to pose a risk of fragmentation 
o f the market (Ham 1996b).
While long term ’relational contracting’ appears to address several of the problems 
created by discrete or ‘hard contracts’ within a  market environment, it has certain 
requirements for success, and also raises further problems of its own. Firstly, this 
approach requires an appropriate context or social framework in which socially 
sanctioned behavioural norms and standards of conduct apply. Without this 
environment, it will be difficult for purchasers to trust providers sufficiently to enter into 
this form o f contract (Walsh 1995). Critically, this approach to contracting also has the 
potential to undermine the advantages sought from a competitive bidding process, and 
risks creating either monopolistic or duopolistic competition, and dependency on a 
single provider (Propper 1992b, Robinson and L e Grand 1995). In this situation, the 
supplier will no longer face incentives to perform efficiently, and may return to 
exploiting the contract
In response to these problems, it has been argued that contestability, the threat o f market 
entry, rather than actual competition, should ensure efficient performance by the 
contractor (Baumol, Panzar and Willig 1982, Culyer 1990, Robinson and Le Grand 
1995, Ham 1996a). On this argument competition occurs ‘for the market’ at the 
periodic re-negotiation of the contract rather than on a continuous basis ‘within the 
market’ (Robinson and Le Grand 1995). In this situation, contestability requires the real 
threat that the incumbent contractor will be replaced at the next round, should
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performance be sub-optimal, or should a more efficient bidder emerge (Ham 1996a). 
There are however substantial capital barriers to entry into the market, particularly in the 
case o f hospital services, and these might undermine the potential contestability of the 
market Robinson and Le Grand (199S) argue that this specific problem can be 
addressed through the use of hospital management contracts, in which the assets remain 
in public ownership, although this solution assumes an adequate supply of hospital 
management capacity to create competition, which may not always be the case. Despite 
these concerns, a recent survey of contracting patterns among DHAs in the UK NHS 
showed that each authority has an average of 3.6 main contracts, suggesting a fairly 
substantial degree o f contestability within the market (Raftery, Robinson, Mulligan et 
al. 1996). Issues relating to hospital competition and its effects on efficiency are 
discussed in more detail below.
The reliance on contestability rather than competition also raises questions as to price 
setting and quality regulation within the market. Where active competitive bidding 
occurs at regular intervals, market prices should be efficient, and the threat of 
competition should ensure adequate quality standards. In the absence of competition, 
and particularly in the face of monopoly supply, it will however be more difficult to be 
sure that prices and quality standards are at efficient levels. This suggests that some 
form o f public regulation will still be required to ensure efficiency. In this situation, 
Robinson and Le Grand (1995) suggest that some form o f  ‘yardstick competition' could 
be used as a key regulatory mechanism. This might take the form of regulating prices in 
line with the industry average (or some other norm), encouraging contractors to produce 
more efficiently than the norm. Such an approach also suffers problems, however, 
including the fact that contractors may face special problems (or may argue that they 
do), the potential for collusion, and the risk that quality will decline as contractors 
maximise profits in a  fixed price environment.
Over and above the fundamental problem of balancing incentives for efficiency and 
transactions costs, some analysts have pointed to a further set of problems emerging 
from the complex networks of contractual relations found in some of the more 
comprehensive ‘marketisation' reforms. Walsh (1995), for example, argues that the
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nexus of contracts required to ensure efficient delivery of complex public services may 
be so detailed and complex that it comes to resemble an hierarchical system in its 
functioning. Similarly, Propper (1995) argues that the UK internal market is currently 
characterised by multiple, overlapping principal-agent relationships, in which ownership 
o f assets and the rewards accruing from them are not clear, resulting in lack o f  clarity 
and a weakening o f efficiency incentives.
2.4.1.2 Contracting and transparency in trading
In addition to its incentive effects, contracting has been argued to enhance hospital 
efficiency through increased transparency in prices, quantities and quality o f  services 
(Culyer, Maynard and Posnett 1990, Maynard 1991). In theory, increased transparency 
should apply on both the purchaser and the provider side of the market. On this view, 
purchasers are expected to take greater account o f prices, quality, and other value for 
money criteria (as well as population need) than would a financing authority that simply 
allocated annual budgets to directly managed providers. Similarly, providers having to 
compete for contracts are more likely to be aware of input-output relationships, costs, 
prices and quality than would directly managed providers operating within a fixed 
budget
Information problems may, however, pose substantial obstacles to these theoretical 
benefits o f  contracting. Existing information may be inadequate to promote efficient 
trading (and may even worsen the efficiency o f resource allocation), and the transactions 
costs o f obtaining the necessary level of information may be prohibitive. The difficulties 
o f assessing hospital output have already been discussed, and most health care 
purchasers and providers in non market systems also have little information on costs and 
prices.
There is some debate as to the level of accuracy in pricing that is necessary to enable 
trading to proceed. In the context o f the NHS reforms, for example, it has been argued 
that broad estimates o f  prices are sufficient to allow trade, and that, in any event, the
-48-
introduction of trading will generate increasingly accurate cost and price information 
over time (Robinson 1990). However, where prices do not accurately reflect the 
opportunity costs of resource use, trading may in fact produce distortions in resource 
allocation (Robinson 1990). There are several reasons, in addition to lack of 
information, which suggest that hospital prices will deviate from the true opportunity 
costs o f the resources consumed in producing their outputs. These include general 
problems o f  market failure, such as externalities and monopoly or oligopoly in the 
hospital sector (see below). These latter problems suggest that hospitals in a market 
environment may therefore be able to set prices above efficient levels, necessitating the 
use o f a range of price control mechanisms, such as yardstick competition discussed 
above, although these mechanisms themselves have high transactions costs (Robinson 
1990, Ferguson and Posnett 1990). As argued above, health care markets appear to be 
characterised by a tendency towards long term purchaser-provider relationships rather 
than repeated rounds of competitive bidding, and this trend also undermines the claim of 
increased transparency o f  trading in a contract based system .
These arguments suggest that it may not be accurate to isolate transparency o f trading 
per se as an independent cause o f increased efficiency within health care markets. 
Instead, it is arguable that the beneficial effects of transparency are themselves 
contingent on a range o f the necessary conditions for efficient markets (Propper 1992a). 
On this point, Sappington and Stiglitz (1988) argue that decentralised production of 
welfare services will only be more efficient than direct government production under 
specific conditions, including competition between suppliers, definable outputs for 
which consumer valuations are derivable, and relatively low transactions costs in 
determining what is being produced. As has been argued above, it is not clear that 
managed health care markets meet these conditions.
As with several of the other issues discussed in this review, there remains relatively 
limited empirical evidence on these issues. In the context of the UK NHS reforms, there 
is some evidence that the introduction of the internal market has brought about 
substantial changes in both purchaser and provider behaviour, many of which can be 
regarded as contributing to  increased transparency (Ham and Heginbotham 1991, Kings
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Fund College 1993, Appleby, Little, Ranade et al. 1992, Ham 1992, Bartlett and Le 
Grand 1994, Ham 1996a, Ham 1996b). On the purchaser side, this includes increased 
efforts to translate concepts of health gain into feasible purchasing strategies, requiring 
information on costs, quality and effectiveness o f services, as well as population needs. 
Provider behaviour has also seen substantial changes as hospitals have had to attach 
prices (and hence costs) to their outputs. Bartlett and Le Grand (1994) argue that these 
changes have been more profound in the case o f hospital providers, with purchasers 
lag g in g  behind. Other data however suggests that transparency of trading remains 
somewhat limited since purchasers continue to have relatively poor access to accurate 
information on costs and patient flows, and that as a consequence, purchasing remains 
relatively unsophisticated (Mills 1995, Walsh 1995).
2.4.1.3. Contracting and decentralisation o f managerial authority
Simple decentralisation o f managerial authority from the centre to the provider level, 
without the introduction o f purchaser-provider contracts, has been a central feature of 
health care reforms in both developed and developing countries over the past few 
decades (Mills 1990c, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996, Kutzin 1995, McPake 1996, 
Walsh 1995, Mills 1995, Bamum and Kutzin 1993, World Bank 1994). The main 
arguments in favour of decentralisation o f  authority are that managers with the 
appropriate levels o f  authority and power will act more efficiently, since they will have a 
better understanding of local needs and local factor costs, and freed of bureaucratic 
restrictions, they w ill be more likely to innovate, and to adapt to local conditions (Smee 
1995). Despite substantial experience with these reforms, Mills (1995) notes that it 
remain unclear w hat conditions and actions are required to ensure success, and points 
out several obstacles to the success of these measures, including government reluctance 
to hand over control, the risk that lines o f authority become blurred, and increased 
informational and administrative requirements. One general lesson which has emerged 
is that decentralisation of specific sets o f powers without substantial changes in the 
power relations between the provider level and the centre tend to be ineffective, with the
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intended provider autonomy often being subverted by the centre (Bennett, Russell and 
Mills 1996, Walsh 1995).
In this context, the introduction o f a formal purchaser-provider split and contractual 
relations can be seen as genuinely shifting a significant level o f authority to providers, 
and thus as providing the basis for increased provider efficiency. Walsh (1995) argues 
that in the UK NHS reforms, the establishment o f full Trust status for hospitals was a 
necessary condition for real decentralisation o f authority, and that without this, the 
reforms would have been ineffective. In reviewing the experience of the UK hospital 
Trusts thus far, Smee (1995) observes that Trusts appear to have made only limited use 
of their increased freedom to set local employment conditions and to manage their 
human resources, although there is evidence of more efficient use of capital resources, 
as well as substantial experimentation and change in management structures, and in the 
range and quality of services offered. Importantly, he also argues that Ministers and the 
NHS Executive have found it difficult to reconcile devolved authority with the demands 
of parliament and the media, and have consequently been drawn into a range of 
operational issues.
In the context of developing countries, the decentralisation of management authority has 
taken the form of the granting o f autonomy to selected public hospitals, sometimes 
accompanied by the introduction o f ‘performance contracts’ between the government 
and the hospitals (Mills 1995, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996, McPake 1996). A study 
from Tunisia suggests some efficiency gains from these measures (World Bank 1993), 
but there remains very limited evidence as to the general impact of these reforms (Mills 
1995). Where contracts are with private providers, as occurs in the UK (Raftery, 
Robinson, Mulligan et al. 1996), the US (Walsh 1995), as well as in many developing 
countries (Green 1987, Gilson, Dave Sen, Mohammed et al. 1994, Hospital Strategy 
Project Consortium 1996a), providers inherently have a much higher degree of 
managerial authority, and it would be useful to compare the performance of these 
providers with those o f publicly owned contractors. The very limited evidence on this 
issue is discussed further in the section on hospital ownership and efficiency below.
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2.43.. Com petition and efficiency
As discussed above, competition, or at least contestability, appears to be a necessary 
condition for the achievement o f efficiency gains through contracting. In fact, 
competition on the provider side of the health care system is more broadly considered to 
be a central feature o f ‘marketisation’ reforms, on which much of the claims of 
increased efficiency are based. In theory, increased competition between providers is 
argued to increase technical efficiency on the supply side, and through that, allocative 
efficiency within the system. Whether or not this can be achieved will depend on two 
distinct questions; firstly, whether it is in fact possible to create and sustain provider 
competition; and secondly, whether such competition actually does enhance provider 
efficiency. These questions are examined in the following sections, with specific 
reference to hospitals, rather than to the PHC component of health care systems.
2.4.2.1. Can marketisation create and sustain hospital competition?
The question o f  whether and how hospital competition can be created and sustained may 
be examined from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. In theoretical terms, 
one approach is to examine the conditions pertaining in the market, and to assess these 
against the theoretical requirements for competition. From an empirical point o f view, it 
is possible to assess the presence and extent o f hospital competition, provided that the 
relevant markets can be satisfactorily defined, and that the necessary data are available.
The theoretical requirements for perfect competition are strenuous, and include the 
presence o f fully informed, utility maximising consumers, numerous profit maximising 
providers, and freedom of entry to, and exit from the market. The evidence suggests 
that, with some exceptions, these are unlikely to be met within most public, or even 
private hospital sectors, nor within health systems more generally (Donaldson and 
Gerard 1993, McGuire, Henderson and Mooney 1988, Bennett 1991). Consumers of 
health care (whether individuals or collective purchasers) seldom possess complete
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information, and face prohibitive search costs in obtaining relevant information. This is 
particularly pertinent in the case o f hospital services, in which the quality o f output is 
very difficult to observe (Propper 1992b). This creates a significant asymmetry of 
information between purchaser and providers, which interferes with the emergence of 
competition (as well as with other aspects of market functioning) in several ways. The 
information advantage may allow hospitals to reduce competition by segmenting the 
market through product differentiation (Light 1992, McLaughlin 1988). As noted above, 
the high level o f uncertainty on the part of purchasers also means that it is in their 
interests to enter into long term fixed relationships with one more providers, further 
undermining competitive pressures.
Competition between hospitals is also limited by constraints on entry to and exit from 
the market. Entry is constrained by high start up costs and sunk costs, as well as 
regulatory barriers, while a range o f non-market, political pressures and concerns with 
continuity o f care and accessibility may prevent hospital closure, even where market 
conditions suggest that this should occur (Culyer 1990, Maynard 1991, Akehurst, 
Brazier and Normand 1988, McPake and Ngalande Banda 1994). These barriers to entry 
and exit might in theory be overcome by the exploitation of existing spare capacity in 
the hospital sector, by the creation o f additional capacity, or by switching other capital 
assets to and from hospital production. In most countries, however, these are only 
theoretical solutions, since hospital systems do not often have significant spare capacity, 
except in some limited areas (Akehurst, Brazier and Normand 1988, Culyer, Maynard 
and Posnett 1990), and the high degree of asset specificity of most hospitals prevents the 
switching o f assets to and from hospital production.
It is also widely accepted that a certain minimum size is required for hospital viability, 
and in addition, hospitals are likely to enjoy geographical monopolies, particularly 
outside densely populated urban areas (McPake and Ngalande Banda 1994, Akehurst, 
Brazier and Normand 1988, Culyer, Maynard and Posnett 1990). All o f these factors 
tend to favour the emergence o f monopoly, or forms of monopolistic or oligopolistic 
competition, rather than perfect competition, between hospitals in most countries 
(Propper 1992b). In attempts to contain costs and to constrain the negative effects of
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monopoly power in the hospital sector, government regulations, including licensing 
requirements and price controls, often further inhibit competition.
It thus seems clear, at least from a theoretical perspective, that conditions approximating 
perfect competition are unlikely to be achieved in the hospital sector in most countries. 
As noted above, it has been argued that it is not so much genuine competition, as 
contestability, that is required in order to achieve efficiency gains. Some economists 
have also argued the need for a distinction between long run competitive equilibrium, 
and a competitive process, in which the market is moving towards a situation of full 
competition- On this view, the competitive process itself will enhance efficiency, 
notwithstanding the persistence o f elements of monopoly (Ferguson and Posnett 1990).
Empirical efforts to assess the presence and extent of hospital competition have largely 
focused on the US market, where several of these studies have demonstrated relatively 
low degrees of concentration, and hence a high degree o f  competition in some hospital 
markets (Noether 1988, Freeh and Woolley 1992, Chirikos 1992, Culyer and Posnett 
1990). Evidence from early phases of implementation o f  the UK reforms is somewhat 
contradictory. Research on the potential for hospital competition suggests that hospitals 
may face a  degree o f competition under market conditions (Robinson, Appleby, Little et 
al. 1993, Appleby, Smith, Ranade et al. 1994, Bartlett and Le Grand 1994), and some 
studies have demonstrated evidence o f emerging competition (Bartlett and Le Grand 
1994, Appleby, Smith, Ranade et al. 1994). However, other authors have described an 
emerging pattern o f  bilateral monopoly, with provision dominated by one local hospital 
supplier (Bartlett and Le Grand 1992), and, as cited above, more recent empirical 
evidence suggests that the UK internal market is characterised more by contestability 
than by actual competition (Ham 1996a, Raftery, Robinson, Mulligan et al. 1996). Early 
evidence from the introduction o f a purchaser-provider split in 15 Russian regions also 
shows that these reforms have failed to create competition between hospitals, except in 
one or two areas (Sheiman 1995).
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2.4.2.2. Does competition between hospitals promote efficiency?
Competition between hospitals is argued to increase technical efficiency in several 
ways. Under competitive conditions, hospitals theoretically face incentives to innovate 
and to adopt lowest cost production methods since only the most efficient among them 
will survive, the others being forced out of the market. As this process continues, 
efficient hospitals should also be able to exploit spare capacity in the system, as well as 
economies o f scope and scale. In addition to these improvements in technical efficiency 
(which is essentially a static concept), competition is also argued to improve dynamic 
efficiency, which refers to the ability of providers to innovate in response to changing 
environments (Culyer 1990, Akehurst, Brazier and Normand 1988, Maynard 1991, 
Shiell 1991).
While it is probable that the behaviour o f hospital providers in a market environment 
will be substantially different from directly managed public hospitals, there are some 
important theoretical reasons to doubt that competition will unambiguously improve 
hospital efficiency. The first of these concerns the complexity of hospitals as 
organisations, and of health care markets, and the resulting uncertainty about hospital 
behaviour within a market environment. A second issue concerns the information 
advantage possessed by hospitals, and their consequent ability to respond to competitive 
pressures in inefficient ways, should this be in their interests. A third, and in this case 
confounding problem, is that a range o f factors including ownership and methods of 
reimbursement may exert independent effects on hospital efficiency, as well as 
influencing the responses of hospitals to the market environment. This section explores 
these various issues.
2.4.2.2.1. Hospital behaviour under market conditions
A review o f the literature suggests that there is currently no consensus on appropriate 
models o f hospital behaviour, and that theoretical work on these issues remains 
underdeveloped. McGuire (1985), and McGuire et al. (1988) attribute this to
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weaknesses in the general theoretical understanding of the economic ‘Arm’ (and, in 
particular, discretionary behaviour of firms), as well as to some specific characteristics 
of hospitals and of hospital markets. The first of these is the diverse nature o f  the ‘agent’ 
under consideration. Hospitals differ so widely in terms of scale, functional definition, 
outputs and ownership structures that is probably not feasible to seek a general theory of 
the hospital as a ‘firm’. A second feature is the dominance of non market linkages 
within the health sector, and the consequently limited role played by prices in resource 
allocation. Examples o f such relationships include the so called ‘agency’ relationship 
between clinicians and patients, and the relationship between hospital managers and 
government in publicly funded health care systems.
These problems have several crucial consequences for attempts to predict hospital 
behaviour. The first is that market roles may be allocated across more than one relevant 
actor within the ‘firm’, explaining the difficulty of identifying the relevant decision 
maker within the hospital. A second consequence is that the boundaries o f  the ‘firm’ 
may not coincide with the legal or organisational entity of the hospital, so that two or 
more ‘firms’ may co-exist within the hospital, or ‘firms’ may extend beyond the 
boundaries o f the hospital, through integration with other actors in the sector. Thirdly, 
there is no consensus on the motivations of decision makers within the hospital ‘firm’ 
(McGuire 1985, McGuire, Henderson and Mooney 1988, Bartlett and Le Grand 1994).
The lack o f  consensus on appropriate models o f hospital behaviour is compounded by 
the narrow focus o f most modelling efforts, which have generally examined only private 
hospitals in the US context, and have yet to address some of the complexities of public 
sector hospitals in both developed and developing countries. As a result, it remains very 
difficult to predict the effects o f marketisation reforms on the performance o f  hospitals 
with any confidence (Bartlett and Le Grand 1994, Le Grand 1991, McGuire, Henderson 
and Mooney 1988, Robinson 1990).
At this stage, there remains very limited empirical evidence on these issues. Some initial 
work on the UK NHS suggests the potential for conflict between clinicians and 
managers in responding to market incentives, confirming the theoretical predictions of
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the co-existence o f  multiple firms' within the hospital. One study of initial experience in 
clinical trading illustrates the difficulties encountered by hospital managers in 
convincing consultants to take on the additional workload implicit in a new contract 
(Robinson 1990, Ranade, Appleby and Middlemas 1989).
2A.2.2.2. Price and non price competition
The complex and heterogeneous nature o f hospital services means that both individual 
and collective purchasers o f hospital care face significant levels of uncertainty in their 
transactions with hospitals, and this lack o f transparency may permit inefficient hospital 
behaviour, where this is in the interests o f the relevant hospital agents. Donaldson and 
Gerard (1993) regard this response as a form of moral hazard. One critical manifestation 
of this problem is the ability o f hospitals to respond to competitive pressures by 
competing, either on the basis of price (as the theory of competition would predict) or on 
the basis of quality (as perceived by patients and/or doctors) - so called ‘non price 
competition’.14
Empirical data from the US strongly suggests that hospitals engage in non price 
competition in competitive markets (Robinson and Luft 1987, Woolley 1990, Chirikos 
1992, Culyer and Posnett 1990, Luft, Robinson, Gamick et al. 1986, Freeh and Woolley 
1992, Noether 1988, Salkever 1978, Joskow 1980, Robinson and Luft 1985). It is 
however important to recognise that this response is contingent on factors such as 
market structure and hospital reimbursement methods (Culyer and Posnett 1990,
14 Freeh and W oolley (1992) describe three major theories o f hospital competition, each o f which posits different 
explanations fo r the  relationship between the degree o f concentration in hospital markets and price and non 
price competitive behaviour. The first, which they term traditional anti-trust theory, holds that increased 
competition in hospital markets is associated with price competition, lower quality-adjusted prices and 
narrowing o f  price-cost margins. The redundant resources theory, attributed to Salkever (1978), argues that 
hospitals view doctors as primary decision makers in the movement o f patients, and as a result, compete on 
quality (non-price) terms to attract doctor-induced referrals. On this view, increased concentration would lead to 
reduced non price competition, and reduced costs (and perhaps quality), but no change in price competition, so 
that prices o f quality  adjusted days and price cost margins would be expected to remain constant with changes 
in concentration. T he  increasing monopoly theory, argued by Stiglitz (1987) regards consumer information and 
search costs as prim ary determinants o f the effects o f competition. On this view, increasing competition is 
associated with h igher search costs (since there are more hospitals), and results in reduced search efforts. This 
reduces price elasticity of demand at the individual hospital level, and allows prices to rise, reducing price 
competition, and allowing wider price-cost margins.
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Noether 1988, Culyer and Posnett 1990). On the demand side of the market, for 
example, low price elasticity of demand for health care (which usually results from 
consumers facing low or zero cash prices), and consumer ignorance predispose to non­
price competition. Similarly, supply side conditions such as the presence of profit 
maximising hospitals, and weak incentives for hospitals to reduce costs (as occurs, for 
example, in a retrospective fee-for-service reimbursement system, or in a system of 
global budgeting with soft budget constraints), will also encourage non-price 
competition.
Where purchasers face harder budget constraints, competitive pressures may however 
generate genuine price competition. This is borne out by some more recent US data, 
which show that price competition does in fact occur in highly competitive markets, 
usually alongside some element o f non price competition (Noether 1988, Chirikos 1992, 
Freeh and Woolley 1992, Robinson 1990, Culyer and Posnett 1990, Robinson and Luft 
1988, Melnick and Zwanziger 1988, Zwanziger and Melnick 1988).
There remains to date very little systematic evidence from other OECD countries on the 
impact o f competition on hospital costs. In the UK, the evidence that does exist indicates 
that early Trust hospitals were a self-selecting group with lower unit costs than non trust 
hospitals across a wide range of outputs (Bartlett and Le Grand 1992, Bartlett and Le 
Grand 1994). There is some evidence, however, that the introduction of GP fundholding 
has resulted in better prices and quality of care than that obtained by DHA purchasers, 
although it is difficult to assess whether this is due to superior purchasing by 
fundholders or to competition between hospitals, or some combination of both (Smee 
1995, Ham 1996b).
While non price competitive responses clearly increase health care costs, their effects on 
quality o f care, and on overall efficiency of resource allocation, are less clear. The 
following section examines the relationship between competition and quality of care.
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2 .4 .2.2 3 . Hospital competition and quality o f  care
The efficiency implications o f non price competitive behaviour is a matter of some 
debate. Pauly (1988) argues that increased costs represent a response to consumers' 
preferences for higher quality o f  care, so that non price competition is in fact consistent 
with efficient resource allocation. McClaughlin (1988), on the other hand, argues that 
non price competition results in prices above long run minimum costs, and in excess 
capacity, thus representing a loss in efficiency. Where hospitals are profit (or quantity) 
maximising, competitive pressures may also create incentives to reduce the costs of 
inputs (through reduction of intensity, quality or both), perhaps at the expense of quality 
of services. An alternative response is to engage in a range of cost-shifting practices 
which may indirectly reduce quality of care while maximising financial margins (or 
volumes) for the hospital. Examples of this latter practice include the problems o f low 
cost patient selection, and premature discharging o f patients from hospital.
The evidence on these issues is once again somewhat ambiguous. There is fairly strong 
evidence from the US that hospitals have responded to competitive (and other cost 
containment) pressures by reducing average length of stay (LOS) (Culyer and Posnett 
1990, DesHamais, Kobrinski and Chesney 1987, Monisey, Sloan and Valvona 1988, 
Sager, Easterling, Kindig el al. 1989). There is also some evidence of decreasing use of 
highly expensive hospital resources, such as intensive and coronary care units 
(DesHamais, Kobrinski and Chesney 1987).
Evidence on the impact of these factors on quality o f care (as measured by patient 
outcomes) is scant and ambiguous. The study demonstrating reduced use of intensive 
care units showed no change in in-patient mortality or re-admission rates (DesHamais, 
Kobrinski and Chesney 1987). However, other studies have demonstrated positive 
correlations between in-patient mortality and intensity o f market competition, as well as 
other aspects o f cost containment (Culyer and Posnett 1990, Shortell and Hughes 1988). 
However, as Culyer et al (1990) note in commenting on this and other data, in-patient 
mortality is an incomplete measure of patient outcome in this instance, since it cannot 
discriminate between changes in  case-mix, severity, changes in length of stay, or
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changes in resource use during in-hospital care. Further research, and in particular, 
evidence on post discharge mortality, is required before conclusions on the relationship 
between competition and quality of care can be assessed.
There is also very limited data on these issues from other parts of the world. Early 
evidence from experimental reforms in IS Russian regions demonstrates lower LOS, 
and a general reduction in the demand for hospital services, but this effect appears to be 
due to the introduction o f purchasing by polyclinics, rather than to the effect of 
competition per se. The authors also note that the impact of these changes on quality are 
unclear, and express some concern that quality may be compromised due to too great a 
reduction in hospital admissions (Sheiman 1995). There is also early evidence from the 
UK (Smee 1995, Walsh 1995) and Sweden (Annel 1995) that hospitals have responded 
to the reforms by becoming more responsive to the needs of users and purchasers, 
resulting in innovative changes in service delivery, which might be argued to  represent 
an improvement in at least one dimension o f quality. It is not possible, though, to 
attribute these effects to competition per se, since they could be due to several other 
features of the reforms, including explicit contracting.
2A.2.2.4. Overview o f effects of competition on hospital efficiency
In summary, the empirical data on the effects of competition on hospital efficiency 
present a mixed, and somewhat ambiguous picture. Most commentators observing the 
overall impact of competition on the efficiency o f the US hospital sector argue that it has 
failed to meet its objectives (Robinson 1990, Evans 1986), although Evans (1986) 
concedes that this may be attributable to the particular conditions pertaining in US 
hospital markets, rather than to competition itself. Another explanation advanced for the 
failure o f competition to enhance overall hospital efficiency is the ability hospitals to 
subvert the competitive process for their own ends. This may occur through several of 
the mechanisms described earlier (cost shifting via biased selection o r discharge 
practices, market segmentation, induced demand for services), and importantly, through 
manipulation of regulatory procedures imposed to manage the competitive environment
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(Light 1992, Stigler 1971). Light (1992) explains the failure of competition on the basis 
of its inability to address a series of embedded inefficiencies in the health sector more 
generally. Pauly (1988), as noted earlier, takes a different view, arguing that competition 
is not intended to reduce overall system costs, but to enhance allocative efficiency 
through increased consumer choice, and to increase technical efficiency of individual 
hospitals.
Despite this mixed evidence, it is probably safe to say that under particular (and fairly 
restrictive) conditions, including a high degree o f  competition, the presence o f budget 
constraints on hospitals and consumers, and the use o f  appropriate reimbursement 
mechanisms, competition may be expected to generate some degree of price 
competition, and consequent efforts to reduce in-hospital resource consumption. These 
conditions should thus increase technical, and hence allocative efficiency to some 
extent, although the possibility of worsening outcomes would undermine this. In the 
absence o f these conditions however, competition is likely to generate non price 
competition, increasing the costs o f production without necessarily enhancing quality of 
care, thus worsening both allocative and technical efficiency.
The interaction o f  market structure and hospital efficiency thus needs to be recognised 
as a  complex one, in which the degree of competition is only one variable, which may 
itself be partly endogenous. Other relevant variables include the management and 
organisational structure o f hospitals and the hospital system, the availability of 
information on hospital output and quality, budget constraints on the demand and supply 
sides o f the market, and hospital reimbursement mechanisms. These conditions are 
likely to vary substantially both within and between countries.
As noted earlier, evaluations o f the relationship between market incentives and hospital 
efficiency may be confounded by the effects o f other important determinants o f hospital 
behaviour. One o f  these, hospital reimbursement mechanisms, has already been 
discussed. Others are discussed in the following section.
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Another important determinant of hospital efficiency is the nature of hospital ownership, 
and linked to this, the managerial motivations associated with different ownership 
structures. Most research on these issues has focussed on comparisons of the efficiency 
of public and private hospitals, and aim to test the hypothesis that privately owned 
hospitals are more efficient than their public sector equivalents. Private hospitals may 
either be for-profit, or not-for-profit (e.g. owned by communities or by non government 
organisations (NGOs)), and consequently, the question o f motivation may be as 
important as ownership per se in determining efficiency. In theory, private providers are 
argued to be more efficient than their public sector counterparts because of their 
increased managerial flexibility, particularly in respect of human resources, and their 
superior management structures and systems. On the other hand, in the context o f a 
contractual environment, it has been argued that contracts with not-for-profit providers 
may be more efficient than those with for-profit providers since not-for-profit 
organisations are more likely to be motivated to ensure good quality of care, are less 
likely to behave opportunistically, and are therefore more suitable to the development of 
the long term, trust based relationships discussed above (Gilson, Adusei, Arhin et al.
1997). A  counter-argument to this is that that profit maximising providers will pay more 
attention to production efficiency than will their not-for-profit counterparts.
Once again, the bulk of evidence on these issues emerges from the US, where studies 
have compared for-profit private hospitals with not-for-profit community owned 
hospitals. In that context, recent reviews suggest that for-profit hospitals tend to have 
higher treatment costs than not-for-profit hospitals, even after adjustment for case-mix, 
size and other potential confounders15, with no systematic differences in quality of care 
(Donaldson and Gerard 1993, Institute of Medicine 1986, Bennett 1991). These results 
therefore contradict the usual assumption that for-profits are more efficient than not-for- 
profits in the US context. There is less evidence on this issue for other OECD countries.
2.43 . H ospital ownership and other determ inants of hospital efficiency
I* This pattern is attributed to the greater provision by for-profit hospitals o f high cost (and high profit) services, 
which is a  predictable response to the incentives o f the fce-for-service reimbursement system used in the US at 
the time o f these studies.
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Some data from the UK does suggest that the private hospital costs are lower than those 
o f  public hospitals in the production o f non acute services (Brazier, Hutton and Jeavons
1990) . There is also evidence that as the internal market emerges, DHAs are making 
increasing use o f private providers, with a recent survey demonstrating that 94% of 
DHAs held contracts with both for-profit and voluntary private providers (Raftery, 
Robinson, Mulligan et al. 1996). There is however no evidence on any differences in 
efficiency between these and NHS providers. Walsh (1995) observes, though, that 
public service contracts with private providers in the UK are terminated more 
frequently than those with public contractors, although there is no  indication as to 
whether this is due to inferior performance by the private contractors, o r to reluctance by 
public purchasers to terminate contracts with public providers.
There is also very limited empirical evidence on these issues in developing countries. 
Some limited studies o f not-for-profit private providers, usually owned and operated by 
church organisations, indicate that cost recovery is better in these than in public 
hospitals, but there is no consistent evidence that they are more efficient than public 
hospitals (Bennett 1991). Other studies comparing the costs of public and private sector 
hospitals and health facilities in developing countries have shown mixed results (Mills 
1990a, Mills 1990b, Berman and Dave 1990, Alailima and Mohideen 1984, Bennett
1991) . Some studies indicate that private hospitals tend to have significantly lower costs 
than public hospitals, while others suggest no significant cost differences. Where cost 
differences do exist, these appear to be attributable mainly to lower staff costs at the 
private hospitals. These observations suggest that while hospital ownership and the 
motivation of hospital managers may exert effects on hospital efficiency, there is no 
consistent evidence as to the direction or extent o f these effects. It is also difficult, given 
current empirical evidence, to separate out the impact of these two factors, and to isolate 
them from the context in which hospitals function.
This concludes the review of the evidence on the first two claims for managed markets. 
A third, and usually implicit argument for these reforms is that their benefits will 
outweigh the costs o f their implementation and maintenance. The sources of these costs 
and their likely magnitude are discussed in the next section.
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2.4.4. The costs of selective contracting and other marketisation reforms
Any benefits o f marketisation reforms must clearly be weighed against their costs, 
including transactions costs, the higher costs that may result from the loss of monopsony 
purchasing power, and the social costs arising from equity problems. Each of these costs 
is briefly explored in the following sections.
2.4.4.1. Transactions costs
As discussed above, there are likely to be substantial transaction costs involved in 
creating and maintaining the contracts which form the basis of a managed market for 
health care services. The extent o f such costs will depend on the numbers of contracts 
that have to  be written, the extent of detail in their specification, and the intensity with 
which implementation is monitored, and will therefore vary between and within 
systems. Early evidence from various OECD countries bears out the expectation of very 
high transactions costs resulting from ‘marketisation’ reforms, including both one-off 
costs of establishing the market, as well as recurring costs of contract re-negotiation and 
management. Reviewing the general experience with these reforms thus far, Saltman 
and von O tter (1996) argue that the costs of transition to contract based health care 
systems have almost universally been significantly higher than expected.
There is also strong evidence o f substantial one-off and recurring transactions costs in 
the UK internal market (Ham 1996b, Mills 199S, Walsh 199S, Appleby, Little, Ranade 
et al. 1992), with a recent estimate by the UK Audit Commission putting the cost of 
commissioning at an average o f 1.3% of total DHA expenditure. Walsh (1995) cites 
interesting data on the costs o f contracting for local government services in the UK, 
which demonstrate that costs to government of contract negotiation amount to 
approximately 7.7% of total contract value, while those for monitoring account for
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6.4%. These data also show that approximately two thirds of these costs are incurred 
repeatedly at each contract round.
While it is thus clear that ‘markedsation’ reforms incur high transactions costs, it is 
important to compare these with the explicit and hidden costs of directly managed 
public systems, rather than to view them as entirely incremental. For example, public 
agencies may face large costs in monitoring staff and output quality, and there may also 
be significant costs involved in bureaucratic administrative mechanisms, and in the 
effects o f political interference (Krashinsky 1986).
2.4.4.2. Loss o f monopsony purchasing power
A second set o f costs may come from the loss of monopsony power resulting from the 
fragmentation o f the single purchasing agency in the traditional public health sector. 
This problem might apply to the purchasing of goods and services throughout the health 
sector, but is most often identified in connection with labour costs (Kings Fund Institute
1989, Robinson 1990). In the case o f the pre reform UK NHS, for example, the 
relatively low wage levels associated with its monopsony position are argued to be one 
o f the major factors behind its relatively low cost, especially when compared with 
systems in which there are multiple employers (Robinson 1990). Evidence from the US 
s u g g e s ts  that hospital wage levels are higher in more competitive environments (Le 
Grand 1991). The current UK reforms are predicted to lead to increases in wage levels, 
and to increasing dispersion of wages, as competing providers bid up wages (Barr, 
Glennerster and Le Grand 1989). Within a cash limited system, the increase in the total 
wage bill is thus predicted to cause a drop in service volumes and/or quality, while wage 
dispersion may aggravate the recruitment and retention problems faced by many 
hospitals (Kings Fund Institute 1989, Robinson 1990). Counter arguments here include 
the fact that wage differentials and higher wages may overcome some of the morale 
problems associated with low wages, and may also increase productivity (Robinson
1990, Kings Fund Institute 1989).
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2.4.4.3. Equity considerations
Some critics of ‘marketisation* reforms argue that they embody a potential conflict 
between efficiency requirements o f  the market environment and equity goals, and may 
act to undermine equity. Examples o f this problem include the loss of 
comprehensiveness of local service provision, and potential loss of consumer choice 
(both of which would also impair efficiency), as inefficient local services are forced to 
close, as economies of scale dictate increasing concentration o f service provision, or as 
hospitals concentrate on more profitable services at the expense o f core services 
(Robinson 1990).
Equity may also be threatened through the practice of provider, or purchaser selection of 
low risk patients (Le Grand 1991, Bartlett and Le Grand 1994). Another threat to equity 
is identified by von Otter and Saltman (1992) as peculiar to the 'mixed market' 
approach, as exemplified by the U K  reforms. In this instance, the participation of private 
sector providers in the market is predicted to force public hospitals to behave more like 
for-profit hospitals, focusing on profitable services and stripping out non profitable but 
essential services. These authors also predict that for-profit hospitals are better equipped 
to survive under market conditions, and that public hospitals will thus be disadvantaged, 
further aggravating equity problems. Commenting on the Swedish reforms, Annel 
(1995) confirms this risk of a threat to the equity of the system due to the potential for 
increasing private sector participation in the health care market. While the theory 
therefore suggests that ‘marketisation’ reforms may have negative effects on equity, 
there is as yet no definitive evidence on this issue from either developed or developing 
countries.
2.4.4.4. Effects on the wider health care system
While comprehensive marketisation reforms are designed to restructure large parts of 
the health care system, selective contracting may be regarded as having minimal impact
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beyond the specific contract itself. However, these contracts may also have a substantial 
impact on the wider health care system. Firstly, introduction of contracted private 
providers may lead to fragmentation or lack of coordination within the broader public 
health system. Secondly, contracting can lead to competition between contractors and 
public providers for staff resources, particularly where supply is already constrained, 
leading to increasing salaries, and to public hospitals being drained of key personnel, or 
to suffer from increased staff turnover (Mills 1995). Thirdly, contracts can lock scarce 
resources into a particular allocation, even when changed circumstances dictate a 
réallocation. Finally, as noted above, competition may distort the behaviour o f  public 
hospitals or other providers. These systemic effects should therefore be taken into 
account when the cost and benefits of selective contracting are being evaluated.
2^ 5. The experience o f ‘marketisation* reforms
This section reviews the available empirical evidence on the overall impact o f selective 
contracting and o f more comprehensive ‘marketisation’ reforms, on both provider and 
system efficiency, as well as on other social objectives. While its main focus is 
obviously on these reforms in the health sector context, there has been more extensive 
experience with public sector contracting for various other public services, and these 
experiences are briefly reviewed as well.
Selective contracting for public services, including both health and other services, has 
been utilised by many developed countries over the past decade or more. Experience of 
this form o f public service delivery is probably most developed in the US and the UK, 
although it is increasingly applied in many other countries including Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand (Walsh 1995). The evidence on the impact of 
this approach to public service delivery is somewhat ambiguous, with different 
commentators having different views o f  what constitute the relevant costs and benefits 
o f these measures. In general, selective contracting appears to have realised often 
substantial savings in direct service costs, particularly for services which rely on 
relatively simple, repetitive tasks (Walsh 1995), although some data from the US
-67-
indicate that the Federal government has also been able to achieve substantial savings by 
contracting out the delivery of more complex clinical services to for-profit providers 
(Kutzin 1995).
The evidence emerging from the UK experience o f  contracting of ancillary hospital 
services during the 1980s also suggests that fairly substantial savings were achieved. 
Domberger et al. (1987) report reductions in service costs of 34% for contracted out 
services relative to savings of 22% when an in-house provider was awarded the bid. A 
1986 study by the UK National Audit Office suggests savings equivalent to 20% of 
service costs before competition (Walsh 1995). Walsh (1995) however argues that these 
data should be treated with caution given the limited data available, the lack of 
systematic evaluations, and the evidence that savings tend to be reduced or eliminated in 
subsequent contracting rounds.
The ambiguity in these cost data also emerges from the fact that cost savings were 
derived mainly from some combination of reducing the number of employees used to 
produce the service, as well as reductions in wages and other benefits (Kettle 1993). If a 
broad view of social costs is assumed, as several authors contend should be the case 
(Key 1988, Kettle 1993, Saltman and von Otter 1996), it is arguable that any financial 
savings on direct service costs are undermined by the broader social costs incurred 
through lower wages and benefits, as well as additional costs to government, such as 
higher unemployment insurance payouts (Key 1988, Kettle 1993). There is also very 
limited data on which to judge these experiences in terms of other measures of 
efficiency, such as effectiveness and quality o f services. Walsh (1995) argues that 
evidence on effectiveness is mixed, with some evidence of failed contracts and some of 
significant improvements in service delivery. In terms o f quality, he argues that there is 
definite evidence of improved quality in services involving simple, repetitive tasks (e.g. 
waste collection), but that there remains insufficient evidence to evaluate the quality o f 
more complex services subjected to selective contracting.
The data on the overall impact of the more extensive and recent health sector reforms is 
also ambiguous, but some common themes are emerging. There is suggestive evidence
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that some of the reforms are generating short term gains in micro-efficiencies (Saltman 
1995). This is illustrated by the apparent success of GP fundholding in the UK, which 
has been able to obtain better prices and quality o f care for patients than the DHAs are 
able to achieve, and by the greater responsiveness of Trust hospitals to the needs of the 
market (Smee 1995).16 As noted above, the UK reforms have also resulted in an 
increased focus on patient needs and outcomes in resource allocation decisions, and 
have led to the rationalisation of services in London (Ham 1996a, Ham 1996b). There is 
however no systematic evidence, thus far, that these reforms have effectively improved 
the responsiveness o f services to patients, and the prevalence o f ‘block contracts’ has 
meant only marginal changes in the extent of patient choice (Ham 1996b). Early 
evidence from the Swedish reforms suggests that hospitals have become more 
productive and responsive to patients, that queues have been eliminated, and that patient 
choice and accessibility have improved in some areas of the country (Annel 1995, 
Diderichsen 1995).
Notwithstanding this evidence o f some short term gains, most commentators argue that 
it remains too early to make definitive judgements on the long term success or failure of 
these efforts, and that in some cases, definitive judgements may be very difficult to 
make due to the speed of implementation o f the reforms, and the difficulty o f isolating 
the individual impacts of the multiple measures which have been implemented in recent 
years (Saltman and von Otter 1996, Saltman 1995, Smee 1995, Annel 1995, Roberts 
1993, Ham 1996b). There is also evidence o f a number o f problems associated with 
these reforms: the problem of high transactions costs has been discussed above, and it 
remains unclear whether the long term efficiency gains from these reforms will in fact 
justify these increased transactions costs. As also mentioned above, there are concerns 
from some countries about the negative equity effects of these reforms, as well as about 
their broader intersectoral and social impacts (Diderichsen 1995, Saltman and von Otter 
1996, deRoo 1995).
16 As noted above, however, it remains unclear whether the introduction o f  Hospital Trusts has systematically 
improved either hospital or system efficiency.
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A number of problems have also been encountered in the implementation of these 
reforms, including political and technical difficulties, and problems emerging from 
conflicting objectives (e.g. efficiency versus equity) and/or from conflicting policy 
instruments (e.g. allowing patients to choose providers versus requiring patients to 
attend providers contracted by public purchasers) (Saltman and von Otter 1996).
In developing countries, experience has thus far been limited to selective contracting for 
a range o f non-clinical and clinical services, although as noted in the introduction, 
countries such as Colombia (Gonzales-Sedano 1995), Mexico (Mills, Hongoro and 
Broomberg 1997), Chile (Jiminez 1993), Thailand (Mills 1995), South Africa 
(Department of Health, Republic of South Africa 1996) and Zambia (Bennett, Russell 
and Mills 1996) are presently considering or have implemented more comprehensive 
‘marketisation’ reforms. There is thus far greater experience with selective contracting 
for non-clinical than for clinical services, as demonstrated in Table 2.1, which shows 
that many countries contract out a wide variety of non-clinical, ancillary services.
Empirical evidence on these arrangements is extremely limited and unsystematic, and is 
also fairly mixed. In some cases, contracting appears to have resulted in efficiency 
gains: a  catering contract in Bombay, for example, appeared to result in some savings 
(Bhatia 1997), while an hospital cleaning contract in Thailand resulted in lower costs 
than had the service been provided in-house (Tangcharoensathien, Nittayaramphong and 
Khungsawatt 1997). There is also evidence from a public hospital in Tunisia which 
appears to have obtained contracted out food, cleaning and security services of higher 
quality for comparable or lower cost than the in-house alternative (World Bank 1993).
In some o f  these contracts, and in others, however, problems have arisen which could be 
argued to undermine the cost savings from contracting out. In the Thailand situation, for 
example, contracting out led to a loss of control by hospital staff over the performance 
of the relevant functions, and over the specific duties carried out by the staff concerned 
(Tangcharoensathien, Nittayaramphong and Khungsawatt 1997, World Bank 1994). A 
survey o f  contracting out of non-clinical services in South Africa demonstrated that 
extensive use is made o f outside contractors for a range of functions, but that no
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comparisons had been made with the costs of in-house provision, nor had any 
systematic evaluations o f contractor performance been undertaken. Some of these 
contracts also presented problems of poor performance (especially in contracts for 
security services), as well as loss of flexibility and control by hospital staff (Hospital 
Strategy Project Consortium 1996a).
Table 2.1; Selective contracting arrangements in developing countries
Type o f  
contract
Service contracted for Country
Non Clinical 
Services
Laundry India, Malaysia. South Africa, Sri Lanka, Indonesia. 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Thailand
Cleaning Thailand, Jamaica, South Africa, Mexico
Security Lesotho, South Africa, Malaysia, Sri Lanka
Billing functions Zimbabwe, South Africa
Catering services India, Lesotho, Malaysia, South Africa, Mexico, 
Catering
Equipment maintenance South Africa, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Mexico, 
Uganda
Patient transport South Africa
Distribution o f  pharmaceutical 
supplies
South Africa
Gardening services South Africa
Waste removal services South Africa
Clinical
services
Acute hospital care (explicit 
contracts)
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Papua New Guinea, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Philippines1?
Acute hospital care (implicit 
contracts with church or other 
NGO providers)
Ghana, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Nepal, Rwanda, 
Swaziland, South Africa
Long term hospital care South Africa (TB and chronic psychiatric care)
Ambulatory care South Africa, Namibia
Diagnostic services Thailand (CT, ESWL, MRI)1»; Malaysia (CT. Xray, 
Radiation therapy)
Laboratory services Nigeria, South Africa
Public health services India (vector control)
Hospital management contracts China, Bolivia, South Africa
Blood product supply South Africa
Supply o f  nursing personnel South Africa
Modified from: Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996. Additional sources: Mills I99S, Kutzin 1995, Hospital 
Strategy Project Consortium 1996a.
•?  In the  Philippines and Thailand, the contracts are held by the social insurance system.
i l  CT: Computerised tomographic scanning; ESWL: Lithotripsy; MR1: magnetic resonance imaging
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While experience with contracting for clinical services is less extensive, there is 
nevertheless fairly wide experience of contracts for a range of different clinical services 
in many developing countries, as also shown in Table 2.1. South Africa has particularly 
extensive experience in this regard, having had a long history of contracting out to both 
for-profit and not-for-profit providers of hospital services for several decades, as well as 
for a  broad range of other clinical service contracts. In total, clinical contracts held by 
the various South African government authorities accounted for 9.4% of total hospital 
expenditure in 1995 (Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996a). As shown in the 
table, contracts for provision o f hospital services take a variety of forms. In South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and Papua New Guinea, there are explicit contracts, although in the 
latter two countries, only single hospitals are covered in each contract. In South Africa, 
on the other hand, a large number of contracts, covering both acute and long term 
hospital care are held with a single for-profit provider, details of which were given in 
Chapter 1.
Several countries also operate implicit contracts with a range of private, usually not-for- 
profit providers. As noted above, these are usually with hospitals run by church 
organisations, although as described in Chapter 1, the South African government 
authorities have similar arrangements with a charitable organisation which runs TB 
hospitals, as well as with numerous autonomous not-for-profit acute care hospitals 
(Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996a). As Mills (1995) points out, these 
contracts are ‘implicit’ in the sense that there is no obvious competition in the award of 
the contracts, and governments have not historically specified contract terms or 
monitored performance. Tanzania is an exception here, since the government has 
explicit contracts in place with the various church organisations which provide services 
(Gilson, Adusei, Arhin et al. 1997, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996).
Again despite this fairly extensive experience, there remains very little systematic data 
on the impact of these various clinical contracts. A study of a contract between a DHA 
and a mine hospital in Zimbabwe indicated that the government was able to obtain 
services o f the same quality at a lower cost than the equivalent costs in a public hospital. 
However, the contract was also noted to be unable to control utilisation and hence total
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cost, and was found to account for almost 70% of non-staff recurrent expenditure in the 
district, despite the fact that only a small minority of the district population utilised the 
hospital. This led the authors to query whether the contract could in fact be regarded as 
successful at all (McPake and Hongoro 1993). A recent comparison o f contracted and 
public sector TB hospital services in South Africa found that costs were lower, and 
quality o f care higher, at the contractor compared to the public hospital, although here 
again the authors identified a  number o f important systemic inefficiencies resulting from 
the contract, including lack o f coordination between the contractor hospital and other 
public services (van Zyl et al. 1996). A series o f  case studies comparing the 
performance of ‘contracted' church hospitals with public sector hospitals in Ghana, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe did not identify any systematic differences in performance or 
cost, except in the case o f  Zimbabwe, where the church hospitals were noted to have 
lower unit costs. These studies noted, though, that the church hospitals were 
characterised by more highly motivated managerial staff, and enjoyed substantially 
greater autonomy than the public hospitals, suggesting potential for greater efficiency. 
One serious problem identified by the study was the fragmentation and lack of 
coordination in district health services resulting from the dual lines o f accountability 
when church owned hospitals are introduced into the public health system (Gilson, 
Adusei, Arhin et al. 1997).
A case study from Mexico, in which a state owned company contracted with private 
providers, showed that the average cost per beneficiary was 15% higher than the costs of 
direct provision, a result that was attributed to the use o f  a fee-for-service reimbursement 
mechanism. By contrast, a  capitation based PHC contract for workers covered by the 
social health insurance system in Mexico demonstrated efficiency gains (Domberger, 
Meadowcroft and Thompson 1987).
Analysis o f the sources o f efficiency or inefficiency in these various contracts highlights 
some important trends. Where cost savings were shown, they were in most cases due to 
some combination o f lower wages, lower staffing levels, and tighter management o f 
supplies (Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson 1987). These studies have also 
identified a number o f problems in the design, management and implementation of
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contracts, which may explain their failure to generate meaningful efficiency gains in 
several cases. Firstly, many o f the contracts appear to have arisen in an ad hoc way, with 
little explicit justification or evaluation o f their likely costs and benefits, and were often 
very vaguely specified (Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996, Hospital Strategy Project 
Consortium 1996a, Gilson, Adusei, Arhin et al. 1997, Kutzin 1995). This explains the 
fact that contracting in a developing country environment has generally failed to live up 
to one o f its objectives, that o f  clarification of organisational objectives and increased 
transparency o f  resource allocation through an explicit trading relationship between 
purchasers and providers (Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996). Many contracts also 
resulted in a shift of most o f the contractual risk to the government, thus unduly 
favouring the contractors, for example through minimal specification of contractor 
performance (especially in clinical contracts) and/or of sanctions for poor performance, 
through use o f  payment methods in which the purchaser bears all the risk, or through 
long contract terms. Specific examples of these problems were identified in South 
Africa (Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996a) and in Thailand (Bennett, Russell 
and Mills 1996), and are attributed, at least in part, to poor government negotiating 
capacity. Similar problems were also noted in the contracts or agreements between 
governments and church hospitals in the study by Gilson et al. (1997) cited above, as 
well as in several of the case-studies reviewed by Mills (1987).
Bennett et al. (1996) also argue that there is little evidence that contracting in 
developing countries has met the objective of encouraging provider competition, 
although, as noted above, there has been little explicit effort to encourage competition in 
most cases. In a review o f several case studies of non-clinical and clinical contracts, 
Mills (1987) found that the majority o f non-clinical contracts were in fact awarded on a 
competitive basis, while the majority o f the clinical contracts were awarded through 
direct negotiation. The South African survey cited above found very similar results, and 
in that case, the authors note that directly negotiated contracts appear to more strongly 
favour the contractor, again suggesting that contractors are often stronger negotiators 
than governments (Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996a). There is also the risk, 
noted by McPake and Hongoro (1993) that, without competition, governments can 
become dependent on powerful monopolistic contractors.
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Experience in some countries suggests that contracting also has mixed success in 
overcoming bureaucratic restrictions, despite the fact that this is argued as one o f its key 
objectives. While evidence from Lesotho, Thailand and South Africa suggest that 
contracting has assisted governments or individual hospitals to overcome public service 
restrictions, other experiences in South Africa, Thailand, Ghana, Zimbabwe and 
Tanzania suggest that the public procurement process itself can become highly 
bureaucratic, undermining the potential efficiency o f contracted providers 
(Tangcharoensathien, Nittayaramphong and Khungsawatt 1997, Hospital Strategy 
Project Consortium 1996a, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996, Gilson, Adusei, Arhin et 
al. 1997). Finally, there is fairly extensive evidence o f very weak government capacity 
to monitor the performance o f both for-profit and not-for-profit contractors (Mills 1995, 
Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996, Gilson, Adusei, Arhin et al. 1997, Domberger, 
Meadowcroft and Thompson 1987).
Taken together, these observations suggest that despite the fairly extensive experience 
with selective contracting and other marketisation reforms in both developed and 
developing countries, systematic evaluation and evidence on their impact remains very 
limited. The data which does exist shows mixed results; there is fairly broad evidence of 
short-term gains in micro-efficiency, including cost savings and quality improvements, 
although several studies, particularly in developing countries, have also highlighted 
short term efficiency losses. It is also generally regarded as too early to judge the long 
term effects o f these arrangements, although there are serious concerns as whether their 
high transactions and other social costs will reduce or even eliminate overall efficiency 
gains from these reforms. Finally, there is evidence that the potential efficiency gains 
from contracting may be undermined by the absence o f critical environmental 
conditions, such as government contracting capacity, and competition or contestability, 
among others.
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2.6. Conclusions and research questions
This review has identified a number of important conclusions and unanswered questions 
in relation to the implementation of selective contracting or more comprehensive 
‘marketisation’ reforms in the context o f developing countries. Perhaps the most 
important conclusion is that there remains relatively limited and contradictory evidence 
on the impact of these reforms on efficiency and equity at the institutional and/or at the 
health system level. This is true for both developed and developing countries, and 
highlights the need for extensive additional research on the effects of the various 
reforms now being implemented in various countries.
This review has also shown that many of the theoretical claims on which basis 
‘marketisation’ reforms are argued to improve efficiency themselves remain ambiguous. 
This ambiguity is important since it leads to uncertainty as to the determinants of 
efficiency gains through ‘marketisation’, and hence, as to the set of conditions that are 
necessary for achieving efficiency gains through these reforms.
This is illustrated, firstly, by the set of issues concerning the relationship between the 
nature o f the contract, the contracting process, and efficiency. This review has 
highlighted several aspects of the design of contracts which may impact on contractor 
behaviour and hence efficiency, but the relative importance o f each of these aspects, 
their interrelationships, and their individual and combined impacts on efficiency merit 
further investigation. For example, while the literature does indicate the general 
direction o f  the trade-offs between detailed specification o f contracts, balanced 
distribution o f contractual risk and transactions costs, there remains limited evidence on 
die specific relationships between these various factors and efficiency in various 
contractual situations. Regarding the relationship between the contracting process and 
efficiency, the relative merits o f awarding contracts competitively or through direct 
negotiation remain unclear, as do other issues such as the optimal number of bidders for 
a contract, and the trade-offs between securing adequate numbers of bidders and 
ensuring an efficient distribution o f risk between the contractor and the purchaser.
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Closely related to these issues of contract design and process are questions relating to 
government capacity to act as a competent purchaser of health services. This review has 
indicated that efficiency gains from contracting appear to be contingent on government 
capacity to act as an efficient purchaser, and more specifically, to make the appropriate 
decisions as to whether and when to let contracts, to design efficient contracts, and to 
effectively monitor contractor compliance. Conversely, lack o f this capacity may lead to 
inefficiency through exploitation by contractors, through distorted resource allocation 
(Bennett 1991, Mills 199S), or through uncontrolled expansion of the private sector, 
creating further problems of fragmentation and inequity (Saltman 1991).
Some analysts have pointed out a generic set of skills and resources that governments 
require in this context, including skills in planning, economic analysis, and contract 
design and negotiation, as well as suitable information systems (Bennett, Russell and 
Mills 1996, Kutzin 1995), and sophisticated government regulatory capacity to carry out 
such functions as licensing and accreditation (Saltman and von Otter 1996). Not 
surprisingly, current evidence suggests that most developing country governments lack 
all or most of these capacity requirements (Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996, Mills 
1995). However, there is as yet limited evidence on the relative importance of these 
various aspects o f government contracting capacity, nor on their specific impacts on 
contractual efficiency. It is thus difficult, without further research, to identify accurately 
those situations in which governments are likely to achieve efficiency gains, or in which 
these reforms should be avoided until specific aspects of contractual capacity have been 
strengthened.
A second critical area o f ambiguity concerns the relationship between competition and 
contractual efficiency. The theoretical arguments reviewed here suggest that at least 
some degree of contestability for contracts, or preferably, actual competition, is required 
to ensure efficiency gains from contract based provision. There is also some empirical 
evidence that where competition or contestability is absent, efficiency may be 
undermined through contracts biased towards contractors, through exploitation by for- 
profit contractors, or through governments becoming dependent on a single 
monopolistic contractor.
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The limited evidence available on these issues suggests that the conditions necessary for 
competition, and even for contestability, are generally absent from most areas of most 
low and middle income countries (Mills 1995, McPake and Ngalande Banda 1994, 
Chemichovsky 1995, Saltman 1995). However, there remains scant information on the 
actual extent o f competition or contestability in most countries, an issue that is made 
more complex by geographic variations in levels of competition, as well as by the fact 
that both local and international providers may compete for contracts. Similarly, there 
are still few data on the precise relationships between competition or contestability and 
contractual efficiency, so that is not possible to predict the likely success of 
‘marketisation’ reforms under various competitive conditions. For example, there is 
limited evidence on what number of actual or potential competitors would constitute 
adequate levels of competition, on whether competitors should be local as opposed to 
international, and on whether competitive requirements differ in contracts for different 
types of services (e.g. PHC versus hospital services).
This review has also suggested that the success of ‘marketisation’ reforms may be 
contingent on a number of features of the broader social, political and economic 
environment. Important factors here appear to include a general political and social 
environment in which corruption is discouraged, in which contractors share a 
commitment to public responsibility and contractual compliance, and in which there is 
effective legal system to ensure that sanctions for non-compliance pose a meaningful 
threat. Where such conditions are absent, there is the risk that contracts may be 
inappropriately awarded, and that contractors may exploit contracts, thus undermining 
efficiency (Schieber 1995, Saltman 1995, Bennett, Russell and Mills 1996). There is 
also evidence that under conditions of inadequate financial resources, contracting may 
not lead to efficiency gains. For example, financially constrained governments may only 
wish to let short-term contracts, which may be unattractive to potential bidders. Contract 
prices may also be set too low, leading to poor quality o f services (Mills 1995, Gilson, 
Adusei, Arhin et al. 1997); and contracts may lock public resources into a specific use, 
limiting the flexibility which governments have to reallocate such resources (McPake 
and Hongoro 1993, Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson 1987). Once again,
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however, there remains quite limited empirical evidence on the extent to which these 
various conditions, alone or combined, are necessary for the achievement of efficiency 
gains from contracting or other ‘marketisation’ reforms, and further research will be 
required before it is possible to predict the likely success or failure of such reforms 
under various environmental conditions.
This review has also examined the impact of the ownership structure of the contractor, 
and the associated motivations and managerial structures and systems, on efficiency. As 
indicated above, there remains limited and ambiguous evidence on the relative merits of 
for-profit and not-for-profit contractors in a contractual environment, as well as on the 
determinants of efficient behaviour on the part of these two types of contractor. It is also 
not possible, given available evidence, to separate the effects of ownership structure 
from the various other determinants of contractual efficiency outlined here.
The fifth and final area o f  ambiguity identified by this review concerns the impact of the 
relationship between public purchasers and contracted providers on provider efficiency. 
More specifically, it is not yet clear whether contracting leads to transparency in the 
contractual relationship, or to decentralisation of management authority, nor is it clear to 
what extent these consequences of contracting contribute to efficiency gains. As 
discussed above, the potential advantages o f a greater awareness of needs, prices, quality 
and quantities in resource allocation are dependent on the availability o f  detailed 
information, and on the administrative capacity to use this information. The evidence, 
cited above, on poor government administrative capacity in many developing countries 
suggests that contracting or other forms of marketisation may not necessarily produce 
the degree of 'transparency of trade' claimed by proponents of these reforms. Similarly, 
while contracting will clearly encourage some degree of managerial decentralisation 
relative to direct public management, the general lack of managerial expertise in 
developing countries may prevent effective decentralisation amongst the majority of 
providers, even where this is formally introduced. In developed countries and in some 
middle income developing countries, however, contracting may produce these desired 
consequences.
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Together these observations suggest that there remains much uncertainty as to the 
overall impact of 4marketisation’ reforms on efficiency and equity, as well as to the 
determinants of efficiency and the necessary conditions for ensuring efficiency gains 
when such reforms are implemented. It is thus clear that the overall role and future of 
‘marketisation' reforms in the health sectors of developed and developing countries, and 
the relative importance o f  these as opposed to more traditional public sector reforms, 
cannot be regarded as settled issues at this stage. In addition, it remains difficult to 
predict with confidence those countries or areas within countries, or those components 
of the health system, in  which ‘marketisation’ reforms are more or less likely to generate 
meaningful efficiency gains. Instead, more experience and extensive further research, 
along the lines outlined in this section, is still required in order to provide answers to 
these and related questions.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the methodological approaches used to address the objectives of 
this study, as outlined in Chapter 1. Table 3.1 summarises these objectives together with 
the analytic methods used to address each one. The chapter begins by describing the 
methodology used in the assessment o f hospital utilisation statistics and the general cost 
analysis, followed by tracer cost analysis and DEA. This is followed by the various 
components of the evaluation o f quality of care, and then by the assessment of the 
various determinants o f  efficiency studied here. In each section, the methods used and 
methodological problems encountered are outlined, and where required, further details 
are provided in the appendices.
Table 3.1: Research objectives and analytic methods
Research objectives Analytic method used
Compare production efficiency at contractor 
and directly managed public hospitals
compare utilisation statistics Analysis o f hospital utilisation statistics 
Pabon Lasso analysis
compare production costs Step down unit cost analysis 
Tracer cost analysis
compare quality of care Evaluation o f structural aspects of quality of 
care
Objective and subjective evaluation o f the 
quality o f nursing care
Evaluation o f quality o f  clinical record keeping 
Evaluation o f outcomes o f care in tracer 
conditions
Evaluation o f avoidable factors in cases of peri­
natal and maternal mortality
Compare overall efficiency of contracted out 
versus directly managed public hospitals
Incorporation o f total contract costs into step 
down unit cost analysis and tracer cost analysis
Assess impact of various determinants of 
efficiency
contracts and the contracting process Analysis o f contracts, interviews
competition Interviews
ownership structures Interviews
transparency in the contractual relationship, and 
extent o f  decentralisation o f  authority
Interviews
management structures and systems Interviews
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The primary objective of the cost analysis was to obtain the unit costs o f a uniform 
range o f hospital outputs, thus allowing assessment of the relative costs o f producing 
these outputs at the study hospitals. Further objectives included assessment of the 
distribution o f total costs between different cost centres, and across a defined range of 
inputs, as well as evaluation of the relationships between recurrent and capital costs, and 
between fixed and variable costs19, thus allowing assessments o f the relative efficiency 
o f resource use, and explanations of unit cost differentials. In addition to the assessment 
o f these costs, this analysis also aimed to compare the total costs incurred by the 
government in the contracting out of hospital services with those incurred in production 
o f public sector hospital services. This comprehensive approach necessitated calculation 
o f the full financial costs to the health services, including recurrent and capital costs, 
involved in the production of the various outputs listed here. Costs to users, and other 
costs external to the health sector, were omitted from the analysis.20 All cost and other 
data were obtained for a one year period. In all public and private hospitals, this was for 
the 1992/93 financial year. In the case o f  the Lifecare hospitals, data were obtained for 
the 1991/92 financial year and inflated for comparability with the other hospitals.21
Cost analysis was carried out using a 'step  down’ cost accounting approach (Bamum 
and Kutzin 1993b, Cowing etal. 1983, M ills 1990b, Robertson 1985, Creese and Parker 
1990). This involved the following steps, each of which is discussed in more detail 
below:
1. Identification o f hospital cost centres
2. Identification and adjustment of all expenditures incurred in production of hospital 
outputs
3.1. Cost analysis and assessment o f hospital utilisation statistics
Fixed costs are defined here as all costs which d o  not vary with the quantity o f  outputs o f the hospital over a 
one year period. These would therefore include all capital costs, as well as staff costs and other overhead costs. 
Variable costs are defined as those costs which vary  with the quantity o f outputs, and would include medicines, 
disposables etc.
20 a h  costs incurred in the direct production o f  public sector health services, but which are home by 
governm ent agencies outside o f  the health s ec to r were included.
21 Although the study was planned to include da ta  from the 1992/93 year for all hospitals. Lifecare agreed to 
provide access to data only from the 1991/92 y ear for its three hospitals.
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3. Allocation of line item expenditures as direct costs to intermediate and final cost 
centres
4. Allocation of costs of intermediate cost centres as indirect costs to other intermediate 
cost centres, and to final cost centres
3. Calculation of unit costs and other cost relationships.
3.1.1. Identification o f hospital cost centres
Each hospital was divided into intermediate administrative, intermediate service and 
final cost centres based on interviews with administrative staff and analysis o f the 
organisational structure of the hospital. Intermediate administrative centres were defined 
as those which provided administrative services to other cost centres; intermediate 
service centres were defined as those providing services to patients, but whose costs 
could be further allocated to final cost centres, while final cost centres were defined as 
those which provide services only to patients and not to other cost centres. In those 
hospitals which undertake nursing training, and/or in which community services are 
supported by the hospital, both o f these activities were also identified as final cost 
centres. Table 3.2 provides an example of the cost centre structure of a public hospital. 
Table A l.l ,  Appendix 1 shows the actual cost centre structure of each hospital, and 
illustrates the variability in actual organisational structure between the study hospitals.
Table 3.2; Organisation of typical public hospital into cost centres
Interm ediate Administrative Cost 
C e n tra
Interm ediate Service C ost C en tra Final Cost C e n t r a
Administration
Stores
Maintenance and housekeeping
Catering
Transport
Laundry
Nursing administration and housing
Laboratory
Pharmacy
Radiology Department 
Rehabilitation Unit 
Operating theatres 
Mortuary
Outpatients Department 
Wards:
•  Female medical
•  Male medical
•  Female surgical
•  Male surgical 
a  Isolation
•  Tuberculosis
•  Psychiatry 
a  Maternity 
a  Paediatrics
Nurse Training Department 
Community Services
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3.1.2. Identification and adjustment of expenditures
Expenditure reports for each hospital for the study year were obtained from the relevant 
authorities.22 These were adjusted to include all expenditures incurred in the production 
of hospital services, but not reflected on the expenditure reports, as well as to exclude 
any expenditures reflected in the reports, but not regarded as being utilised for 
production of hospital outputs. Examples of additional expenditure items not reflected in 
the expenditure reports included capital expenditures and services provided to the 
hospitals by other government departments or by the head offices (HO) of the private 
and contractor hospitals. The cost items excluded despite their appearance in the 
expenditure reports were some capital items (since a 'replacement cost’ approach was 
adopted for estimation o f  capital costs23), as well as items not regarded as representing 
true production costs (e.g. bad debts, discounts allowed and similar items found in the 
expenditure reports o f the private hospitals). Full details o f  the adjustment to the 
expenditure reports for each hospital are given in Table A1.2, Appendix 1, which also 
shows the sources o f any additional expenditure data included in the analysis. In the case 
of the contractor hospitals, the use of 1991/92 expenditure data necessitated adjustment 
to 1992/93 prices. This adjustment was carried out using a  specific factor for each 
hospital, based on the actual inflation in production costs experienced by each hospital 
between 1991/92 and 1992/93.24
22 Sources o f  expenditure reports were as follows: Lifecare Head O ffice  (HO) for the three Lifecare 
hospitals. In the case o f  Shiluvana and Hewu, additional data on staff co sts  and other expenditures were 
obtained from the G azankulu and Cislcei Departments o f  Health (DoH) respectively; Gaziuikulu DoH for 
Tintsw alo and Letaba; Cislcei DoH for Bisho; HospiPlan HO for P ietersburg and Nelspruit; Afrox HO for 
St Dominies.
23 This approach involves an estimate o f the current cost o f replacing all capital items in the hospital, and is 
described in more detail below. This approach means that inclusion o f specific capital items from the current 
expenditure data would represent double counting.
24 D a i  on which these factors was based were obtained from Lifecare HO. T he  factors used were as follows: 
Matikwana: 15%; Hewu: 15% ; Shiluvana: 17% These compare with the change in the Consumer Price Index 
o f  13% over the same period (Central Statistical Services 1994).
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3.1.2.1. Estimation o f capital costs
Capital items were defined as all items having a lifespan o f at least one year and a 
current replacement cost of at least R500. The costs of all capital items were estimated 
using a  ‘replacement cost’ approach, in which the annuitised values of the current 
replacement costs o f all buildings and equipment were estimated. This approach was 
adopted in preference to the more conventional 'accounting’ approach in which historic 
purchase costs are used as the basis of valuation, since in most cases, there were 
insufficient data to undertake this latter approach. As discussed further below however, 
historic costs were in some cases used as the basis for estimating current replacement 
costs.
3.1.2.1.1. Building costs
Official government estimates (Department Health and Welfare, Republic o f South 
Africa 1985) were used to estimate the current replacement costs of the public hospital 
buildings.25 These replacement cost estimates are given in 1985 prices, and were 
inflated to 1992/93 prices using a locally developed building cost inflation index (Kilian 
and Snyman 1993). The inflated figures were then applied to each of the public hospitals 
and to one of the contractor hospitals which was originally built as a public hospital 
(Hewu), using dimensions obtained from floor plans. This allowed an estimate of the 
current replacement costs for each section o f the hospital, and for the hospital as a 
whole.
In the case of the remaining two contractor hospitals, historic building costs were 
available and these were inflated to 1992/93 prices using the building cost index 
described above, and the estimated total replacement cost was attributed to the various 
functional areas of each hospital using relative weights for each area, which were 
derived from the public sector estimates. A similar approach was adopted for two of the
25 T h ese  estimates w o e  independently reviewed by two experts both o f whom confirmed them as sufficiently 
accurate for use in estimating current replacement costs (Jackson 1994, Abbot 1994).
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private hospitals for which historic building cost data were available (Pietersburg and 
Nelspruit). In the case o f the third private hospital, for which no historic cost data were 
available, the historic costs of the other two private hospitals were used to estimate a 
mean replacement cost for each area, which was then applied to the dimensions o f  the 
hospital. The choice o f  historic costs as the basis for estimating current replacement 
costs in the private hospitals was based on the view that the use of public sector 
estimates would produce biased results due to probable differences in building 
specifications and in control over building costs between the public sector and the 
private hospital companies. Table A1.3, Appendix 1 illustrates the extent and direction 
of the bias for these hospitals, confirming that the use of public sector estimates would 
lead to overestimation o f replacement costs for contractor hospitals, and underestimation 
for private hospitals.
3.1.2.1.2, Equipment costs
Since there were no detailed equipment inventories at any of the study hospitals, it was 
not possible to estimate individual replacement costs. Instead, the current costs o f  re­
equipping each o f the study hospitals were obtained from a specialist hospital equipment 
supply company26, on the basis o f detailed specifications concerning the structure and 
range o f  services delivered by each hospital. The resulting estimates o f equipment 
replacement costs (in 1994 prices) were deflated to 1992/93 prices.27 These data were 
compared with inflated historic cost data for the same two contractor and private 
hospitals for which building costs were available, indicating that the estimates of current 
replacement cost exceeded historic costs by 53% on average for the contractor hospitals 
and 41% on average for the private hospitals (see Table A1.3, Appendix 1).
While these discrepancies suggest that the historic costs should be used where available, 
the absence of specific sources of data for the public hospitals (unlike the case of
26 Med Pro Ply (Ltd), a  hospital turnkey and supply company based in Johannesburg.
27 Deflation was carried out using a factor o f 10% per annum, which has been accepted as standard for the hospital 
equipment industry over the last several years (Gunning 1994).
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building costs) would mean that such an approach would risk biasing the public sector 
estimates to a greater degree than for the other two groups. It was therefore decided to 
apply the current replacement cost estimates to all hospitals, and to adjust these to allow 
for the discrepancies noted here.2* Sensitivity analysis was conducted by applying a 
range o f adjustment factors to these estimates. In the case of vehicles, current 
replacement costs of all vehicles used by each hospital were obtained and deflated to 
1992/93 prices.* 29
3.1.2.1.3. Annuitisation o f capital costs
The annual cost of all capital items was estimated by annuitising the estimated initial 
capital outlay over an assumed useful life o f the asset concerned, thus incorporating both 
depreciation, and the opportunity cost of capital employed. A discount rate of 8% was 
used as the standard rate throughout the cost analysis.30 The useful life o f buildings was 
assumed to be SO years, equipment 10 years, and vehicles S years, and all assets were 
assumed to have no salvage value at the end of their life-spans. Sensitivity analysis was 
carried out to test the effects of changes in the discount rate and in lifespan assumptions 
on final cost estimates.
3.13. Allocation of expenditure items to intermediate and final cost centres
Once all expenditures were identified and adjusted, these were allocated, in a first step, 
to the appropriate intermediate, and/or final cost centres, to give the direct costs of each 
of those centres. In a second step, the costs of all intermediate cost centres were then
2* Since contractor a id  public hospitals are likely to resemble each other more closely in terms o f equipment than 
they would private hospitals, the average discrepancy for contractor hospitals was used to adjust the estimates 
for all public and contractor hospitals, while the equivalent figure for the two private hospitals was used for all 
three private hospitals.
29 Deflation was based on official vehicle price inflation rates (Central Statistical Services, Republic of South 
Africa 1994).
29 This was the discount rate used by the public sector to calculate the costs o f capital during the 1992/93 financial
year (Central Economic Advisory Services, Republic o f South Africa 1994).
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allocated, as indirect costs, to other intermediate cost centres, and to final cost centres. 
Details o f the allocation methods used in each of these steps are now described.
3.1.3.1. Allocation o f recurrent costs
Recurrent costs were attributed to each cost centre on the basis o f information obtained 
from the relevant HOs and hospitals, and where this was not available, on the basis of 
standard assumptions applied uniformly to all hospitals. In the case o f staff costs, time 
use data were used to allocate appropriate proportions of total costs to the relevant cost 
centres. Details of the information used in these allocations is given in Table A 1.4, 
Appendix 1. In all cases, sample estimates of staff costs were adjusted proportionately to 
fit the known total expenditures on staff from the annual expenditure reports. Table 
Al.S, Appendix 1 shows the margins of error encountered in sample estimations of total 
staff costs relative to known totals obtained from expenditure reports, and provides 
some explanations for these errors. Table A 1.6, Appendix 1 describes the information 
and assumptions used to allocate medical and surgical supplies, while Table A 1.7, 
Appendix 1 provides similar information for all other categories of direct recurrent 
costs.
3.1.3.2. Allocation o f capital costs
In the case o f buildings, the annuitised replacement costs per square metre for specific 
areas o f the hospital were allocated to the appropriate cost centre using dimensions 
obtained from floor plans. The annuitised replacement costs o f  equipment for each 
section o f the hospital were allocated to the appropriate section where this could be 
determined. Where equipment replacement costs apply to generic areas, such as wards, 
these were allocated to specific wards in relation to the proportion o f beds accounted for 
by each ward. Annuitised vehicle replacement costs were allocated in full to the 
transport section.
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In the second step of the allocation process, the costs of each intermediate cost centre 
were allocated to other relevant intermediate cost centres, and to final cost centres, using 
appropriate allocation formulae. This approach required that an allocation sequence be 
adopted, with the first intermediate centre being fully allocated, followed by the second, 
and so on until all intermediate cost centres were fully allocated to final cost centres. 
The general principle adopted in designating the sequence was to give priority ranking 
to those intermediate centres which deliver most services to other intermediate centres, 
while receiving relatively few services from others. Where intermediate services are 
involved in servicing each other, this necessitated a subjective judgement as to the 
balance between these. For the purposes o f  uniformity, it was decided to maintain a 
consistent allocation order between all hospitals. While it is clear that the overall choice 
o f allocation sequence can have some impact on the relative costs o f different centres, 
this appears to relate mainly to the prioritisation of those centres which primarily service 
others. Evidence from other studies indicates that the particular ranking of intermediate 
centres which service each other does not have a significant influence on final cost 
estimates (Trisolini et al. 1992). For this reason, sensitivity analysis on the impact of 
different allocation sequences was not carried out.
Allocation formulae were developed from information obtained from hospital statistics 
and from interviews with hospital officials. While the study attempted to attain 
uniformity of approaches between hospitals, the variability in organisational structure 
and functioning between hospitals meant that accurate allocation within each hospital 
necessitated the adoption of unique allocation formulae in some cases. Table A1.8, 
Appendix 1 describes the allocation formulae, and notes where different approaches 
were used in particular hospitals. The order o f intermediate cost centres in the table 
reproduces the allocation sequence adopted (as does Table 3.2). Where a particular 
hospital did not have one of these intermediate centres, allocation proceeded to the next 
cost centre in the sequence.
3.1.4. Allocation of indirect costs to intermediate and final cost centres
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3.1.5. Calculation of unit costs and other cost relationships
The outputs defined for the purposes o f the unit cost calculations were beds, operations, 
outpatient (OPD) visits, in-patient days and admissions, the latter two for the hospital as 
a whole, as well as for four service-mix categories: medical, surgical, paediatric and 
maternity patients.31 Table A1.9, Appendix 1 describes the methods used for collecting 
data on these outputs at each hospital. In addition, composite 'in-patient day equivalent’ 
and 'admission equivalent’ outputs were defined, which aggregated in-patient days and 
OPD visits, and admissions and OPD visits respectively. In both cases, the relative 
weights o f the in-patient and outpatient outputs in the composite measure were 
determined individually for each hospital on the basis of the relative unit costs of the 
respective outputs at that hospital. Table A 1.10, Appendix 1 shows the relative weights 
used for the two composite measures at each hospital.
Unit costs were calculated by dividing total costs for each section by the outputs for that 
section. In order to allow for standard comparisons between all hospitals, the costs and 
outputs o f particular cost centres had to be aggregated in some cases. These 
aggregations are described in Table A l.l 1, Appendix 1.
In order to assess, and correct for, the effects of service-mix, the unit cost estimates were 
standardised using an indirect standardisation approach, in which all hospitals were 
assumed to have the same service-mix profile as an hypothetical hospital. This 
hypothetical profile was calculated by taking the mean service-mix of all nine hospitals,
31 These various terms were defined as follows:
Beds: the actual number o f beds in active use at the hospital during the study y ea r.
Operation: surgical procedures carried out in the operating theatres. Minor procedures carried out in the 
casualty departments were excluded from the definition o f  operations.
OPD visit: a  visit by a  patient to the OPD, irrespective o f  the number o f  proccdurcs/treatmcnts carried out 
during the v is it
In-patient day: each twenty four hour period that the patient was treated as an in-patient in the hospital. 
Admission: an episode o f in-patient treatment beginning with initial admission to the hospital, and ending with 
discharge.
Service-mix: the distribution o f cases treated as in-patients in the hospital between the four standard service 
categories - medical, surgical, maternity and paediatric.
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or o f  the six contractor and public hospitals where only these were being compared. 
Table A1.12, Appendix 1 shows the service-mix profiles for each hospital as well as the 
hypothetical profiles used in the standardisation procedure.
In addition to the distribution of costs between capital and recurrent costs discussed 
above, recurrent costs were aggregated into standard categories for purposes o f 
comparison across hospitals. These were administration, domestic services, clinical 
support services, and staff costs.32 Recurrent costs were also categorised as fixed or 
variable, with variable costs defined as those costs which increase with an increase in 
the number o f in-patients treated or OPD visits conducted over a one year period.33
3.1.6. Comparisons of total contract costs and public sector production costs
As discussed in the research framework in Chapter 1, the critical comparison from a 
policy perspective is that between the total costs incurred by the government in the 
contracting out o f  hospital services (total contract cost) and the costs to the government 
o f producing services in public hospitals (public sector production costs). This section 
begins by defining and distinguishing between total contract cost, contractor production 
costs, and total production costs at contractor hospitals, and then describes the methods 
used in calculating these various costs.
Total contract cost is defined as the total cost borne by the government in contracting 
out o f  hospital services, and includes the price paid to the contractor, the transactions 
costs incurred by the government in establishing and maintaining the contract, as well as
32 Administration costs included external administrative costs (incurred by the HO infrastructure and allocated to 
the hospital), and internal administration costs (including all costs incurred in the administration cost centre) 
Domestic services included all costs incurred in the transport, laundry, catering and housekeeping/maintenance 
cost centres.
Clinical support services included all costs incurred in the pharmacy, radiology, rehabilitation services and 
operating theatres cost centres.
Staff costs included all medical, paramedical and nursing staff costs, but excluded the costs o f staff working in 
the administration, domestic services and clinical support services categories.
33 Variable costs included medicines costs, food, supplies used in production o f  X-rays and laboratory tests, tests 
conducted by outside laboratories and other consumable items.
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other costs borne by the government.34 *Examples of this latter category include the costs 
o f public sector staff employed (full-time or part-time) in contractor hospitals, and the 
costs o f  public sector ambulance services which support the contractor hospitals.33
As distinct from total contract cost, contractor production costs include only those costs 
borne by the contractor itself in producing services at each hospital. This cost should in 
turn be distinguished from the concept of total production costs at contractor hospitals, 
which includes both contractor production costs, and costs incurred by the government, 
but excludes the contract price.36 *
Data on  the price of the contracts at the three contractor hospitals were obtained from 
Lifecare, and corroborated by data from the relevant government authorities. The 
contract prices incorporated an element o f value-added tax (VAT), which was 
introduced five months into the study year at a rate o f 10%. Since there is some debate 
over whether VAT should be treated as a true cost to the public sector, total contract 
costs were calculated with and without VAT.
Total contract costs per in-patient day, per admission and per OPD visit were estimated 
by allocation o f the total contract cost between the OPD and all in-patient wards as a 
whole, in proportion to their respective shares o f production cost at each of the 
contractor hospitals. This approach was necessary since the contract price is charged as a
34 Total contract cost may be formally defined as follows:
C r=  P+Ca 
where:
C t  ■ Total contract cost 
P  — Price o f  the contract
C q  — Costs incurred by the government in contracting out o f  hospital services
3$ T he  costs incurred by the government in supporting community services in the vicinity o f the contractor 
hospitals were omitted from the cost estimates, since the cost analysis explicitly excluded community services 
a t all o f the study hospitals.
36 Total production costs at contractor hospitals may be formally defined as follows:
Cc — Co + Ccmm
where
C c  *  Total production costs at contractor hospitals
C o  -  Costs incurred by the government in contracting out o f  hospital services (excluding contract price)
C con -  Contractor production costs
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fixed amount per day for all hospital patients, with no distinction being made between
3.1.7. Assessment o f hospital utilisation statistics
The assessment o f hospital utilisation statistics drew on the same hospital output data 
described in Section 3.1.5 o f this chapter and in Table A1.9, Appendix 1. The
parameters analysed included turnover rate, average length of stay (LOS), and bed
occupancy rate. Turnover rate was defined as the total number o f admissions per
available bed per year.3* LOS was defined as the stay (in days) o f the average in­
patient39 LOS data were adjusted for service-mix. This adjustment assumed that all 
hospitals admitted an identical service-mix profile, derived from the mean values of the 
6 public and contractor hospitals , but that LOS for individual wards at each hospital 
remain constant The average bed occupancy rate40 1 was defined as the percentage of
37 An exception to this occurs in the esse o f OPD visits, w hich are charged for at the rate o f one third o f  a patient 
day price at Matikwana and Hewu hospitals, and are n o t charged for at Shiluvana. These factors were taken 
account o f  in the allocation o f total contract cost to individual cost centres.
M  Turnover Rate was calculated as follows:
where:
T  ■ Turnover rate
N  -  Total annual admissions
B — Average annual number o f beds available
39 Length o f  stay was calculated as follows:
where:
D -  Total number o f  in-patient days during the study year 
N  — Total annual admissions
40 The 6  contractor and public hospitals were used in preference to all 9 hospitals in deriving the hypothetical 
service-mix profile because o f  the primary focus o f  the  study on the former 2 groups, and because the 
considerably different service-mix profile o f the private hospitals was thought likely to bias the results o f the 
adjustment-
41 Bed Occupancy Rate was calculated as follows:
patients o f different service-mix categories.37
where:
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tíme, on average, that all beds in the hospital (or ward) are occupied. The estimates of 
average bed occupancy rates were also adjusted for service-mix.
The individual performance indicators discussed here are interrelated42, and can be 
analysed simultaneously, using a graphical technique devised by Pabon Lasso (1986), in 
which occupancy rate is plotted on the X axis, and turnover rate on the Y axis. As 
illustrated in Figure 3.1, when hospitals are plotted on a graph of this type, a ray drawn 
from the origin through each point represents the LOS, which increases across the top of 
the graph and down the right hand axis. The graph is divided into four quadrants by the 
mean values for occupancy rate and turnover rate. The resulting graph consists of four 
sectors; Sector 1 is characterised by relatively low turnover rates and low levels of 
occupancy, despite relatively long LOS, and represents the least productive use of 
hospital resources. Sector 2 represents a more productive use of resources, with higher 
turnover and shorter LOS than in Sector 1. Sector 3 represents the most desirable 
situation, with high turnover and intermediate levels o f LOS resulting in high 
occupancy levels, while Sector 4 is characterised by high occupancy and low turnover, 
suggesting particularly long LOS.
In the application of this technique, the data used to divide the graph into quadrants were 
derived from the contractor and public hospitals only.43 The data for individual study 
hospitals were then used to plot their respective positions on the resulting graph.
42
O  -  Occupancy rate
D -  Total number o f in-patient days during the study year 
B -  Average annual number o f beds available
The equations for each o f  the individual statistics can be solved to give:
LOS
O x  365 
T
LOS -  length o f stay 
O  -  Occupancy rate 
T -T urnover rate
43 The contractor and public hospital data were used in preference to data from all nine hospitals in order to 
highlight differences between these two groups, since the inclusion o f the private hospital data would have 
blurred the distinctions between the public and contractor groups. In addition, the very different utilisation 
profiles at the private hospitals would have lead to bias in these results.
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of Pabon Lasso graphical technique
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Note: Data represents the study hospitals (see Chapter 4).
3.1.8. Comparisons between hospitals and groups
As indicated in the research framework (Chapter 1), study hospitals were matched by 
geographic area so as to eliminate the possible confounding effect of location on the 
primary assessment of the relationship between hospital ownership and performance. 
Analysis o f variance was therefore performed to test the relative effects of location and 
ownership on a range o f key hospital utilisation and cost parameters. Because of the 
small sample sizes involved, the Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis of variance by ranks 
test was used. This is a non-parametric test, which does not rely on the assumption of a 
normal distribution of data in the underlying population and is thus appropriate with 
sample sizes o f  the order used in this study (Siegel and Castellan 1988). Because of 
small sample sizes involved, statistical tests measuring the significance of observed 
differences between the ownership groups were not appropriate, and were therefore not 
utilised.
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When the private hospitals were included in the cost analyses, costs at the contractor and 
public hospitals had to be adjusted by eliminating the costs of medical and paramedical 
staff, and of radiological and laboratory investigations to allow for comparability with 
the private hospitals. These adjustments were necessary because, as described in Chapter 
1, medical and paramedical staff are self-employed, and radiology and pathology 
services are owned and operated by independent specialists, and not by the private 
hospitals themselves. As a result, the private hospital costs (and prices) exclude all of 
these items, and patients using these hospitals pay separately for these various services.
3.1.9. Data collection and analysis
All d a ta  were collected by the senior researcher and two research assistants during two 
site visits to each hospital, and one visit to each of the relevant head offices. All data 
processing and statistical analysis was carried out using a spreadsheet programme 
(Microsoft Excel Version 5).
3.1.10. Methodological problems
Two main sets of methodological problems were encountered in the cost analysis. The 
first arose from the estimation of unit costs at the individual hospitals, and the second 
from comparisons between the hospitals. Problems in the estimation of unit costs arose 
firstly from the process o f adjusting expenditures to estimate total hospital costs, 
secondly from the various assumptions required in the ‘step down’ cost allocation 
process, and thirdly from the data on hospital outputs.
Capital costs presented the major problem in the estimation o f total hospital costs. 
Unlike the majority of recurrent costs, the costs of capital items were neither available 
from expenditure reports, nor could the estimates of their replacement values be adjusted 
to fit known total expenditures from the expenditure reports. The gaps between some of 
the replacement cost estimates and the available historic cost data point out the potential
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problems o f this approach. Additional uncertainties in capital cost estimation derive 
from the use of assumptions as to lifespan o f assets which may not accurately reflect 
their usage patterns, as well as from an assumed cost of capital, which may not 
accurately reflect the true opportunity cost o f  capital to the different hospitals. In these 
latter cases, sensitivity analyses were carried out in order to test the impact of variations 
in these assumptions on total and unit costs. A final problem with the use o f  the 
‘replacement cost’ approach is that it fails to capture the condition or age of buildings or 
equipment. This provides cause for concern in this study since these factors vary 
significantly both within and between some o f the study hospitals.
Another problem encountered in the estimation of total costs concerns the inclusion of 
costs which were not reflected within the budgets o f the hospitals or the respective HOs. 
Since these data were obtained from a large number of outside agencies, it was not 
always possible to obtain the data required to corroborate them. This was a particular 
problem in the case o f the costs of staff employed by outside agencies, where estimates 
o f annual staff costs could not be adjusted to fit known total expenditures as was done 
for hospital staff.44 This problem affected mainly the public hospitals, and to a lesser 
extent the contractor hospitals, but did not occur at the private hospitals.
The absence of detailed cost centre information at all hospitals necessitated the 
development of allocation formulae which may not accurately reflect the true utilisation 
o f the relevant resources by each cost centre. Although efforts were made to develop the 
formulae as accurately as possible, the validity of these formulae in three particular areas 
gives rise to some concern. The first emerges from the allocation o f HO costs to the 
individual public hospitals; whereas the contractor company and the two private hospital 
companies account accurately for the use of HO administrative resources by their 
individual hospitals, this was not the case with the public sector hospitals, for which 
specific allocation formulae had to be developed. While detailed interviews were 
undertaken in the development of these formulae, it is not clear that these accurately 
capture the true use o f HO administrative resources by the public hospitals. The high
44 Canying out these adjustments would have required detailed data on numbers and costs o f  all staff employed by 
the relevant agencies, and was judged to be not feasible within the timetable set for this study.
-97-
administrative costs in the public sector HOs emphasises the importance of this 
problem, and sensitivity analysis was carried out to document the impact of these 
allocations on the resulting cost estimates.
A second area o f  concern emerges from the allocation of staff costs to cost centres. One 
possible source of inaccurate information here is sampling error resulting from the 
sampling of payroll, roster or other data to obtain details o f  numbers and costs of staff in 
each cost centre. This is likely to have been a particular problem only where small 
samples were available, as occurred at Bisho hospital, for example. It was also more 
serious where accurate data were not available, as was the case with the distribution of 
doctors’, nursing managers’ and hospital managers’ time.
A final problem in the cost allocation process arose in the allocation of medicines and 
surgical supplies costs to final cost centres. As noted above, a range of different 
formulae with different levels of accuracy were applied, depending on the availability of 
data  at the different hospitals. In general, these allocations were most accurate in the 
case o f the private and contractor hospitals, and least so in  the public hospitals, where 
the allocation relied heavily on sampling of utilisation patterns rather than on more 
accurate tracking of utilisation.
Several problems were also encountered in the collection o f  data on hospital outputs, the 
accuracy of which is vital to the validity of the unit cost estimates. Perhaps most 
important amongst these were possible inaccuracies in the output data available from the 
public and contractor hospitals.4S Wherever possible, these data were checked for 
inaccuracies through the use of multiple data sources, and through resolution of 
inconsistencies between these sources. None of the information systems at the study 
hospitals contained the hill range of data required for this study, necessitating various
4S Data collection systems a t two of the public hospitals (Bisho and Letaba) were haphazard and poorly organised, 
with most data collection driven by die need to submit statistical returns to the relevant government HO. At the 
third. Tintswalo, a  well developed, systematic data collection system w as in place and was functioning well. In 
the contractor hospitals, data collection is driven primarily by the need to collect information on the total 
number o f  patient days and outpatient visits (since billing is based on these data), so that data on these 
parameters were accurate, but data on other outputs appeared to be m ore haphazard. In the private hospitals, the 
use o f itemised billing procedures necessitates highly sophisticated information systems which maintain 
accurate and detailed data on all hospital outputs.
- 98-
sampling procedures at each hospital, and implying the possibility o f some degree of 
sampling error in most instances. While efforts were made to obtain large sample sizes 
wherever possible, logistical factors prevented this in several cases.
Variations in hospital information systems also presented important problems of their 
ow n. Inconsistency in the definitions o f service-mix categories was a particular problem 
a t the private hospitals, where definitions o f surgical and medical patients differ 
substantially from those pertaining at the public and contractor hospitals (where these 
definitions are fairly uniform). This problem was addressed through reclassification of 
samples o f medical and surgical patients at the private hospitals in line with the implicit 
definitions at the public and contractor hospitals, an approach which itself introduced the 
potential for further sampling error. Variations in organisational structure between the 
hospitals necessitated aggregation of certain outputs into uniform categories, which also 
complicated the cost allocation process in many cases.
Some of the problems highlighted here contributed to the methodological problems 
relating to the comparability between study hospitals. Several other factors are however 
m ore relevant in this context, including the variability between hospitals in 
demographic, service-mix and case-mix46 profiles, as well as the small sample sizes. 
Although demographic profile data were collected, this was of uneven quality, and was 
n o t used for standardisation in the light of the results o f the logistic regression analysis 
carried out in the tracer analysis (see Chapter 4). As discussed above, an attempt was 
m ade to adjust for variations in service-mix profiles by calculating the unit costs of 
service-mix based outputs, as well as by standardisation against an hypothetical service- 
m ix  profile. Both o f these attempts however rely upon a fairly crude categorisation of 
service-mix, which may have masked important differences in actual service-mix 
between the study hospitals. The problems arising from service-mix differences are 
aggravated by likely differences between hospitals in case-mix and severity47 of cases, 
a s  well as in the demographic profiles of patients within each o f the service-mix
4 6  As distinct from service-mix, which was defined above, case-mix refers to the distribution o f patients treated in 
the hospital (and within each service-mix category) between different types o f clinical cases.
4 7  Severity refers to  the seriousness o f  a particular illness. Patients in the same case-mix category can be more or 
less severely ill, and will require different resources for successful treatment
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categories. The application of the cost analysis to four tracer conditions (see below) was 
undertaken to partially address these problems.
An additional constraint on the comparability between the hospitals emerges from the 
small sample o f hospitals in each of the groups. This prevented parametric statistical 
analysis o f the significance o f any observed differences between the groups, and also 
limits the generalisability of the results to other hospitals within each of the groups. 
While the statistical problem was addressed through the use of non-parametric statistical 
techniques, the limited generalisability of these results to other public and private 
hospitals is conceded as an additional important limitation of the cost analysis, as well 
as o f the broader study more generally.
3.2. Cost analysis of tracer conditions
In an effort to address the problems caused by differences between the hospitals in case- 
mix and severity, cost analysis was applied to four specific types of cases, termed tracer 
conditions here. Two of these were obstetric conditions - normal vaginal deliveries 
(NVD) and caesarean sections, while the other two were surgical conditions - hernia 
repair and appendectomy cases. These four conditions were selected on the basis that 
they are relatively simple and homogenous, at least in comparison to most other types of 
cases treated in these hospitals, and could thus be expected to reduce, if not eliminate, 
the problem o f varying severity across the study hospitals.
The tracer cost analysis involved identification and selection of a sample o f cases from 
each of the four tracer conditions, the collection of data for each case on the use of 
various resources (termed cost components here), and the attachment of costs to each of 
the cost components to give an estimate of total costs per case. This was followed by 
statistical analysis to facilitate comparison between individual hospitals and groups. 
Each o f these steps is discussed in more detail below.
- 100-
3.2.1. Identification and sample selection
All caesarean sections and NVDs conducted at each hospital during the study year were 
identified as described in Table A 1.9, Appendix 1. A systematic sample of cases from 
each o f the two tracers was drawn from the maternity registers in all hospitals. All cases 
of the surgical tracers conducted at the contractor and public hospitals during the study 
year were identified from the operating theatre registers, and the same source was used 
to draw a systematic sample o f cases. In the private hospitals, total numbers of cases of 
the surgical tracers were obtained from the hospital information system, and the same 
sources were used to  identify systematic samples. Once samples had been identified, 
case identification numbers were recorded, and the appropriate case records were 
withdrawn for analysis. Tables A2.1 and A2.2, in Appendix 2, show the total numbers 
of cases, as well as intended sample sizes and actual sample sizes for the obstetric and 
surgical tracer conditions respectively. Absolute sample sizes and corresponding 
percentages of the sampling populations differ between hospitals, in part because of 
logistical constraints on the number o f cases that could be analysed (resulting in 
different intended sample sizes), and in part because of variable record retrieval rates 
among hospitals.4*
3.2.2. Collection o f  data on cost components and cost analysis
Data were collected on LOS, usage o f laboratory services, medicines and surgical 
supplies, usage o f operating theatre time, and age and sex profiles for each of the tracer 
conditions. Where possible, these data were collected from the analysis of individual 
patient records. In some cases, however, the required information was not available from 
individual patient records, and other methods of deriving this information had to be 
utilised. The methods and sources of data collection on these cost components are 
summarised in Table A2.3, Appendix 2.
W  Failed retrieval w as due either to  a  failure to find the record at all, or to successful retrieval o f an incorrectly 
identified or filed record.
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Costs were then attached to each of the components using a standard approach for all 
tracer conditions and for all hospitals, wherever possible. The methods used here are 
also summarised in Table A2.3, Appendix 2. These data were then used to calculate the 
total costs per day and per admission for each individual case.49 50The mean and median 
values of the costs per case were calculated for each of the tracers at each hospital, using 
Microsoft Excel Version 5, and the same package was used to carry out T tests for the 
statistical significance of differences in mean cost per case between the ownership 
groups. These tests were done by pooling all cases within each group, and were 
conducted to compare the contractor and public hospitals only, as well as to compare all 
three groups. In the latter case, the costs per case at the contractor and public hospitals 
were adjusted to allow for comparability with cases at the private hospitals. Logistic 
regression analysis, again using Microsoft Excel Version 5, was carried out in order to 
test for the effect of age and sex on costs per case for each tracer. These variables were 
regressed against cost per case individually, as well as collectively, for each hospital, as 
well as on the pooled data for each of the groups.
The estimation of total contract costs for the tracer conditions was based on an 
adjustment o f the hotel and staff costsso component of each o f the tracer cases to reflect 
the difference between production cost and total contract cost. It was not possible to 
adjust the other components of total cost per case since the contract price itself could not 
be allocated to intermediate cost centres. The estimates of total contract cost per case for
49 The costs per day and per admission were calculated using the fonnulae:
C D =  H + I +  M + Op
CE = ( H x L O S ) + I +  M  + Op 
where:
CD -  Cost per day 
CE -  Cost per admission
H -  A venge hotel cost per day for the relevant ward (defined as all costs incurred in running the ward aside 
from laboratory, medicines and operating theatre costs)
I -  The sum o f laboratory and radiological costs 
M— medicines and surgical supplies costs 
Op -  operating theatre costs 
LOS -  length o f stay
50 Hotel and staff costs include all ward costs besides the costs o f laboratory tests, drugs and operating theatre 
time, which were estimated separately.
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the tracer conditions are therefore likely to underestimate the true total contract cost per 
case for these conditions.
3.2 J .  Methodological problems
Some o f  the methodological problems encountered in the tracer analysis related to the 
problems of the general cost analysis, while others were specific to this analysis. As 
noted in Tables A2.1 and A2.2, Appendix 2, logistical constraints and problems with 
record retrieval resulted in differing sample sizes at the various hospitals. All sample 
sizes were, however, sufficiently large to permit parametric statistical analyses o f the 
data. An additional problem was encountered at Bisho hospital, where no hernia repair 
or appendectomy operations were undertaken during the study year, necessitating 
omission o f this hospital from the analysis o f the surgical tracer conditions. In the 
analysis o f  the individual cost components, some of the required data were noted to be 
absent from some of the patient records, primarily as a result o f poor record keeping. 
The most frequent problem in this instance was the absence o f data on utilisation of 
medicines and surgical supplies. Where these or other data were missing, the case 
involved was assumed to have utilised the relevant resource at the average rate obtained 
from the analysis o f the remaining cases.
As for the general cost analysis, perhaps the most significant problem here concerns the 
impact o f  factors such as case-mix, severity and age and sex on the comparability of the 
tracer cases across the study hospitals. As discussed further in Chapter 4, logistic 
regression analysis showed no confounding relationship between age or sex and costs 
per case. Lack o f data however prevented a similar analysis o f the effects of case-mix 
and severity on costs. In particular, it w as not possible to assess the impact of parity and 
gravidity31, nor o f the reasons for caesarean section on the costs of the obstetric cases. 
Similarly, it was not possible to assess the effects o f  the severity o f the pre-existing
Parity refen to the number o f times a w om an has been pregnant, and gravidity to the number o f times a 
pregnancy has been carried to term. Variations in these factors are clearly recognised to impact on the outcomes 
o f  obstetric care, and are therefore likely to  affect LOS, and investigation and treatment costs, and hence costs 
per case.
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appendeceal disease, nor of the presence or absence of a strangulated hernia or other 
complications on the costs per case of appendectomies and hernia repairs respectively.52 
It is therefore recognised that systematic differences between the hospitals in the 
occurrence of one or more of these factors may have affected costs per case, and hence 
may have led to biased results.
33 . Data Envelopment Analysis
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a relatively recently developed linear 
programming technique designed to measure technical efficiency, which can be applied 
to any production process. Since this technique is relatively new, particularly in its 
application to the health sector, this section reviews some details of the basic technique, 
before providing details of its application in this study.53 Appendix 3 provides a formal 
mathematical formulation of the DEA technique, while Appendix 4 reviews the recent 
literature on the advantages and disadvantages of this technique, and its applications in 
the health sector.
The DEA technique was developed by Chames et al. (1978), following initial 
developments by Farrel (1957), and has been extended by Fare et al. (1985). The basic 
unit o f analysis may be any production unit, often termed a decision making unit 
(DMU), which combines a defined set o f inputs to produce a defined set of outputs. The 
notion of technical efficiency implicit in the technique is based on the concept o f Pareto 
efficiency, which may be defined in terms of input and output criteria. In terms of the 
input criterion, a DMU is efficient if it is not possible to decrease any input without 
increasing any other input and without decreasing any output. In terms of the output 32
32 The reasons for appendectomy may vary from acute abdominal pain to more severe problems such as rupture of 
the appendix with or without infection o f the abdominal cavity. In these latter situations, the post operative 
recovery period is likely to be longer, and more expensive drugs may also be required, thus increasing the cost 
per case. Similar considerations apply to a situation in which a hernia repair is carried out on an emergency 
basis due to strangulation o f the hernia, as distinct from the more usual situation, in which elective hernia repair 
is undertaken prior to such complications occurring.
33 The description o f  the methodology o f  DEA provided here draws on a number o f published sources, including: 
Sexton 1986, Norman and Stoker 1991, Gan ley and Cubbin 1992, Rosko 1990, Sexton c l at. 1989, Sherman 
1984, Nunamaker 1983. Huang 1989.
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criterion, a DMU is efficient if it is not possible to increase any output without 
decreasing any other output and without increasing any input. Within the DEA 
framework, a DMU would be regarded as perfectly efficient when both of these criteria 
are fulfilled (Rosko 1990, Nunamaker 1983).
DEA evaluates the technical efficiency of a DMU relative to  other DMUs in a given 
sample by calculating a relative technical efficiency ratio (TE) for each DMU, which is 
defined as the ratio of the DMU’s total weighted output to its total weighted input. The 
computation o f  input and output weights is based on maximisation o f the TE for each 
DMU, subject to some constraints on the selection of weights.54 In other words, each 
DMU is permitted to select that set of weights which will maximise its own TE, 
provided these weights satisfy the general constraints. In general, maximisation o f the 
TE means that DMUs will place higher weights on the outputs which they produce most 
of, and on the inputs which they use least of. Within any sample of DMUs being 
assessed, this approach therefore allows for the identification o f the most efficient DMU 
or DMUs, which define a production envelope along which production is maximally 
efficient, as well as the location of all other DMUs relative to the efficient production 
frontier. DMUs on the efficient frontier are accorded a TE o f  1, while the scores for all 
others (which will be between 0 and 1) reflect their efficiency relative to the efficient 
frontier.
The DEA model for each DMU can be formulated as a linear fractional programme, 
which can be solved if it is transformed into its equivalent linear programme in which 
the decision variables are the input and output weights o f the DMUs. The transformed 
linear programme is then solved using the simplex method. A complete DEA analysis 
requires that one such programme be solved for each DMU in the sample under study. 
The results o f the DEA analysis are therefore the TE for each DMU and its set o f input 
and output weights. In addition, DEA identifies a reference set o f perfectly efficient 
hospitals for each DMU identified as inefficient, together with multipliers for each 
DMU. These allow the formulation o f an hypothetical composite DMU, which uses the
M  These constraints are firstly, that no weight may be negative, and secondly, that that all weights must be 
universal - that is any DMU must be able to use the same set o f weights an d  the resulting TE must not exceed I.
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same input and output weights as the inefficient DMU, but which is able to produce the 
same level o f outputs with fewer inputs, or greater levels o f output with the same inputs. 
This composite DMU thus indicates the extent of potential efficiency gains if the DMU 
were to move to the efficiency frontier (while retaining the same production technology) 
and also provides efficiency targets (in teims of inputs or of outputs) for the inefficient 
DMU.
The application of DEA in this study involved the steps of model specification, data 
collection and analysis. Each of these steps are discussed in the following sections.
3-5.1. Specification of DEA models
DEA was applied separately to a range o f DMUs, using various permutations o f input 
and output specifications in each case. Table 3.3 shows the various DMUs for which 
the analysis was carried out, as well as the relevant output variables used in each 
analysis. As noted in the table, where individual wards were the DMU, total annual 
admissions to those wards was used as the output.55 Where all wards combined was the 
DMU, three different specifications were used: the first used total annual admissions for 
the hospital as a  whole, the second used admissions adjusted for service-mix, while the 
third used admissions broken down into the same four service-mix categories utilised in 
the cost analysis. The table also shows that three similar specifications were used where 
the whole hospital was the DMU. In this instance, however, three additional 
specifications were included, incorporating adjustments for various aspects of quality of 
care. Finally, DEA was also applied to the four tracer conditions used in the cost 
analysis, with total numbers of cases o f each of the tracers being the relevant output 
variable in each instance.
Admissions were chosen over in-patient days as the key output variable in all analyses 
for two main reasons: the first is that, like OPD visits or operations, an admission
SS The medical and surgical wants w oe analysed jointly, since at some o f  «he study hospitals the costs (and hence 
inputs) o f these wards could not be determined separately.
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represents a true functional output o f the hospital, whereas in-patient days could 
arguably be viewed as a controllable input to the production of an episode o f  patient 
care. The second reason was the expectation that were in-patient days to be used as the 
key output variable, DEA would produce the counter-intuitive result that, ceteris 
paribus, hospitals with relatively longer LOS, and hence higher numbers o f  total in­
patient days would appear relatively more efficient than hospitals with shorter LOS, and 
hence fewer total in-patient days. Sensitivity analysis was carried out to assess the 
impact of the use o f in-patient days rather than admissions as the key variable.
Table 33: Decision making units and corresponding output variables used in
dea __________________________________________________
DMU Oatpat variables used in DEA
Medical/Surgical ward/> Output model 1: i. Total annual medical admissions 
ii. Total annual surgical admissions 
Output model 2: i. Total annual medical in-patient days 
ii. Total annual surgical in-patient days
Paediatrics ward/s Output model 1: Total annual paediatrics admissions 
Output model 2: Total annual paediatrics in-patient days
Maternity wards Output model 1: Total annual maternity admissions 
Output model 2: Total annual maternity in-patient days
AH wards Output model 1. Total annual admissions
Output model 2: Total annual admissions adjusted for service-mix
Output model 3: i. Total medical admissions
ii. Total surgical admissions
iii. Total paediatrics admissions
iv. Total maternity admissions 
Output model 4: i. Total annual in-patient days
Outpatient Dept. Total annual OPD visits
Operating theatres Total annual operations
Whole hospital Output model 1: i. Total annual admissions
ii. Total annual OPD visits
iii. Total annual operations
Output model 2: 1. Total annual admissions adjusted for service-mix
ii. Total annual OPD visits
iii. Total annual operations 
Output model 3: i. Total medical admissions
ii. Total surgical admissions
iii. Total paediatrics admissions
iv. Total maternity admissions
v. Total annual OPD visits
vi. Total annual operations
Output model 4: As for Output model 1; all outputs adjusted for 
structural quality of cam
Output model 5: As for Output model 1; all outputs adjusted for 
quality of nursing cam
Output model 6: As for Output model 1: all outputs adjusted for
combined structural quality of cam and quality of 
nursing cam
Output model 7: i. Total annual in-patient days
ii. Total annual OPD visits
iii. Total annual operations
Maternity ward/s 1. Total annual caesarean section cases
2. Total annual normal delivery cases
Surgical ward/s 1. Total annual appendectomy cases
2. Total annual hernia repair cases
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Adjustment of total admissions for quality of care was carried out using the results of 
the analyses o f structural quality of care and quality of nursing care (see Chapter 5). 
These two elements of the quality of care evaluations were selected since they are the 
only ones which generated quantitative evaluations of quality of care which could be 
used to adjust outputs. In both o f these analyses, quality of care at each hospital was 
rated using a percentage o f the maximum possible attainable score. In this exercise, the 
resulting percentages were used as weighting factors to adjust the various outputs 
specified in each model.56 In the adjustments for both structural quality of care and 
quality o f nursing care, the grand total scores obtained by each hospital were used to 
adjust the relevant outputs. In the combined adjustment, a weighted average of the 
scores obtained in  the two separate evaluations was calculated and used to adjust the 
outputs in the same manner.57
Since detailed cost data were available for all hospital inputs, it was decided to measure 
the input variables in terms of cost (in 1992 Rand), rather than in physical units, since 
this would allow evaluation of economic rather than just technical efficiency. As shown 
in Table 3.4, three separate sets o f general input models were specified, with separate 
models specified for the operating theatres and tracer analyses. Since the results o f the 
DEA were expected be sensitive to the total number of input and output variables 
included, particularly in the light of the small samples of DMUs being analysed here 
(Norman and Stokerl991, Sexton et al. 1989), input model 1 (also referred to as the 
base model) aggregated total production costs into two input variables. To test the 
sensitivity of the DEA results to the number of variables, model 2 aggregated total costs 
into four variables, while model 3 broke costs down further to give a total of eight 
variables. As noted in Table 3.4, adjustments to some of the inputs were required in 
some o f the analyses, particularly where the private hospitals were included in the 
analysis set
56 For example, w here a  hospital obtained «grand tool score o f  78%, and where total annual in-patient admissions 
-  X, total O PD  visits “  Y and total operations -  Z. the adjusted values of the outputs would be given by 0.78 x 
X. 0.78 x Y  and 0.78 xZ .
57 The score obtained in the structural quality o f  care evaluation was given a weight o f 35%. while that obtained in 
the evaluation o f  the quality o f nursing care was given a weight o f 65% These weights reflect a subjective 
assessment o f  th e  relative importance o f  nursing care and structural factors on the ultimate outcomes o f patient 
care.
-108-
Total contract costs, as well as production costs, were used as input variables in the 
comparisons between the contractor and public hospitals.’* In the case of the tracer 
analysis, a four input model was used since the data emerging from the tracer analysis 
were available in this form only. The major difference between this and the other 
models is the inclusion o f capital costs within the ‘hotel and staff costs’ variable.
DEA can be carried out assuming constant (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). 
Since the study hospitals vary systematically in size according to their ownership group, 
the base models incorporated an assumption of CRS in order to eliminate the effect of 
scale on efficiency. A further justification for the use o f a CRS assumption is the fact 
that the data used in this study refer to a short run period of one year, with the result that 
capital stock can safely be regarded as fixed during the study period. The available 
empirical data on hospital cost functions in developing countries also generally suggest 
constant returns to scale in most cases, the exceptions being some limited studies in 
which decreasing returns to scale were noted (Bamum and Kutzin 1993). In order to test 
the sensitivity o f the results to this assumption, all models were run again incorporating 
an assumption o f VRS.
Since only a  single total contract cost was available, this was broken down into the required variables using 
proportions derived from the production cost analysis.
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Table 3.4; Input model specifications for PEA
Input model 1 (Base L Total recurrent costs*
model): il. Capital costs
Input model 2: L Administrative/Domestic services costs"
ii. Drugs/Other clinical services costs*
lit Total staff costs*
iv. Total capital costs
Input model 3*: i. Administrative costs
ii. Domestic services costs
III. Drug costs
iv. X-ray and laboratory investigations costs
V. Theatre costs
vi. Nursing staff costs.
vii. Medical, paramedical and other staff costs
vili. Capital costs
Operating theatre i. Theatre costs
input model:
T racer analysis input i. Drug costs'
model: ¡1. Laboratory investigations1
ili. Theatre costs*
iv. Hotel and staff costs'
Notes: a. When the private hospitals were included in the analyses, total recurrent costs at the contractor 
and public hospitals were adjusted to  exclude the costs o f  X-ray and laboratory investigations, 
and medical and paramedical staff costs.
b. Includes all expenditures in the categories of administration and domestic services, as defined 
in the methodology o f the cost analysis above.
c. Drugs category includes total expenditure on drugs and surgical supplies. Other clinical 
services includes expenditures on X-ray and laboratory investigations, as well as on operating 
theatres. The ‘other clinical services' category had to be adjusted for the particular DMU being 
analysed. Where the OPD and the individual wards were analysed, operating theatre costs were 
excluded. When the private hospitals were included in the analyses. X-ray and laboratory 
investigations were omitted from this category (since these services are not provided at the 
private hospitals).
d. When the private hospitals were included in the analyses, medical and paramedical staff costs 
at the contractor and public hospitals were excluded from this category.
e. Variables in this model were adjusted in similar ways to those noted in the other two models. 
Costs o f X-ray and laboratory investigations, as well as medical and paramedical staff were 
omitted from the contractor and public hospitals when the private hospitals were included in the 
analysis. Theatre costs were excluded when the OPD and the individual wards were the DMUs 
being analysed.
f. Mean drug costs per case. Calculated as described in cost analysis methodology.
g. Mean laboratory investigations pe r case. These costs were omitted from the contractor and 
public hospitals when the private hospitals were included in the analysis.
h. These costs omitted from normal delivery cases.
L These costs include all administrative, domestic, staff and capital costs.
33.2 . Data collection
All data required for the various input and output variables were derived from the 
general and tracer cost analyses.
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3 J J . Analysis
The DEA was carried out using a proprietary software programme, IDEAS (1 
Consulting 1993). Separate analyses were carried out on analysis sets comprising the six 
contractor and public hospitals, and one comprising all nine hospitals. For each analysis 
set, multiple runs were required to incorporate the full number of permutations emerging 
from the various input and output models specified. Mean values of the resulting 
efficiency scores were calculated using Microsoft Excel Version S.
33.4. Methodological problems
The approach adopted here attempted to overcome several of the general 
methodological problems associated with DEA, as reviewed in Appendix 4. As noted 
above, the availability o f detailed cost data allowed this analysis to overcome one of the 
critical limitations of most DEA studies, that of the restriction of the technique to 
evaluations of technical efficiency. The problem of potential sensitivity of results to 
model specifications was addressed through the comparison o f the results emerging 
from a  wide range of models, incorporating variations in input and output specifications, 
total numbers o f variables, and scale assumptions. The problems of the confounding 
effect o f  service-mix and case-mix on efficiency were partially addressed through use of 
service-mix adjustments and through the use of DEA analysis applied to the four tracer 
conditions, while an attempt was made to address the confounding effect of differences 
in quality of care through the use of two quality of care adjustments.
A final problem concerns the validity of, and possible measurement errors in, the data 
used in the input and output variables, which were described in detail in the discussion 
of the cost analysis methodology above.
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3.4. Evaluation of quality of care
This section describes the methods used in the evaluation o f the quality of patient care. 
It begins with the evaluation of structural aspects of the quality o f care, followed by the 
evaluation o f the quality o f nursing care, the quality of clinical record keeping, and the 
evaluation o f  the outcomes o f care in the tracer conditions.
3.4.1. Evaluation of structural aspects of quality of care
The evaluation o f the structural aspects of quality o f  care (SQOC) involved the 
development o f an evaluation instrument, data collection and analysis.
3.4.1.1. Development o f evaluation instrument
The development o f the SQOC instrument involved the identification of evaluation 
criteria, the grouping o f these criteria into appropriate categories, and the development 
o f  standards by which to judge hospital performance on each criterion. This was 
followed by the development o f a scoring and weighting system to allow for quantitative 
comparisons of hospital performance. Discussion of each o f  these stages is facilitated by 
examination o f the structure of the final instrument, which is shown in Appendix 5. This 
illustrates the definitions o f 'good', ‘adequate ’ and 'poor ’ standards for each criterion, 
the grouping of individual criteria into categories, and the grouping of categories into 
clusters.
In the first step o f this process, a draft list of criteria, standards for each criterion, and 
suggested groupings was developed on the basis o f  information obtained in 
consultations with a number o f experts in hospital management, clinicians and 
researchers, as well as from written documentation and previous research studies. The 
individuals and published sources consulted in this drafting process are shown in
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Appendix 6.59 The general approach adopted was to develop criteria and standards 
which would reflect realistic norms for the public sector, and where possible, existing 
official norms and standards for the public sector were used. The draft instrument 
emerging from this process formed the basis for a consensus development process 
involving a series of individual and group discussions with a smaller group of experts in 
hospital management, clinicians and researchers.60 A final draft was then piloted at three 
o f  the hospitals, following which minor modifications were made.61
A s shown in Appendix S, the final instrument consists of 132 individual criteria, 
grouped into standard categories, which are further grouped into 9 clusters. The clusters 
represent the major functional divisions within the hospital. The clinical personnel 
cluster refers to medical, nursing and paramedical staff, and is treated separately because 
o f  the importance attached to these aspects of SQOC. The maternity ward is treated 
separately from the other wards because of its unique equipment requirements. Most 
clusters are divided into the standard categories o f staff, functions, supplies and 
equipment, and buildings. The sta ff category refers to non-clinical staff (since clinical 
staff are dealt with in a separate cluster) and covers issues such as staff numbers, 
tra in ing  and qualifications. The Junctions category covers the major activities carried out 
within the section being reviewed. The ward clusters have neither staff nor functions 
categories, since their staff are covered in the clinical personnel cluster, while the 
functions of the wards were separately evaluated. Supplies and equipment refers to the 
availability, quantity and quality of supplies and/or equipment in different sections, 
while buildings covers issues such as availability of space, provision o f toilets and other 
amenities, and the physical condition and cleanliness o f buildings.
In the second step of this process, the final instrument was used as the basis for a further 
consensus development exercise, in this case aimed at developing a scoring and 
weighting system. The aim of this step was to attach scores to criteria, as well as to
59 Managers and clinicians connected with the study hospitals were omitted from this process because o f  the 
problem o f potential bias in their contributions.
6 9  Consensus was developed ‘serially', rather than with the entire group of experts simultaneously.
61 These involved adjustments to the definitions of standards where these were found to be impossible or 
impractical to measure, o r to capture inadequately the specific feature being evaluated.
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weight categories and clusters so as to allow for aggregation of scores. In recognition of 
the fact that performance on different criteria could be expected to impact differently on 
overall quality o f care, it was decided to attach unique scores to individual criteria, 
rather than to use a standard scoring system for all criteria. The approach adopted was to 
give 'good' a value o f 1, but to vary the scores attached to the ‘adequate ’ and ‘poor' 
standards between 0 and 1, with a lower score representing a more negative impact on 
overall quality o f care.62
Weighting o f individual categories was designed to reflect the relative impact of each 
category within its own cluster, while that of clusters was similarly aimed at reflecting 
the relative impact of each cluster on quality of care in the hospital as a whole. The 
same group o f  experts who participated in the design of the instrument were asked to 
attach scores and weights on an individual basis, in accordance with the general 
approach adopted here. The median values o f the sample of scores and weights obtained 
from the whole group were then taken to represent the ‘consensus’ values. Median 
values were used in preference to means in order to exclude the potential bias that might 
be introduced by outlier scores or weights. Sensitivity analysis was carried out to test the 
impact of using mean rather than median values. Table A7.1, Appendix 7 shows the 
range, mean and median values of the scores for the ‘adequate ’ and ‘poor ’ standards for 
each o f the criteria in the final instrument, while Table A7.2, Appendix 7 shows the 
weights for the categories and clusters.
3.4.1.2. Data collection
Direct observation was used to complete a checklist of required information which is 
shown in Appendix 8. Formal interviews, using structured interview schedules, were 
conducted with the medical superintendent, senior management officials and the 
nursing service manager at all hospitals.63 The interview schedules used are shown in *
*2 A score o f  zero was excluded because o f the use o f  geometric means in the analysis (see below).
*3 The actual officials interviewed at the different hospital groups varied due to the different management
structures in place. In the contractor hospitals, the medical superintendent and hospital manager were
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Appendix 9. A questionnaire, shown in Appendix 10, was also distributed to all medical 
staff in order to obtain additional information. A variety of informal interviews were 
also held with clinical, nursing, administrative and domestic staff. All observations and 
interviews at all hospitals were conducted by the senior researcher so as to eliminate 
inter-observer bias.
3.4.1.3. Analysis
Inconsistencies identified in the data were resolved through discussion with relevant 
officials in the hospital concerned. The rating of hospital performance using the SQOC 
instrument was earned out by the same researcher who collected the data, once again to 
eliminate inter-observer bias, and to ensure consistency o f judgements across hospitals. 
Scores were calculated for each category, cluster and for the hospital as a whole using 
Microsoft Excel Version S. In the calculation of total scores for each category, the 
geometric mean o f  the scores of all criteria in the category was used in preference to a 
simple sum of the scores.64 This approach, which involves a multiplicative aggregation 
of the data, was adopted in order to capture the interactive effect of the individual 
criteria within each category on quality of care. Aggregation of the category scores to 
give a total cluster score was however carried out by calculation of the weighted sum of 
the scores for each category, and the same approach was used for calculation o f the total
interviewed; corresponding officials a t the public hospitals were the medical superintendent and hospital 
secretary, while a t  the private hospitals, they were the hospital manager and assistant manager.
M  The formula for th e  geometric mean is:
GMy = Tjy,yiy*...y.
where:
yn -  score for criterion n
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hospital score.65 Weighted sums were used in preference to the geometric mean, since 
the implication o f the impact o f interactions between different categories and between 
clusters for quality o f care is much less clear than in the case of the individual criteria 
within each category. Sensitivity analysis was carried out to test the effect of using mean 
rather than median values of the score and weight data obtained from the panel of 
experts, as well as to test the effect of using the weighted sum rather than the geometric 
mean to aggregate the scores for individual criteria within each category.
3.4.1.4. Methodological problems
The critical methodological problem encountered in this evaluation is the influence of 
subjective judgement at each stage of the evaluation process. Although efforts were 
made to address this problem through the use of a wide range of published information, 
through consensus development with numerous experts, and through the use of a single 
researcher to collect and interpret the data, these could not completely eliminate the 
influence o f subjectivity from the evaluation process.
The impact o f subjectivity was perhaps strongest, and this component o f the study 
consequently weakest, in the implicit judgements as to the importance of the various 
elements o f the structure of care relative to each other, as well as to the causal
65 The fonnuta giving the score for each cluster was therefore:
C£/«XC W
(•i
where:
C l> -  Total score for Cluster J 
Cj -  Score for category i 
Wj -  Weight for category ■ 
n “  number o f categories in the cluster.
Similarly, the score for the hospital as a whole is given by the formula:
CT =  ¿ C L  • W
M
C i y -  Total score for the hospital; CLj -  Score for cluster i 
Wj -  Weight for cluster I; n  -  number o f clusters
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relationships between these elements and the ultimate quality of patient care. These 
problems are somewhat aggravated by the use of quantitative scales, which may imply 
the existence of ordinal relationships both between the various elements measured, and 
in their impact on quality of care, when it is clear that such relationships do not exist. 
Despite these potential problems in the interpretation of the study, it was nevertheless 
felt that quantitative measures would more easily allow for concise interpretation of the 
data, as well as for comparability between individual hospitals and groups. It is thus 
crucial that the data emerging from this component of the study be interpreted 
cautiously, and that ordinal relationships are not imputed where they do not exist.
These latter problems also relate to the more general problem of the uncertain 
relationship between structural aspects of care and overall quality of patient care. While 
it is clear that several of the elements evaluated here impact directly on the nature of 
patients’ experiences in the hospital, and that other elements are vital to the ongoing 
functioning of the hospital, it is not clear which of these elements are necessary and/or 
sufficient for good quality of care, nor how they relate individually and collectively to 
the ultimate measure of quality o f care - the outcome of care for the patient.
As in the cost analysis, the small sample sizes again prevented statistical analyses of the 
significance of observed differences between the hospital groups.
In addition to these various problems, all six of the public and contractor hospitals, but 
not the private hospitals, were affected by problems related to the general political 
environment during the period in  which this evaluation was being conducted.66 In 
particular, some level of industrial action amongst nurses affected all six hospitals either 
prior to, or during the evaluation process. Since this evaluation relied upon a one-off 
assessment of conditions pertaining in the hospital at the time of data collection, these
66  The process o f political transition occurring during this period created uncertainty with regard to the future o f 
the ‘homeland' administrations, and consequently, some level o f job insecurity on the part o f all civil servants, 
including nurses. These general problems were aggravated by specific, and different political tensions affecting 
the Ciskei and Gazankulu administrations, which resulted in widespread industrial action. These problems 
affected all three o f the public hospitals, as well as the contractor hospital where nursing staif are public sector 
employees (Shiluvana). In the remaining two contractor hospitals, the tense political environment caused 
similar problems, even though the nursing staff are not government employees.
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problems are likely to have impacted on the performance of these hospitals. These 
factors were therefore taken into account in the rating of the hospitals, and where 
appropriate, adjustments were made to the ratings in order to avoid bias emerging from 
the differential impact o f these problems on the various study hospitals.
3.4.2. Evaluation of the quality of nursing care
The quality o f nursing care was evaluated using two main approaches. The first used a 
survey instrument, modelled on the SQOC instrument, to evaluate various aspects of 
nursing care against a set of pre-defined criteria and standards. This was complemented 
by a subjective evaluation o f a number of aspects of the nursing process, carried out by 
two experts in nursing care, education and management.67
3.4.2.1. Development o f survey instrument
An approach similar to that used in the development of the SQOC instrument was used, 
with the important difference that the exercise was undertaken by a team of two experts, 
who were also responsible for the data collection, the initial stages o f analysis, and the 
subjective evaluation exercise. As with the previous instrument, the approach adopted 
aimed to identify a set of criteria that would capture critical aspects o f clinical nursing 
care at the ward level, as well as o f nursing management at the hospital level, and to 
define standards for each criterion. These standards were again based on a combination 
o f existing public sector norms or standards and, where these did not exist, the opinions 
o f the two experts. A draft o f the instrument was piloted at three o f the study hospitals, 
after which modifications were made.61 The final instrument was then used as the basis 
for development o f the scoring and weighting system, using the same approach as that 
used for the SQOC instrument.
Professor B. Robertson, Head, Department o f Nursing Education, University o f the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg; and Ms D. Lee, Senior Lecturer, Department o f Nursing Education, University o f the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
<• These were made for the same reasons as those noted in the discussion of the SQOC instrument.
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The final instrument, together with scores for individual criteria, categories and clusters, 
is shown in Appendix 11, and consists of 29 separate criteria, grouped into 2 broad 
clusters - nursing care and nursing management. The nursing care cluster is further 
broken down into four categories • assessment and diagnosis; nursing care 
planning/monitoring/control; equipment; and diet. Several elements of this cluster are 
based on a particular model of appropriate nursing care, in which the nurse makes an 
assessment and diagnosis of each patient on admission, followed by the development 
and implementation of a nursing care plan (NCP). The model further assumes that 
rigorous and consistent monitoring and control procedures are integral to the 
implementation process, as are adjustments to the nursing care plan (here termed 
‘upgrading') in the light o f any changes in the patients’ circumstances. Implicit in this 
model is the expectation that this nursing process should occur in conjunction with, but 
independently of, the medical care of the patient, since there are distinct aspects of 
nursing care that are unlikely to be covered by the latter.69
In the evaluation of ward equipment, the focus of the instrument was on those aspects 
assumed to be under the control of nurses, including the completeness and level of 
organisation, as well as the regular checking, of equipment. The evaluation also covered 
some aspects not specifically related to the quality o f  nursing care, including the 
availability o f supplies and equipment, ward linen, and the quality of patient diets. 
While it is recognised that these aspects are not under the control of the nursing staff, 
they are nevertheless important determinants of the quality of patient care. Since the 
nursing care experts were competent to evaluate these additional aspects of care, it was 
decided to include these in the survey instrument.
In the case o f the nursing management cluster, the instrument again included a range of 
criteria considered to be critical to the ultimate quality o f  nursing care, although some of 
these are not directly under the control of the nursing management team. Examples 
include those criteria concerned with service conditions, occupational health services,
W  In the view o f  the experts involved in this review, this model o f nursing care is appropriate for, and ought to 
have been expected in, all o f  the study hospitals.
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and staff patient ratios. This cluster thus aimed to evaluate the general management of 
the nursing staff in each hospital, rather than the performance of the nursing 
management team itself. However, some of the criteria included in the cluster did in fact 
serve to evaluate some relevant aspects of the performance of the nursing management 
team itself; examples here being the recruitment and placement mechanisms for nursing 
staff, the nature o f in-service training for nurses, the use of procedure and policy 
manuals, and the nature o f the relationships between the senior nursing management and 
the general nursing staff.
3.4.2.2. Data collection
Data collection was carried out by the two experts who designed the survey instrument, 
both o f whom visited each o f the study hospitals. Direct observation was supplemented 
by Hat« obtained in formal and informal interviews. Formal interviews were conducted 
with the nursing service manager at all hospitals, and with the medical superintendent at 
some hospitals, and were carried out jointly by both researchers. Each expert was 
assigned to assess either the maternity or the medical and surgical wards, and these roles 
were m ain ta in ed at all study hospitals, so as to allow uniformity in judgements between 
hospitals.70 Where hospitals had separate medical and surgical wards, one o f each of 
these wards were assessed. In some hospitals, medical and surgical wards are combined 
into adult male and adult female wards. Where this was the case (Matikwana, 
Pietersburg and S t Dominies) one or more of these combined wards were assessed. 
Where discrepancies in information obtained from different sources were noted, these 
were resolved through discussion with the nursing service managers and other 
appropriate individuals.
70 The researchers were denied permission to  evaluate the maternity ward at Bisho hospital, and this ward had to 
be omitted from the analysis.
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3.4.2.3. Analysis
The rating o f hospital performance on the various criteria in the survey instrument was 
also carried out by the two experts. In the case of individual wards, rating was carried 
out by the expert who had collected data for that ward. For all other criteria, the rating 
was conducted jointly by both experts on a consensus basis. Scores were then calculated 
for each category, cluster and for the hospital as a whole using Microsoft Excel Version 
5, and using the same approach as used in the SQOC instrument.
The subjective evaluations were carried out immediately following the data collection in 
each hospital, and were recorded in note form, loosely based on the structure of the 
survey instrument. As with the survey instrument, these were conducted by one of the 
experts in the case of individual wards, and on the basis of joint consensus for all aspects 
not concerned with individual wards. Once the evaluations of individual hospitals were 
completed, evaluations o f each of the hospital groups were also made, once again on the 
basis o f joint consensus, and in loosely structured note form. The notes were 
subsequently structured in tabular form by the senior researcher, and then reviewed by 
the two experts, following which some modifications were made.
3.4.2.4. Methodological problems
Several o f the problems encountered in this evaluation were very similar to those 
encountered in the evaluation of SQOC, including the influence o f  subjective 
judgements, and the implication of ordinal relationships between the elements evaluated 
and quality o f care, as well as uncertainty as to the precise nature of the relationship 
between the quality o f nursing care and the ultimate quality of patient care. In this latter 
instance, it seems clear that the relationship between the quality of nursing care and the 
outcomes o f care is a more direct one than in the case of structural aspects o f  care. This 
is particularly true in the context o f the public and contractor hospitals, where the 
relative shortage o f medical staff necessitates a more important clinical role for the 
nursing staff.
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In addition to these general problems, some specific problems were encountered in the 
data collection phase. The expert observers noted a tendency for nurses, particularly in 
the contractor and public hospitals, to bias the information supplied so that it reflected 
well on their own performance.71 While efforts were made to verify information by 
using multiple sources, this possible source of bias should be noted in the interpretation 
of the findings reported here. While the influence of bias was generally subtle, in two 
particular cases it took the form of the evaluators being denied access to wards 
designated for evaluation.72 Although other ostensible reasons were given for this, it was 
the view of the evaluators that they were deliberately being prevented from seeing the 
wards in question. In these cases, the wards were omitted from the evaluation. Bias in 
the information supplied may also have been aggravated by the industrial action 
affecting the public hospitals and one of the contractor hospitals, as discussed above. 
Where such industrial action was in progress, or had taken place recently, the evaluators 
attempted to compensate for this in the ratings of the affected hospitals. The potential 
bias emerging from this problem should nevertheless be recognised.73
An additional problem encountered in the data collection phase was the variable ward 
structure between the study hospitals, in particular the designation of male and female as 
opposed to medical and surgical wards in some hospitals. Where this was the case, 
evaluations were conducted so as to ensure comparability between hospitals.74 As noted 
in the discussion o f  the evaluation o f SQOC, the small sample sizes prevented the use of
It is not dear why this problem o f  bias should have been more serious in the case o f nurses than for other 
officials interviewed for the various components o f this study. It is arguable that this may be attributable to the 
more rigid and hierarchical employment structures for nurses than for other groups o f hospital employees, 
which may engender both job insecurity and more general fear o f  admitting to problems in the work place.
72 This occurred in one public and in one private hospital. In each case, access to only one ward was denied.
73 it is arguable that the  industrial action which occurred at the time of the study may have been systematically 
linked to poor management within the public sector hospitals, in which case it should not necessarily be 
compensated for completely in these evaluations. However, the particular political circumstances prevailing at 
the time o f the study clearly played an important role in this particular round o f industrial action, and it is 
difficult to separate these causes from the longer term problems in human resources management within public 
hospitals.
74 Where a hospital had male and female wards, the nursing care o f medical and surgical patients within these 
wards was separately evaluated, in order to ensure comparability with hospitals which have medical and 
surgical wards.
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statistical analyses for the significance of observed differences between the hospital 
groups in this component o f the study.
3.4J. Evaluation of clinical record keeping
This component o f  the quality o f care evaluation focused on aspects of clinical record 
keeping from a medical point o f view, and involved analysis of a sample of the records 
o f patients in the hospital at the time o f the study, as well as a review of some of the data 
collected from the samples o f patient records withdrawn for the tracer cost and quality 
o f care analysis.
3.4.3.1. Sample selection
Eight patients in each of the medical, surgical, paediatrics and maternity wards at each 
hospital were chosen at random, and their records examined at the bedside. Where a 
patient record was missing, another patient was randomly chosen, and so on until eight 
records were obtained from each of the selected wards. Where a hospital had more than 
one ward in each category75, the samples of records were obtained from all appropriate 
wards. The d a ta  on the use o f partograph charts76 in maternity cases were obtained from 
the general review o f the NVD and caesarean section records undertaken as part of the 
tracer quality of care evaluation. Additional data on some of these topics were obtained 
from an analysis o f  a sub-sample o f the tracer records which was undertaken for the 
SQOC evaluation.
73 For example, some hospitals have male and female medical and surgical wants, or different categories of 
medical or surgical ward.
76 These are *»«~t«rrfi^i charts which are used in all South African hospitals for monitoring o f the progress o f 
labour.
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3.4.3.2. Data collection and analysis
The records o f patients in the hospital were analysed at the bedside by the senior 
researcher, using the data capture form shown in Appendix 12. Data on the use of 
partograph charts as well as the other data used in this study were collected by the senior 
researcher as part of the process of data collection for the tracer cost and quality o f care 
analysis.77 78All data were analysed using Microsoft Excel Version 5, and the chi-square 
test was applied to test for the significance of the observed differences between the 
pooled data from the three hospital groups (Kirkwood 1991).
3.4.4. Evaluation of the outcomes of care in tracer conditions
This component of the study focused on the evaluation o f the outcomes of patient care, 
using the same four tracer conditions as were used in the cost analysis. Quality o f care 
was defined largely in a negative sense here, that is by the presence or absence of 
evidence of poor outcomes of care. In this context, poor outcomes were defined in two 
ways: firstly, by the prevalence7* of a set of indicators o f potential problems in the 
outcomes of care; and secondly, by the proportion of cases in which expert clinicians 
judged there to be evidence of poor outcomes which might possibly or clearly have been 
avoided. This approach required, firstly, the development o f  a set o f  indicators for each 
o f the tracer conditions, followed by sample selection and analysis o f patient records for 
the prevalence o f indicators. Thereafter, a  sub-sample o f cases was selected for further 
evaluation by expert clinicians.
77 T he data on the recording o f medicines usage and laboratory investigations, as well as concerning the general 
organisation o f  the records, were also used as components o f one o f the criteria in the evaluation of SQOC. The 
timtm were used again in this analysis in order to g ive more weight to these particular aspects o f the process of 
care, as well as to provide a  more complete picture o f  clinical record keeping.
78 Prevalence was defined here as the proportion o f  cases in the sample in which one o r more o f the indicators was 
present.
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3.4.4.1. Definition o f indicators o f potential problems in the outcomes o f care
An initial list of indicators for each o f the tracer conditions was developed by the senior 
researcher. Criteria for selection o f these indicators included, firstly, their assumed 
sensitivity and specificity79 in detecting potential problems in the outcomes of care, and 
secondly, the assumed availability o f the information required to identify the presence 
or absence o f the indicators. The ideal indicator would be both sensitive and specific, 
and would be easily identifiable from routine hospital records. The initial lists for each 
o f  the tracer conditions were then independently reviewed by two expert clinicians in 
each case (obstetrician/gynaecologists for the NVDs and caesarean sections, and 
specialist surgeons for hernia repair and appendectomy cases), and consensus on the lists 
achieved through a series o f discussions with the reviewers. These lists, and 
corresponding data capture forms were then piloted at three o f the study hospitals, 
following which modifications were made. These involved primarily the removal of 
those indicators for which it was clear that the relevant data were not readily available 
from routine hospital records.
The piloting process also highlighted those specific indicators in each of the tracer 
conditions which were suitable or unsuitable for selection o f cases for further evaluation 
by the expert clinicians.*0 The final list of indicators used in the analysis of each o f the 
tracer conditions is shown in Table 3.5, while Appendix 13 shows those indicators for 
which identified cases were submitted for, or excluded from, further evaluation by the 
expert clinicians. The data capture forms for the four tracer conditions are shown in 
Appendix 14.
T9  in this context, sensitivity refers to the probability that the indicator/s will correctly detect true poor outcomes of 
cate, while specificity refers to the probability that absence o f the indicator/s will detect cases in which there is 
truly no poor outcome o f care (Last 1988).
• 0  For example, in both the hernia repair and appendectomy groups, analysis o f patient records indicated that 
reasons for delays between initial presentation and operation, or between admission to hospital and operation, 
were never provided in the patient records, nor was it possible to assess whether or not these delays had 
themselves affected negatively the outcomes of care. All cases identified by these indicators alone were 
therefore excluded from further evaluation by the expert clinicians. Cases identified by the indicators concerned 
with pre-operative assessment, and with histology results (in the appendectomy group) were excluded for 
similar reasons.
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Table 3-5: Indicators of potential problems in the outcomes of care in tracer
conditions
All obstetric 
cases
1. Maternal mortality: all deaths occurring within 1 month of 
childbirth
2. Peri-natal mortality: all deaths occurring within 2 weeks of birth, 
and where birthweight above lOOOg
Normal
deliveries
1. Third degree tear
2. Failed assisted delivery
3. Puerperal sepsis
4. Other complications
Caesarean
sections
1. Post operative wound sepsis
2. Anaesthetic complications
3. Other complications
Appendectomy 1. Evidence of delay between first presentation and operation
2. Evidence of delay between admission to hospital and operation 
(evidence of rescheduling of operation, or evidence o f wait o f 
more than 24 hours before operation)
3. Absence of basic investigations prior to surgery (basic 
investigation defined as at least one of: white cell count, 
urinalysis, abdominal X-ray)
4. Negative histology (any findings other than acute appendicitis on 
histological examination of appendix tissue)
5. Peritonitis during operation or in post-operative period
6. Post operative wound sepsis
7. Other post-operative complications
8. Death following appendectomy or due to appendicitis
9. Anaesthetic complications
Hernia Repair 
(groin hernias 
only)
1. Evidence of delay between admission and operation (evidence of 
rescheduling of operation for logistic rather than medical 
reasons)
2. Absence of pre-operative assessment by anaesthetist/medical 
officer for fitness for surgery
3. Post operative wound sepsis
4. Other postoperative complications
5. Death following hernia repair
6. Anaesthetic complications
3.4.4.2. Sample selection
The same samples o f cases as those identified for the cost analysis were used for the 
initial analysis of the prevalence of indicators of poor outcome. All retrieved records 
were analysed on site by the senior researcher, and data concerning the prevalence of
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indicators was entered onto data capture forms. The subsequent analysis of these records 
is further described below. All records showing the presence of one or more of the 
indicators were then reviewed again by the senior researcher in order to exclude those 
individual records where there was clearly insufficient information to justify further 
evaluation by the expert clinicians.
Once records suitable for expert evaluation had been selected, permission was sought to 
photocopy the relevant parts o f  the records. Permission was obtained at all hospitals 
aside from Shiluvana.81 All signs of identification of the hospital, the patient and all staff 
involved in treatment of the patient were removed from each of the photocopied records, 
which were then labelled with a unique code for each hospital and tracer condition.
3.4.4.3. Analysis ofpatient records for prevalence o f indicators
The prevalence o f indicators in the sample o f each of the tracers was analysed using 
Microsoft Excel Version 5. The Chi-square test, and where appropriate, Fishers’ exact 
test,* 2 was applied to test for the statistical significance of observed differences in the 
prevalence o f indicators between the hospital groups (Kirkwood 1991).
3.4.4.4. Evaluation o f records by expert clinicians
The samples of records of hernia repair and appendectomy cases, selected as described 
above, were submitted for analysis by the same two specialist surgeons who developed 
the lists of indicators. The records were analysed sequentially and independently by the 
tw o experts, who were requested to evaluate whether or not the records demonstrated 
evidence of one or more poor outcomes of care, and whether these outcomes were 
possibly or clearly avoidable. Avoidability was defined as a situation in which the
®* At this hospital, permission was denied by the hospital superintendent. No reasons were given for this decision.
* 2  Fisher's Exact test was applied when the overall total o f the 2X2 contingency table was less than 20, or w hen
the overall total o f  the table was between 20 and 40, and the smallest o f  the four expected numbers was less 
than 5 (Kirkwood 1991).
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outcome o f note could have been prevented had one or more actions been undertaken or 
omitted. The results o f this analysis were recorded on a data capture form shown in 
Appendix 15. As noted in the results section, the analyses made by the two surgeons 
turned out to be the same in all the cases submitted, obviating the need for adjudication 
of divergent results.
The obstetrical tracer condition cases were evaluated by one of the specialist 
obstetricians using a specially developed audit system. This system, which is discussed 
in more detail below, focused primarily on a detailed analysis of the causes and 
avoidability of peri-natal and maternal mortality. Poor outcomes as related to the 
presence o f the indicators discussed above were also analysed, although outside the 
framework of the audit system.
The audit system applied here*3 involved a systematic analysis of all cases o f peri-natal 
death in infants weighing more than lOOOg, with the initial aim of classifying each case 
in terms o f the primary obstetric cause o f death (defined as the major maternal factor 
contributing to the death of the infant). In a second stage, the cases were analysed for the 
presence o f avoidable factors (defined as potentially avoidable actions taken or omitted 
which might have affected the outcome o f peri-natal death).
Avoidable factors were then classified as patient orientated, administrative and medical 
management related. The patient orientated category, which relates to actions 
undertaken or omitted by the patient, was further divided into inappropriate response to 
a complication (e.g. failure to present to hospital after premature rupture of membranes), 
non or late attendance at ante-natal clinics, and intervention in the pregnancy (e.g. 
attempted abortions). Administrative factors were defined as those relating to logistical 
and other problems within the clinic and hospital system, and included transport 
problems, laboratory related problems, lack of adequate equipment in theatres, and lack 
of adequately skilled or trained staff. These problems were further divided into those 
associated with the hospital itself and those occurring outside the hospital (e.g. related to
*3 This system, termed the ICA Solution system, was developed by the Department o f Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology, University of Pretoria (Pattinson ef o f 1995, W arder at. 1995)
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clinic transport systems, or clinic laboratory services). The medical management 
category included all factors which could be attributable to actions undertaken or 
omitted by the clinical staff caring for the patient. This category was further divided into 
honest errors (situations in which appropriate action was undertaken given the available 
information, but in  which that information was inaccurate), oversight (situations in 
which information pointing to an abnormal situation was available, but was overlooked 
or not acted upon), and gross deviation from  accepted practice (a situation in which a 
potentially dangerous and/or inappropriate intervention is carried out). In a final stage 
of the analysis, the  avoidable factors identified here were classified as either Grade 1 
(actions which, i f  altered or avoided, could possibly have modified the outcome) or 
Grade 2 (actions which, if altered or avoided, would probably have modified the 
outcome).
All cases submitted were reviewed and discussed by a group of clinicians hum the 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology of the University o f Pretoria (the University 
o f Pretoria group). The final classification of avoidable factors was undertaken by one 
senior member o f  the group in order to eliminate inter-observer bias. The results of this 
analysis were analysed using proprietary software designed to accompany the audit 
system.*4 A less systematic analysis of the causes of maternal mortality was 
undertaken. In th is case, all records were analysed by the same group of clinicians, and 
where possible, the presence o f avoidable factors was identified. An attempt was also 
made to judge whether or not the maternal death was possibly or probably avoidable. In 
the case of the general analysis of obstetric outcomes in relation to the defined 
indicators, results were entered on the data capture forms shown in Appendix IS, and 
were analysed using Microsoft Excel Version S. Chi-square and, where appropriate, 
Fishers’ exact tests were applied to all the results obtained from these analyses to test for 
the statistical significance o f observed differences in the prevalence o f poor and 
avoidable outcomes between the hospital groups (Kirkwood 1991).
M  Peri-natal Problem  Identification Programme (PPIP), also developed by the Department o f  Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology. University o f Pretoria.
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3.4.4.5. Methodological problems
The major methodological problems encountered in this evaluation were related to the 
reliance on patient records as the primary sources of data. In several of the hospitals, the 
quality of record keeping on clinical aspects of care was so poor that it was not possible 
to detect the presence o f indicators, and even where these were detected, the records 
were often judged to contain insufficient information to allow for accurate evaluation by 
the expert clinicians. Record keeping appeared to be a particular problem in the case of 
the surgical tracer conditions, and less so in the obstetrical conditions, since maternity 
care tends to be recorded on standard forms resulting in more usable information being 
recorded on a routine basis.85 These problems explain in part the very small numbers of 
surgical cases submitted for expert review, although other factors also influenced sample 
size, including small total numbers o f cases in some of the hospitals, low prevalence of 
some of the indicators, and the unsuitability o f some of the indicators for case selection 
purposes. Conversely, the much larger numbers of maternity cases were mainly 
attributable to the larger total sample sizes, as well as to the generally better recording of 
patient information in obstetrical cases in all hospitals.
Where record keeping is generally poor, it is also likely that the occurrence of problems 
in clinical care will be underreported. This tendency may be aggravated by deliberate 
underreporting of mistakes or other aspects of care likely to reflect badly on the clinical 
staff, and may serve as an additional explanation for the low prevalence of indicators 
noted for some of the tracer conditions. This particular problem may also lead to a 
perverse situation in which those hospitals in which record keeping is of a high standard 
will show higher prevalence of indicators of poor outcome, and will therefore 
systematically appear to have poorer quality of care, whereas in fact there may well be a 
positive correlation between good record keeping and quality of care.
A particular set of problems related to record keeping were encountered in the analysis 
o f patient records at the private hospitals, relating mainly to the fact that much of the *
*5 The nature o f record keeping in the surgical tracer conditions is thus likely to be representative of most record 
keeping in the hospitals, with obstetric cases being the exception.
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care of these patients is undertaken by their doctors on an outpatient basis. These 
problems are discussed in more detail in Appendix 18.
Finally, poor record keeping was also evident in the absence of central records of 
anaesthetic complications in all of the study hospitals, thus preventing systematic 
analysis of this aspect of care in the surgical and caesarean section cases.86 Although 
reporting of such complications is a legal requirement, all o f the hospitals fulfilled these 
requirements by submitting statutory reports but did not keep copies of these reports, nor 
any other centralised record of these complications.
3.5. Assessment of management structures and processes
The management structures and systems applied in the various HOs and hospitals were 
qualitatively assessed through a series of interviews with relevant officials and 
employees. The individuals interviewed for this assessment are shown in Appendix 16. 
All interviews were conducted by the senior researcher, using a structured interview 
schedule, which is shown as Schedule 1 in Appendix 17. In addition to the formal 
interviews, informal interviews were conducted with nursing and other staff at all o f the 
study hospitals, and these data were used to supplement those obtained from the formal 
interviews. All interviews were recorded manually, and were subsequently analysed by 
the senior researcher. Additional information on the issues addressed here was obtained 
in a  series o f ‘feedback’ sessions held with HO and hospital officials from the various 
government departments and private hospital companies.
This approach involved a number o f largely predictable problems. The introduction of 
some element o f both observer and respondent bias87 is inevitable in the personal 
interview situation. The use of the same interviewer for all interviews, as well as in the *
* 6  It was possible, in some cases, to identify anaesthetic complications from the patient records or from the 
operation notes. However, these sources are likely to be subject to the same sources o f bias discussed above.
|n  this instance, observer bias may have emerged from variations in responses to the answers provided by 
different interviewees, from biases in recall o f  interviews, as well as from biases in the subsequent analysis o f 
the interview data. Respondent bias is taken to  mean the bias introduced when respondents perceive that certain 
answers may be more or less acceptable and modify their responses accordingly.
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analysis, was in part designed to limit observer bias, while the use of multiple interviews 
from each organisation hopefully served to mitigate some of the effects of respondent 
bias. Time and other logistical constraints also prevented the use of structured focus 
group discussions among hospital staff, which would have allowed for a more 
comprehensive ‘view from below’ of the range of issues assessed in this component of 
the study.
3.6. Assessment of contracts and the contracting process
Various aspects of the contracting process were assessed through interviews with senior 
officials from the relevant government departments and hospitals, and from the 
contractor company. These issues were explored in the same interviews as those 
described in the previous section, in this case using the structured interview schedule 
shown as Schedule 2 in Appendix 17. The contracts currently in force at the three 
contractor hospitals were also analysed, using the analytic framework embodied in 
Schedule 2, Appendix 17.
3.7. Assessment of market structures, competition and prospects for 
contracting
Issues related to market structures, competition and the prospects for extension of 
contracting arrangements were assessed in a series of interviews with the same senior 
officials of the contractor and other private hospital companies listed in Appendix 16, as 
well with officials from other private hospital companies in South Africa. These 
interviews were conducted using a structured interview schedule, shown as Schedule 3 
in Appendix 17. Information obtained in the interviews was collated and interpreted by 
the senior researcher in tabular form. These initial findings were then discussed with 
most of the interviewees, and the analysis was modified on the basis of their responses.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS - HOSPITAL 
UTILISATION STATISTICS, COST ANALYSIS 
AND DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
As indicated in the research framework outlined in Chapter 1, the main focus o f this 
study is on the comparison of contractor and public hospitals, and only secondarily on 
the performance o f private hospitals. The presentation o f results in this and other 
chapters will reflect these priorities, with most attention focused on the former two 
groups, while private hospital performance will be highlighted where relevant. As 
indicated in Chapter 3, study hospitals were matched by geographic area so as to reduce 
the possible confounding effect of location on the primary assessment of the 
relationship between hospital ownership and performance. The relative effects o f 
location and ownership on the various measures of performance and costs are therefore 
explicitly addressed prior to the presentation of individual results. As indicated below, 
this analysis provides justification for the use of ownership group, rather than location, 
as the basis for aggregate comparison between the study hospitals. The data for all 
parameters measured are therefore presented by ownership group and by individual 
hospital. In the former case, both mean and median data are presented throughout, since 
significant variation within ownership groups was observed across several o f the 
parameters, suggesting that the use of mean data alone would lead to distorted 
interpretations.
The chapter begins with a brief utilisation profile of the study hospitals, followed by the 
results o f  the analysis o f  hospital utilisation statistics. It then presents the results o f the 
general and tracer cost analyses, of the comparison o f  total contract costs with public 
sector production costs, and of the DEA analysis.
4.1 Utilisation profiles of study hospitals
Table 4.1 summarises the utilisation profiles of the study hospitals over the 12 month 
study period, further details o f which are given in Tables A19.1 and A19.2, Appendix
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19. Table 4.1 demonstrates a significant degree o f homogeneity within, as well as clear 
differences between, the ownership groups in several of the key utilisation parameters. 
This pattern holds true for admissions and in-patient days, as well as for OPD visits and 
operations, although there is a somewhat higher degree o f intra-group variability in 
respect o f  the latter two outputs. Table A19.1, Appendix 19 also shows a higher degree 
of intra-group variability when admissions and in-patient days are broken down by 
service-mix category.
Table 4.1: Hospital utilisation profiles
C o n tra c to r Public P r iv a te
M atik . H ew u ShiL T in ts . L c tab a Bisho SL
Dorns.
P i e t Neis.
Beds 178 250 170 322 364 287 138 100 94
A dm issions 5,635 5,761 5,464 10,994 10,350 12,346 9,807 8,647 9,361
P a tien t D ays 46,161 49,728 49,170 91,310 87,567 62,147 35,846 27,339 28,448
O PD  visits 12,204 14,678 22,995 78,316 45,581 30,941 n/a 818 2,837
O p e ra tio n s 801 1,136 1,506 3,540 3,070 754 6,442 6,562 5,915
O PD /A dm issions 
ra tio
2.17 2.55 4.21 7.12 4.40 2.51 n/a 0.09 0.30
O p e ra tio n s / 
A dm issions ra tio
0.14 0.20 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.6 0.66 0.76 0.63
Notes: n /a  -  not applicable, since n o  O PD at St. Dominies
These three tables provide evidence o f the relatively similar ‘pattern of care’ offered by 
the contractor and public hospitals, particularly when contrasted with that delivered by 
private hospitals. Table 4.1 shows that public and contractor hospitals have relatively 
similar ratios o f operations and OPD visits to total admissions, while the private 
hospitals show a very different pattern, with significantly higher operations to 
admissions ratios and a lower OPD visit to admissions ratios than the other two groups. 
Similar patterns are also apparent in the analysis of other utilisation statistics, such as 
turnover rate and LOS (see below).
These different ‘patterns o f care’ are in part explained by variations in hospital structure 
and service delivery, details of which are shown in Table A19.2, Appendix 19. This 
table shows that the public hospitals are generally larger (in terms o f numbers of 
hospital beds) than the contractor hospitals, and that the private hospitals are 
significantly smaller than those of the other two groups. The table also shows that the
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private hospitals have a significantly higher proportion of their total complement o f beds 
in surgical or combined medical/surgical wards than either of the other two groups.88 
Additional features of note are that two of the public hospitals have dedicated wards for 
TB, psychiatric and infectious disease patients (and that one contractor hospital also has 
a TB ward), and that one of the public and one of the private hospitals has a short stay 
ward.89
Table A19.2, Appendix 19 also highlights some differences in the range o f services and 
facilities offered by these hospitals. Both the contractor and public hospitals provide a 
wide range of outpatient services, with two of the private hospitals providing a more 
limited range of these services.90 All of the public hospitals and one o f  the contractors 
provide community services91, while no private hospitals provide these services. The 
different pattern of care prevailing at private hospitals is also highlighted by the 
presence of intensive care units at all three of these hospitals, while none of the other 
hospitals have similar units.
In addition to these differences in structure and service delivery, the varying patterns of 
care delivered by these hospitals are also reflected in, and partly explained by, the 
service-mix profiles demonstrated in Figure 4.1. This shows the proportion o f total
88 As indicated by the data on service-mix profiles and admissions presented below, the substantial majority o f 
patients admitted to the combined medical/surgical wards at Pictcrsburg and Nelspruit hospitals are surgical 
patients.
89 These short stay wards serve different functions in these hospitals. In the case o f the public hospital. Bisho. this 
ward is used to admit patients for observation prior to a decision to discharge or admit to  one o f the wards for 
further treatment In the case o f  the private hospital. St Dominies, the short stay ward is used for day surgery, 
where patients are admitted for treatments (usually surgical or investigative) requiring admission o f less than 
one day.
90 None o f the contractor hospitals provide specialist outpatient care which is provided at all o f the public 
hospitals. In contrast to the Killy fledged outpatient departments at the public and contractor hospitals, those at 
the two private hospitals consist o f  small casualty departments which function mainly to  treat minor and major 
emergencies, since the bulk o f routine outpatient care required by patients using these hospitals is provided in 
the offices o f private practitioners.
The term community services is used here to cover the provision o f fixed and mobile clinic services, school 
health services, immunisation and a  range of other primary health care activities which are provided by staff 
based at the hospital and financed out o f the hospital budget. The model o f a district hospital supporting 
community services is typical o f  public sector hospitals in former 'homeland' areas. T he contracts at all three 
contractor hospitals do not cover the provision o f community services. However, since the Gazankulu 
government employed all nursing and medical staff at Shiluvana hospital, all staff in these categories working 
in community services are formally on the staff establishment o f the hospital, so that the hospital can be 
regarded as providing and supporting community services, although to a lesser ex tent than in the public 
hospitals.
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admissions accounted for by the different service-mix categories for each hospital, as 
well as the mean values for each ownership group. Despite some variation between 
individual hospitals in each group, these data indicate a relatively similar service-mix 
distribution at the contractor and public hospitals, particularly in comparison with the 
pattern observed in private hospitals. As the figure indicates, however, the public 
hospitals admitted higher proportions of medical and surgical cases, on average, than did 
the contractors, with the pattern being reversed for paediatric and maternity cases. In the 
private hospitals, by contrast, surgical cases constitute a much higher, and maternity 
cases a much lower, proportion of total admissions than in the other two groups.
Figure 4.1: Service-mix profiles
4.2. Effects of ownership and location on hospital utilisation and costs
Table 4.2 presents the results of an analysis of the relative effects of ownership and 
location on various key parameters of hospital utilisation and cost, using the Kruskal- 
Wallis one w ay analysis of variance by rank. As the table indicates, location exerts a 
very limited effect on the parameters assessed here, with a statistically significant effect 
at the 5% level occurring only in the case o f production costs per OPD visit. Ownership, 
on the other hand, is demonstrated to exert a statistically significant effect on twelve of
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the sixteen parameters assessed here, the exceptions being the percentages of surgical 
and paediatrics admissions in the service-mix data, bed occupancy rate, and the 
production cost per admission. Location also fails to be statistically significant in the 
case of these four parameters. These data therefore emphasise the influence of 
ownership group, and the relative lack of influence of geographical location, on key 
aspects of hospital performance. They therefore justify the use of ownership, rather than 
location, as the basis for comparisons between the study hospitals.
Table 4.2: Relative impact of ownership and geographical location on key
_____________hospital parameters________________________________
P value
Parameter measured (Kruskal-Wallis analysis o f variance)
Ownership Location
Hospital utilisation data
Admissions <0.05 >0.1
Days <0.05 >0.1
OPD visits <0.05 >0.1
Operations 0.05 >0.1
Total expenditure per bed <0.05 >0.1
LOS <0.05 >0.1
Turnover rate <0.05 >0.1
Bed Occupancy rate >0.1 >0.1
Service-mix data
% medical <0.05 >0.1
% surgical >0.1 >0.1
% maternity <0.05 >0.1
% paediatrics >0.1 >0.1
Production costs
per day <0.05 >0.1
per admission >0.1 >0.1
per OPD visit <0.05 <0.05
per composite output <0.05 >0.1
43. Hospital utilisation statistics
This section presents the results o f an analysis o f three interrelated indicators of hospital 
utilisation: turnover rate, LOS and bed occupancy rate, as well as the application of the 
Pabon Lasso graphical technique described in Chapter 3.
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4 3 .1. Turnover rate
Figure 4.2 illustrates the total turnover rate for each hospital as well as the mean values 
for each ownership group. As the figure demonstrates, contractor and public hospitals 
occupy an overlapping range o f  values (23-31 and 28-39) with the public group 
demonstrating higher mean and median values. The figure also illustrates the very high 
rates for private hospitals (71-100), which are on average more than double those of 
public hospitals and treble those o f  the contractor hospitals. Table A19.3, Appendix 19 
shows these data for different service-mix categories. These data show some intra-group 
variability, but confirm that public hospitals have higher mean and median turnover 
rates than contractors across all service-mix categories with the exception of paediatrics.
Figure 42: T umover rate
4 3 2 .  Average length of stay
Figure 4.3 shows LOS for all in-patients, as well as the effects of adjustment for service- 
mix. The figure shows that, using both unadjusted and adjusted data, the contractors 
demonstrate a higher range o f  values for LOS than the public group, with a slight 
overlap between the ranges, which is confirmed by the higher mean and median values 
for the contractors relative to the public group. The use o f median values reduces the
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contractor-public gap, due to removal of the effect o f the short LOS at one o f the public 
hospitals, Bisho.92 The effect o f service-mix adjustment is to slightly increase the gap 
between the contractor and public hospitals in both the mean and median values. 
Private hospitals, on the other hand, show a substantially lower range of values of LOS 
than all other hospitals, an observation which is not affected by adjustment for service- 
mix. Table A19.4, Appendix 19 shows these data for individual service-mix categories. 
Despite some intra-group variability, these data maintain the general pattern observed 
for all in-patients. Using the mean and median data, for example, the contractors 
demonstrate longer LOS than the public hospitals across all service-mix categories, with 
the exception o f the median value for surgical cases where public hospitals show longer 
LOS.
92 Ti,is ¡s hugely attributable to the fact that a high proportion o f  admissions to this hospital are to the short stay 
ward, in which length o f stay is 1 day or less. Short say  admissions accounted for 21% of admissions and 4 4*/. 
o f  in-patient days during the study year. Service-mix. case-mix and severity factors may also contribute to the 
short LOS at this hospital.
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4-33 . Bed Occupancy Rates
Figure 4.4 shows the average occupancy rates for individual hospitals as well as the 
mean values for each group, with and without service-mix adjustment. The contractors 
and public hospitals again demonstrate an overlapping range of values (71%-79% and 
59%-78% using unadjusted and adjusted data respectively), although the contractors 
occupy the higher end o f the range, and have higher mean and median values than do 
the public hospitals. The private hospitals show data in a  similar range to the other two 
groups, although they occupy the higher end of the total range, and demonstrate the 
highest mean and median values overall. As the figure indicates, service-mix adjustment 
does not significantly affect these general observations.
Figure 4.4: Bed occupancy rate
The data on turnover rates and LOS suggest that the observed convergence between the 
three groups in average bed occupancy rates is attributable to different factors in each of 
the groups. Comparing the contractor and public hospitals, for example, it is clear that in 
the contractor group, long LOS overrides the effect o f  a  lower turnover rate on average 
bed occupancy, while the opposite is the case in the public hospitals, which have 
relatively shorter LOS and higher turnover rates. Similarly, the generally high
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occupancy rates for private hospitals occur despite the short LOS, and are attributable to 
the particularly high turnover rates in these hospitals. Table A 19.5, Appendix 19 shows 
data on occupancy rates for individual service-mix categories. These data maintain a 
generally consistent pattern with that observed for all in-patients, although there is some 
variability across service-mix categories within individual hospitals, as well as within 
and between hospital groups.
43.4. Combined hospital utilisation indicators
Figure 4.5 applies the Pabon Lasso graphical approach to assessment o f hospital 
utilisation, as described in the Chapter 3. As would be expected from the data discussed 
above, this integrated analysis highlights important differences between the three 
groups. As Figure 4.5 shows, the contractors all lie close to the borders of Sector 4, 
demonstrating a consistent pattern of relatively low turnover and high LOS, resulting in 
relatively high occupancy rates. The public hospitals show a more variable pattern, with 
one each in sectors 1, 2 and 3, while the private hospitals all occupy sector 3, 
demonstrating consistently superior performance in activity terms, characterised by high 
turnover, short LOS and high occupancy rates.
Note: C M ”  C ontractor (M atikw ana); PB “  Public (B isho); P v te^ -P riv a te  ( S t  D om inies), etc.
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4.4. Cost analysis
This section begins with a brief review of the expenditure profiles of each hospital, and 
then examines the unit production costs of a range of outputs, as well as the costs per 
case of the four tracer conditions. It then explores the reasons for variations in these unit 
costs through further analysis o f a series of component unit costs and input-output 
ratios. Thereafter, it presents the data on the comparative costs to the public sector o f 
contracting as opposed to directly managed public provision.
4.4.1. Hospital expenditure profiles
Figure 4.6 shows the total annual expenditure, and its distribution between four main 
areas o f hospital activity, for each o f the study hospitals. Table A 19.6, Appendix 19 
provides further detail on these data. The data on both total expenditure and its 
distribution confirm the differences between ownership groups noted above, with 
variation between ownership groups exceeding intra-group variability in all cases. The 
figure shows that total expenditure by contractor hospitals is one third that of the public 
hospitals, on average, even when the outlier in the former group (Bisho) is excluded. 
This factor is in excess of that expected from the analysis of bed numbers and hospital 
throughput data given earlier, suggesting differences in unit production costs, which are 
discussed in more detail below.
These expenditure data also reflect the differences between the groups in hospital 
structure and service delivery noted above, with public and contractor hospitals 
demonstrating significant expenditure on outpatient services, and the public hospitals 
(and one contractor) showing expenditure on community services. As expected, the 
private hospitals show a different picture, with two hospitals showing small proportions 
of expenditure on outpatient services and none showing expenditure on community 
services. All hospitals also show some expenditure on nurse training, although this
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accounts for a very small proportion of the total at the private hospitals, and slightly 
larger, but still small, proportions in the other two groups.
Figure 4.6: Expenditure profiles
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4.4.2. Analysis of production costs
4.4.2.1. Production costs per in-patient day
Figure 4.7 shows the total production cost per in-patient day for all in-patients at the 
contractor and public hospitals, as well as the mean values for the two groups, with and 
without adjustment for service-mix. Table 4.3 shows these data for individual service- 
mix categories. Figure 4.7 indicates that the costs per in-patient day at the contractor 
hospitals are consistently below those at the public hospitals, with the mean contractor 
cost 66% lower than that of the public hospitals, while the equivalent margin in the 
median values is 41%.93 Service-mix adjustment does not affect these general
93 The term margin, as used throughout this chapter, generally refers to the margin, expressed as a percentage, 
between th e  mean or median values o f  the public hospital costs and contractor hospital costs (or between the 
mean or median private and public hospital costs) and is calculated as:
[ (public hospital cost- contractor hospital costy( contract or hospital cost)] X 100.
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observations: after adjustment, mean contractor costs are 71% lower than the mean 
public hospital costs, while the margin in the median values is 33%.
Figure 4.7: Production costs per in-patient day
Table 4.3 shows that the same general pattern is maintained across the individual 
service-mix categories when mean and median data are used, although there is some 
variation across categories in the extent o f the margin between the contractor and public 
hospitals. The table also shows some individual instances where contractor costs exceed 
those at public hospitals.
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Table 43: Total Production costs (Rand, 1992/93)
C o n tra c to r Public M ean M edian
Matik. Hewu Shil. T ints. Letaba Bisbo Con. Pub. Margin
<%)»
Con. Pub. M argin
<%)■
In -p a tien t days
M edical 128 145 140 168 288 137 198 45 137 168 23
Surgical 133 183 187 214 285 158 229 45 158 214 35
A dult
m edical/surgical
108 130 166 154 186 286 135 209 55 130 186 42
Maternity 184 306 212 171 371 444 234 329 40 212 371 75
Paediatrics 100 84 74 120 157 322 86 200 132 84 157 88
A ll  in -pa tien t 
d a ys
124 137 140 153 193 318 133 221 66 137 193 41
A ll  in -pa tien t 
d a ys  -  a d ju s te d
94 148 145 133 193 334 129 220 71 145 193 33
In -patien t
adm issions
Medical 1,572 1,568 1 ,456 1,741 1,691 1,570 1,629 4 1,570 1,741 II
Surgical 1,488 1,436 2 ,0 9 7 2,021 1,172 1,462 1,763 21 1.462 2,021 38
Adult
medicat/surgical
1,342 1,532 1,485 1,643 1,857 1,386 1,453 1,629 12 1,485 1,857 25
Maternity 813 1,703 1,437 8 9 0 1,162 1,793 1,318 1,282 -3 1,437 1,162 -19
Paediatrics 901 1,347 795 1,123 1,431 2,085 1,014 1,546 52 901 1,431 59
A ll in -pa tien t 
adm issio n s
1,014 1,533 1,256 1 ,269 1,632 1,586 1,268 1,496 18 1,256 1,632 30
A ll in -p a tien t 
adm issio n s  -  
a d ju s te d
1,098 1,538 1,330 1,383 1,580 1,676 1,322 1,546 17 1,330 1,580 19
O u tp a tien t visits 121 154 40 53 88 227 105 123 17 121 88 -27
O p era tio n s 1,236 952 679 5 8 7 751 3,164 956 1,501 57 952 751 -21
C om posite
o u tp u t
123 140 108 107 157 288 124 184 49 123 157 27
C om posite  
o u tp u t -  
ad justed
98 149 111 9 9 157 297 119 184 54 I I I 157 42
Notes a: M argin refers to  the public-contractor m argin, expressed as a  percentage, and is calculated as:
I(Pub-Con)/Con) X 100
Figure 4.8 shows the average costs per in-patient day for all in-patients at all hospitals, 
in this case adjusted for comparison with the private hospitals, as described in Chapter 3. 
As illustrated in the figure, the costs per in-patient day at private hospitals are 
substantially higher than those in all other hospitals, with mean costs exceeding mean 
public sector costs by 152%, and with the equivalent margin in the median values being 
291%. Service-mix adjustment has the effect of significantly reducing average costs per 
in-patient day at all of the private hospitals, but this does not affect their position relative 
to the other two groups. These patterns are maintained across individual service-mix
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categories, as illustrated in Table A9.7, Appendix 19, although with some variation 
between groups in the observed margins.
Figure 4.8: Production costs per in-patient day, adjusted for comparison with 
private hospitals
4.4.2.2. Production costs per admission
Figure 4.9 shows the total production costs per admission for all in-patients at the 
contractor and public hospitals, as well as the mean values for the two groups. The 
figure shows that the costs at these hospitals occupy an overlapping range (RIO 14- 
R1S33 in the contractor hospitals, and R1269-R1632 in the public hospitals), with 
public hospital costs occupying the higher end of the range. This is reflected in the mean 
and median values which are 18% and 30% lower in the contractor than in the public 
hospitals respectively. Adjustment for service-mix does not affect the overall pattern 
observed here, although it does affect the extent o f the margin in the median values, 
which is reduced from 30% to 19%.
Table 4.3 shows the costs per admission for individual service-mix categories. In 
general, these data maintain the general pattern of overlapping ranges between the two
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hospital groups, with generally lower mean and median costs in the contractor group. 
One exception is in the case of maternity admissions, in which mean and median 
contractor costs exceed public hospital costs by 3% and 19%  respectively. The table also 
demonstrates significant variation between the margins across service-mix categories, as 
well as instances in which costs per admission at individual contractor hospitals exceed 
those observed in one or more of the public hospitals.
The margins between contractor and public hospital costs observed here are 
substantially narrower than those observed in the data on costs per in-patient day. This is 
attributable to the longer LOS in the contractor hospitals than in the public hospitals, 
which has the effect o f increasing the average cost per admission.
Figure 4.9: Production cost per admission
Figure 4.10 shows production costs per admission for all in-patients adjusted for 
comparison with the private hospitals, and shows that costs at the private hospitals fall 
into a higher range than the other two groups, although this range does overlap with that 
o f the public hospitals. The fact that the margins between the private group and the other 
two groups are narrower in costs per admission than those observed in costs per in-
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patient day is attributable to the significantly shorter LOS in the private hospitals, which 
weakens the impact of the significantly higher private hospital costs per in-patient day.94
Figure 4.10: Production cost per admission, adjusted for comparison with 
private hospitals
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4.4.2.3. Production costs per outpatient visit and per surgical operation
Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the total production costs per OPD visit and per surgical 
operation, respectively, at the public and contractor hospitals. As both figures illustrate, 
the unit costs for these two outputs occupy wide and overlapping ranges, with much 
greater variation within and between groups than was the case with costs per in-patient 
day or per admission. These high variations mitigate against the use of mean data for 
comparison between the groups here, particularly because of the distorting effect o f the 
outlier in the public hospital group. Table 4.3 shows that median contractor costs exceed 
those o f  public hospitals in both cases, with margins of 27% and 21% for OPD visits 
and operations respectively.
94 Service-mix adjustment docs not affect this general pattern, although it does have the effect o f increasing the 
private-public margin in the mean and median values, reflecting the longer LOS attributed to private hospitals 
when they are assumed to admit patients resembling the hypothetical service-mix profile.
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Figure 4.11: Production costs per OPD visit
Figure 4.12: Production costs per operation
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Table A 19.7, Appendix 19 shows the data on cost per OPD visit and per surgical 
operation, adjusted for comparison with the private hospitals. The mean costs per OPD 
visit at the private hospitals exceed the median costs of the public and contractor 
hospitals by 297% and 177% respectively.95 The data on the costs per operation show a 
very different pattern, with median costs per operation at the private hospitals being
95 Mean costs rather than median costs are used for the private hospitals since only two hospitals deliver OPD 
services.
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31% and 45% lower than the equivalent costs at the public and contractor hospitals 
respectively,96 an observation which is attributable to the very high throughput o f the 
operating theatres in the private hospitals.
4.4.2.4. Costs per composite output
Figure 4.13 shows the costs per composite output, defined as the weighted sum o f in­
patient days and OPD visits97 for the contractor and public hospitals, with and without 
adjustment for service-mix. The figure shows that the costs for the two groups occupy 
overlapping ranges, although the range of costs in the public hospital is wider and 
extends much higher than in the contractor hospitals. This is reflected in the higher 
mean and median costs in the public hospitals, with margins of 49% in the mean and 
27% in the median values. The effect of service-mix adjustment widens the margin 
observed here to 54%  in the mean and 42% in the median values. These margins, which 
are lower than those observed in the case of costs per in-patient day, reflect the impact 
o f the higher median costs per OPD visit in the contractor hospitals. This has the effect 
of reducing, but not reversing, the margin observed in the cost per in-patient day. since 
the number of in-patient days substantially exceeds the number o f OPD visits at all of 
these hospitals.
The use of in-patient days rather than admissions in computation of a composite output 
will bias the findings in favour o f hospitals with long LOS, and hence would be 
expected to favour the contractor hospitals. Table A 19.8, Appendix 19 provides a 
comparison of this approach with one in which the composite output is defined as the 
weighted average o f  admissions and OPD visits. As the table shows, the use of 
admissions in the definition o f a composite output in fact reverses the observed margin 
between contractor and public hospitals, with the contractor hospitals now emerging as 
2% more costly in the mean values, and 7% more costly in the median values (as
96 As noted in the discussion o f hospital profiles above, the nature o f the OPD visits at the private hospitals is vets 
different from those at the other two groups, so that this cost comparison should be interpreted » ith caution
97 Other elements o f  hospital output, including surgical operations, are included w ithin the measure o f costs per 
in-patient day.
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opposed to being 47% and 27% less costly when in-patient days were used in the 
definition o f a composite output).
Table A19.7, Appendix 19, shows the data on costs per composite output adjusted for 
comparison with private hospitals. As expected, the costs at the private hospitals exceed 
those in the other two groups by wide margins.
Figure 4.13: Production costs per composite output
This analysis has demonstrated that unit production costs of most of the outputs 
measured are generally lower at the contractor than at the public hospitals, with the 
exceptions o f OPD visits and surgical operations. This pattern is maintained across most 
o f the service-mix categories, although exceptions to this general pattern were noted in 
some cases. Analysis of individual hospital costs also revealed instances in which 
individual contractor hospitals demonstrated unit costs in excess of those at one or more 
o f the public hospitals. The comparison with private hospitals demonstrated a similarly 
consistent pattern, with unit costs of these hospitals being uniformly higher than those of 
the other groups in all cases besides surgical operations.
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4.4.2.5. Sensitivity analysis
As discussed in Chapter 3, the cost estimates presented here depend upon a range of 
assumptions, variations in which would be expected to affect the resulting estimates of 
unit costs to varying degrees. Figures A 19.1 and A 19.2, Appendix 19, illustrate the 
effect of variations in three of these assumptions on estimated capital and total costs 
respectively for the three hospital groups, while Tables A 19.9 to A 19.11, Appendix 19 
show these data for the individual hospitals. Detailed commentary on these analyses is 
provided after Table A19.11 in Appendix 19. The first assumption to be varied was the 
level of the discount rate, which affects the interest costs of capital. Whereas the 
standard rate used was 8%, sensitivity analysis was performed using rates of 4% and 
0%. The second set of assumptions concerns the estimated lifespan of capital items. 
Here the standard assumptions were SO years for buildings and 10 years for equipment, 
and the sensitivity analyses examined the effect of reducing these estimates to 30 years 
and 5 years respectively. A third set of assumptions related to the method of estimating 
the replacement costs of equipment, as discussed in Chapter 3.
As shown in the figures and tables, these various sensitivity analyses lead to three main 
conclusions. Firstly, capital costs are highly sensitive to changes in these various 
assumptions, and total costs are somewhat less sensitive, although combinations of 
extreme assumptions did produce changes o f  6-12% in total costs in the different 
hospital groups. A second observation concerns the differential response of the different 
groups to changes in these assumptions, and in particular, the greater sensitivity of the 
contractor hospitals to these variations, which is attributable to the higher proportion of 
total costs accounted for by capital costs in this group (see below). The third and most 
important conclusion is that the critical differences between contractor and public 
hospitals observed in the cost analysis are robust to these variations in capital cost 
assumptions. While the extent of the margins varied in some cases, these variations were 
not substantial in any of the cases analysed, and none of the margins were shown to 
change direction.
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4.4.2.6. Composition and determinants o f production costs
Figure 4.14 illustrates a breakdown of total production costs into capital and recurrent 
costs, as well as into selected recurrent cost components, further details o f which are 
presented in Table A19.12, Appendix 19.9* As the figure and the table demonstrate, 
capital costs account for a higher proportion of total costs in the contractor hospitals 
than in the public hospitals (ranges of 12%-17.5% and 8%-10% respectively), which is 
reflected in the contractors' lower recurrent to capital cost (RCC) ratios." This is in part 
due to the inclusion o f community services in the calculation of total recurrent costs, 
but not o f capital costs, at the public hospitals (and at Shiluvana hospital). Removal of 
this element of recurrent costs reduces the RCC ratios at the public hospitals, but these 
remain higher, on average, than those of the contractor hospitals, suggesting some 
underlying differences in production patterns.98 100
Staff costs account for the largest proportion of recurrent and total costs in all 
hospitals101, and for similar proportions of mean total costs in the contractor and public 
groups (ranges of 57%-67% and 53%-64% respectively), while administrative costs 
account for significantly lower proportions of mean total costs in the contractor than in 
the public group (5%-7% and 10%-13% respectively).102 Pharmaceuticals and 
laboratory tests account for a slightly lower proportion of total costs in the contractor 
than in the public hospitals, while domestic services account for very similar proportions 
between the two groups. Figure 4.14 also demonstrates important differences between 
the private hospitals and the other two groups. These are seen primarily in the high
98 Definitions o f the recurrent cost components were given in Chapter 3.
99 The recurrent to capital cost ratio is defined as the ratio o f annual recurrent costs to the total costs o f the capital 
employed at the hospital.
100 Table A9.12, Appendix 19 shows that capital costs arc dominated by building costs in all hospitals, although 
the distribution o f these costs between building costs and equipment varies between hospitals, with equipment 
accounting for a higher proportion o f  capital costs in private hospitals than in the other two groups.
191 The one exception to this observation is Pietersburg hospital, in which staff costs and drug costs account for 
similar proportions o f  total expenditure.
102 Table A19.12, Appendix 19 shows the breakdown o f the administrative cost category into internal and external 
components, with external administrative costs defined as those costs incurred by the relevant HO 
administration and allocated as an overhead to the hospital. The table demonstrates that the ratio o f external to 
internal administrative overheads is much greater in the public hospitals than in the contractor hospitals.
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proportion of total costs accounted for by pharmaceutical expenditure, and the relatively 
lower expenditure on staff.103
Figure 4.14: Composition of production costs
Table A19.12, Appendix 19 also shows the proportion of total expenditure accounted 
for by variable costs. These data show wide variation within each group, with the 
contractor and public groups showing a similar range of values (means of 14% and 15% 
respectively), which is significantly lower than that of the private hospitals (mean of 
33%), in which high drug costs inflate total variable costs.104
Table 4.4 provides further insights into the cost differentials between contractor and 
public hospitals through an analysis of the composition of unit production costs, in this 
case using in-patient days as the measure of output. As the table demonstrates, mean 
contractor costs are lower than public hospital costs across all but one of the individual
103 The comparison with the private hospitals is not strictly accurate, since the omission o f  some categories o f staff 
and investigation costs from these hospitals leads to overestimates of the relative share accounted for by the 
other categories.
104 Variable costs at the private hospitals omit laboratory and X-ray costs, which are included in these costs at the 
contractor and public hospitals.
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categories o f non-capital costs105, as well as for capital costs, although to a lesser extent 
in the latter category. The table also shows wide variations within each group across 
most o f the cost categories and sub-categories.
Further analysis of each o f the non-capital cost categories provides some explanations 
for these findings. The higher administrative costs per in-patient day in the public 
hospitals are almost entirely due to the much higher levels of external administrative 
costs in this group. Public hospital costs are also higher across all sub-categories of 
domestic services, in the clinical support services category (with the exception of 
radiology), and in both the nursing and medical staff categories.
Figure 4.15 shows the relative contribution of each of the categories to the total public- 
contractor margin, using mean and median data. As the figure indicates, differences in 
nursing, medical and paramedical staff costs106 contribute most to the total public- 
contractor margin using both mean and median values. This is followed by domestic 
services and then by clinical support services when mean values are considered, with 
this order being reversed in the median data.
Table 4.4 also shows the total costs per in-patient day broken down into fixed and 
variable costs. This shows that the total variable costs per in-patient day at the 
contractor hospitals are consistently lower than those at the public hospitals, with a 
margin o f  170% in both the mean and median values.
Table 4.5 provides the same analysis for OPD visits. Here, mean public hospital costs 
are higher than contractor costs in the administration, domestic services and staff 
categories, but not in the clinical support services category, where the pattern is 
reversed. In the median data, however, public hospital costs are lower in all cost 
categories besides domestic services.
105 The single exception to this observation is the X-ray category, in which contractor costs exceed those o f the 
public hospitals.
106 As noted in Table 4.4, only nursing, medical and paramedical staff costs are included in the general measure o f 
staff costs, since all other staff costs are included within the remaining categories (domestic services and clinical 
support services).
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Table 4.4: Composition of in-patient day costs (Rand, 1992/93)
C o n tra c to r Public M ean M ed ian
M atik . H ew u ShiL T in ts. L c taba Bisho C on. P u b . C on . P u b .
External adm inistration 7.09 4.35 7.55 13.09 18.70 15.66 6.33 15.82 7.09 15.66
Internal adm inistration 2.77 2.40 1.94 0.36 0.54 6.53 2.37 2.48 2.40 0.54
Adm in, to ta l 9 .8 7 6 .7 5 9 .49 13.45 19.24 2 2 .1 9 8 .7 0 1 8 .2 9 9 .4 9 1 9 .2 4
Transport 2.55 3.32 9.16 6.62 6.93 3.90 5.01 5.82 3.32 6.62
Laundry 6.92 5.17 7.55 5.39 5.28 19.25 6.55 9 .98 6.92 5.39
Catering 12.02 8.76 12.96 11.07 17.33 27.26 11.25 18.55 12.02 17.33
Housekeeping/
M aintenance
5.53 9.96 12.94 11.37 22.75 35.62 9.48 23 .25 9.96 22.75
D o m estic  s e rv ic e s  to ta l 2 7 .0 2 2 7 .2 1 42 .61 3 4 .4 4 5 2 .3 0 86 .0 3 32 .2 8 5 7 .5 9 27 .2 1 5 2 .3 0
Pharmacy 8.05 10.32 5.61 7.54 8.73 11.49 7.99 9.25 8.05 8.73
Radiology 0.64 3.04 2.64 1.10 0.97 1.05 2.11 1.04 2.64 1.05
Rehabilitation services 0.55 0.22 1.71 1.75 1.83 5.15 0.83 2.91 0.55 1.83
Laboratory 2.76 1.94 1.01 2.18 10.59 3.73 1.90 5.50 1.94 3.73
Operating theatres 21.45 16.79 20.81 22.75 26.34 38.79 19.68 2 9 .29 20.81 26.34
C lin ica l s u p p o r t se rv ic e s  
to ta l
3 3 .4 3 3 2 .3 2 3 1 .7 9 3 5 .3 2 48 .4 6 6 0 .2 0 32.51 4 8 .0 0 32 .3 2 4 8 .4 6
Nursing Staff 43.67 57.55 48.40 53.69 60.30 129.75 49.87 81.25 48.40 60.30
Medical Staff 1.66 1.87 1.40 8.32 5.34 4.39 1.64 6.01 1.66 5.34
M ed ica l/N u rs in g  S ta f f  
to ta l0
4 5 .3 3 5 9 .4 1 4 9 .8 0 6 2 .0 0 65 .6 4 134 .14 51.51 8 7 .2 6 4 9 .8 0 6 5 .6 4
C a p ita l c o s ts 8 .1 3 1 1 .1 7 5 .92 7 .62 7 .27 15 .82 8.41 1 0 .2 4 8 .1 3 7 .62
T o ta l co s ts 1 2 3 .7 8 1 3 6 .8 7 139.61 152 .84 192.91 3 1 8 .3 8 133 .42 2 2 1 .3 7 1 36 .87 192 .91
Total Fixed costs 100.22 118.21 127.46 111.69 142.30 263.29 115 .29 1 7 2 .4 3 118.21 142.30
Total variable costs 2 3 .5 6 1 8 .6 5 12.15 4 1 .1 5 5 0 .6 0 5 5 .0 9 18.12 4 8 .9 5 18 .6 5 50.60
Notes: a: S ta ff  total refers to  m edical/param edical and nursing staff costs. O ther s ta f f  costs are 
incorporated w ith in  the dom estic services, adm inistration and clinical su p p o rt services 
categories.
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Table 4.5; Composition of outpatient visit costs (Rand, 1992/93)
C o n tra c to r P u b lic M ean M edian
M atik . H ew u ShiL T in ts . L e ta b a Bisho C on . Pub . C on . P u b .
External adm inistra tion 4.88 3.36 1.79 4.28 4.12 11.31 3.34 6.57 3.36 4.28
Internal adm in istra tion 1.91 1.85 0.46 0.12 0.12 4.72 1.41 1.65 1.85 0.12
A d m in , to ta l 6 .7 8 5 .21 2 .2 6 4 .4 0 4 .2 4 16 .03 4 .7 5 8 .2 2 5.21 4.40
Transport 6.97 12.38 0.00 1.83 19.54 5.84 6.45 9.07 6.97 5.84
Laundry 1.58 1.76 1.79 1.79 1.54 6.32 1.71 3.22 1.76 1.79
Catering 1.09 1.56 0.58 0.82 1.00 8.50 1.07 3.44 1.09 1.00
Housekeeping/
M aintenance
7.02 4.10 1.51 2.43 11.29 26.99 4.21 13.57 4.10 11.29
D o m e stic  s e r v ic e s  to ta l 1 6 .6 6 1 9 .7 9 3 .8 7 6 .8 7 3 3 .3 7 4 7 .6 5 13 .44 2 9 .3 0 16 .66 3 3  37
Pharm acy 16.52 30.57 5.15 6.51 6.13 11.70 17.42 8.11 16 .52 6.51
Radiology 7.28 12.80 2.68 1.80 4.82 13.31 7.59 6.64 7 .28 4.82
Rehabilitation serv ices 2.62 1.11 3.61 3.40 6.15 4.60 2.45 4.72 2 .6 2 4.60
Laboratory 3.10 2.10 1.88 1.46 0.51 2.21 2.36 1.39 2.10 1.46
Operating thea tres 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C lin ic a l s u p p o r t s e r v ic e s  
to ta l
2 9 .5 3 4 6 .5 9 1 3 .3 3 13 .17 17 .61 31 .81 2 9 .8 2 2 0 .8 6 2 9 .5 3 1 7  61
N ursing S taff 32.43 44.37 11.79 15.31 13.70 94.55 29.53 41.19 32.43 15.31
Param edical s ta f f 1.52 1.03 0 .00 0.00 1.18 1.09 0.85 0.76 1.03 1.09
M edical S ta ff 21.98 30.61 7.50 8.32 14.14 22.63 20.03 15.03 21.98 14.14
O ther staff 0.00 0.00 0 .00 1.93 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.97
S ta f f  to ta l 5 5 .9 3 76.01 1 9 .2 9 2 5 .5 6 2 9 .0 2 1 1 8 .2 7 50 .41 5 7 .6 2 5 5 .9 3 2 9 .0 2
C a p ita l co s ts 11 .61 6 .4 2 1 .3 6 2 .84 3 .4 3 13 .4 5 6 .4 6 6 .5 8 6 42 3 .43
T o ta l co s ts 120 .51 154 .02 4 0 .1 1 52 .8 4 8 7 .6 7 2 2 7 .2 2 1 04 .88 122 .58 120.51 8 7 .6 7
Total fixed costs 98.02 116.53 32.04 43.38 76.18 201.66 82.20 107.08 98.02 76.18
Total variable c o s ts 22.49 37.49 8.07 9.46 11.49 25.55 22.68 15.50 22.49 11.49
Figure 4.15: Contribution of cost categories to public-contractor margin
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Tables A19.13 and A19.14, Appendix 19 show the composition of costs per in-patient 
day and per OPD visit respectively, adjusted for comparison with the private hospitals. 
Table A19.13 indicates that the higher overall costs per in-patient day in the private 
hospitals result from higher unit costs in all of the cost categories analysed, although the 
most important contributors are staff costs, capital costs and, importantly, the clinical 
support services category, where both pharmacy and operating theatre costs show 
substantial margins over the other two groups. The tables also indicate that variable 
costs are substantially higher at the private hospitals than at the other hospitals for both 
output measures.
The relative importance of staff costs in the composition of total costs, and in the 
contribution to the public-contractor margins noted above, justifies a closer examination 
o f this category of production costs. The determinants o f staff costs include the numbers 
and mix of staff employed, as well as levels of remuneration of different staff categories. 
Figure 4.16 shows the ratios o f various staff categories to composite hospital outputs for 
the public and contractor hospitals. As indicated, the staff to output ratios are higher in 
all of the public than in all of the contractor hospitals in the total staff, as well as in the 
n u r s in g  and medical staff categories. In the administrative and domestic staff category, 
however, the public hospitals have marginally lower ratios than the contractor hospitals, 
with the exception of Bisho.
Figure 4.17 shows the ratios of nurses to in-patient days and OPD visits, the two 
components of the composite output measure.107 As the figure indicates, the higher 
nurse to output ratio in the public hospitals is maintained in the case of in-patient days, 
but not consistently in the case of OPD visits. Table A19.15, Appendix 19 shows 
additional nurse to output ratios, in this case, for admissions and operations, and 
indicates that the difference between public and contractor hospitals is reduced in the 
case o f admissions10* , while in the case of operations, the public sector data is heavily
107 in these calculations, nurses working in the in-patient wards were counted separately from those working in the 
OPD.
*0* This is explained by the relatively fewer admissions produced at the contractor hospitals, which has the effect 
o f  increasing the number o f nurses per admission.
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biased by the figure for Bisho, removal of which results in very similar results for the 
two groups.
Table A19.15, Appendix 19 also provides data on these various staff output ratios for 
the private hospitals, and indicates that these have higher total and nursing staff to 
composite output ratios than the public hospitals (with the exception o f Bisho in both 
cases), while their administrative/domestic staff to output ratios are o f a similar order to 
those of public hospitals (again with the exception o f Bisho). The private hospitals also 
show higher ratios per in-patient day than the public hospitals (with the exception of 
Bisho), but show lower average nurse per admission and nurse per operation ratios, than 
both the other groups.
Figure 4.16: Staff to composite output ratios
12.00
10.00
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Figure 4.17: Nurse to in-patient day and OPD visit ratios
While the staff to output ratio data presented thus far seem to corroborate the patterns 
observed in the unit cost data, they do not as yet permit distinctions between the effects 
o f  staff numbers, staff mix and remuneration levels on unit staff costs. Figure 18 
addresses the issue of remuneration levels, showing the average annual cost per staff 
member in the various staff categories. The figure shows that mean salary costs per 
doctor and per paramedical109 staff member at the contractor hospitals substantially 
exceed those at the public hospitals, with mean annual salaries per doctor o f  R91,026 in 
the contractor hospitals and R59,697 in the public hospitals, with the equivalent figures 
for paramedical staff being R42.526 and R19,543. In the case of nurses, the contractor 
and public hospitals show mean annual salary costs in a similar range, with contractors 
being slightly higher on average (R24.376 and R22.355 respectively), while this pattern 
is reversed in the case o f administrative and domestic staff (mean annual salaries of 
R12,875 in the contractor hospitals and R14.733 in the public hospitals). The figure also 
shows that average salaries for nursing, administrative and domestic staff at the private 
hospitals are higher than those in the other two groups. *
*09  Paramedical staff include physiotherapists, occupational therapists, radiologists, pharmacists or assistant staff in 
any o f these categories.
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Figure 4.18: M ean annual salary cost per staff m em ber
Figure 19 shows the distribution of nursing staff between Professional nurses, Staff 
nurses and Assistant/pupil nurses at each of the hospitals.110 As expected from the 
analysis of mean costs per nurse, the figure confirms a relatively similar nursing mix 
between the contractor and public hospitals, with the contractor hospitals appearing to 
employ a slightly more expensive mix, with marginally higher proportions of 
Professional and Staff nurses than their public sector counterparts. The mean 
proportions o f Professional nurses are 33% and 30%  in the contractor and public 
hospital groups respectively, while the figures for Staff nurses are 24% and 20%.’11 The 
figure also shows the somewhat different picture at private hospitals, which are 
characterised by a significantly higher proportion of Professional nurses (mean o f 57%) 
with the balance evenly distributed between the other two categories.
110 These categories o f  nurses arc distinguished by the duration o f their training, subsequent professional status and 
levels o f remuneration. Professional nurses are the highest paid category, and undergo a three year formal 
training. Staff nurses undergo a  two year training, while Assistant nurses undergo a one year training. The 
Pupil nurse category comprises a varying mix o f  nurses in training, either to become staff or professional 
nurses.
111 |n  addition to questions o f staffing policy, one explanation fo r the relatively lower proportions o f  more 
qualified staff at the public hospitals is the presence o f larger num bers of Pupil nurses at these hospitals due to 
their more substantial training function. Note also the similarity in nursing staff profile between Shiluvana 
hospital and the public hospitals, which is explained by the fact th a t all nursing staff at Shiluvana are employed 
by the government, and also by the fact that the hospital undertakes a greater teaching load than do the other 
two contractor hospitals.
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Figure 4.19: Nursing staff mix
Taken together, these data allow some conclusions concerning the effects of 
employment patterns and remuneration on the observed differences in unit costs at the 
study hospitals. As noted above, differences in unit staff cost explain a significant 
proportion o f  the total public-contractor margin in the various unit staff costs analysed 
here. This analysis has shown that this occurs despite the relatively more expensive staff 
mix (in all categories except administrative and domestic staff) at the contractor 
hospitals, and therefore suggests that the relatively higher unit staff costs at the public 
hospitals are entirely attributable to their relatively higher staff to output ratios in most 
staff categories. The one exception to this pattern is found in the administrative and 
domestic staff categories, where the higher public hospital costs are attributable to a 
combination of higher staff output ratios and a more expensive staff mix.
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4.43. Tracer conditions
Table 4.6 presents the median values o f the data on the total production costs per case, 
as well as on the composition of these costs, for the four tracer conditions. These data 
represent median values o f the data for each parameter. Tables A19.16 - A19.19, 
Appendix 19 present more detailed data on each of these parameters for the individual 
tracer conditions."2 Table 4.7 shows the results of a statistical analysis o f  the pooled 
group data for the contractor and public hospitals only, while Table 4.8 shows the results 
o f  a similar analysis for all nine hospitals, on this occasion adjusted for comparison with 
the private hospitals. The results obtained for each of the tracers are discussed 
separately below. Table A19.20, Appendix 19 presents the results of regression analyses 
undertaken to investigate the relationship between age and sex and costs per case. As the 
table demonstrates, no significant relationship between either of these parameters and 
costs per case were noted for any o f the tracer conditions, and the data were 
consequently not adjusted for age or sex.
• *2 As Tables A I9 .I6  -A 19.19, Appendix 19 demonstrate. the median values o f the date are low er than the mean 
values for most o f the parameters, reflecting, in general, the influence o f a few outliers at the higher ends o f  the 
ranges o f values. For this reason, the median values were chosen for detailed analysis here. Comparison of 
pooled data for the different groups however relies on statistical comparisons o f sample means.
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Table 4.6: Tracer cost analysis — comparison of contractor and public
____________ hospitals (costs per case - Rand, 1992/93)
Contractor Public
Matik. Hewn ShiL Tints. Letaba Bisho
Caesarean Section
Length of Stay (days) 11 10 10 8 6 8
Lab Costs 5 4 0 0 4 4
Drug Costs 9 13 39 9 19 17
Theatre Costs 1,742 1,304 1,422 1,221 932 5,580
Hotel and Staff Costs 1,530 2,077 1,758 1,074 1,591 2,677
Total production cost 3,272 3,411 3,216 2,295 2,552 8,262
Total Contract Cost 3,942 3,968 4,061
Normal Deliveries
Length of Stay (days) 2 3 4 3 2 4
Lab Costs 0 4 0 0 4 0
Drug Costs 2 0 17 1 3 67
Hotel and Staff Costs 278 623 615 403 530 1,258
Total production cost 283 631 631 404 530 1,325
Total Contract Cost 405 799 927
Appendectomies
Length o f Stay (days) 12 11 7 8 6
Lab Costs 64 23 0 45 52
Drug Costs 24 50 26 12 21
Theatre Costs 1,888 1,849 2,098 1,140 956
Hotel and Staff Costs 904 1,145 798 792 707
Total production cost 2,962 3,082 2,925 2,022 1,746
Total Contract Cost 3,358 3,390 3,309
Hernia Repair
Length of Stay (days) 7 10 13 6 9
Lab Costs 0 4 0 0 28
Drug Costs 3 2 32 6 4
Theatre Costs 2,482 1,452 1,502 1,136 1,182
Hotel and Staff Costs 528 1,041 1,536 633 1,002
Total production cost 3,085 2,538 3,046 1,779 2,215
Total Contract Cost 3,349 2,818 3,785
Table 4.7: Tracer cost analysis - pooled group data for contractor and public
Contractor Public Adjusted Public*
Mean Cl* Median Mean C l Median P value Mean C I Ivied ian P value
Caesarean
Section
3,655 161 3,290 4,727 409 2,839 <0.01 2537.45 89.24 2429.44 <0.01
Normal
Delivery
636 89 439 870 69 694 <0.01 550.79 79.22 404 <0.05
Appen­
dectomy
3,223 387 2,964 2,061 284 1,983 <0.01 n/a‘ n/a n/a n/au
2,983 141 2,959 2,453 387 2,040 <0.01 n/a n/a n/a n/a
pooled ample, in order lo m en the impact of the removal of the high costs at this hospital on the perfonnance of the 
remaining two public hospitals, 
b: 95% confidence interval
c: n/a - not applicable (since no appendectomy and hernia repair cases were earned out at Bisho during the study year).
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Table 4.8: Tracer cost analysis - pooled group data for all hospitals (costs per 
case-R and, 1992/93)________
Contractor Public Private P values
Mean C f Median Mean Cl Median Mean Cl Median P
(Pvte-
Pub)
P
(Pvte-
Con)
Caesarean
Section
3,592 156 3,261 4,647 412 2,678 4,845 343 4,353 0.23 <0.01
Normal
Delivery
617 87 423 773 72 510 2,415 138 2,320 <0.01 <0.01
Appen­
dectomy
3.110 363 2,856 1,938 258 1,881 1,775 51 1,704 0.11 <0.01
Hernia
Repair
2,941 143 2,916 2,342 358 1,958 1,578 56 1,554 <0.01 <0.01
N ote: a. 9 5 %  confidence interval
4.4.3.1. Caesarean sections
Table 4.6 shows that the total production costs per caesarean section case at all of the 
contractor hospitals are higher than the costs at two of the public hospitals, but 
substantially lower than those at Bisho hospital. This pattern is reflected in the 
comparison o f means and medians for the pooled data shown in Table 4.7, which shows 
lower means and medians for the contractor group (with a statistically significant 
difference between the mean values). When the cases from Bisho hospital are removed, 
however, the mean and median values for the contractor hospitals are in fact higher than 
those o f the public hospitals, the difference between the means again being statistically 
significant Examination o f the component costs in Table 4.6 suggests some 
explanations for these observations. The extremely high cost per case at Bisho is largely 
attributable to the very high theatre costs at that hospital, although the higher hotel and 
staff costs'13 per in-patient day observed earlier combine with the longer LOS to give 
the highest hotel and staff costs per case o f all hospitals. A comparison of the 
contractors with the remaining public hospitals shows that the longer LOS in the 
contractors overrides the effect o f their lower costs per maternity in-patient day observed 
earlier, resulting in higher hotel and staff costs per case. Theatre costs are also higher in 
the contractor hospitals. Table 4.8 shows that the mean costs per case at the private 13
113 As defined in Chapter 3, hotel and staff costs include all costs besides the costs o f laboratory tests, drugs and 
operating theatre time, which were estimated separately.
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hospitals exceed the means of the other two groups, although the difference between the 
private and public hospital data is not statistically significant.114
4.4.3.2. Normal Deliveries
As in the case of caesarean sections, analysis of the pooled data (Table 4.7) shows that 
the contractors had a lower mean cost per case than the public hospitals with the 
difference being statistically significant, although this pattern is reversed when the effect 
o f Bisho is removed from the public hospital data.115 Table 4.6 shows that LOS for 
normal deliveries falls into a similar range for the two groups, so that differences in 
hotel and staff costs per case are attributable mainly to differences in underlying 
production costs. Table 4.8 shows that private hospital costs per delivery exceed those 
of both of the other groups, in this case by a factor o f between 3 and 4.116
4.4.3.3. Appendectomy
Table 4.6 demonstrates that the costs per appendectomy case at all three of the 
contractor hospitals exceed those at the two public hospitals for which data were 
available,117 and Table 4.7 shows the higher mean and median costs per case for the 
contractor group, with the difference between the means again occurring at a statistically 
significant level. Table 4.6 demonstrates that the higher total costs at the contractors are 
attributable to a combination of longer LOS (which counteracts their lower hotel and
1 A s  demonstrated in Table A19.I6, Appendix 19, the higher private hospital costs occur despite these hospitals 
having shorter LOS and lower theatre costs per case than the other hospitals, and are attributable to a 
combination o f the higher costs per maternity in-patient day demonstrated earlier, and to substantially higher 
drug costs per case.
IIS  Table 4.6 again shows Bisho hospital as an outlier, with costs per case more than double those o f the next 
highest hospital. In this case, the major factor appears to be the higher costs per in-patient day in the maternity 
ward. The table shows a more variable pattern in respect o f total costs per case at die remaining hospitals, with 
one contractor hospital (Matikwana) demonstrating the lowest total costs, but with the remaining two showing 
higher costs than at the remaining public hospitals.
11® Table A I9 .I8 , Appendix 19, shows that this occurs despite similar LOS to that o f the other hospitals, and is 
again attributable to the much higher drug  costs per case, as well as to the higher underlying hotel and staff 
costs per maternity in-patient day at the private hospitals.
117 No appendectomies or hernia repair operations were carried out at Bisho hospital during the study year.
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staff costs per in-patient day) and significantly higher theatre costs per case. Table 4.8 
shows the data for private hospitals and demonstrates a very different pattern to that 
observed for maternity cases. In this case, the costs per case are lower at the private 
hospitals than in both of the other groups, although the difference in the means between 
private and public hospitals is not statistically significant.118
4.4.3.4. Hernia Repair
Table 4.6 demonstrates that costs per hernia repair case follow a very similar pattern to 
that observed for appendectomy cases, with the total costs per case at each of the 
contractor hospitals being higher than those at the two public hospitals for which data 
were available. Once again, this is reflected in the higher mean and median costs per 
case at the contractor hospitals (see Table 4.7). Table 4.6 also suggests a similar set of 
explanations for this pattern, with LOS and theatre costs being higher in the contractor 
hospitals. As noted previously, the higher LOS in the contractor hospitals is sufficient to 
override the effects of their lower costs per surgical in-patient day, so that total hotel and 
staff costs per case are significantly higher in the contractor than in the public hospitals. 
Table 4.8 shows that mean and median costs per case at the private hospitals are lower 
than in both o f the other groups, with differences between the means being statistically 
significant in both cases.119
4.4. Comparison of total contract costs and public sector production 
costs
This section reviews the relationships between the various components of total contract 
cost and public sector production cost, before presenting comparative data on these cost
t 18 As Table A 19.18, Appendix 19 shows, the lower costs per case at the private hospitals occur despite the much 
higher drag costs per case and the higher underlying hotel and staff costs per in-patient day at these hospitals, 
and are attributable to significantly shorter LOS and to much lower total theatre costs per case.
119 Table A I9.I9, Appendix 19 shows that the lower private hospital costs occur despite higher drag costs per case, 
and are attributable to shorter LOS and to substantially lower theatre costs per case.
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parameters. As in the previous sections, these comparisons are made separately for in­
patient days, admissions and other measures of output, as well as for the four tracer 
conditions.
Table 4.9 presents the data on the elements of total production cost and total contract 
costs at each o f the contractor hospitals, and also shows the price of the contract and 
consequent contractor profit levels and margins at each hospital. The table shows that 
the relative contribution of the government and contractor cost elements of total 
production cost vary significantly between hospitals, which is attributable to variations 
in the nature o f the contract in place at each hospital. As further discussed in Chapter 6, 
variations in the contract concern three main issues: the inclusion or exclusion of capital 
costs in the price, the distribution of staff costs between the contractor and the 
government, and the presence or absence of a  minimum occupancy clause. The 
inclusion of capital costs in the contract price at Matikwana and Shiluvana increases the 
contribution o f the contractor cost element of total contract cost at these hospitals, 
although the government's role as the major employer of staff at Shiluvana overrides 
this effect by significantly increasing the government component of total production 
cost. The relatively low government component at Matikwana reflects the absence of 
capital costs, and the minimal government role in employment of staff, while the 
relatively high government component at Hewu, despite its employing no full-time staff 
at the hospital, is attributable to its bearing the full cost of capital at that hospital.
The profit levels and margins shown in the table reflect the difference between the 
contract price and contractor production cost, adjusted to exclude the effect of VAT.1 ‘° 
The lower estimated profit margin at Hewu than at the other two hospitals is likely to be 
attributable to a combination of relatively higher underlying production costs121, the *
120 v a t  is included in the contract price, but does not contribute to  contractor profits, since it is paid back to the 
government.
*21 Cost per in-patient day at Hewu was shown above to be substantially higher than the cost at Matikwana. but 
slightly lower than the cost at Shiluvana.
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absence of a minimum occupancy clause, and the absence of capital charges from the 
price at Hewu.122
Table 4.9; Elements of production and total contract costs (Rand, 1992/93)
Contractor 
production 
cost (A)
Govt 
element of 
production 
cost(B)
Total
Production 
costs (A+B)
Per diem 
rate
Contract 
Price (O
Total 
coatract 
cost (B+O
Contractor
Profil
(C-A)
Contractor
profit
margin
(D/A)
Matikwana 6,839,261 472.817 7299.762 158 88 10,043,661 10,516,477 3,017,476 44%
Hewu 9,013,523 2,275.506 11,141,624 167.47 12,044,785 14,320,291 2.854,437 32*/.
Shiluvana 4.123.748 5,122,345 7,943,798 118.21 7203,152 12225.498 2,899,772 70%
Mean 2,923.895 49%
Table 4.10 shows the effect of the minimum occupancy clause on the contract price and 
on contractor profit margins, and shows that the minimum occupancy clause led to an 
effective increase in the contract price (relative to the charge in the absence of the 
clause) o f 14% and 17% at Matikwana and Shiluvana respectively. Removal of the 
clause would in turn reduce the profit margins at the two hospitals by 41% and 36% 
respectively, indicating the extent to which this component of the contract contributes to 
profit margins at these two hospitals.
Table 4.10: Effect of minimum occupancy clause on total contract price and 
_____________profit margins___________________________________________
Days
produced
Days
charged
Excess days 
charged
Effective price 
increase due to 
occ. clause
Profit margin 
after removal 
of occ clause
Matikwana 50229 58530 8301 14% 26%
Shiluvana 49170 59292 10122 17% 45%
The high margin at Shiluvana, even after removal o f the effect of the minimum 
occupancy clause, is not attributable to lower unit production costs at that hospital since, 
as demonstrated above, these are in fact higher than those at Matikwana for all outputs 
except OPD visits. Instead this margin is attributable, at least in part, to the contract 
price not fully reflecting the reduced costs borne by the contractor through the 
government’s bearing of a substantial burden o f total staff costs at the hospital. This is 
confirmed by an analysis of the relative prices and production costs at Matikwana and
122 The extent to which this hitter factor affects the profit margin would depend on the extent o f differential returns 
earned by the contractor on capital and recurrent expenditure. This study did not produce the data required to 
distinguish the relative returns earned on each o f  these components o f expenditure.
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Shiluvana hospitals. The elimination of the costs of the staff employed by the 
government at Shiluvana represents a reduction in production costs of at least 107% 
relative to the costs the contractor would have incurred had it employed the same staff 
complement at the same salary costs.123 However, the price per in-patient day charged 
at Shiluvana was only 30% below that charged at Matikwana. If w e assume that the 
pattern o f all other production costs incurred by the contractor is similar at the two 
hospitals, these figures do suggest that the high margin at Shiluvana may be attributable 
to the price factor postulated here.124
Figure 4.20 compares total contract costs per in-patient day with production costs per in­
patient day, and indicates that the total contract costs at all three contractor hospitals fall 
below the production costs of two o f the public hospitals, but exceed the production 
costs at Tintswalo hospital. The figure also shows that the mean and median total 
contract costs are below the equivalent values for public hospital production costs, 
although the margins in this case (19% and 8% in the mean and median values 
respectively) are less than those observed in the comparison of production costs at these 
hospitals. Table 4.11 shows that service-mix adjustment does not alter the pattern 
observed here, although the margins are affected to some extent, increasing to 22% in 
the mean values and decreasing to 3% in the median values. The table also shows that 
the same general pattern is observed when VAT is excluded from the total contract cost, 
but that the margins are increased to 22% and 12% in the mean and median values 
respectively.
123 The estimated reduction in costs o f 107% may deviate from the actual figure, since the government and the 
contractor have different employment practices, affecting both numbers o f staff an d  salary levels. Were the 
contractor to employ the staff at Shiluvana, total staff costs could be expected to b e  lower since, as shown 
above, the contractor tends to utilise a lower stafT to output ratio than do public hospitals. As a result, the 
reductions in costs could be expected to be lower than those postulated here.
124 Observations undertaken during the study suggest that aside from capital costs, an d  contractual differences 
(such as the range o f staff employed), the general structure o f production costs is  similar at all three o f  the 
contractor hospitals. This is particularly the case for Matikwana and Shiluvana. In th e  case of capital costs, the 
study estimated a lower annual cost for Shiluvana than for Matikwana. This m argin is however substantially 
higher when the contractor's own estimates o f  the annual cost o f capital at these hospitals are taken into 
account In this case, the cost o f capital at Shiluvana is just over half o f that at Matikwana. In either case, these 
data suggest an even greater discrepancy between price and production cost at these two hospitals than is the 
case when capital costs are not considered.
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Figure 4J0: Total contract costs vs. public sector production costs —  in-patient 
days
Figure 4.21 shows the same data for admissions. In this case, there is a narrower gap 
between total contract costs and public hospital production costs, with total contract 
costs falling into a higher range of values than public hospital production costs 
(R1,458-R1,945 and R1,269-R1,632 respectively), and with a significant overlap 
between these ranges. As the figure shows, both mean and median total contract costs 
exceed the equivalent values of public hospital production costs by approximately 15%. 
Table 4.11 again shows that service-mix adjustment does not affect this general pattern, 
and in fact increases the observed margins to 19% and 21% in the mean and median 
values respectively. The exclusion o f VAT from the total contract cost does not affect 
the direction o f  the margins, but reduces them to 13% and 12% in the mean and median 
data respectively.
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Table 4.11: Total contract costs vs. contractor and public sector production costa (Rand, 1992/93)
Matikwana Hewn Shiluvana
Mean Median
Tints. | Let | Bisho Contractor Public Contractor Public
Price Price
ex
VAT
Prod.
Cost
Price Price
ex
VAT
Prod.
Cost
Price Price
ex
VAT
Prod
Cost
Pratluctkracost n-x_rncc Price
ex
VAT
Prod.
Cost
Prod.
Cost
Price Price
ex
VAT
Prod.
Cost
Prod.
Cost
In-patient days 178 172 124 174 168 137 207 203 140 153 193 318 186 181 133 221 178 172 140 193
In-patient days • adjusted 135 131 94 187 182 148 214 211 145 133 193 334 179 174 129 220 187 182 145 193
Admissions 1,458 1,410 1,014 1,945 1,887 1,533 1,860 1,828 1,256 1,269 1,632 1,586 1,755 1,708 1,268 1,496 1,860 1,828 1,256 1,586
Admissions - adjusted 1,579 1,527 1,098 1,951 1,894 1,538 1,970 1,922 1,330 1,320 1,570 1,533 1,833 1,781 U22 1,474 1,951 1,922 1,330 1,533
Outpatient visits 173 168 121 195 190 154 n/a n/a n/a 53 88 227 184 179 137 140 184 179 137 140
Composite output 177 171 123 178 172 140 154 151 108 107 157 288 169 165 124 184 177 171 123 157
Composite output - adjusted 141 137 98 189 183 149 157 155 111 99 157 297 163 158 119 184 157 155 111 157
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Figure 4.21: Total Contract Costs vs. Public Sector Production Costs 
Admissions
2.000
■  Unadjusted 
□Adjusted for service-mix
!
i 3 ?
Table 4.11 also shows these data for OPD visits. This indicates, as noted previously, that 
public hospital production costs per OPD visit vary widely, and that the total contract 
costs at the two contractor hospitals at which this figure is relevant fall within this wide 
range.125 However, mean and median total contract costs exceed the equivalent values 
for public hospital production cost by 24% and 52% respectively, the higher margin in 
the median values reflecting the effect of the removal o f the very high production costs 
per OPD visit at Bisho hospital.
Figure 4.22 shows the same comparisons for composite hospital outputs. This indicates 
that total contract costs per composite output at the contractor hospitals fall within a 
relatively narrow range (R154-R177), which itself falls entirely within the wider range 
of values observed for public hospital production costs (R107-R288). In this case, the 
total contract costs at all three contractor hospitals fall below production costs at two of 
the public hospitals, but exceed those observed at Tintswalo hospital. The figure also 
shows that mean total contract costs fall below mean public hospital production costs by 123
123 As noted above, OPD visits a re  not charged for at Shiluvana hospital, so that a comparison between total 
eontract cost and public hospital production costs is not relevant in this case.
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a  margin of 8%. However, this margin is reversed in the case of the median data, in 
which case total contract costs exceed public hospital production costs by 11%. As 
noted previously, this reversal is due mainly to the elimination o f the bias in the mean 
values which results from the high unit costs at Bisho hospital. Table 4.11 shows that 
service-mix adjustment increases the observed margin in the mean values to 13%, but 
eliminates it in the case of the median data, in which case total contract costs exceed 
public hospital production costs by only 0.5%. The elimination o f VAT from the total 
contract price does not affect the margins observed in either the mean or median data. 
Tables A19.21 - A19.23, Appendix 19, show the effects on total contract costs and 
public sector production costs of the same set o f sensitivity analyses carried out in the 
analysis of production costs. Table A19.21, Appendix 19 shows the effect o f reductions 
in the discount rate. Because total contract cost is not related to the discount rate, these 
variations affect public sector production costs only in this analysis. The positive public- 
contractor margins in costs per in-patient day and costs per composite output are thus 
reduced as discount rates are reduced, while the negative margins in costs per admission 
and per OPD visit are increased.
Figure 4>22: Total Contract Costs vs. Public Sector Production Costs —  
Composite Outputs
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Table A 19.22, Appendix 19 shows the effects o f  the extreme high and low sets of 
capital cost assumptions used earlier. These data illustrate a similar pattern to that 
observed for discount rates, with the low assumptions increasing the positive public- 
contractor margins and reducing the negative margins, and with high assumptions 
having the converse effect. In all cases except costs per composite output, the direction 
o f the margin remains constant. In this latter case, the positive margin in the mean 
values is eliminated on the low capital cost assumptions, while in the median values, the 
positive margin is in fact converted into a negative margin, indicating that total contract 
costs exceed public sector production costs.
Table A19.23, Appendix 19 shows the effects o f removal of capital costs on these 
comparisons. As expected, this has the effect o f  reducing the positive public-contractor 
margins in costs per in-patient day, and of increasing the negative margins in costs per 
admission and per OPD visit. The direction of all margins, however, remains constant.
Table 4.12 shows the mean and median values o f  the estimated total contract cost per 
case for the tracer conditions. This shows that, in the case of caesarean sections, the 
mean total contract cost remains below that o f  the mean public hospital cost, with the 
difference being statistically significant. As would be expected, however, removal o f the 
effect o f the high costs at Bisho hospital (as reflected in the median data) reverses this 
observation, so that total contract costs per case now exceed mean public hospital costs 
by a statistically significant margin. In the case o f  normal deliveries, the table shows that 
mean total contract cost exceeds mean public hospital costs, although the difference is 
not statistically significant. When the effects o f  Bisho are removed, however, the 
difference becomes statistically significant at the 1% level. As would be expected from 
the previous data for appendectomy and hernia repair cases, total contract costs per case 
exceed those of the public hospitals, in both cases by statistically significant margins.
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Table 4.12: Pooled Tracer Data - Total contract costs vs. public sector
production costs (Rand, 1992/93)
Contractor Public Adjusted Public*
Mean C l Median Mean C l Median P
value
Mean CI Median p
value
Caesarean
Section
4431 209.7 3952 4600 411.41 2799 <0.05 2541 78 89 61 2432 58 <0.01
Normal
Delivery
879.81 119.74 650.81 869.55 68.55 693.94 >0 05 544.79 78.96 404.2 <0.01
Appendectomy 3884.56 682.75 336537 2060 54 284 46 1983 14 <0.01 n/a' n/a n/a n/a
Hernia Repair 3261.19 167.06 3260.76 245258 386 64 2040 05 <001 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Notes: a: The public hospital data were adjusted by removing the caesarean section and NVD cases at 
Bisho hospital from the pooled sample, in order to assess the impact o f  the removal of the high 
costs at this hospital on die performance o f  the remaining two public hospitals, 
b: not applicable (since no appendectomy and hernia repair cases were carried out at Bisho 
during the study year).
4.5. Data Envelopment Analysis
As discussed in Chapter 3, the DEA analysis was applied separately to an analysis set 
comprising the six public and contractor hospitals, and to one comprising all nine 
hospitals. Unless otherwise indicated, all results discussed refer to those obtained using 
input model 1 (the base model).126 As noted in Chapter 3, a score of 1 represents a point 
on the efficiency frontier, and thus, maximum relative efficiency within the group being 
analysed. The difference between any other score and 1 represents the distance between 
that DMU and the efficiency frontier, so that a lower score represents a less efficient 
DMU.
Table 4.13 shows the efficiency scores emerging from the DEA applied to the contractor 
and public hospitals, and shows the mean values for the two groups as well as the scores 
obtained by the individual hospitals. The results are shown for input models 1 and 2127, 
with all analyses assuming CRS. The table indicates that where model 1 specifications 
were used, and where the individual wards were treated as the DMU, the contractor 
group obtained higher mean scores than the public group in all cases, and that this
'2 6  The base model aggregated total production costs into two input variables, total recurrent costs and capital 
costs.
•27 input model 2 specified four input variables: administrative/domcstic services costs, drugs/other clinical 
services costs, total staff costs, and total capital costs.
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pattern is repeated when all wards combined were analysed as the DMU. Examination 
of the mean data for model 2, indicates similar results to those obtained using model 1, 
except in the case of the maternity ward, where the use of model 2 specifications results 
in the contractors obtaining a slightly lower score than the public group, due to the 
higher score obtained by Tintswalo hospital in the latter analysis.
In the case o f the OPD analysis, model 1 data again shows a higher mean contractor 
score which is reversed by the use of model 2 data, again due to the higher score 
obtained by Tintswalo. The operating theatre analysis shows almost identical mean 
scores for the two groups, with the mean public score being marginally higher than that 
obtained by the contractors.
E xam inatio n  of individual hospital performance in these various analyses indicates two 
key patterns; the first is the variable performance of the hospitals across the different 
analyses, echoing the results of the production cost analysis reported above. The second 
is that in all of the analyses, the use of model 2 specifications results in a lower 
proportion o f hospitals emerging as inefficient than when model 1 specifications are 
used. This confirms the expectation, discussed in the Chapter 3, that the sensitivity of 
DEA is reduced when larger numbers of input and/or output variables are specified, as 
occurs with model 2.
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Table 4.13: DEA results - comparison of contractor and public hospitals only
(CRS)____________________________________________________
Contractor Public Mean
Matik. 1Hewu 1 Shilu. Tints. |Le taba Bisho Con. | Pub.
Medical/Surgical wards
Model 1 1.0000 0.8770 1.0000 1.0000 0.6893 1.0000 0.9590 0.8964
Model 2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.6893 1.0000 1.0000 0.8964
Paediatric w ard
Model 1 0.9562 0.5787 1.0000 0.8178 0.6341 0.4778 0.8450 0.6432
Model 2 1.0000 0.5787 1.0000 0.8178 0.6341 0.4778 0.8596 0.6432
Maternity w ard
Model 1 0.7164 1.0000 0.3853 0.7337 1.0000 0.3651 0.7006 0.6996
Model 2 0.7164 1.0000 0.3853 1.0000 1.0000 0.3651 0.7006 0.7884
All wards
Model 1 1.0000 0.6066 1.0000 0.9193 0.8091 0.7028 0.8689 0.8104
Model 2 1.0000 0.6232 1.0000 0.9151 0.8051 0.6018 0.8744 0.7740
Outpatient Dept.
Model 1 0.3328 0.2604 1.0000 0.7590 0.4575 0.1765 0.5311 0.4644
Model 2 0.3328 0.2604 1.0000 1.0000 0.4575 0.1765 0.5311 0.5447
Operating theatres 0.4748 0.6162 0.8637 1.0000 0.7811 0.1855 0.6516 0.6555
Whole hospital
Model 1 1.0000 0.6943 1.0000 1.0000 0.7551 0.6030 0.8981 0.7860
Model 2 1.0000 0.6943 1.0000 1.0000 0.7551 1.0000 0.8981 0.9184
Whole hospital -  SQOC quality adjusted
Model 1 1.0000 0.6985 1.0000 1.0000 0.8359 0.6652 0.8995 0.8337
Model 2 1.0000 0.7021 1.0000 1.0000 0.8368 1.0000 0.9007 0.9456
Whole hospital -  NQOC* quality adjusted
Model 1 1.0000 0.4711 1.0000 1.0000 0.5609 0.3842 0.8237 0.6484
Model 2 1.0000 0.4711 1.0000 1.0000 0.5609 1.0000 0.8237 0.8536
Whole hospital -  Combined quality adjusted
Model 1 1.0000 0.5642 1.0000 1.0000 0.6729 0.4901 0.8547 0.7210
Model 2 1.0000 0.5642 1.0000 1.0000 0.6729 1.0000 0.8547 0.8910
Notes: a: Adjusted for quality of nursing care
Table 4.13 also presents the results o f the DEA using the whole hospital as the DMU. In 
this instance again, the model 1 data shows a higher mean contractor score, which is 
reversed when model 2 data are used (in this case due to the better performance 
demonstrated by Bisho hospital in the latter analysis). Examination of the results 
obtained when the output variables were adjusted for the various quality of care 
measures indicates a very similar pattern to that observed with the unadjusted outputs, 
indicating that none of the quality adjustments affect which hospitals are identified as 
inefficient, although they do impact on the extent of inefficiency observed. In the case of 
adjustment for structural quality o f care, the affected hospitals in fact appear relatively
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more efficient than when outputs are not adjusted.128 When outputs are adjusted for 
quality o f nursing care, the inefficient hospitals appear relatively more inefficient, 
suggesting that they are affected more adversely than the other sample hospitals by this 
adjustment. The adjustment for both elements o f  quality of care shows scores in 
between those obtained by the individual adjustments, and reflects the heavier weighting 
given to quality o f nursing care in the combined adjustment.
Table A20.1, Appendix 20 shows the results of a similar analysis, in this case allowing 
for VRS. These data suggest the important finding that the results are sensitive to the 
treatment o f economies of scale in the DEA models. As would be expected, the 
allowance of VRS benefits the generally larger public hospitals through the effect o f  
economies o f scale, with the result that the mean contractor scores are lower than those 
o f the public group across most of the DMUs analysed, an observation that is robust to 
the input model specification used. Important exceptions to this observation are noted in 
the OPD and operating theatre analyses, where the very poor scores obtained by Bisho 
overwhelm the beneficial effects of VRS for the public hospitals, so that the mean 
public score remains below that of the contractor group.129
Table A20.2, Appendix 20 shows the results o f  a model 1 analysis, in this case 
substituting in-patient days for admissions. The inclusion of in-patient days as the key 
output variable significantly benefits the contractor hospitals (due to the longer LOS in 
this group), which maintain higher mean scores across all the ward related DMUs, and 
in the whole hospital, and with substantially higher margins than was previously the 
case.
In summary, this analysis of the relative economic efficiency o f the contractor and 
public hospitals demonstrates that the contractor hospitals are, on average, more 
efficient than the public hospitals, when the most sensitive model specifications are
*2* This observation suggests that some of the other sample hospitals are affected more adversely than the 
inefficient hospitals by the adjustment for structural quality o f  care, but not by a  sufficient margin to affect 
which hospitals are identified as inefficient
The general pattern is also reversed when the whole hospital is analysed after adjustment for nursing quality o f  
care. In this case, the mean contractor score is slightly higher than that o f the public group, with the gap 
decreased when model 2 is specified, due to the  higher score obtained by Bisho in the latter analysis.
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used, and when CRS are assumed. However, a more mixed picture emerges when the 
less sensitive model 2 specifications are used, and when the model allows for VRS, the 
public hospitals appear more efficient. The efficiency scores obtained by both groups are 
relatively high in most cases, with all scores being above 0.75 in seven of the ten 
analyses conducted (and eight out of ten cases in the VRS analyses). Important 
exceptions to this latter observation occur in the case o f the OPD and operating theatres, 
in which the efficiency scores are generally lower in both groups. Sensitivity analysis 
also demonstrates that the results are sensitive to the use of in-patient days rather than 
admissions, with contractor performance substantially enhanced when in-patient days 
are used in the analysis.
Table 4.14 shows the results o f  the DEA analysis of all nine hospitals, again using the 
two input models and assuming CRS. Analysis of the individual wards and combined 
wards as the DMU, using model 1 specifications, demonstrates that the private hospitals 
obtain the highest mean scores o f  all three groups in the medical/surgical and paediatrics 
wards, and the lowest mean scores in the maternity wards and when all wards combined 
were analysed. In the analysis o f  the OPD, the private hospitals demonstrate the worst 
performance of the three groups, a result that is consistent across both input models. 
This pattern is reversed in the case of the operating theatres, where, as expected, the 
private hospitals demonstrate far superior performance, with the other two groups 
showing very similar scores. The analysis o f the whole hospital as the DMU again 
demonstrates superior performance by the private hospitals, results which are again 
robust to both model specification and adjustment for the various measures o f quality of 
caie.,î0 Table A20.3, Appendix 20 shows the results of the same analysis, on this 
occasion allowing for VRS. These data again demonstrate the sensitivity of the results to 
the treatment of economies o f  scale, although the effects of the VRS assumption are less
1^0 These latter results are attributable mainly to the inclusion of operations within the output specifications in the 
whole hospital analysis, since the private hospitals earned out substantially higher numbers o f operations than 
all other sample hospitals, and also  demonstrated significantly superior efficiency within the operating theatres 
themselves.
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substantial here than was the case in the comparison o f the contractor and public 
hospitals alone.131
Tables A20.4 and A20.5, Appendix 20 present further evidence of the sensitivity of the 
results o f DEA to the specification o f  input and output variables. Table A20.4, 
demonstrates the effect of higher numbers o f output variables by comparing the model 1 
analyses of the combined wards and the whole hospital, using total admissions as a 
single output variable in the first analysis, and admissions broken into four service-mix 
categories (and hence four output variables) in the second analysis.132 The table 
demonstrates that for both DMUs, the use o f four output variables results in only two of 
the nine hospitals being identified as inefficient, while the use of a single output variable 
results in six of the nine hospitals being identified as inefficient. Table A20.S compares 
the results of DEA analyses using input models 1 and 3.133 Once again, this table 
demonstrates numerous instances in which the model 1 analysis, which specified two 
inputs, is able to identify inefficient hospitals which are identified as fully efficient when 
model 3 specification (with five inputs) is used, highlighting the sensitivity of the DEA 
analysis to the number of input and/or output variables specified.
•31 | n this instance, the relative position o f the private hospitals is not affected in any o f the DMUs assessed, with 
the exception o f the OPD, where the allowance o f VRS results in a significant increase in the observed 
efficiency o f the two private hospitals which operate OPDs.
•32 This analysis assumed CRS, and was applied to all nine hospitals. Very similar results were obtained when the 
analysis was applied to the contractor and public hospitals alone, and when VRS was assumed.
•33 Input Model 3 divided production costs into 8 variables: administrative costs, domestic services costs, drug 
costs. X-ray and laboratory investigations costs, theatre costs, nursing staff costs, medical, paramedical and 
other staff costs, and capital costs.
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Table 4.14: PEA results - comparison of all study hospitals (CRS)
Contractor Public Private Mean
Matik. Hewu Shilu. Tints. Letaba Bisho St
Dorns.
Piet Nets. Con. Pub. Pvte.
Medical/Surgical wards
Model! 1.0000 0.8798 0.9180 1.0000 0.7281 0.9812 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9326 0.9031 1.0000
Model 2 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9473 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.9824 1.0000
Paediatric ward
Model 1 0.7062 0.4154 0.7358 0.6118 0.4553 0.3440 0.5091 1.0000 0.8076 0.6191 0.4704 0.8076
Model 2 1.0000 0.4783 1.0000 1.0000 0.5890 0.4417 0.6329 1.0000 0.7817 0.8261 0.6769 0.7817
Maternity ward
Model 1 0.6902 1.0000 0.3802 0.7076 1.0000 0.3506 0.1701 0.1524 0.1751 0.6901 0.6860 0.1701
Model 2 1.0000 1.0000 0.4404 1.0000 1.0000 0.3764 0.1905 0.1726 0.1973 0.8135 0.7921 0.1905
All wards
Model! 0.5224 0.3173 1.0000 1.0000 0.8551 0.3681 0.2735 0.3488 0.3940 0.6132 0.7411 0.3488
Model 2 1.0000 0.6260 1.0000 0.9380 0.8328 0.8073 0.6062 0.5690 1.0000 0.8753 0.8594 0.6062
Oatpatient Dept
Model 1 0.2909 0.2297 1.0000 0.6801 0.4104 0.1332 n/a 0.0708 0.1673 0.5069 0.4079 0.1190
Model 2 0.2909 0.2297 1.0000 0.6801 0.4014 0.1332 n/a 0.0708 0.1672 0.5069 0.4049 0.1190
Operating theatres 0.3207 0.4161 0.5833 0.6753 0.5275 0.1253 0.4056 1.0000 0.8391 0.4400 0.4427 0.8391
Whole hospital
Model 1 1.0000 0.6979 1.0000 1.0000 0.7596 0.5916 n/a 1.0000 1.0000 0.8993 0.7837 1.0000
Model 2 1.0000 0.6979 1.0000 1.0000 0.7596 1.0000 n/a 1.0000 1.0000 0.8993 0.9199 1.0000
Whole hospital - SQOC quality adjusted
Model! 1.0000 0.6859 1.0000 1.0000 0.8324 0.6526 n/a 1.0000 1.0000 0.8953 0.8283 1.0000
Model 2 1.0000 0.6931 1.0000 1.0000 0.8739 1.0000 n/a 1.0000 1.0000 0.8977 0.9580 1.0000
Whole hospital - NQOC quality adjusted
Model! 1.0000 0.4611 1.0000 1.0000 0.5620 0.3774 n/a 1.0000 1.0000 0.8204 0.6465 1.0000
Model 2 1.0000 0.4611 1.0000 1.0000 0.5620 1.0000 n/a 1.0000 1.0000 0.8204 0.8540 1.0000
Whole hospital • Combined quality adjusted
Model 1 1.0000 0.5454 1.0000 1.0000 0.6428 0.4805 n/a 1.0000 1.0000 0.8485 0.7078 1.0000
Model 2 1.0000 0.5454 1.0000 1.0000 0.6428 1.0000 n/a 1.0000 1.0000 0.8485 0.8809 1.0000
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Table 4.15 presents the results of a DEA analysis applied to the contractor and public 
hospitals, in this instance substituting total contract cost for production costs at the 
contractor hospitals. The analysis was applied using the whole hospital as the DMU, 
with and without adjustments for quality of care, and once again using both model 1 and 
model 2 specifications and assuming CRS. For purposes of comparison, the table also 
presents the data emerging from the comparison of production costs discussed above. 
As would be expected in the light of the cost analysis results, the table indicates that the 
use o f total contract costs has a significant effect on the overall assessment of relative 
efficiency o f  the two groups. In all but two instances, the mean score obtained by the 
public hospitals now exceeds the mean contractor score. In two o f  these cases 
(unadjusted, model 1 and adjusted for structural quality of care, model 1), the use of 
total contract cost reverses the results observed when production costs were used, while 
in the remaining analyses, the margins between the higher mean public and the lower 
contractor scores are increased when total contract costs are used.
An important exception to this pattern is found in the analysis of hospital outputs 
adjusted for quality o f nursing care, in which model 1 data show a higher mean 
contractor score even when total contract costs are used. As the table shows, however, 
the use o f total contract costs reduces the previously observed margin between the two 
groups. The other exception occurs in the analysis of hospital outputs adjusted for both 
structural and nursing quality of care. In this case, the previously observed higher 
contractor score in the model 1 analysis is significantly reduced so that the mean scores 
of the two groups are almost identical, with the contractor score remaining marginally 
higher.
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Table 4.15: DEA result» —  Total contract cost vs. public sector production costs
Contractor Public Mean
Matik. Hewu Shilu. Tints. Letaba Bisho Con. Pub.
Whole ho*pittl
M odel 1
Production Costs only 1.0000 0.6943 1.0000 1.0000 0.7551 0.6030 0.8981 0.7860
Total Con. Cost vs. Pub sector prodn. 
costs
0.9254 0.6926 0.9524 1.0000 1.0000 0.7612 0.8568 0.9204
M odel 2
Production Costs only 1.0000 0.6943 1.0000 1.0000 0.7551 1.0000 0.8981 0.9184
Total Con. Cost vs. Pub sector prodn. 
costs
0.9403 0.7417 0.9524 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8781 1.0000
Whole hospital - SQOC quality 
adjusted
M odel 1
Production Costs only 1.0000 0.6985 1.0000 1.0000 0.8359 0.6652 0.8995 0.8337
Total Con. Cost vs. Pub sector prodn. 
costs
0.8268 0.6239 0.6904 1.0000 1.0000 0.7569 0.7137 0.9190
M odel 2
Production Costs only 1.0000 0.7021 1.0000 1.0000 0.8368 1.0000 0.9007 0.9456
Total Con. Cost vs. Pub sector prodn. 
costs
0.8396 0.7254 0.6645 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7432 1.0000
Whole hospital - NQOC quality 
adjusted
M odel1
Production Costs only 1.0000 0.4711 1.0000 1.0000 0.5609 0.3842 0.8237 0.6484
Total Con. Cost vs. Pub sector prodn. 
costs
1.0000 0.5067 1.0000 1.0000 0.6568 0.5201 0.8356 0.7256
Model 2
Production Costs only 1.0000 0.4711 1.0000 1.0000 0.5609 1.0000 0.8237 0.8536
Total Con. Cost vs. Pub sector prodn. 
costs
1.0000 0.5067 1.0000 1.0000 0.6568 1.0000 0.8356 0.8856
Whole hospital - Combined quality 
adjusted
M odel 1
Production Costs only 1.0000 0.5642 1.0000 1.0000 0.6729 0.4901 0.8547 0.7210
Total Con. Cost vs. Pub sector prodn. 
costs
1.0000 0.5801 0.8139 1.0000 0.7216 0.6555 0.7980 0.7924
M odel 2
Production Costs only 1.0000 0.5642 1.0000 1.0000 0.6729 1.0000 0.8547 0.8910
Total Con. Cost vs. Pub sector prodn. 
costs
1.0000 0.5556 0.8349 1.0000 0.7472 1.0000 0.7968 0.9157
Table 4.16 shows the results of the DEA analysis applied separately to  each of the four 
tracer conditions at the contractor and public hospitals only, assuming CRS. The table 
also shows the results of the same analysis, adjusted to reflect total contract cost, rather 
than production costs, at the contractor hospitals. The caesarean section data show that 
one hospital in each group was judged to be inefficient, with the very low score obtained 
by Bisho resulting in a lower mean score for the public group. This result is not affected
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by the use o f  total contract cost at the contractor hospitals. In the case of normal 
deliveries, one of the public hospitals is shown to be inefficient, and the mean contractor 
score again exceeds that o f  the public group. The use of total contract cost again does 
not reverse this observation, but does reduce the observed margin between the two 
groups.
A different pattern emerges from the analysis of appendectomy cases. Here, one of the 
contractors appears inefficient, so that the mean contractor score is lower than that of the 
public group. This pattern is repeated in the hernia repair analysis, where two o f the 
contractor hospitals are identified as inefficient. Neither of these results are significantly 
affected by the use o f total contract costs in the analysis. In the former case, the 
observed contractor public margin is marginally increased, while in the latter it is 
increased to a  greater extent.
Table 4.16: DEA analysis of tracer conditions - contractor and public hospitals
only
Contractor Public Mean
Matilc. Hewu Shilu. Tints. Letaba Bisho Con. Pub.
Caesarean section
Production costs only 1.0000 0.5896 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2832 0.8632 0.7611
Total contract c o s t vs. pub. sector 
prodn. cost
1.0000 0.5018 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.2832 0.8339 0.7611
Normal Deliveries
Production costs only 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.5431 1.0000 1.0000 0.8477
Total contract cost. vs. pub. sector 
prodn. cost
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.7773 1.0000 1.0000 0.9258
Appendectomy
Production costs only 1.0000 0.7519 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 n/a* 0.9173 1.0000
Total contract cost. vs. pub. sector 
prodn. cost
1.0000 0.7350 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 n/a 0.9117 1.0000
Hernia Repair
Production costs only 0.5586 1.0000 0.5829 1.0000 1.0000 n/a 0.7138 1.0000
Total contract c o s t vs. pub. sector 
prodn. cost
0.S142 1.0000 0.4731 1.0000 1.0000 n/a 0.6624 1.0000
Notes: a. not applicable, since no appendectomy or hernia repair cases were undertaken at Bisho during
the study year.
Table 4.17 shows the results of the DEA applied to the four tracers, with all nine 
hospitals included in the analysis. These data show that the private hospitals 
demonstrate the best performance o f the two groups in the caesarean section and
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appendectomy analyses (in the latter case, tied with the public group), and a similar high 
mean score to that obtained by the public group in the hernia repair analysis. However, 
in the case o f normal deliveries, the private hospitals show the worst performance.
Table 4.17: DEA analysis of tracer conditions - all hospitals
Coo tractor Public Private Mean
Malik. Hewn Shi! a. Tint*. Letaba Biafco St
Dome
Piet Neb. Coa. Pub. Pvte.
CioarcM 1.0000 0.5899 0.6694 1.0000 1 0000 0.2826 0.6377 1 0000 1 0000 0.7531 0.7609 0.8792
Normal
Delivery
1.0000 1.0000 0J567 0.8252 0.5486 0.2358 0.1176 0 0821 0.0685 0.7856 05365 00894
Appendectomy 1.0000 0.5956 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 tVa1 07923 1 0000 1.0000 08652 1.0000 1.0000
Hernia Repair 0.5608 1.0000 0.5830 1.0000 1.0000 n/a 08348 1.0000 1 0000 0.7146 1.0000 0 9449
Notes: a. not applicable, since no appendectomy or hernia repair cases were undertaken at Bisho during
the study year.
Table A20.6, Appendix 20 shows the results o f the same analyses, in this case assuming 
VRS, and again demonstrates the sensitivity of the results to assumptions regarding 
scale. In the case of the contractor/public comparisons, the assumption of VRS 
improves the mean efficiency performance o f  hospitals in both groups, and eliminates 
most of the variation between the groups noted above, with the differences being 
consistently maintained only in the cases of normal deliveries (production cost analysis 
only) and hernia repairs (production and total contract cost analyses).
Table 4.18 shows a comparison of the results obtained by the contractor and public 
groups in the general cost analysis and in the DEA. Examining the data for DEA model 
1 first, the table shows a qualitative correlation between the general cost analysis and 
DEA for all DMUs aside from the maternity ward and operating theatres, and a 
reasonable quantitative correlation in all cases besides the operating theatre and whole 
hospital analyses. When model 2 specifications are used, there is again good qualitative 
and quantitative correlation in the medical/surgical and maternity wards, as well as for 
total admissions, but poor correlation for the OPD, operating theatre and whole hospital 
analyses.
Table 4.19 shows the results of a similar comparison, in this case including all nine 
hospitals, and showing the rankings obtained by the three groups in the cost and DEA
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analyses. When DEA model 1 specifications are used, there is a close correlation 
between the two sets of results in the maternity, total admissions, OPD and operating 
theatre categories. In all of these cases, the three groups obtained the same ranking in 
both analyses (the only exception being the operating theatre, where the contractors and 
public hospitals reversed positions between the two analyses). The table also shows, 
however, that the correlation is much poorer in the case of the medical/surgical ward, 
and the whole hospital, in both of which cases the position of the private hospital 
changes from the least efficient in the general cost analysis to the most efficient in the 
DEA. The use of model 2 specifications does not alter these observations significantly.
Table 4.18: Comparison o f  general cost analysis and DEA (contractor and
public hospitals only)
Cost analysis" 
( %  margin)
DEA*
( %  margin)
Model 1 Model 2
Medical/ Surgical ward Con (12) Con (7) Con (10)
Maternity ward Pub(3) Pub(13)
Total admissions Con (18) Con (7) Con (16)
OPD Con (17) Con (13) Pub (3)
Operating theatres Con (57) n/a" Pub (1)
Whole hospital Con (49) Con (12) Pub (2)
Notes: a. Most efficient group as measured by lowest mean unit production cost per admission 
(absolute value of the percentage margin between the two groups).
b. Most efficient group as measured by lowest mean efficiency score (absolute value o f the 
percentage margin between the two groups).
c. No difference in mean values obtained by the two groups.
d. No alternative model specifications applied in operating theatre analysis.
Table 4.19: Comparison o f  general cost analysis and DEA (»11 hospitals)
Cost analysis D E A  (Model 1) D E A  (Model 2)
Con. Pub. Pvte. Con. Pub. Pvte. Con. Pub. Pvte.
Medical/ Surgical ward 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 1
Maternity ward 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Total admissions 1 2 3 2 1 3 1 2 3
OPD 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Operating theatres 2 3 1 3 2 1 n/a* n/a n/a
Whole hospital 1 2 3 2 3 1 3 2 1
Note: numbers represent ranking o f  groups in each analysis, with 1 indicating lowest cost (in cost
analysis) or most efficient score (in DEA), and 3 indicating highest cost or lowest DEA score, 
a: not applicable, since operating theatres not separately analysed in this analysis
Similar comparisons can be applied to the cost and DEA analysis of the tracer 
conditions. Table 4.20 shows this comparison for the contractor and public hospitals
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alone, and shows that the direction of observed differences between the groups is 
correlated for all four tracers, although the magnitude of the observed margins differ to 
some extent, being lower in the DEA in all cases aside from hernia repair. Comparison 
of the two analyses applied to all nine hospitals (Table 4.21) shows a lesser degree of 
qualitative correlation. In this case, the results of the two analyses are identical only in 
the NVD analysis, and are similar in the appendectomy analysis, but differ significantly 
in the other two conditions.
Table 4.20: Comparison of cost analysis and DEA in tracer conditions 
____________ (contractor and public hospitals only)__________________
Cost analysis1 
(•/• margin)
DEA*
( %  margin)
Caesarean section Con (29) Con (12)
Normal Delivery Con (37) Con (15)
Appendectomy Pub(36) Pub (9)
Hernia Repair Pub(18) Pub (41)
Notes: a. Most efficient group as measured by lowest mean unit production cost per admission (absolute 
value of the percentage margin between the two groups).
b. Most efficient group as measured by lowest mean efficiency score (absolute value of the 
percentage margin between the two groups).
Table 421: Comparison of cost analysis and DEA in tracer conditions (all
hospitals)
Cost analysb D EA
Con. Pub. Pvte. Con. Pub. Pvte.
Caesarean section 1 2 3 3 2 1
Normal Delivery 1 2 3 1 2 3
> o S 3 2 1 2 1 1
Hernia Repair 3 2 1 3 1 2
Note: numbers represent ranking of groups in each analysis, with 1 indicating lowest cost (in cost
analysis) or most efficient score (in DEA), and 3 indicating highest cost or lowest DEA score.
4.7 Summary of results
Table 4.22 provides a brief summary of the results presented in this chapter.
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Table 4.22: Summary of results of utilisation statistics, cost analysis and Data 
_____________ Envelopment Analysis______________________________________
Analysis Comparison between public and 
contractors
Comparison between private 
and other hospitals
Hospital
utilisation
statistics
Contractors demonstrated relatively inferior 
utilisation patterns, with higher turnover rates, 
and longer LOS, leading to higher bed 
occupancy rates.
Private group demonstrated relatively 
superior utilisation pattern, with 
highest occupancy rate o f the three 
groups, due to very high turnover 
rates, and very short LOS.
Cost analysis
Analysis of 
production 
costs
Contractors demonstrated lower unit production 
costs per in-patient day, per admission, and per 
composite output (defined to include in-patient 
days). These results were robust to adjustment 
for service-mix, and across most service-mix 
categories. Contractor production costs higher 
per OPD visit, per operation, and marginally 
higher per composite output (defined to  include 
admissions).
Private hospitals demonstrated highest 
unit production costs for all outputs 
besides operations, with substantial 
margins in costs per in-patient day and 
OPD visit. These results were robust 
to service-mix adjustment.
The generally lower contractor production costs 
were due mainly to lower unit staff costs, 
themselves explained by lower staff to  output 
ratios, which more than compensate fo r higher 
average salaries and the more expensive staff 
mix in the contractor hospitals.
Higher private hospital production 
costs were due to high unit staff costs 
(due to higher staff-output ratios, 
higher average salaries and more 
expensive staff mix), and to 
substantially higher drug costs.
Tracer cost 
analysis
Contractors demonstrated lower costs than 
public hospitals for caesarean sections and 
NVDs, and higher costs for appendectomies and 
hernia repair cases. All differences were 
statistically significant
Private costs higher than other two 
groups for caesarean sections 
(differences not statistically 
significant) and NVDs (differences 
statistically significant).
Private costs lowest of the three 
groups for appendectomy (differences 
not statistically significant) and hemia 
repair cases (differences statistically 
significant)
Total General cost analysis: TCC remained below
contract cost 
versus public 
sector 
production 
costs
public sector production cost per in-patient day, 
and per composite output defined to include in­
patient days (latter result in mean values, but 
reversed in median values). TCC higher than 
public sector production costs for all other 
outputs These results robust to service-mix 
adjustment, and to removal o f VAT from TCC.
Tracer cost analysis: TCC remained lower than 
public sector production cost for caesarean 
sections (differences statistically significant). 
TCC higher than public sector production costs 
for other three tracers (NVD not statistically 
significant; other two statistically significant).
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Tabic 4.22: Summary of results of utilisation statistics, cost analysis and Data 
_________ Envelopment Analysis (contd.)______________________________
DEA
Applied to 
general cost 
analysis
Contractors obtained higher efficiency scores for 
alt DMUs besides operating theatres, when most 
sensitive specifications (Model 1) used. Results 
robust to adjustments for quality of care, but 
sensitive to model specifications. Model 2 (two 
output variables) led to more mixed picture of 
efficiency. Using VRS assumption led to public 
hospitals obtaining higher efficiency scores for 
most DMUs, due to scale effect.
Private group obtained highest scores 
in some wards (med/surg and 
paediatrics), theatres and whole 
hospital, but lowest scores in 
maternity wards and OPD.
Applied 
using TCC 
instead of 
contractor 
production 
costs
Contractors obtained lower efficiency scores in 
most analyses, besides when data adjusted for 
quality o f  nursing care (contractor score 
remained higher than public), and when adjusted 
for quality of nursing care and SQOC (identical 
scores obtained).
Applied to 
tracer cost 
analysis
Contractors obtained higher scores for caesarean 
section and NVD cases, for both general 
production costs and when TCC used. 
Contractors obtained lower scores for 
appendectomy and hernia repair cases, again 
irrespective of whether general production costs 
or TCC used.
Private hospitals obtained highest 
scores for caesarean section and 
appendectomy cases, and lowest 
scores for NVD and hernia repair 
cases.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS - EVALUATION OF 
QUALITY OF CARE
This chapter presents the results of the evaluations of various aspects of quality of care. 
It begins with the evaluation o f  structural aspects of quality of care (SQOC), followed 
by the evaluation of the quality of nursing care, and of the quality of clinical record 
keeping. The final section presents the results of the evaluation o f the outcomes of care 
in the tracer conditions.
5.1. Evaluation of structural aspects of quality of care
This section presents the results of the evaluation of SQOC using the instrument 
described in Chapter 3. Figure S.l shows the mean values of the cluster and grand total 
scores for the three hospital groups, while Table S.l shows these data for the individual 
hospitals. In all these data, scores represent percentages of the maximum possible score 
obtainable in each case. An initial observation from these data is that all o f the study 
hospitals performed relatively well, as suggested by the generally high mean grand total 
and cluster scores. While individual hospitals performed more poorly than these figures 
suggest in some areas, this general pattern is maintained throughout the analysis. As 
Figure S.l shows, the contractors obtained a lower grand total score than the public 
hospitals, a pattern which is repeated for all clusters aside from x-ray and administration. 
The figure also shows that the private hospitals obtained the highest grand total score of 
all three groups, as well as the highest cluster scores in all cases aside from operating 
theatres and pharmacy.
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Figure 5.1: Evaluation of structural quality of care - mean cluster and grand total scores
Table 5.1: Evaluation of structural quality of care - cluster scores for individuel hospitals (% mai, possible score)
Contractor Public Private
Matik. Hewn ShiL Tints. Letaba Bisho StDoms. Piet Neb.
AdminVmanagement 61 75 60 74 54 68 92 76 86
Laboratory 56 70 66 78 75 88 0 0 0
Radiology Dept. 87 83 86 76 75 88 0 0 C
Pharmacy 89 89 74 96 95 86 95 86 92
Clinical Staff 66 57 66 91 94 84 93 100 100
Operating theatres 98 88 87 97 88 90 100 85 84
Outpatients Dept 86 93 71 81 97 93 0 92 92
Maternity Ward 77 84 71 78 79 80 100 77 89
Other wards 66 73 57 58 64 77 68 92 77
All Wards 71 78 64 68 72 79 84 85 83
Grand Total 75 76 71 84 82 84 92 86 89
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Table 5.2 shows the mean scores obtained by each hospital group for the individual 
categories within each cluster. The table indicates that within the administration cluster, 
the contractor group obtained higher scores than the public group in all categories aside 
from MIS.134 The lower contractor score in the laboratory cluster is attributable to the 
significantly lower scores in the staff and functions categories, which override the 
effects o f the relatively higher contractor scores in the supplies/equipment and buildings 
categories. In the radiology cluster, on the other hand, the higher mean contractor score 
is explained by the higher scores obtained in all categories aside from staff, where the 
contractor score is substantially lower than the public hospital score. In the pharmacy 
cluster, the lower contractor score is due to lower scores on the staff and 
supplies/equipment categories, which outweigh the higher contractor scores in both the 
functions and buildings clusters. The significantly lower contractor score in the clinical 
staff cluster is attributable to lower scores on all individual categories within this cluster, 
although the margin is particularly noticeable in the case of paramedical staff.135
The contractor and public groups show very similar scores in the operating theatre 
cluster, with the marginally lower contractor score attributable to a lower score in the 
functions category overriding the better contractor score in the buildings category. In the 
OPD cluster, the lower contractor score is explained by the lower scores on the functions 
and supplies/equipment categories. The maternity ward and general ward clusters 
demonstrate similar patterns to those observed above, with the lower contractor score 
being attributable to the lower scores in the supplies/equipment category outweighing 
the effect o f the higher scores in the buildings category.
This comparison o f mean contractor and public scores for individual categories has 
demonstrated some consistent patterns. Most noticeable among these is that the 
contractor group shows higher scores in the buildings category in all 7 clusters where 
this category is analysed, and lower scores in the staff category in 4 of the 7 clusters in
134 The higher mean public score for MIS is entirely attributable to the 100% score obtained by Tintswalo hospital, 
since both other public hospitals obtained the same low score as the three contractor hospitals (see Table A21.3, 
Appendix 2 1).
135 This category is not heavily weighted within the cluster, explaining its relatively small impact on the d uster 
total.
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which this category is analysed (the exceptions being in the administration, operating 
theatre and OPD clusters). Performance in the other common categories, 
functions/services and supplies/equipment is more even, although the public hospital 
group demonstrates superior scores in more cases than does the contractor group. These 
patterns are clearly demonstrated in Figure 5.2, which shows mean values of the 
aggregated scores for each of these common categories.136 As expected horn this 
analysis, Figure 5.2 shows that contractors have a lower mean grand total score for the 
aggregated staff category, and a higher score for the aggregated buildings category, than 
do the public hospitals. In the remaining two aggregated categories, the contractor group 
shows lower scores than the public group, although the margins are somewhat smaller 
than those observed in the aggregate staff and buildings categories. Table A21.1, 
Appendix 21 shows the scores obtained by individual hospitals in all categories, while 
Table A21.2, Appendix 21 shows the individual hospital data obtained from the analysis 
of the aggregate categories.
136 These scores are calculated by taking the weighted sum of the scores obtained from the relevant categories in all 
dusters. Weights used were th e  same as those used in the general analysis.
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Table 5J2: Evaluation of structural quality o f care: mean category and cluster
_____________scores by hospital group_____________________
C ontractor Public Private
AdminJMaaagemeiit
Stair 66 62 78
Functions 77 62 80
MIS 17 44 100
Patient record system 88 85 77
Utilities/services 91 82 95
T o ta l 66 65 85
Laboratory
Stair 32 78 n/a
Functions 63 82 n/a
Supplies and equipment 100 80 n/a
Buildings 90 84 n/a
T o ta l 64 81 n/a
Radiology Dept
Stair 59 72 n/a
Functions 88 79 n/a
Supplies and equipment 95 92 n/a
Buildings 100 71 n/a
T o ta l 85 80 n/a
Pharmacy
Stair 89 93 94
Functions 96 80 81
Supplies and equipment 70 100 92
Buildings 91 89 95
T o ta l 84 92 91
Clinical Stair
Medical staff 68 80 n/a
Nursing staff 77 97 98
Ancillary services 14 100 n/a
T o ta l 63 90 98
Operating theatres
StaflT 100 100 67
Functions 70 83 100
Supplies and equipment 90 90 99
Buildings 100 89 100
T o ta l 91 92 90
Outpatients Dept.
Staff 83 83 n/a
Functions 91 100 71
Supplies and equipment 67 88 100
Buildings 100 95 100
T o ta l 83 91 92
Maternity Ward
Supplies and equipment 73 76 86
Buildings 95 93 100
T o ta l 77 79 89
Other wards
Supplies and equipment 58 62 74
Buildings 95 84 99
T o ta l 65 66 79
AU W a n ts 71 73 84
G ra n d  T o ta l 74 83 89
Notes: n /a  - not applicable, since laboratory and radiology services are not provided directly by the 
private hospitals, and clinical staff working in the private hospitals are self-employed, and not 
considered part o f the hospital staff.
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Figure 5.2: Structural Quality of Care - Analysis of aggregated categories
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 also show some consistent patterns in the performance of the 
private hospitals, and demonstrate that this group obtained the highest mean scores of all 
three groups in the supplies/equipment, buildings and functions/services categories, but 
obtained lower scores than the public hospitals in the staff categories.
Further insights into the various patterns observed here can be obtained from an 
examination of these data at a more disaggregated level. Table A21.3, Appendix 21 
shows the mean values of the raw scores for individual criteria, and provides an analysis 
o f these data.
5.1.1. Sensitivity analysis
As discussed in Chapter 3, the calculation of the various aggregated scores reported here 
relied on the use of the median values of a sample of criteria scores and category and 
cluster weights obtained on a consensus basis from a group o f experts. Table A21.4, 
Appendix 21 presents the results of the same analysis reported above, on this occasion
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using the mean rather than the median values of the criteria scores and category and 
cluster weights. The table shows that the use of mean data does not materially affect any 
o f the observations made here. While the grand total score, and individual cluster and 
category scores are all modified slightly, the direction o f the margins between the 
groups is not affected in any case, and the extent of these margins is either left 
unchanged, or modified only slightly. Where the margins do change, the average change 
involves a shift o f  less than 2 percentage points. In the case of the private-public 
margins, the use o f mean data has the effect of reversing the direction of the observed 
margin only in the case of operating theatres. In all other categories, there are either 
minor increases or decreases in the extent o f the margin, or no changes at all.
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the aggregated categories using 
mean data, as shown in Table A21.S, Appendix 21. This indicates that the direction of 
the observed public-contractor margins remains constant across all four aggregate 
categories, and that the extent of the margin remains constant in two of these (staff and 
supplies/equipment) and increases by 1 percentage point in the remaining two 
categories. Similarly, analysis o f the private-public margins shows no change in the 
direction of these margins in any of the aggregate categories, and only slight changes in 
the extent of the margins.
Tables A21.6 and A21.7, Appendix 21 show the effects of using a weighted sum 
approach, rather than the geometric mean, in the calculation of category total scores. 
These data show that this variation does not materially affect any of the observations 
made here. In the case of the comparisons between the contractor and public hospitals, 
the previously observed margin changes direction only in the case of the other wards 
cluster (where the contractor score shifts from 1 percentage point below that of the 
public hospitals to an equal score).
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5.2. Evaluation of the quality of nursing care
5.2.1. Evaluation of the quality o f nursing care using the survey instrument
Table 5.3 shows the mean category, cluster and grand total scores obtained by the three 
hospital groups, while Table A22.1, Appendix 22 presents the same data for the 
individual hospitals. As with the SQOC instrument, all data represent the percentage of 
the maximum possible score obtainable in each case. Table 5.3 shows that the mean 
grand total score for the contractors exceeds that of the public hospitals, as do the scores 
for the maternity, medical/surgical and all ward components of the nursing care cluster. 
This pattern is reversed in the case o f the nursing management cluster, where the mean 
contractor score is slightly lower than that of the public hospital group. Table 5.3 also 
shows that the grand total and all cluster totals of the private hospital group exceed those 
o f both the other groups by substantial margins.
Analysis o f the categories within the nursing care cluster shows that the mean contractor 
scores exceed mean public scores for all categories and in all the wards assessed. In the 
case o f  the nursing care planning and equipment categories, the observed margins 
remain fairly constant in both the maternity and medical/surgical wards. There is 
however greater variation in the other two categories - nursing assessment/diagnosis and 
diet. In the former case, the substantial margin observed in the maternity wards is 
reduced in the medical/surgical wards, while the converse is true for the diet category. 
Several o f the differences between individual hospitals and groups noted here are further 
illuminated by examination of the raw scores achieved on each of the individual criteria. 
These data, followed by a brief commentary, are shown in Table A22.2, Appendix 22.
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Table 5 3 : Evaluation of the quality of nursing care: mean category and cluster
_____________scores, by group (%  max, possible score)___________
Contractor Public Private
Nursing care: Maternity ward
Nursing A ssess/D iagnosis 70 19 86
Nursing care  planning/m onitoring/control 50 40 83
Equipm ent 39 24 88
Diet 72 71 100
T o ta l 56 34 86
Nursing care: Medical/Surgical wards
Nursing A ssess/D iagnosis 37 32 81
Nursing care  planning/m onitoring/control 46 38 70
Equipm ent 42 25 91
Diet 72 46 100
T o ta l 44 35 79
Nursing Care: Ail wards
Nursing A ssess/D iagnosis 53 26 84
Nursing care  planning/m onitoring/control 48 37 76
Equipm ent 40 25 90
Diet 72 50 100
T o ta l 50 33 82
Nursing management 48 51 83
Overall Total 50 39 83
5.2.1.1. Sensitivity analysis
Table A22.3, Appendix 22 shows the scores obtained by individual hospitals and groups 
when category totals are calculated using weighted sums, rather than geometric means. 
As the table shows, this approach has minimal effect on the general conclusions reported 
here. Comparing the contractor and public scores, the table shows that this method of 
calculation serves to increase the observed scores for both groups in all categories and 
clusters, although the public hospital scores are increased to a greater extent in all cases 
aside from that o f the nursing management cluster. The directions of the margins 
between contractor and public hospital scores reported above however remain 
nnrh«ng<-rt in all categories o f both wards in the nursing care cluster. As would be 
expected, though, the observed margins are reduced, by 2 percentage points in the 
cluster totals, and by varying margins in all of the category totals aside from the 
equipment category in the medical/surgical ward (which shows a 1 percentage point 
increase).
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5.2.2. Subjective evaluation of the quality of nursing care
As with the survey instrument, the subjective evaluation of the quality of nursing care 
examined nursing at the ward level, including ward management and the nursing care 
process, as well as aspects of nursing management at the hospital level. Tables 5.4 and 
5.5 present the findings on the nursing at the ward level, while Table 5.6 summarises the 
findings in respect o f nursing management at the hospital level.
Table 5.4 indicates that, with some exceptions, the contractor and private hospitals 
performed relatively well in the evaluations of the physical appearance of the wards, as 
well as in the availability and control of supplies and linen, and that the private hospitals 
generally demonstrated the best performance o f all the groups in these areas. In the 
public hospitals, on the other hand, the evaluations of these aspects were far less 
favourable, and were highly critical in several instances. The evaluations o f the 
availability, organisation and monitoring o f medical equipment presents a less 
homogenous picture, with variation both within and between groups being noted. In 
this case, essential equipment was noted to be complete in most hospitals, although the 
private hospitals were clearly the best equipped of all the groups, and the public 
hospitals were noted to be somewhat better equipped than the contractor hospitals. 
Regarding the organisation, monitoring and control of equipment, the private hospitals 
were again regarded as superior to the other two groups, which presented a more mixed 
picture.
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Table 5.4; Subjective evaluation of ward management issues
Physical i p p n n ic c  of wards Availability aw) 
control of ward rappllcs
W a r d  U n e a M td k tl equipment
M itikw tM W a d s  create  g o o d  im pression . A ll 
clean  an d  tidy . S ta f f  appearance 
professional.
N o  appa ren t shortages. A dequate  
con tro l sy stem s in  p lace.
S ta ff  co m plain  o f  sh o ita g es  o f  linen  o v e r  w eek-ends. 
N o  sho rtages ip p arc n L  L inen  d e s n  m d  neaL  L inen  
supp lie s  n o t s tried y  co n tro lled , a lthough contro l 
su p erio r to  p u b lic  sec to r hosp ita ls.
E qu ipm en t supp ly , o rgan isa tion  m d  m o n ito ring  satisfac to ry  
O x y g en  eq u ip m en t satisfac to ry  in  m atern ity  « a r t ,  b u t po o r in 
o th e r  w a d s  -  equ ip m en t d irty  m d  com ponen ts  m issing .
H e n W ants  d e a n ,  tidy  an d  w ell o rgan ised N o  sho rtages. E x trem e ly  ligh t contro l 
o v e r  a ll d ru g s an d  supplies.
S ta ff  co m plain  o f  w eek -en d  shortages. A dequate  
supp lie s  in  m ost w a rd s besides  m atern ity  w a r t .  A ll 
linen  c le m  a n d  nea t, a lth o u g h  n o t o f  g o o d  quality .
E qu ipm en t requ irem en ts com plete  in m ost w a n ts  as id e  from  
sh o rtag e  o fb a u m a n o m ctc fs . Equipm ent a p p e a s  u n tidy  m d  
d iso rgan ised . C h eck in g  o f  equ ip m en t satisfac to ry  O x ygen  
eq u ip m en t p o o r  - com ponen ts  m issing , an d  m uch  o f  the 
eq u ip m en t dirty .
cm _______S N I tU I A ll w a d s  d e a l  a i d  w ell o rgan ised , 
a n d  crea te  g o o d  im pression
S o m e sh o itag es  o f  s to ck s and  
sup p lie s  no ted . C on tro l ad equate , b u t 
n o t a s  w ell o rgan ised  as  o ther 
L ifeca tc  hosp ita ls.
S ta ff  co m plain  o f  sho rtages b u t n o w  q ip a i tn t .  L inen  
clean .
E qu ipm en t in m o s t w a d s  com plete  m d  w ell o rgan ised . 
M on ito ring  o f  eq u ipm en t is adequate . O x ygen  equ ip m en t 
s a is fa c to ry  in  all w a rts .
Tiatswalo Several w an ts  d irty  a n d  diso rgan ised  
G enera l a ir  o f  neg lect, w ith  no th ing  
appearing  to  b e  in  order.
N o  sho rtages no ted . V ery  po o r 
con tro l sy stem s - a ll s to reroom s 
no ted  to  be  u n locked  and  
d isorganised .
Severe sho rtages o f  linen  no ted  in  several w ards. 
S heets ap p ear sh sb b y  an d  d irty  Linen  s tock  room s 
em pty  in  several w ards. S hortage  o f  w a te r ap p ears  lo  
b e  im portan t cause  o f  th ese  problem s.
E q u ip m en t in  m ost w a d s  com plete  b u t un tidy  an d  poorly  
o rg an ised  M on ito ring  o f  eq u ipm en t g ene rally  satisfactory . 
O x y g en  eq u ip m en t p re sen t in  all w a rts , b u t po o rly  m ain ta ined  
an d  n o ted  to  be  d irty  in  several w ards.
U t i l x W a r ts  hav e  un k em p t air. M atern ity  
w a r t  clu ttered  an d  d irty  M ed ica l an d  
surg ica l w a rd s u n tidy  b u t d e a n
as  T in tsw alo S ignifican t sho rtages n o ted  in  several w an ts . S ta ff 
co m plain  th a t p rob lem  w o rse  o n  w eek-ends.
E qu ipm en t com plete  in m ost w ards b u t often  p oorly  o rgan ised  
M on ito ring  o f  equ ip m en t variab le  betw een  w a r t s  -  s a is fa c to ty  
in  m atern ity  w a r t  a i d  surg ica l w a r ts , b u t p o o r in m edica l w ards. 
O x y g en  eq u ip m en t incom plete  an d  poorly  m ain ta ined  in all 
w ards.
Boko W a rts  an d  co rrido rs  u n tidy , d irty  an d  
noisy . T o ile ts  an d  s lu ice  room s dirty  
in  all w a r ts  exam ined .
N o  sho rtages no ted . C on tro l 
g ene rally  poor.
S ta ff  co m plain  o f  sho rtages. M ost w a r ts  appeared  
w ell s tocked  w ith  linen  o f  g o o d  quality .
E qu ipm en t com plete , c le m  b u t d iso rgan ised  in all w ards; 
m on ito r in g  o f  equ ip m en t unsatisfactory . O x ygen  equ ip m en t 
g ene rally  unsatisfactory  • som e equ ipm en t m issing  an d  often  
d irty .
St D o n in o W ards w ell o rgan ised , tid y  an d  d e a n . N o  sho rtages no ted . C on tro l is  strict 
sn d  effic ien t. F u ll-tim e s ta ff  alloca ted  
to  th is  A uc tion .
N o  sho rtages no ted . L inen  c le m  and o f  h igh  quality . A ll equ ip m en t presen t an d  m on ito red  ap p ro p ritfe ly  in  all w ards. 
O xygen  equ ip m en t com plete  an d  c lean  in a ll w ards.
M atern ity  w ard  c lean  a n d  n ea t 
F em ale m edica l/surg ical w a r t  d e a n , 
b u t disorganised .
F u ll-tim e s ta ff  fo r con tro l and  
m o n ito ring  o f  u sage o f  supplies. A ll 
sto reroom s lock ed  m d  w ell 
contro lled .
W an ts  w ell s tocked  w ith  linen . D edicated  linen  
su perv iso r en su res  adequate  supplies to  all w a rts .
E q u ipm en t variab le  betw een  w ards. C om p le te  in m atern ity  w a r t ,  
b u t d iso rgan ised  an d  n o t m on ito red  satisfactorily . E qu ipm en t in 
m ed ica l an d  surgical w ards co m plete  an d  w ell o rg an ised  b u t also  
p oo rly  m o n ito red  O x ygen  equ ipm en t co m plete  an d  c lean  in all 
w ants.
xi-i-------m coprali M edical, surg ica l m d  o th e r general 
w a r ts  d e a n  an d  w ell o rganised . 
M atern ity  w a r t  c lean  b u t appears 
d isorganised . P leasan t atm osphere in 
all w a rts .
as  P ietersburg . S upp lie s  adequate . S ta ff  co m plain  o f  som e shortages 
in th e  p ast an d  occasio n a lly  a t p resen t, bu t no 
ev id en ce  o f  this.
E q u ipm en t com plete , w ell o rgan ised  an d  app rop riately  
m o n ito red  in a ll w a rts . O x ygen  eq u ipm en t com plete , c lean  and  
w e ll o rg an ised  in  all w ards
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Table 5.5 indicates that the conduct of nursing assessment and diagnosis was judged to 
be either good or satisfactory in most wards at the contractor and private hospitals, 
although nursing diagnosis was noted to be poorly conducted in one o f the wards at 
Hewu and in two of the wards at Shiluvana. The public hospitals again performed 
relative poorly here, although Tintswalo hospital appears superior to the other two 
public hospitals in some o f the aspects evaluated. The process of nursing diagnosis was 
also noted to be poorly conducted in most wards at all of the public hospitals. A general 
problem, which was noted to occur in many of the wards at most hospitals, was the 
emphasis o f the nursing assessment and diagnosis on medical as opposed to nursing 
problems and issues, as well as a general reliance on the doctors’ diagnosis in place of 
the development o f  an independent nursing diagnosis.
Table 5.5 also shows the findings concerning the processes o f nursing care planning, 
implementation, monitoring and control, and upgrading o f the nursing care plan, as well 
as record keeping. In this instance, the variability within individual hospitals, as well as 
within and between groups, makes it more difficult to identify consistent patterns in 
comparing the three groups. Nevertheless, it is again possible to discern generally 
superior performance among the private hospital group relative to the other two, both of 
which show a similarly poor overall performance profile. Although the private group 
appears superior to the other two, it is important to note that several problems were 
noted in these hospitals as well, as illustrated by the poor ratings obtained in some of the 
wards at Pietersburg and Nelspruit hospitals.
Consistent with evaluations o f the conduct of nursing assessment and diagnosis, one of 
the key problems identified concerns the reliance of nursing care planning and 
implementation on the orders issued by doctors, with very little initiative taken by 
nurses themselves. This is reflected in the fact that in many cases, no nursing care plan 
is formulated, and that often only medical treatments and procedures are recorded and 
upgraded. The evaluation also detected several instances of potentially serious errors in 
elements o f the nursing care process.137 In all o f the public hospitals, the evaluators
137 Examples o f  these include inaccurate transcription o f doctors’ orders into the nursing records (surgical ward at 
Hewu hospital), evidence o f  inappropriate nursing care being delivered (maternity ward at Tintswalo and
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noted that the poor monitoring and control o f nursing care could possibly be attributed 
to shortages o f  the appropriate forms.
Regarding the standards of record keeping at ward level, Table 5.5 shows that, with 
some exceptions, these were regarded as being o f an acceptable standard at the 
contractor and private hospitals and somewhat problematic at the public hospitals. The 
evaluators also reported the general impression that the standards o f record keeping 
were clearly best at the private hospitals, followed by those at the contractor hospitals.
Table 5.6 shows that in the case of the staff numbers and skill levels, all hospitals were 
judged to meet adequate standards, with the exception of Hewu hospital, where there 
appeared to be insufficient registered nurses, resulting in some wards being run by staff 
nurses. Concerning the contractor group generally, the evaluators noted that although 
staffing levels were adequate for current patient numbers and acuity levels, any 
increases in patient acuity levels would place severe strains on the nursing staff and 
might lead to compromises in the quality o f nursing care. Importantly, only the private 
hospitals were noted to be able to adjust staffing levels to cope with fluctuations in 
demand, either through use o f outside agency staff or through the employment of part- 
time staff.
medical w ard at Lctaba), doctors’ orders not being carried out (medical ward at Letaba), patients not receiving 
medicines as ordered (various wards at Bisho), and inadequate monitoring (medical/surgical ward at 
Pietersburg).
-203-
Table SJ; Subjective evaluation of the nursing process
Nursing assessment and diagnosis Nursing care planning, implementation and control Record keeping
Malik. Maternity: Good assessments with hill examination and 
assessment of new patients. Satisfactory and safe level of 
information collected. Diagnoses good, although not 
specifically related to nursing care problems.
Medical and surgical wards: Assessments of good 
standard, and satisfactory information collected. Nursing 
diagnosis limited and unsatisfactory.
Maternity: NCP satisfactory - use a limited NCP for problem patients. 
Implementation satisfactory - cany out and document doctors' orders effectively. 
Monitoring and control satisfactory - nurses dependent on doctors’ instructions to 
monitor and treat. NCP upgrading satisfactory.
Medical and surgical wards: NCP satisfactory - limited to doctors’ instructions. 
Implementation, monitoring and control and NCP upgrading all satisfactory. Use 
simple cardcx system.
Good: records available and properly 
completed in all wards.
Hewu Maternity: Assessments satisfactory, with only some 
patients seen by nurses, others by doctors. Information 
collected satisfactory. Nursing diagnosis satisfactory, but 
emphasis placed on doctors’ orders and diagnosis 
Medical ward: Assessment satisfactory; diagnosis 
satisfactory with focus mainly on doctors orders and 
physical needs.
Surgical ward: Low level of information collected - mainly 
related to physical needs. Diagnosis satisfactory - nurses 
allowed some latitude by doctors in diagnosis and treatment
Maternity: NCP poor • not properly formulated. Implementation limited to 
doctors’ orders. Monitoring and control poor.
Medical ward: NCP incomplete in many instances. Nursing records partial and 
elementary. Mainly medical treatments recorded. Implementation satisfactory • 
appears uneven. One case identified where nursing treatment not regarded as 
appropriate for needs. Monitoring, control and upgrading of NCP poor.
Sargical ward: NCP at basic level. Implementation satisfactory. Monitoring and 
control poor. Upgrading satisfactory. Nurses transcribe doctors’ orders, often 
inaccurately.
Maternity: Good; records available and 
completed.
Medical and surgical wards: Not of 
adequate standard. Some deviations 
between doctors orders and actual 
execution noted. Recording of 
dependence producing drags inadequate 
in some cases.
ShiL Maternity: Assessments very good - based on clear policies 
and regimens for different patient categories. Information 
collected of high standard. Nursing diagnoses good, with 
emphasis on nursing cate aspects. Nurses make own 
diagnoses of routine cases.
Medical ward: Assessments and information collected 
satisfactory, although based on medical notes. No nursing 
diagnosis made.
Sargical ward: Satisfactory nursing assessment.
Information collected unsatisfactory as relates only to 
medical treatment Poor or no nursing diagnoses carried out
Maternity: NCP good in routine cases. Rely on doctors in complex cases. 
Implementation satisfactory - record only routine implementation. Control and 
monitoring poor due to lack of records, therefore may be satisfactory under the 
circumstances. Upgrading of NCP satisfactory.
Medical ward: No formal NCP. Implementation satisfactory - mainly medical 
treatment recorded. Monitoring and control poor - incompletely written up, no 
documentation of nursing orders. Upgrading of NCP poor - only medical treatment 
upgraded.
Surgical ward: No NCP done. Implementation poor - only doctors' orders carried 
out Monitoring and control poor. NCP upgrading satisfactory - relies on medical 
staff assessments.
Records available, neat and complete in 
maternity and medical wards. Some 
records not accurate in surgical wards.
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Table 5.5: Subjective evaluation of the nursing process (contd.)
Nursing assessment and diagnosis Nnrsing care planning, implementation and control Record keeping
Tints. Materatty: Good assessments and information collected. 
Nursing diagnosis poor.
Medical ward: Satisfactory assessment, information 
collection and nursing diagnosis, although ail based entirely 
on doctors’ orders.
Surgical ward: Assessments good, information collected 
satisfactory, but nursing diagnosis poor.
Maternity: NCP, implementation, monitoring and control satisfactory. Evidence 
of poor care noted in one case.
Medical ward: NCP satisfactory - hampered by lack of appropriate forms. 
Implementation, monitoring and control satisfactory.
Surgical ward: No NCP • simply carry out doctors’ orders. Monitoring and 
control arc as good as possible under circumstances, since forms lacking.
Al wards: Records often not available 
and poorly photocopied. Record keeping 
generally inadequate, with resulting 
dangers of medico-legal problems. 
Particularly poor record keeping in 
medical wards.
Letaba Maternity: Nursing assessments rely on doctors’ notes, 
although these not adequately interpreted or used. 
Information collected unsatisfactory for patient care. No 
nursing diagnoses carried out 
Medkal/surgical wards: Poor assessments, information 
collection and nursing diagnoses.
Maternity: No NCP • use doctors’ orders only. Implementation satisfactory, but 
poor monitoring and control, with scrappy recording of activities.
Medical wards: Poor implementation of NCP. Several instances noted of doctors’ 
orders not being carried out, or inappropriate or inadequate nursing care being 
applied. Only medical treatments implemented in several wards. Monitoring good, 
and upgrading satisfactory.
Surgical ward: No NCP formulated (staff claim due to lack of forms) or 
implemented • only medical orders implemented. Poor control and monitoring • 
staff allocation books not completed for whole week.
Records available and satisfactorily 
completed in most wards. Some records 
not available, and staff make own forms 
where this occurs.
Bbho No nursing assessments carried out in any wards. All rely 
only on doctors' orders and some interviews. Information 
collected inadequate.
All wards: No NCP used. Use NCP method inappropriately and on rote basis. 
Nursing staff don’t appear to understand NCP concepts. All care related to medical 
treatment Poor monitoring and control of implemented care. Some evidence of 
patients not receiving prescriptions ordered.
Records often not available. Poorly 
completed in some wards and 
satisfactorily completed in others. Some 
discrepancies between orders and 
execution of dependence producing drug 
prescriptions noted.
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Table 5J: Subjective evaluation o f the nursing process (contd.)
Nursing assessment and dbgnosb Nursing care planning, implementation and control Record keeping
StDoou. All wards: Nursing assessments, information collection and 
diagnoses very good.
Maternity: NCP good • always up to date. Implementation good. Monitoring and 
control very good, although a little complex. NCP upgrading good. Nursing staff 
responsible for keeping up to date with all changes in care.
Mcdical/surgical ward: NCP good - appropriate to medical diagnosis and to 
nursing needs. Comprehensive, precise sticker system used, as well as short and 
long term records. Implementation of NCP good. Monitoring and control 
unsatisfactory since forms not always up to date or complete • may be due to large 
numbers of admissions and emergencies. NCP upgrading very good. Frequent 
special nursing rounds as well as doctors’ rounds. Records assessed more than 
once daily.
Complex record system. Perhaps too 
many forms with some duplication. 
Forms well understood by staff, and well 
completed in all wards.
Piet Materaity: Good assessments and information collection. 
Well developed protocols and forms. Diagnosis satisfactory 
• based only on doctors' orders and standing orders. 
MedieaVsargical wards: Assessments good; information 
collected and diagnoses satisfactory. Poor information on 
nursing care aspects, and strong emphasis on medical 
diagnosis.
Maternity: NCP satisfactory. Rely on protocols, so very little initiative 
encouraged. Implementation satisfactory. Monitoring and control unsatisfactory • 
only document drugs and special treatments. No documentation of nursing cate. 
NCP upgrading satisfactory - frequent upgrading, but only of changes in doctors’ 
orders.
Medical/surgical wards: NCP satisfactory • mainly focused on doctors' orders, 
and not documented, but left to discretion of nurse in charge. Implementation 
satisfactory. Monitoring and control poor - no documentation of nursing actions. 
One case identified where monitoring clearly inadequate. NCP upgrading 
satisfactory.
Forms well completed in maternity 
ward. In medical and surgical wards, 
some forms well completed, but some 
not adequately completed.
Neb. Materaity: Nursing assessments and information collection 
good. Diagnoses satisfactory, since based only on medical 
treatment.
Medical wards: Assessments satisfactory, mainly from 
doctors’ notes, with occasional examinations. Use brief 
assessment form. Diagnosis good, but rely mainly on 
doctors’ prescriptions.
Surgical wards: Assessments satisfactory; good information 
collected - based mainly on doctors' orders but some nursing 
information collected as well. Nursing diagnoses good.
Materaity: NCP satisfactory - based on medical treatment and standing orders. 
Implementation good - nursing staff able to cany out wide range of interventions. 
Monitoring and control poor - antenatal and delivery records poorly recorded. 
Labour progress badly recorded. Reports mainly focused on medical treatments 
and doctors' orders. NCP upgrading good - do 3 -4 nursing rounds per day. 
Medical wards: NCP and implementation satisfactory. Monitoring and control 
good - good system of recording and reporting with special forms in use. NCP 
upgrading satisfactory - mainly related to doctors' orders.
Surgical wards: NCP good - use simple recording book, and document all nursing 
actions. Implementation, monitoring and control systems good - use effective 
communications systems. NCP upgrading good.
Forms available and well completed in 
all wards.
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Recruitment, placement and nurse allocation mechanisms were judged to be good at all 
hospitals with the exception of Bisho, where the allocation of nurses to wards was 
reported as being haphazard. The evaluation of nurse training and career development 
policies and programmes, also summarised in Table S.6, shows some variation in the 
quality of in-service training programmes at the contractor and public hospitals. It is 
important to note, however, that where these were judged to be poor, the hospitals in 
fact had good formal training programmes in place, but problems of staff morale and 
recent industrial action had undermined interest and attendance. All of the private 
hospitals were noted to have adequate in-service training programmes in place. 
Attendance at outside courses and seminars, and other aspects of career development, 
were noted to be encouraged in the public hospitals and in the contractor hospital in 
which staff are public sector employees. However, this was not the case at the other two 
contractor hospitals, nor at the private hospitals.
The evaluation o f staff satisfaction with reimbursement and promotion procedures 
elicited interesting differences between the groups. In two of the contractor hospitals 
(Matikwana and Hewu), staff expressed dissatisfaction with the reimbursement package, 
which was not perceived as competitive with comparable public sector packages, as well 
as with the promotion process, which was regarded as lacking transparency. In the case 
o f Shiluvana hospital, staff were generally satisfied with the reimbursement package, 
but were less happy about the promotion process.131 In the public hospitals, staff were 
again noted to be dissatisfied with their reimbursement packages as well as with the 
system of promotions. In these latter cases, however, the dissatisfaction was related to 
discrepancies between current pay levels and those o f equivalent staff at hospitals 
controlled by the South African government.
•38 As noted earlier, nursing staff at Shiluvana hospital are employed by the government, which would explain the 
fact that their attitudes to reimbursement issues differs from that o f  nurses at the other Lifccare hospitals.
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Table 5.6: Subjective evaluation of nursing management
Adequacy of staff numbers 
and skills
Recruitment, placement 
and allocation of staff.
Reimbursement and 
promotion
Training and carter 
development
StafT morale, turnover and 
absenteeism
Matikwana Adequate. Limited flexibility in 
staffing numbers.
Good recruitment and placement 
mechanisms.
Staff dissatisfied with 
reimbursement - perceived as 
inferior to public sector package. 
Some suspicion as to methods of 
merit assessment and promotion, 
as process not transparent
In-service training programme 
poor at present May relate to 
recent strikes. Attendance at 
seminars/courses is allowed if 
motivated.
Staff morale generally low. 
Turnover high due to 
accommodation problems for 
nursing staff. Absenteeism low.
Hew* Adequate, although some wards 
not ran by registered nurses.
Good recruitment and placement 
mechanisms, but difficulties in 
recruiting skilled staff. May 
relate to location and lack of 
accommodation.
Staff dissatisfied with 
reimbursement • perceived as 
inferior to public sector package.
Good in-service training 
programme. Career development 
not actively encouraged.
Staff morale appears reasonable. 
Turnover high.
Absenteeism high.
Shiluvana Adequate. Limited flexibility in 
staffing numbers.
Good recruitment and placement 
mechanisms.
Staff satisfied with most aspects 
of salary package. Some 
dissatisfaction with cash 
bonuses, promotion system, and 
merit rating system.
In-service training poor at 
present Two sessions per week, 
but staff do not attend. May 
relate to recent strikes.
Good career development 
policies - staff allowed to attend 
seminars, courses.
Staff morale is low, with general 
dissatisfaction since recent 
strikes.
Turnover and absenteeism low.
Tintswnlo as Shiluvana Recruited and placed according 
to required qualifications 
wherever possible.
Some staff dissatisfaction since 
pay package not comparable 
with staff employed by South 
African authorities. Also 
dissatisfied with promotions 
system.
Good in-service training 
programme. Some problems of 
attendance since strikes. 
Satisfactory policies on career 
development
Morale is poor, and is affecting 
quality of work. This has 
occurred since the recent strikes. 
Turnover and absenteeism low
Letaba as Shiluvana Formalised, effective recruitment 
and allocation process. Frozen 
posts interfering with efficiency 
of staffing system.
as Tintswalo. Poor in-service training 
programme at present due to low 
staff interest. Good policies on 
career development. Generous 
study leave allowances.
Since strikes, morale has been 
low. Some tension between 
hospital and community which 
aggravates problems of morale. 
Turnover at satisfactory levels. 
Absenteeism presents a 
significant problem.
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Table 5.6: Subjective evaluation of nursing management (contd.)
Adequacy of staff numbers 
and skills
Recruitment placement 
and allocation of staff.
Reimbursement and 
promotion
Training and career 
development
Staff morale, turnover and 
absenteeism
Bisho asShiluvana Allocation to wards appeared
Knntin-anmrlnapnazara.
General dissatisfaction among 
staff over pay package
Good in-service training 
programme. Good career 
development policies.
Staff appear generally 
dissatisfied. Several strikes 
recently.
Absenteeism high.
St Dominies Adequate. Use agency staff to 
allow for flexibility.
Good recruitment and placement 
system. Use part-time staffing 
pool when additional staff 
needed. Use flexible shift system 
in maternity ward so that nursing 
staff remain with patient 
throughout delivery.
Staff appear satisfied with pay 
packages and promotions 
system.
Good in-service training 
programmes. Career 
development policies 
satisfactory. Long study 
allowances not permitted.
Staff appear satisfied and well 
motivated.
Staff turnover very low. 
Absenteeism at satisfactory level.
Pietersburg Adequate. No use of agency 
staff, but employ part-time staff 
to allow for flexibility
Good recruitment and placement 
system.
as St Dominies Good in-service training. Not 
formal, but frequent informal 
activities linked to staff 
meetings. Poor career 
development policies.
Staff well motivated. Some 
initial problems of transition 
from public hospital 
employment, but no problems at 
present
Turnover and absenteeism low.
Nelspruit as Pietersburg Excellent recruitment and 
placement system. Have part- 
time staff which allows 
flexibility.
as St Dominies Satisfactory in-service training 
programme. Limited 
encouragement of career
Staff morale very good. 
Turnover low. 
Absenteeism satisfactory.
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Table 5.6 also indicates that staff morale was noted to be satisfactory at one of the 
contractor hospitals (Hewu), but low at the remaining contractor and at all of the public 
hospitals. The evaluators noted that in all cases, these findings may have been 
attributable to recent industrial action, as well as to uncertainty among the nursing staff 
concerning the future of the hospitals and their employment, as a result of the process of 
political transition underway during the period o f  this study. In the private hospitals, on 
the other hand, staff morale was uniformly found to be good. The findings concerning 
levels o f staff turnover and absenteeism correlate with those of staff morale in the 
private hospitals, in which both turnover and absenteeism were found to be generally 
low. In the contractor and public hospitals, however, there appears to be no correlation 
between these factors and staff morale, or between these factors themselves, which were 
found to vary within individual hospitals, as well as within and between groups.
The evaluators also made general comments on their impressions o f the style of 
management adopted by the nursing management teams. In this regard, the management 
styles at all o f  the public hospitals were found to be highly bureaucratic and rule-bound, 
with relatively little attention being focused on the needs of staff, or on systems aimed at 
maximising staff productivity. A similar pattern was noted at Shiluvana hospital. In the 
remaining contractor and the private hospitals, by contrast, the management style was 
reported as noticeably more open and flexible, with much greater concentration on 
increasing both staff satisfaction and productivity.
A final set o f  comments concerned the overall impression of standards of patient care 
from a nursing perspective. Patient care was judged to be of an acceptable standard at all 
of the contractor and private hospitals, with the possible exception of the maternity ward 
at Nelspruit hospital, where problems in ward management and record keeping were 
regarded as having the potential to compromise patient care. In the public hospitals, on 
the other hand, standards of patient care were generally considered to be inferior to those 
o f the other two groups, and in some wards, to be o f an unacceptable standard in 
absolute terms.
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5 3 . Evaluation of clinical record keeping
Table 5.7 presents the data on the evaluation of clinical record keeping for the hospital 
groups, while Table A23.1, Appendix 23 presents the same data for the individual 
hospitals. Table 5.7 indicates a similar pattern of problems in the contractor and public 
groups, although there were statistically significant differences between the two groups 
in the unable to interpret diagnosis/treatment and in the doctor visits categories, the 
contractors performing worse than the public hospitals in both cases. The table also 
shows a generally superior performance from the private hospital group with the 
exception of the inadequate description o f diagnosis/treatment category, in which the 
private hospital group shows very similar performance to the other two groups, and the 
unable to interpret diagnosis/treatment category, in which the private hospitals occupy 
an intermediate position between the other two groups. The table also shows that, with 
the exception of these latter two categories, the observed differences between the private 
hospitals and the pooled contractor and public hospital data were statistically significant 
at the 5%  level.
These data are generally consistent with those concerning patient records observed in 
the evaluation o f structural aspects o f quality of care. As noted in Appendix 22, the 
contractor and public hospitals show similar performance profiles on the criteria relating 
to the recording of patient details in patient records, as well as to the internal 
organisation of records, and in both cases, these groups showed inferior scores to those 
of the private hospitals. In this instance, however, the contractors scored slightly higher 
than the public hospitals, a reversal of the pattern observed previously.
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Table 5.7: Evaluation of clinical record keeping, by group
Contractor Public Private
Con. vs. Pub. Pvte. vs. PubJCon.
chi-square (P) chi-square (P)
N 96 96 96
Records
disorganised
21% (20) 20% (19) 3% (3) 0 (>0.5) 13.83 (<0.05)
Inadequate 
description of 
diagnosis/treatment
60% (58) 61% (59) 58% (56) 0 (>0.5) 0.09 (>0.5)
Unable to interpret 
diagnosis/treatment
15% (14) 4% (4) 11% (10) 4.97 (<0.05) 0  (>0.5)
Laboratory results 
not recorded
5% (5) 8% (8) 0% 0.33 (>0.5) 5.31 (<0.05)
No evidence of Dr. 
visit last 4 8  h r s
34% (33) 10% (10) 2% (2) 14.50 (<0.05) 18.52 (<0.05)
The section on NVDs in Table 5.8 shows the data on the use of the partograph in the 
NVD cases included in the analysis o f outcomes of care in the tracer conditions, while 
Table A23.2, Appendix 23 shows the same data for the individual hospitals. Table 5.8 
shows a similar pattern to that observed for the other aspects o f clinical record keeping, 
with the contractors demonstrating inferior performance to the public hospitals (with the 
observed difference being statistically significant at the 5% level). The private hospitals 
again showed the best performance o f the three groups, with the observed difference 
between the mean private hospital data and the pooled contractor/public data being 
statistically significant at the 5% level.
5.4. Evaluation of outcomes of care in tracer conditions
This section presents the results o f  the analysis of the outcomes of care in samples of 
cases of the four tracer conditions. As discussed in Chapter 3, this analysis involved an 
initial record review which allowed calculation of the prevalence of indicators of 
potential problems in the outcomes o f care, followed by further evaluation of a sub- 
sample of cases by expert clinicians. The findings of both o f these elements of the 
®alysis are presented jointly for each o f the tracer conditions, with the exception of the 
■nalysis of peri-natal and maternal mortality, which is presented separately. Table 5.8 
Presents the data on the prevalence o f indicators for the hospital groups, while Table
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PAGES MISSING 
NOT AVAILABLE
inconvenience to the patient, as well as longer LOS and hence higher costs, rather than 
poor medical outcome, since the majority of these cases are chronic hernias which do 
not require urgent surgical intervention. Cases such as that identified at Matikwana are 
exceptions to this observation.
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Table 5.8; Prevalence of indicators of possible poor outcome, by group
Con vs. Pub* Pvte. vs. 
Pub/Con>>
Contractor Public Private chi-square (P) chi-square (P)
Hernia Repair
N 24 45 173
Delay between admission 
and operation
1 2 .5 %  (3 ) 2 6 .7 %  (12) 0 % 1.107 (>0.25) 1 9 .0 8 8 (0 .0 5 )
Inadequate pre-op 
assessment
5 4 .2 % ( I 3 ) 4 2 .2 %  (19) 2 9 %  (5 1 ) 0.482 (>0.25) 2.308 (> 0 .l)
W ound sepsis 0 % 2 2 % ( l ) 0 .5 8 %  (1 ) 0.103 (>0.25) 0.073 (>0.5)
Other complications 4 .2 %  (1 ) 6 .7 %  (3 ) 0 % 0.014 (>0.45) 1.478 (> 0 .l)
Mortality 0 % 0 % 0 % n/a n/a
Appendectomy
N 21 15 196
Delay between presentation 
and operation
1 4 .3 %  (3 ) 0 % 0 % 0.840 (>0.25) 10.662 (0 .0 5 )
Delay between admission 
and operation
2 3 .8 %  (5 ) 0 % 0 % 2.39$ (> 0 .l ) 21.625 (0 .0 $ )
Inadequate pre-op 
investigation
2 8 .6 %  (6 ) 13.3%  (2 ) 7 6 .5 %  (150) 0.459 (>0.25) 38.832 (0 .0 5 )
Histology results absent 7 I . 4 % ( I 5 ) 100%  (I S ) 9 4 .9 % (I8 6 ) 3.29 (>0.05) 4.662 (0 .0 5 )
Negative histology^ 5 0 %  (3 ) n/a 4 0 %  (4 ) n/a 0.017 (>0.5)
Peritonitis 1 4 .3 %  (3 ) 0 % 0 % 0.032(>O.S) 16.087 (0 .0 5 )
W ound sepsis 9 .5 %  (2 ) 6 .7 %  (1 ) 0 % 0.093 (>0.5) 1 0 .6 6 2 (0 .0 5 )
Other complications 0 % 6 .7 % ( l ) 1 .5%  (3 ) 0.032 (>0.5) 0.817 (>0.0$)
Mortality 4 .7 % ( l ) 0 % 0 % 0.029 (>0.5) 0.911 (>0.25)
N V D
N 254 266 213
Third  degree tears 0 . 4 % ( l ) 1 1 %  (3 ) 0 .5 %  (1 ) 0.208 (>0.5) 0.008 (>0.5)
Failed assisted deliveries 0 % 0 % 0 % n/a n/a
Puerperal sepsis 0 .4 % (1 ) 1 .9%  (5 ) 0 % 1.381 (>0.1) 1.276 (>0.25)
Other complications 0 .8 %  (2 ) 1 .9%  (5 ) 0 .5 % ( l ) 0.490 (>0.25) 0.429 (>0.5)
Partograph absent or not 
completed
4 4 .5 %  (113) 3 3 .1 %  (88) 2 3 .0 %  (49) 6.655 (0 .0 2 5 ) 1 5 .7 7 7 (0 .0 0 1 )
Caesarean section«
N 191 205 247
W ound sepsis 8 .4 %  (16) 4 .9 %  (10) 0 .4 % ( l ) 1.444 (> 0 .l ) 1 2 .8 6 2 (0 .0 0 1 )
Anaesthetic complications 0 % 0 % 0 % n/a n/a
Other complications 1 .0%  (2 ) 3 .9 %  (8 ) 0 .4 %  (1 ) 2.218 (> 0 . l ) 2.904 (>0.05)
Elective cases 2 6 .2 %  (50) 2 0 .5 %  (42) 6 8 .4 % (I6 9 ) 1.490 (> 0 .1 ) 1 2 6 .9 4 (0 .0 0 1 )
Notes: a. chi-square test for significance o f  difference between the contractor and public hospitals.
b. chi-square test for significance o f difference between the private hospitals and combined contractor and 
public hospitals.
c. Percentage o f  histology records on file which arc negative.
n/a -  chi square test n ot applicable where no differences identified.
Inadequate pre-operative assessment has more serious consequences than operative 
delay in most hernia cases, since many patients presenting with hernias tend to fall 
within older age groups in whom the risks of anaesthetics may be significant. It is not 
clear whether the lack o f records o f pre-operative assessment implies that such
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assessments were not done, or simply not recorded. In the case of the private hospitals, 
for example, all anaesthetics are carried out by specialist anaesthetists, and pre-operative 
assessment is standard practice. In these hospitals, it is therefore likely that the high rate 
of inadequate assessments is attributable to poor recording of these assessments, rather 
than to failure to cany out such assessments.
Tables 5.9, and A23.4, Appendix 23 show the results of the analysis of the surgical 
cases by the expert clinicians, the former presenting the data for the hospital groups and 
the latter for the individual hospitals. These tables indicate that o f the three cases 
submitted for analysis, one was assessed to involve a poor outcome that was probably 
unavoidable (the case involving bowel obstruction at Tintswalo), one to be possibly 
avoidable (relapsed hernia at Matikwana) and one to be clearly avoidable (testicular 
infarction at Tintswalo hospital). This latter case appears to be a particularly serious 
example of a surgical error with severe consequences for the patient. The two clinical 
experts concurred on these findings in all three cases. The very small number of cases 
submitted for analysis prevents adequate comparison between the hospital groups, and 
the differences in the rates of possible and clearly avoidable cases between the groups 
were not statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 5.9: Results of expert analysis of tracer conditions, by group
Contractor | Public | Private | chi-square (P) | chi-square (P )
Hernia Repair
Cases subm itted 1 2 0
Not avoidable 0 1 n/a n/a
Possibly avo idab le 1 0 n/a 0 .104 (>0.5) n/a
Clearly avo idab le 0 1 n/a 0.103 (>0.5) n/a
Insufficient d a ta  to  assess case 0 0 n/a n/a n/a
Appendectomy
Cases subm itted 1 0 0 n/a n/a
Not avoidable 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Possibly avo idab le 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Clearly avo idab le 0 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Insufficient d a ta  to  assess case 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a
Normal deliveries
Cases subm itted 4 13 2
N ot avoidable 0 0 0 n/a n/a
Possibly avo idab le 2 3 1 0.003 (>0.5) 0.144 (> 0 .5 )
Clearly avo idab le 0 1 0 0.001 (>0.5) 0.145 (> 0 .5 )
Insufficient d a ta  to  assess case 2 7 0 1.627 (>0.25) 2.962 (> 0 .05)
No evidence to  suggest poor 
outcom e
0 2 1 n/a n/a
Caesarean sections
Cases subm itted 2 8 1
Not avoidable 2 2 1 n/a 0.488 (> 0 .25)
Possibly avo idab le 0 5 0 2.965 (>0.05) 2.56 (> 0.1)
Clearly avo idab le 0 1 0 0.001 (>0.5) 0.008 (> 0 .5 )
Insufficient d a ta  to  assess case 0 0 0 n/a n/a
Notes: n /a  -  n o t applicable
5.4.2. Appendectomy
Table 5.8 shows a somewhat different picture of the treatment o f appendectomy cases 
from that observed in the hernia repair cases. The contractor hospitals show a poorer 
pattern o f care than the public hospitals across all indicators aside from the absence of 
histology results and the ‘other complications’ category, in which the pattern is reversed. 
Once again, none of these differences were statistically significant at the 5% level. As 
in the hernia cases, the private hospitals show a generally superior pattern to the other 
two groups, with lower prevalence rates o f  all indicators besides the absence of 
histology results and a negative histology finding. With the exceptions of negative 
histology, other complications and the mortality category, the differences between the
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prevalence rates in the private group compared to the pooled data from the other two 
groups were statistically significant at the 5% level. Table A23.2, Appendix 23 again 
shows marked variation between individual hospitals for all of the indicators measured 
here.
The relatively high rates of delay between presentation and operation, as well as 
between admission and operation, at the contractor hospitals provide cause for concern, 
since delay in the treatment of acute appendicitis may have severe medical 
consequences. At Matikwana hospital, the one identified case of delay between initial 
presentation and operation was particularly disturbing. The patient had presented to the 
hospital with features of acute appendicitis almost exactly one year prior to the 
admission analysed here. An appendectomy was carried out, but the histological results 
noted that no appendeceal tissue was in fact removed. The patient then presented one 
year later with acute peritonitis following a ruptured appendix, requiring emergency 
surgery. At Shiluvana hospital, both cases in which a delay between presentation and 
operation were noted appeared to be due to poor initial diagnosis. In one case, the 
patient presented at the outpatient clinic with symptoms and was sent home. This 
episode was repeated two days later, and the patient was finally admitted to the hospital 
16 days after initial presentation to the outpatient clinic. In the second case, the patient 
was admitted to the hospital on the day of initial presentation, but was misdiagnosed as 
having faecal impaction. As a result, the operation was delayed, and an emergency 
appendectomy had to be performed 2 days after admission.
The delays between admission and operation noted at Hewu and Shiluvana hospital 
were poorly explained in most cases, and appear to be attributable to worrying logistical 
problems within the hospital. Two of the cases at Hewu were particularly disturbing; in 
one, a  patient was operated on for a ruptured appendix, but only peritoneal lavage and 
not an appendectomy were performed, following which the patient was discharged. 
Following a  recurrence of symptoms, the patient was re-admitted 6 months later with 
acute appendicitis, for which an emergency appendectomy was performed. In the second 
case, the patient was admitted with a diagnosis o f  acute appendicitis, but not operated
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on. The delay resulted in a ruptured appendix which again necessitated emergency 
appendectomy.
The 50% rates o f negative histology at Matikwana and Pietersburg hospitals are hard to 
interpret in the light o f the substantial proportion of cases in which no results were found 
in the patient records, since there may be some bias in those records that are in fact filed. 
In the contractor and public hospitals, the high proportions of cases in which there are 
no records o f this kind is likely to reflect poor record keeping, rather than failure to 
request histological examination, which appears to be done routinely. In the private 
hospitals these records are likely to be sent to the patients’ doctors, rather than filed in 
the hospital record.
The higher rates o f wound sepsis in the contractor and public hospitals relative to those 
found in the private hospitals are cause for some concern. While none o f the case 
records involving wound sepsis contained sufficient information to allow evaluation by 
the expert clinicians, hospital acquired infections are generally regarded as preventable 
through strict infection control techniques, so that high rates o f  post operative wound 
sepsis can be interpreted as indicative o f failures in infection control, and therefore of 
important problems in the quality of surgical care.
Tables 5.8 and A23.4, Appendix 23 show that o f the four appendectomy cases submitted 
for analysis by the expert clinicians, three showed poor outcomes that were judged to be 
unavoidable (one case o f peritonitis at Matikwana, and two cases of peritonitis at 
Hewu). In all o f these cases, there was evidence that the patient had presented so late to 
the hospital that peritonitis could not be attributable to the actions of the hospital staff. 
In the fourth case (death in 19 year old male at Hewu), there was judged to be 
insufficient information on which to evaluate the case. Both experts concurred on the 
findings in all four cases.
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5.43. Normal deliveries
Table 5.8 shows a fairly similar pattern of problems at the contractor and public 
hospitals, with generally low prevalence rates for all indicators aside from those relating 
to the use of the partograph. The public hospitals show slightly higher prevalence rates 
than the contractors for all indicators except those related to the partograph, although 
none o f  these differences were statistically significant at the 5% level. As in the other 
tracers discussed above, the private hospitals show generally lower prevalence rates than 
do the other groups across most of these indicators, although the differences between 
these rates and those o f the pooled contractor and public hospitals were not statistically 
significant
Table A23.3, Appendix 23 details the cases identified in the ‘other complications’ 
category, all o f which were submitted for analysis by the expert clinicians. Tables 5.8 
and A23.4, Appendix 23 show that a total of nineteen cases139 were submitted for 
expert analysis, of which six were assessed as involving poor outcomes that were 
possibly avoidable (the case of splenomegaly discharged without investigation at 
Matikwana, and the cases o f third degree tears at Shiluvana, Tintswalo, Bisho and St. 
Dominies140). O f the remaining thirteen cases, one was assessed as having a clearly 
avoidable poor outcome (the puerperal sepsis due to gauze being left in situ  following 
delivery, at Bisho), while three cases of post-partum haemorrhage (two at Bisho and 
one at Nelspruit) were assessed as showing no evidence o f poor outcome. The final nine 
cases were assessed as containing insufficient information on which to judge the 
avoidability o f  the poor outcome. This group included the cases of puerperal sepsis at 
Hewu, Tintswalo, and Bisho, as well as the case of the shoulder injury sustained by the 
baby during delivery at Hewu. Table 5.9 also indicates that none of the differences noted 
between the contractor and public hospitals, nor between the private hospitals and the 
pooled public and contractor groups were statistically significant at the 5% level.
139 This number excludes the cases involving perinatal and maternal mortality, which were also evaluated and arc 
discussed separately below.
140 A ll cases o f  3rd degree tears identified were related to an episiotomy.
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5.4.4. Caesarean sections
Table 5.8 shows relatively low prevalence rates for all indicators measured, with the 
contractor hospitals showing higher rates than the public group in the case of wound 
sepsis, and with this pattern being reversed for the ‘other complications’ category. Once 
again, none o f the observed differences between the public and contractor groups were 
statistically significant a t the 5% level. The data for the private hospital group show a 
lower prevalence than the other two groups for both of the indicators for which data 
were available, and the table shows that the difference between the mean private 
hospital prevalence rates and those o f the pooled public and contractor rates was 
statistically significant in the case of wound sepsis, but not in the case of the ‘other 
complications’ category. As noted in the discussion of wound sepsis in the 
appendectomy cases, the higher rates in the contractor and public hospitals relative to 
those in the private hospitals give some indication o f a problem in the quality of patient 
care, even though these were not evaluated by the expert clinicians. Table A23.2, 
Appendix 23 again shows some variability between the individual hospitals within each 
group.
The nature of the cases included in the ‘other complications’ category are presented in 
Table A23.3, Appendix 23, and further analysed in Tables 5.8 and A23.4, Appendix 23. 
As the latter tables show, eleven cases were submitted for analysis by the expert 
clinicians. Of these, five were assessed as unavoidable (the acute respiratory distress and 
post partum haemorrhage cases at Hewu, the typhoid fever and disseminated 
intravascular coagulation cases at Letaba, and the chest infection case at Pietersburg). A 
further five cases were assessed as showing poor outcomes that were possibly avoidable. 
All o f these involved cases of wound dehiscence requiring secondary suturing, and all 
occurred at two o f the public hospitals (two cases at Tintswalo and three at Letaba). The 
final case, in which a  patient sustained a bladder injury during the operation was 
evaluated as a clearly avoidable poor outcome. Table 5.9 indicates that, in common with 
all o f the other tracer conditions, the differences between the groups in the proportions
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of cases regarded as either possibly or clearly unavoidable were not statistically 
significant at the 5% level.
5.4.5. Analysis of peri-natal mortality
Table 5.10 shows the analysis of peri-natal mortality for each of the hospital groups, 
while Table A23.5, Appendix 23 shows the same data for the individual hospitals. Table 
5.10 indicates that both the public and the contractor groups have high mean peri-natal 
mortality rates, with the public hospitals showing the highest rate o f the three groups, 
and with the private hospitals showing a much lower rate than the other two groups. The 
table also indicates that the difference in mean rates between the public and contractor 
group was not statistically significant at the 5% level, while the difference between the 
private and pooled public/contractor rates was statistically significant. These data 
however mask very noticeable differences in these rates at the individual hospitals, as 
shown in Table A23.5, Appendix 23.
Table 5.10 also shows the mean data for each group on the attribution of avoidable 
factors to different causes. These data indicate that in both the contractor and public 
groups, over 80% of avoidable factors were attributable to hospital related problems 
(defined here as including hospital related administrative factors and medical 
management factors). Within this group, the table indicates that a higher proportion of 
avoidable factors was attributable to hospital administrative problems in the contractor 
than in the public group, with the converse applying in the case o f problems related to 
medical management. In this latter case, it is worth noting the high percentages o f 
avoidable factors attributable to medical management (actions undertaken or omitted by 
hospital staff) in both o f  the groups, with the figure for the public group being 
particularly disturbing. A low percentage of avoidable factors in both groups was 
attributable to patient related factors, with the remainder of avoidable factors attributable 
to the other administrative category, in this case relating primarily to clinic transport 
systems. As the table indicates, only the difference between the proportions of avoidable 
factors attributable to hospital administrative problems was statistically significant at the
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5% level. Table A23.S, Appendix 23 again shows some variation between individual 
hospitals in these analyses of avoidable factors, although the degree o f  variability is 
somewhat less than that noted in the analysis of mortality rates.
Table 5.10: Analysis of peri-natal and maternal mortality, by group
Contractor Public Private Con. vs. Pub. 
chi-square (P)
Pvte. vs. PubJCon. 
chi-square (P)
Births 5093 7641 26 0 8
Peri-natal deaths 196 330 35
M aternal deaths 8 10 0
Peri-natal m ortality  
rate (per 1000)
38.01 50.59 14.48 1.59 (> 0.05) 46.995 (<0.05)
M aternal m ortality  
rate (per 100 000 )
160.66 162.27 0 .0 0 0.021 (> 0.05) 2.583 (>0.05)
Analysis of peri­
natal mortality
N 48 57 19
Poor notes 9 9 19
A voidable factor/s" 2 9  (74.4% ) 24  (50% ) n /a k 4 .39  (< 0.05) n/a
G rade 1 7 6 n /a 0.17 (> 0 .05) n/a
G rade II (%  o f  
total A F)
2 2 (7 6 % ) 18(75% ) n /a 0.06  (> 0.05) n/a
Attribution of 
avoidable factors
Total avo idab le  
factors
38 36
Patient re la ted 2 (5 .3 % ) 3 (8.3% ) n /a 0 .004 (> 0.05) n/a
A dm inistrative 
factors (hosp ita l 
related)
14 (36.8% ) 5 (13.9% ) n /a 3.972 (< 0.05) n/a
M edical
m anagem ent
17(44 .7% ) 25  (69.4% ) n /a 3.647 (> 0.05) n/a
Hospital total 31 (81.6% ) 3 0  (83.3% ) n /a 0.012 (> 0 .05) n/a
A dm in, factors 
(non hospital)
5 (1 3 .2 % ) 3 (8.3% ) n /a 0 .086 (> 0 .05) n/a
Notes: a .  C a s e s  in w hich notes w hich w ere  too p oor to  an aly se  were excluded from  th e  denom inator 
(to tal num ber o f  cases analysed) fo r the purposes o f  calculating the  proportions o f  avoidable 
factors.
b . N o t applicable, since patient records at private hospita ls prevented identification  o f  avoidable 
factors.
5.4.6. Analysis of maternal mortality
The data on maternal mortality rates (Table 5.10) show a similar pattern to that o f peri­
natal mortality, with the contractor and public hospital groups showing similar and very
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high mean rates, but with no statistically significant difference between them. The table 
also shows that the difference between the pooled mean rates for these two groups and 
the mean rate o f zero at the private hospitals was not statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Table A23.S, Appendix 23 shows that the variation between individual hospitals is 
greater than was observed for peri-natal mortality rates.
Table 5.11 summarises the evaluations of the cases of maternal death analysed by the 
University o f  Pretoria group. In this case, only six of the eighteen maternal deaths 
identified could be analysed (two of eight cases in the contractor group, and four of ten 
cases in the public group), since permission was denied to copy files at Shiluvana, and 
the remaining files in the other hospitals could not be located. This analysis differs from 
that o f the peri-natal mortality cases in that it does not use a detailed classification 
system, but instead adopts a more subjective approach to the evaluation of cause of 
death, and whether or not the death was avoidable.
The table indicates that in both of the analysed cases at the contractor hospitals, there 
was evidence o f poor quality of care, and the maternal death would probably have been 
avoidable had the clinical staff acted differently. In Case 1, the poor management 
undertaken at the hospital was aggravated by the late arrival of the patient, as well as by 
the failure to refer appropriately. In case 2, on the other hand, the clinical interventions 
appeared to show clear evidence of poor, and even negligent care. One of the cases at 
the public hospitals (case 4) similarly indicates evidence of poor clinical care resulting 
in a maternal death that could probably have been avoided, while a second (case 1) 
shows evidence of poor examination and possible anaesthetic problems, suggesting that 
the death might possibly have been avoided. In the remaining two cases, the notes were 
not «Hcqnat^ to assess the causes of death in sufficient detail to decide whether or not the 
deaths were avoidable.
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Table 5.11: Analysis of maternal mortality cases
Contractor
Hospitals
Case 1: C au se  o f  death: eclam psia
O vera ll im pression o f  care: ‘too  little, too late’
Problem  was detected the  day  before  at the antenatal c linic and patient referred  to  
hospita l, but only  arrived a  day  later. N o explanation fo r th is  delay.
P atien t should h ave been referred  to  a  tertiary centre as soon  as possible after 
adm ission , but w as  not referred.
M anagem ent a t the  hospital w as inadequate, and suggests inadequate know ledge on 
p a rt o f  clinical staff:
1. N otes do  no t indicate aw areness o f  severity o f  condition
2. T he high b lood pressure w as never controlled
3. Inexplicable delay in d e livery  o f  baby 
P robably  avoidable.
Case 2: C ause  o f  death: Eclam psia com plicated by post-partum  haem orrhage.
O vera ll im pression o f  care: m anagem ent totally  inappropriate for the cond ition . 
A ntenatal clinic perform ed w ell in referring patient to  the  hospital.
C onvulsions n ot d iagnosed as eclam psia, and  m anaged inappropriately. A ppears  as if  
d o c to r in charge o f  case d id  n o t know  w hat w as going on.
P ost partum  haem orrhage contro lled  with syntom etrine - to ta lly  inappropriate. 
Probab ly  avoidable.
Public
Hospitals
Case 1 C au se  o f  death: cardiac arrest du ring  anaesthesia for caesarean  section.
P atien t died under anaesthesia during  caesarean section fo r severe p re-eclam psia. 
P ost m ortem  show ed severe bilateral lobar pneum onia, calcific  valvular d isease  and 
en larged  heart, as  w ell a s  liver cirrhosis.
N o  evidence tha t any  o f  these problem s w ere diagnosed in the  antenatal p e rio d , or 
p rio r to  anaesthesia, suggesting  inadequate exam ination.
P ossib le  problem  w ith anaesthesia, although good attem pt a t resuscitation.
P ossib ly  avoidable.
Case 2 C auses o f  death: no t indicated. Eclam psia and  acute renal failure and possib le  m alaria 
n o ted  in file.
V ery  difficult to  interpret even ts  in this case. Eclam psia n o t well controlled. N o  other 
de ta ils  provided.
N o te  that death occurred  on  17th D ecem ber and notes m ad e  on 19th D ecem ber. 
U nab le  to  judge  avoidability.
Case3 C ause  o f  death: post partum  haem orrhage; probably d ue  to  septicaem ia from  
pyelonephritis.
N o tes  scanty b u t clinical m anagem ent appears to  have b een  good.
U nab le  to  judge  avoidability.
Case 4 C ause  o f  death: post partum  bleeding  due to  poor surg ical technique during caesarean  
section.
S evere  haem orrhage after caesarean  section. Patient taken  back to  theatre, b u t  unable 
to  s top  bleeding (probably d ue  to  dissem inated intravascular coagulation).
Probab ly  avoidable.
5.5. Summary of results of evaluations of quality of care
Table 5.12 provides a brief summary o f the main results discussed in this chapter.
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Table 5.12: Summary of results of evaluations of quality of care
Analysis Comparison between 
public and contractor hospitals
C o m p a ris o n  betw een 
p r iv a t e  a n d  o th e r  hosp ita ls
Structural 
quality of care
C ontractors perfo rm ed  worse in grand total score, 
across m ost clusters, and  on staffing and other 
aggregated  categories, but better in buildings 
cluster. Results ro b u st to sensitivity analyses.
P riv a te  group perform ed 
b e n e r  than  both other groups 
in g ra n d  total score and across 
m ost c lusters and aggregated 
catego ries .
Quality of 
Nursing Care
E v a lu a tio n  
u s in g  su rv e y  
in s tru m e n t
C ontractors p erfo rm ed  better in grand total score, 
and  fo r a ll w ards in th e  nursing care cluster. Public 
hosp ita ls  better in nursing  m anagem ent cluster. 
R esults robust to  sensitivity  analyses.
P riv a te  group better than both 
g ro u p s  by  substantial m argins 
in b o th  clusters.
S u b je c tiv e
e v a lu a tio n
C ontracto rs  perfo rm ed  better in m ost assessed 
categories, besides m anagem ent o f  medical 
equ ipm ent and s ta f f  num bers and skill levels. 
O verall standards o f  nursing care acceptable at 
contractors, but in ferio r and, in som e cases, 
unacceptable at p u b lic  hospitals.
P riv a te  group better than  both 
o th e r  g roups across m ost 
ca teg o ries  analysed.
Quality of 
clinical record 
keeping
C ontractors perfo rm ed  worse than public hospitals 
by statistically  sign ifican t margins in tw o categories, 
and  in  u se  o f  partograph  in N V D  cases.
P r iv a te  group superior to  other 
tw o  g ro u p s  by statistically 
s ig n ifican t margins fo r most 
in d ica to rs , including use o f  
p a rtog raph .
Outcomes of 
care in tracer 
conditions
H e rn ia  R e p a ir Public hospitals sh o w  higher prevalence o f  
indicators o f  poor outcom es, but differences not 
statistically  s ignificant. N o statistically significant 
d ifferences in ex p ert analysis.
P r iv a te  hospitals show  lowest 
p rev a len ce  o f  indicators o f  
p o o r outcom es, but 
s ta tistica lly  significant 
d iffe ren c e  for one indicator 
o n ly .
A p p e n d e c to m y C ontractors show h ig h er prevalence o f  indicators o f  
p oo r outcom es, b u t d ifferences not statistically 
s ignificant. N o statistically  significant differences in 
expert analysis.
P r iv a te  hospitals show  lowest 
p rev a len ce  o f  indicators o f  
p o o r  outcom es. D ifferences 
w e re  statistically significant 
fo r m a jo rity  o f  indicators.
N V D Public hospitals sh o w  slightly h igher prevalence o f  
indicators o f  poo r outcom es, but differences not 
statistically  significant. N o statistically significant 
d ifferences in ex p ert analysis, but o f  nine cases 
analysed , ev idence o f  possibly avoidable outcomes 
in cases  a t con trac to r and public hospitals, and one 
c learly  avoidable outcom e at one public hospital.
P r iv a te  hospitals show  lowest 
p rev a len ce  o f  indicators o f  
p o o r  outcom es, but 
d iffe ren ces  not statistically 
sign ifican t.
C a esa re a n
s e c tio n
Public hospitals s h o w  higher prevalence in one o f  
the  indicators o f  p o o r  outcome, and lower 
p revalence in the  o ther. Differences not statistically 
s ig n ific an t N o statistically  significant differences in 
expert analysis, b u t analysis identified five cases o f  
possib ly  avoidable outcom es, all a t public hospitals, 
and  o n e  clearly avo idab le  outcom e, also at a public 
hospital.
P r iv a te  hospitals show  lower 
p rev a len ce  o f  indicators than 
th e  o th e r  groups. D ifference 
w a s  statistically significant for 
o n e  indicator, but not fo r the 
o th e r.
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Table 5.12: Summary of results of evaluations of quality of care (contd.)
Analysis Comparison between 
public and contractor hospitals
C o m p a riso n  be tw een  
p r iv a te  a n d  o th e r  h o sp ita ls
P e r i-n a ta l
m o r ta lity
H igh m ean rates in both groups; public hospital rate 
h igher, but difference no t statistically significant. 
IC A  A udit showed that con tracto r hospitals had 
h igher proportion o f  cases w ith one  or m ore 
avoidable factors, w ith difference between the  
groups being  statistically significant.
Private group show ed lowest 
rate, w ith  difference being 
statistically significant.
M a te rn a l
m o r ta lity
H igh m ean rates in both groups, but difference n ot 
statistically  s ign ifican t N o  statistically significant 
d ifferences in expert analysis, b u t evidence o f  poor 
quality  o f  care, and  possibly avoidable death in tw o 
cases a t contractor hospitals, and  in two cases at 
public hospitals.
Private group show ed lowest 
m ean rate, but d ifference not 
statistically significant.
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS - ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTS 
AND THE CONTRACTING PROCESS
This chapter presents the results of an analysis of the contracts and the contracting 
process in the three contractor hospitals, and examines the historical reasons for the 
emergence of different contractual models, as well as the impact of these on efficiency. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, efficient contracts are those in which the balance of 
incentives for the contracting parties is such that it creates the appropriate trade-offs 
between the risk o f opportunistic behaviour by the contractor, the transactions costs 
faced by the purchaser, and the number of contractors willing to bid for the contract. 
These incentives, and their impact, are in turn a function o f the design, and the resulting 
incentive structure o f the contract, the mechanics of the contracting process, and the 
attitudes o f the contracting parties to risk. The following sections examine each o f these 
aspects o f  the prevailing contractual arrangements.
6.1. Contract design and incentive structure
The theory of contracts discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that one of the major 
determinants o f the incentive effects of contracts is the distribution of risk between the 
contracting parties. In the context of public sector contracts, the government’s major 
risks are those associated with the cost o f the contract, and the quality o f services 
delivered, while those of the contractor relate to the predictability of total revenues and 
total costs. A number o f specific features of contracts will impact on these dimensions 
o f risk for each of the parties, including the services and obligations specified in the 
contract, the reimbursement mechanism employed, the extent o f capital risk faced by the 
contractor, the duration o f the contract, the degree of detail in the specification o f  the 
contract, and provisions for monitoring and sanctions in case of breach of contract. Each 
of these specific aspects o f the contracts are discussed in the following sections.
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6.1.1. Services covered by the contract
Table 6.1 summarises the key structural features of the three contracts, and indicates 
some similarity in the services covered. At Matikwana and Hewu, the contract covers 
both in-patient and outpatient services, while at Shiluvana, the contract is limited to in­
patient services. The exclusion o f out-patient services from the Shiluvana contract was 
at the insistence of the government, which took the view that it had adequate outpatient 
service provision through its district PHC facilities. In all three contracts, the 
contractors’ obligations are limited to delivery of patient and support services within the 
hospital grounds, and do not cover other services such as patient transport, or clinical 
and administrative support to PHC services in the surrounding districts.
Table 6.1; Key features of the contracts
Matikwana Hcwu Shiluvana
Services covered 
by the contract
In-patient and out-patient 
services.
In-patient and outpatient 
services.
In-patient services only.
Personnel
obligations
Contractor employs all 
personnel aside from 
medical staff.
Contractor employs all 
personnel.
Contractor employs only 
senior management 
personnel. Govt, employs 
all other administrative, 
ancillary, nursing and 
medical personnel.
Reimbursement
method
Fixed per diem rate for in­
patient care. OPD visit at 
1/3 o f in-patient day rate.
Fixed per diem rate for in­
patient care. OPD visit at 
1/3 o f in-patient day rate.
Fixed per diem rate.
Price adjustment 
mechanism
Automatic annual price 
escalation.
Provision for interim price 
increases.
As Matikwana As Matikwana
Minimum
Occupancy
Clause
Initially specified at 90%. 
Subsequently reduced to 
80%.
None. Initially specified at 90%. 
Subsequently reduced to 
80%.
Capital risk Capital for hospital 
construction and equipment 
provided by contractor.
Hospital built and equipped 
by government.
Capital for hospital 
construction and equipment 
provided by contractor.
Contract
duration
10 years, renewable for 
further 10 years.
3 years; renewed for further 
3.
10 years, renewable for 
further 10 years.
Specification of 
the contract
Minimal specification of 
contractor's obligations and 
performance review.
As Matikwana As Matikwana
Penalties for 
breach of 
contract
Provision for cancellation 
and penalty in event o f 
breach.
As Matikwana As Matikwana
Method of
awarding
contract
Direct negotiation. Direct negotiation for initial 
3 years, then competitive 
tender for subsequent 3
Direct negotiation.
-229-
6.1.2. Personnel obligations
As Table 6.1 also shows, the three contracts differ quite substantially in terms of the 
contractor's personnel obligations. At Matikwana, the contractor is required to provide 
all hospital personnel aside from the medical staff, who are employed by the 
government. In this case, the contract does not require that either party consult with the 
other on the appointment o f its own staff. At Hewu, the contractor is required to provide 
the full complement o f hospital staff, including medical staff, and must consult with the 
government prior to appointment o f medical or paramedical personnel, but not for other 
staff. The contract for Shiluvana is different again; in this case, the contractor is required 
to supply only senior management personnel and some limited domestic staff, with the 
government supplying most administrative staff, and all nursing and medical personnel, 
with no obligation on either o f the parties to consult with the other prior to appointment 
of staff. None of the contracts specify required numbers or skill mix in the staffing of the 
hospitals, leaving these decisions entirely in the hands of the contractor.
It should be noted here that these personnel obligations expose the contractor to some 
specific risks: all staff employed by the contractor are regarded by it as permanent 
employees, despite the fact that the hospital management contracts have limited terms. 
The contractor thus assumes the risk of finding further employment for its staff, or of 
negotiating acceptable retrenchment packages, in the event that contracts are terminated 
or not renewed. In addition, the contractor faces the risk o f not being able to adequately 
control government employed staff, which may undermine its ability to meet its 
contractual obligations.
6.13. Obligations in respect of other inputs
As with personnel obligations, none of the contracts specify in any detail obligations or 
constraints in regard to the deployment or use of inputs such as equipment, drugs or 
other supplies. In two o f the hospitals (Matikwana and Shiluvana), the contractor has 
access to the government drug supply and distribution system, and the government
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employed medical staff are required to adhere to the government formulary.141 These 
arrangements do not apply in the case of Hewu, where drug purchasing and distribution 
is undertaken by the contractor, and where the medical staff are not restricted to a 
government formulary. Procurement of all other supplies and equipment is undertaken 
by the contractor, using its strong central purchasing capability to ensure low prices and 
good quality. Laundry services are provided at the hospital in all cases, while catering 
services at all three hospitals are subcontracted by the contractor to a specialist catering 
company.
6.1.4. Reimbursement mechanisms
Table 6.1 shows that in all three contracts, reimbursement for in-patient care is based on 
a fixed per diem rate, and that OPD visits are charged at one third of the per diem rate in 
the Matikwana and Hewu contracts.142 Where demand for services is uncertain, as is the 
case with acute hospital services, a per diem reimbursement mechanism distributes the 
risk between the two parties to some extent, since the government is usually unable to 
predict its total costs, while the contractor is similarly unable to predict total revenues. 
This situation applies in the case of the Hewu contract, but not in the other two 
contracts, which both included a minimum occupancy clause which specified that, 
where average bed occupancy falls below 90% for more than two weeks, the per diem 
rate will be payable at an assumed bed occupancy rate o f 90%.143 This clause shifts 
much o f the risk in the contract to the government by protecting the contractor against 
the risk o f periods of low demand, ensuring a high degree o f predictability of revenues.
All three contracts also include provisions for price adjustments which further reduce 
the risk faced by the contractor. As the table notes, the contracts make provision for 
automatic annual price adjustments to account for inflationary increases in production 
costs, and also allow the contractor to request interim price increases, in case of other
These arrangements are not included in the contracts, but were arranged subsequent to their implementation.
142 At Hewu, dental OPD visits are also included in the contract, and are charged at one fifth o f  the per diem rate
143 The minimum occupancy level o f 90% was reduced to  85% during 1993/94 and again to 80% in 1994/9$.
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unpredicted cost increases. The contracts also make provision for arbitration in the case 
o f price disputes, thus limiting the power o f the government to deny price increases. 
Interviews with Lifecare and government officials indicate that, in all three contracts, 
the government has always accepted the annual price increases, and has also accepted all 
requests for interim price adjustments.
6.1.5. Capital risk
Table 6.1 indicates important variations in the extent of capital risk faced by the 
contractor in the three contracts. At both Matikwana and Shiluvana, the contractor was 
required to fund (and undertake) the construction and equipping of the hospitals. This 
higher capital risk is however compensated for in the contracts. This is reflected firstly 
in the contract prices, which are higher than they would otherwise be expected to be 
since the capital invested by the contractor is amortised within the contract price.144 
Similarly, these two contracts provide for a long initial contract term, as well as for 
renewal for a further period. In both cases, the contracts also state that after a 20 year 
period, the buildings and equipment in the hospital will revert to the ownership of the 
government Should the contract be canceled prior to this, however, the government will 
be obliged to purchase the hospital from the contractor, at a value determined by a 
formula in the contract. Thus, while the contract in theory allows the government to 
decide whether or not to renew the contract at the end o f the first ten year period, the 
inclusion of the penalty clause effectively locks the government into a 20 year contract. 
Taken together, these clauses suggest that the contracts fully compensate the contractor 
for the capital risk assumed, and might in fact be argued to overcompensate for this, thus 
further shifting risk towards the government.
Direct comparison o f contract prices is complicated by the variation in personnel obligations o f the contractor at 
the different hospitals. Thus, the price per day at Shiluvana is the lowest o f the three (despite inclusion o f  a 
capital element in the price) since the contractor has the smallest personnel obligations there. Similarly, the 
price at Hewu is slightly higher than at Matikwana, despite the latter including a capital element, because the 
Hewu contract requires that the contractor employ medical staff, who contribute significantly to the contractor's 
total wage bill.
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The situation is somewhat different at Hewu hospital, where the contractor faced no 
capital risk since it took over the management of a hospital that was already fully built 
and equipped. This contract therefore requires the contractor to maintain all facilities 
and equipment, and to purchase new equipment as required, although such equipment 
will remain the property o f the contractor at the end of the contract. The lower capital 
risk faced by the contractor in this contract is reflected in a relatively lower contract 
price, a shorter contract term, and the absence of a minimum occupancy clause.
6.1.6. Specification of contracts and performance review mechanisms
None of the contracts specify the contractor’s obligations in terms o f quantity or quality 
o f services in any detail, including only vague and general provisions that the contractor 
will deliver services o f an acceptable standard. This poor specification of the 
contractor’s obligations shifts contractual risk substantially towards the government, by 
making it difficult for the government to monitor whether or not the contractor is 
actually fulfilling its obligations. More importantly, these contracts render it almost 
impossible for the government to identify any failure on the part o f the contractor as a 
litigable breach of contract.
Similarly, while the right of the government to inspect the premises and monitor 
performance of the contractor is noted in all contracts, none of the contracts provide any 
detail on the nature and fiequency o f monitoring to be undertaken, or on the nature or 
scale of penalties for non performance by the contractor. The contracts do however 
provide for termination o f the contract should either party be in breach of contract.
6.1.7. Overview of the incentive structure of the contracts
In summary, this analysis has demonstrated that the incentive structure in all three o f the 
contracts substantially favours the contractor, with much of the risk in the contracts 
shifted towards the government. This is seen specifically in the reimbursement
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mechanism used, particularly in combination with a minimum occupancy clause and 
price adjustment provisions; and in the minimal degree of specification o f inputs, 
outputs and of monitoring and performance review. While the contracts do pose some 
risk to the  contractor, specifically in the capital risk assumed, and in the engagement of 
permanent staff establishments, this analysis suggests that the contracts more than 
adequately compensate the contractor for this risk.
6.2. The contracting process
6.2.1. Mechanics of the contracting process
The contracts for both Shiluvana and Matikwana were directly negotiated between the 
government and the contractor. In both cases, the initial contract was drawn up by the 
contractor, and this was followed by rapid and straightforward negotiations and review 
of the contracts by government legal staff, prior to signature. In both cases, it appears as 
if the contractor was able to secure all o f its requirements with minimal resistance. In the 
case o f  Hewu hospital, the initial contract was awarded to the contractor after an open, 
competitive tender, in which it bid against two other private for-profit hospital 
companies. While government officials were unable to recall the specific details of the 
different bids, the contractor's view is that it was awarded the contract because it was 
the cheapest bidder, and perhaps because it was already managing another hospital 
under contract to the same government. This initial contract was granted for a five year 
period, and included a clause stating that the incumbent contractor should be given 
preference if a second contract term was entered into. At the end o f  the 5 year period, a 
new 3 year contract was therefore negotiated directly with the contractor. In this case, 
the contractor again drew up the contract, and was able to secure all o f its requirements 
after a  simple and rapid negotiation.
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6.2.2. Attitudes and reactions to contractual risk
Interviews with contractor and government officials demonstrated important differences 
in attitudes and reactions to perceived risk in the contractual situation. On the 
government side, perceptions of risk were not explicitly articulated, but appeared to be 
limited mainly to concerns with the cost of the contract. No explicit concern with 
quality of care issues was raised. Importantly, government officials evinced a 
surprisingly passive approach to these risks and contractual problems, and did not 
appear to perceive the connections between the provisions of the contract and these 
risks. More specifically, government officials seemed not to perceive their own power to 
influence the negotiating and contract writing process, despite their concerns that the 
contracts were biased against them.
The contractor, on the other hand, demonstrated a much more sophisticated 
understanding of the various sources of risk in the contract, of the connections between 
these and the contract itself, as well of the manifestations of these risks in each o f  the 
specific contracts. As would be expected, the contractor identified its capital investment 
at Matikwana and Shiluvana as one o f its main risks in those contracts, and had insisted 
on the long contract terms and minimum occupancy clauses as compensation for this 
risk. Thus, while it was prepared to accept risk on its operating costs, it explicitly 
required that the government asstime some share o f the risk on the capital investment. It 
also identified unpredictability of demand as another risk, and as expected, has a clear 
sense of the specific relationships between levels o f demand and profitability at each of 
the hospitals. Fluctuating demand was identified as a major problem at Hewu, in which 
the absence o f a minimum occupancy clause exposes the contractor to the risk that 
revenues may fall below its fixed costs. This had in fact occurred during the year prior to 
the study, resulting in losses. A further risk, noted above, relates to the hiring o f large 
permanent staff establishments for each hospital, despite the fact that the contracts are 
for limited terms.
As noted in the previous section, the contractor was able to write and negotiate contracts 
which compensated it adequately for most o f these perceived risks. In addition, each
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new contract is subjected to intensive risk and feasibility analysis, using both in-house 
and outside research capability, prior to the decision to enter into the contract 
negotiation.
A number of elements in the attitudes of the parties to contractual risk, and in the 
contracting process, have led to the development of contracts which tend to favour the 
contractor to a significant extent. As shown above, the contractor appears to be more 
risk averse, and more aware of contractual risk, than the government. Direct 
negotiations, as occurred in two o f the three original contracts (and in the second round 
o f the third contract) provided greater scope for the contractor to influence the shape of 
the contract than a competitive tendering process would have, and this tendency was 
further strengthened by what appears to have been extremely weak negotiating capacity 
on the part of the government. Together, these factors led to a situation in which the 
government in effect became a passive ‘taker’ of prices and contractual conditions in all 
three contracts.
There is also a complex relationship between these various factors and the extent of 
actual or potential competition for these contracts. The government appears to have a 
confused understanding o f  competition in this context - in the contracts for Matikwana 
and Shiluvana, the government believed that no other competitors existed and therefore 
negotiated directly with the contractor, whereas in the Hewu case, the initial contract 
was awarded through an open competitive tender. Interviews with government officials 
elicited the general sense of some degree o f dependency on the contractor, despite 
awareness of the existence of potential competition. This is in contrast with the 
contractor itself, which appears to take the threat o f competition seriously both in 
bidding for the contracts initially, and also in its annual price adjustments.
In summary, analysis o f  the contracting process provides some compelling explanations 
for the fact that the prevailing contracts heavily favour the contractor. The government 
appears not to have been sufficiently aware o f the impact o f the design o f the contract on 
its own risks, nor on its transactions costs. Similarly, it appears to have underestimated 
its own ability to influence the terms and conditions o f the contract, in part because of an
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exaggerated sense of its dependence on this particular contractor to undertake the 
required tasks.
63. Explanations for variations in contractual models
When these various features of the contracts and the contracting process are integrated, 
two major contractual models emerge. The first may be termed a ‘build, operate and 
transfer’ contract; here the contractor invests capital for the construction and equipping 
o f the hospital, in return for a management contract, with some variation in the 
personnel and other obligations within the contract. Ownership o f the hospital is initially 
in the hands of the contractor, but is transferred to the government at the end of the 
contract, through amortisation of the capital cost within the contract price. In the second 
model, which may be termed a ‘management contract’, the contractor obtains a contract 
to manage an existing publicly owned hospital, and is required to provide some or all of 
the staff required to manage the hospital.145 Interviews with government and contractor 
officials suggest that these alternative models, and their specific and variable features, 
are attributable to a combination of particular historical circumstances, as well as to 
explicit intentions in contract design, mainly on the part of the contractor. These factors 
are clearly illustrated by examining the background to the development of each of the 
contracts.
The first o f these contracts to be signed was for Shiluvana hospital. This hospital had 
previously been a mission hospital, and by 1985, was in desperate need of major 
investment in new buildings and equipment. The government at the time faced major 
capital constraints, and approached the contractor (but no other companies) to rebuild, 
equip and run the hospital. Government officials indicate that they approached this 
contractor alone because the company had very successfully and rapidly responded to a 
request to build and manage a large chronic psychiatric institution, and because ‘they 
believed that no other companies were capable of rendering the required services’. As
1*5 Interviews with Lifecare officials indicate a  third model, applied in several o f  its other contracts, in which the 
contractor leases a hospital from a third party, and uses it to provide services on contract to the government.
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indicated above, the contractor responded to this request by designing a contract which 
would compensate it for its capital risk, and this was accepted by the government, and 
the contract was signed in 1986.
In the original contract, the contractor was obliged to manage the entire health district, 
including the hospital and its surrounding PHC facilities. However, the contractor 
encountered logistical and administrative difficulties in managing the non-hospital PHC 
facilities, and found itself unable to ‘run these services on business lines’, leading it to 
request that the government re-assume control over the district PHC services, which the 
government agreed to do, some 2 years after the original contract was signed.
The staffing model used at Shiluvana also emerges from this particular history. Since the 
new hospital replaced an existing one which already had a full staff establishment, the 
original contract stated that the contractor would take over the employment of all 
hospital staff aside from the medical staff. This approach lasted 2 years, after which the 
contractor requested that the government re-assume employment of all nursing and most 
domestic staff, a request which was again readily acceded to by the government. 
According to the contractor, it requested this change since it found itself unable to 
control staff costs or productivity due to entrenchment o f public sector practices, despite 
the fact that it was the formal employer o f all hospital staff. The original decision to 
leave medical staff in the employ of the government was also at the insistence o f the 
contractor, which took the view that this would be preferable for the doctors themselves, 
since they could retain the option of transferring to other government hospitals.
The development of the contract for Matikwana followed a similar pattern. Based on the 
success o f  its previous two arrangements with the contractor, and facing similar capital 
constraints, the same government in 1987 requested the company to finance, construct 
and equip a  new district hospital. Again the contractor agreed to this and drew up a very 
similar contract to that used at Shiluvana, which was again accepted by the government. 
In this case, the absence of a pre-existing staff establishment led to a contract requiring 
the contractor to employ all staff aside from medical staff. Management of the district 
PHC services was on this occasion omitted from the contract altogether.
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The contract for Hewu followed a different trajectory. In this case, the hospital had been 
built and equipped in 1984, but by 1986, the Ciskei government had not yet been able to 
commission the hospital, which was lying empty. The contractor approached the 
government suggesting that it manage the hospital on contract, and this led to the 
competitive tender which was won by Lifecare. In the case of staffing, the 
administrative difficulties faced by the government led to a request that the contractor 
employ the full staff complement, although as with the previous contracts, the contractor 
agreed only to provide hospital management services, rather than to assume control of 
all district facilities.
6.4. Impact of contract structure and process on efficiency
The previous sections have indicated that both contract design and the contracting 
process led to contracts in which risk is substantially shifted towards the government, 
and in which there are opportunities for exploitation of the contracts by the contractor. 
This section examines the relationship between these various factors and the efficiency 
of the contractual arrangements.
6.4.1. Impact of the split between hospital and district services
The split in the management o f hospital and district PHC services was identified as one 
o f the critical problems experienced by government officials in all three contracts. A 
number o f specific problems were identified in this context. The first is a lack of 
coordination between hospital and district services; in the normal public sector rural 
hospital model, hospitals act as the hub of an ‘hub and spoke’ system, providing direct 
support to surrounding clinics, and resulting in a fairly high degree of integration and 
coordination between the hospital and district PHC facilities. The model applied in these 
contractor hospitals however resulted in fragmentation, lack of coordination, and in 
some cases, conflict between hospital and district staff. These problems create numerous
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inefficiencies. In the case o f Matikwana, for example, clinics a few kilometres from the 
hospital have to be supported and supervised by staff from another public hospital over 
50 km away, when they ought to be supervised by staff at Matikwana hospital itself.
A second problem emerges from the perverse incentives that result from the separation 
o f hospital and district services. Under the current contractual arrangements, the 
contractor has an incentive to encourage OPD visits at the hospital (at Matikwana and 
Hewu) as well as hospital admissions, since these increase revenues. The contractor 
appears to have responded with a high level of integrity in the case of Matikwana, where 
it financed and built a clinic at the gate of the hospital, at which public sector staff 
examine and screen patients, referring only serious cases to the hospital. In the other two 
hospitals, however, patients often bypass public sector clinics and are seen directly at the 
hospital. There is also an incentive for the contractor to engage in  cost-shifting, since the 
contracts specifically exclude the transport and other costs of patient referrals, 
encouraging the contractor to refer all relatively complex (and hence costly) cases to 
other hospitals. Several o f the government officials interviewed perceived these specific 
problems to be so serious as to undermine almost all of the perceived efficiency gains 
from contracting ou t
6.4.2. Impact of alternative staffing models
Two elements of the alternative staffing models used in these contracts are relevant from 
an efficiency perspective. The first is the separation of medical staff, who remain in the 
employ o f  the government from the management staff employed by the contractor. 
Government officials perceive this approach to have a strongly positive effect, since it 
provides safeguards against any tendency of the contractor to reduce costs at the expense 
o f quality, and/or to prolong length of stay in order to increase revenues. While the 
medical staff working in these two hospitals agreed with these sentiments, they had 
differing views on the overall efficiency effects of this arrangement. Those working at 
Shiluvana, for example, argued that they experienced conflicting loyalties, and that this 
led to conflict and sub-optimal management of the hospital. This view was not shared by
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the medical staff at Matikwana, who experienced a smooth and effective working 
relationship with the contractor’s management team. As discussed further below, the 
problem at Shiluvana may have more to do with the more general ‘dual employment’ 
arrangements at that hospital, than with the specific separation of medical from general 
management staff.
Contractor officials also had mixed views on this arrangement; while all those 
interviewed conceded that this arrangement provided some safeguards against possible 
conflicts of interest on the part of the doctors, some felt strongly that employment of 
doctors by the government undermined the coherence and efficiency of the hospital 
management team. This point was argued with particular reference to Hewu hospital, 
where the full integration of medical and management staff was perceived to create a 
more coherent management team, and to ensure that medical staff were more cost 
conscious in their use of resources. Overall, however, the balance of views on this 
arrangement was in favour o f its retention.
The second issue of relevance here is the more general ‘dual employer’ situation, as 
occurs at Shiluvana hospital. As noted above, this occurred for historical reasons rather 
than by design, and is universally regarded as hindering efficiency within the hospital. 
Specifically, this model leads to a split between the clinical aspects of care, provided by 
government employed medical and nursing staff, and hospital administration and 
domestic services, which are provided by the contractor’s staff. This split undermines 
integration and coordination of service delivery, and is perceived to be responsible for 
tensions between hospital staff. Some public sector employees also appear to exploit the 
situation by playing the two employers off against each other. As importantly, this 
arrangement prevents the contractor from effectively managing resources which account 
for over 60% o f total hospital costs, thus limiting the capacity o f the management team 
to generating any meaningful efficiency gains.
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6.43. Impact of reimbursement methods, pricing mechanisms and contract 
duration
Considered alone, the use of a per diem payment method creates problematic incentives 
for the contractor to prolong length o f stay in order to maximise revenues. However, the 
minimum occupancy clauses at Matikwana and Shiluvana, as well as the fact that that 
the doctors in these hospitals are employed by the government, are likely to mitigate this 
effect to some extent Interviews with these doctors suggested that they experience no 
pressure whatever from the contractor to prolong length o f stay beyond what is 
necessary. Doctors at Hewu, who are employed by the contractor, expressed a similar 
sentiment, although other statements made during the course of the interviews suggested 
that they are highly conscious o f issues affecting the financial performance o f  the 
hospital. This is not surprising, considering the close working relationship between the 
management and medical staff at Hewu (sec below), and the fact that hospital managers 
at the contractor hospitals are rewarded in part on the basis o f the financial performance 
o f their hospital. In this environment, it is possible that medical staff do experience 
subtle pressures to ensure high occupancy rates, particularly where revenues are not 
guaranteed by a minimum occupancy clause, as is the case at Hewu.
The per diem method was also regarded as problematic by government officials because 
o f the administrative difficulties encountered in auditing claims submitted by the 
contractor. Both contractor and government officials recalled instances where the 
contractor had submitted incorrect claims, which were subsequently corrected after a 
government audit Auditing of this kind increases the transactions costs faced by the 
government and officials o f both parties agreed that under current arrangements, 
auditing was irregular, incomplete, and therefore often ineffective. These various 
problems led some government officials to suggest that some form of global budget 
would be a preferable method of reimbursement.
While the incentive effects of these reimbursement mechanisms are ambiguous, the 
price adjustment clauses in all three contracts more clearly undermine the efficiency 
incentives faced by the contractor. If  all cost increases can simply be passed onto the
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purchaser, the contractor faces few incentives to improve productivity, or to change its 
input factor mix, in response to changes in factor prices. While none o f the price 
increases requested by the contractor have ever been resisted, interviews with 
government officials indicated mixed feelings on price levels and the price adjustment 
mechanism. Officials in the Ciskei government felt that prices and the adjustments were 
reasonable, while those in the Gazankulu government argued that prices did not 
accurately reflect resource use, and that the various price increases were not always 
justified. They could not however explain why such increases had always been granted, 
in spite of their views.
While most elements o f  the reimbursement mechanism therefore appear to favour the 
contractor, the interviews also identified slow payment by the government as an 
important element o f  risk faced by the contractor. The contractor’s experience was that 
the government was often 3-4 months in arrears, and often up to 12 months in arrears for 
retrospective payment when tariffs were adjusted.
As with the price adjustment provisions, the long contract terms in two o f the contracts 
also weaken the contractor’s incentive to demonstrate efficiency on an ongoing basis.
6.4.4. Impact of poor contract specification
The absence of detailed specifications o f the contractor’s obligations and o f performance 
review mechanisms is reflected in a complete lack of formal auditing o f contractor 
performance at all three hospitals. Instead, the government relies on a variety of 
relatively superficial formal and informal monitoring mechanisms which appear to give 
it some degree o f insight into contractor performance. The most important of these 
mechanisms is the use of government staff (particularly medical and senior 
administrative staff) employed at the hospitals to observe contractor performance. 
Additional mechanisms include formal inspection visits by government officials (which 
occur at irregular intervals), formal nursing inspections (annually), and formal meetings 
between the contractor and government officials, which usually take place four times a
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year. While monitoring is thus superficial, it is regarded by both sides as fairly effective, 
particularly at identifying problems in staff satisfaction and serious problems in quality 
o f care.
6.4.5. Transparency of trading and transactions costs
The theoretical rationale for contracting, as discussed in Chapter 2, postulates increased 
transparency in the trading relationship between government and contractors as a 
contributor to the potential efficiency gains from contracting. Transparency in the 
trading relationship can be analysed from both the purchaser’s and the provider’s point 
of view. Contractor officials expressed the view that government scrutiny o f contractor 
hospitals was substantially greater than that applied to public hospitals, and that this was 
an important stimulus to efficiency in the contractor hospitals. This scrutiny took the 
form of the monitoring discussed above, as well as of close examination of price 
adjustments requested during the contract period. In the latter case, contractor officials 
argued that the close scrutiny o f price adjustments encouraged the company to maximise 
cost savings wherever possible, in order to maintain its profit margins.
The interviews also highlighted other, less direct evidence of the impact of transparency 
of trading from the contractor’s perspective. As discussed further in Chapter 7, 
managers of the contractor hospitals and corporate head office officials are clearly aware 
of efficiency issues in the production of services, and some efficiency criteria are central 
determinants o f the organisation of production in these hospitals. This is in strong 
contrast with the situation in public hospitals, where managers articulated some 
awareness o f these issues, but in fact have access to almost no specific cost, output and 
quality information. It is important to note, however, that managers in the contractor 
hospitals in turn pay much less attention to these and other efficiency issues (such as 
quality of care) than do their counterparts in the private hospitals, which is reflected in 
the much less sophisticated information systems and consequent level o f detail in 
management information available in the contractor hospitals. This pattern suggests that 
the trading relationship per se does have some impact on efficiency from the provider’s
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perspective, as illustrated by the stark differences between contractor and public 
hospitals in the use of information and the understanding of the determinants of 
efficiency. It also suggests, though, that the particular nature of the trading relationship 
is crucial; where this relationship is relatively crude, with an unsophisticated buyer who 
exerts limited pressure on the provider, as occurs in the contracts analysed here, the 
provider is likely to respond by generating and using the minimum information 
required. Where however a much more sophisticated buyer is involved, and/or where a 
more demanding reimbursement mechanism is in place, both o f which occur in the 
private hospitals, the provider’s response is to invest much more heavily in obtaining 
and using detailed cost, output and quality information.
As regards the purchaser’s perspective, government officials also took the view that the 
monitoring mechanisms they applied to the hospitals contributed to efficiency, although 
none o f  them argued specifically that the monitoring of contractor hospitals was more 
effective than was the case with public hospitals. As noted above, however, they 
expressed a different view from the contractor as regards scrutiny o f requests for price 
adjustments; in this case, their experience was that they had always simply accepted 
requests for price adjustments, rather than encouraging greater efficiency through 
scrutiny and negotiation.
To the extent that the government’s purchasing decisions and behaviour are based on 
explicit cost effectiveness or other efficiency criteria, this might provide further support 
for some impact o f the trading relationship on efficiency. However, the interviews 
provided no evidence that this was the case; for example, decisions to contract out the 
services in  question were based on very limited, if any, needs assessments, and were in 
fact based more on the inability of the government to deliver the service itself than on a 
conscious choice about the efficiency gains from this approach. In addition, and as 
described above, the contracts are vaguely specified, the reimbursement mechanism is 
linked to  crudely defined outputs, there is very limited monitoring of contractor 
performance, and no assessment whatever of the impact of the contracts on quality of 
care or health outcomes.
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These data therefore demonstrate an uneven contribution of the trading relationship to 
hospital efficiency in the contractual environment. On the contractor side, the trading 
relationship seems to provide some incentive for more efficient behaviour, at least in 
contrast with that observed in the public hospitals, where no trading relationship exists 
at all. This pattern is not however evident on the purchaser’s side, where the government 
appears to treat contractor hospitals in almost the identical way to their treatment o f 
public hospitals.
While transparency of trading is argued to be a benefit of contracted services, the 
consequent transactions costs are recognised as a specific cost which may reduce the 
potential efficiency gains of contracting. As discussed in Chapter 3, this study attempted 
to quantify those elements of the transactions costs which were measurable, and, in 
addition, interviews were conducted to assess other aspects of transactions costs. The 
cost analysis and interviews made it clear that government officials have no information 
on the incremental costs they incur in managing contracted out hospitals. While no staff 
are employed specifically to manage the contracts in either of the government 
departments, officials were not able to identify the proportion of time spent by key 
officials in negotiating and managing the contracts. They were also not able to point to 
any specific or systematic differences between contracted out and public sector hospitals 
in the volume and nature of monitoring conducted by the government. The only unique 
transaction cost identified was that of the additional time required to manage the 
intermittent problems consequent on the fragmentation between hospital and district 
services, discussed above. In this case, too, however, officials were not able to quantify 
the amount o f time involved. These interviews thus did not assist in assessing the extent 
to which transactions costs undermine any efficiency gains from contracting.
6.4.6. Impact of competition
Although the impact of competition on the efficiency of the study hospitals was not 
studied in detail here, the interviews did seek the views of government and contractor 
officials on the relationship between competition and hospital efficiency. Government
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officials did not attribute much importance to competition as a determinant of either 
public or contractor hospital performance. In the case o f  public hospitals, this was 
attributed to the lack of any incentive for hospitals to attract patients (since they do not 
retain any revenues so generated), while in the case o f  contractor hospitals, the 
contractor was perceived as dominating the market. This latter perception seemed to 
prevail despite the experience of the Ciskei government in the competitive tendering for 
the initial contract at Hewu. There was also limited understanding of the potential or 
actual effects o f competition on either contractor efftciency or on the prices obtained by 
government
As might be expected, contractor officials demonstrated a clearer sense of the existence 
and impact of competition on the functioning of their hospitals. Hospital managers at all 
three o f the hospitals noted that they faced some competition from surrounding public 
sector hospitals, in the sense that patients choose to attend hospitals based on 
perceptions o f quality o f care. Should patients choose to attend a neighbouring public 
hospital rather than the contractor hospital, occupancy rates and outpatient attendances 
would drop, with negative consequences for hospital revenues. One of the hospital 
managers recalled a period in the recent past during which the surrounding community 
developed negative perceptions o f the quality of care at the contractor hospital and 
shifted their ‘custom' to a nearby public hospital. Hospital managers and officials 
however noted that the extent of this form of competition was constrained by the impact 
o f  the PHC clinic system, which played an important role in directing the flow of 
patients.
For obvious reasons, competition from other private sector operators was perceived to 
be more o f a threat than that posed by public sector hospitals, and this threat was taken 
seriously by all o f the contractor officials interviewed. A t the time of the study, the 
contractor was effectively a monopolist, with no other private for-profit companies 
operating in this particular market. Despite this, the company had a clear sense of the 
threat o f competition, as borne out by the competition from other private hospital 
companies for the Hewu contract. They also took the view that competition from both 
local and international competitors was likely to increase substantially in the future.
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The contractor officials were also clear on the link between their perceptions of the 
threat of competition and the efficiency of their hospitals. In light of these competitive 
threats, they were convinced that they would experience increased and growing pressure 
on prices, so that they would have to continually improve productive efficiency (and 
hence lower costs) in order to maintain (or grow) their profit margins. This had lead to 
efforts to improve cost control and productivity at all hospitals. In this context, their 
views on the mechanics of awarding future contracts were also interesting: whereas it 
would seem to be clearly in their interest to secure further contracts through direct 
negotiation rather than through competition, they were concerned that the lack of 
transparency in the direct negotiation approach would prejudice further contracts. 
Moreover, they were very confident o f their ability to beat their competition on price, 
given their several decades of experience with this form of contracting.
6.4.7. Overview of the impact of contract design and process on efficiency
This analysis has demonstrated a contractual situation, in all three hospitals, which does 
not conform to the theoretical requirements for efficient contracts. A key requirement of 
efficient contracts is that risk in the contract is fairly distributed between the parties, 
such that the risk borne by each party is related to its degree of risk aversion. However, 
as demonstrated here, these contracts shift risk disproportionately towards the 
government, even though there is no explicit evidence that the government is less risk 
averse than the contractor. A second, related requirement is that the contractor has few 
opportunities for exploiting the contract, a situation that can be achieved through 
detailed contract specification and monitoring, which themselves have to be balanced 
against the problem o f increased transactions costs. As this analysis has shown, 
however, the vague specification and poor monitoring of the contracts fail to protect the 
government against exploitation. It is also clear that the vaguely specified contracts were 
not designed with the explicit intention of reducing transactions costs, but were instead 
written by the contractor and passively accepted by the government. Ironically, any 
savings on transactions costs are almost certainly undermined by the increased
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government efforts required to address the problems emerging from the fragmentation 
between hospital and district services noted above. While this study did not demonstrate 
any hard evidence o f exploitation of the contract by the contractor, some of the results o f 
the quality analysis, and some of the quality of care concerns expressed by government 
officials give an indication that the contractor was able to cut costs and hence quality in 
some areas without the government being aware of this. These issues are explored 
further in Chapter 8.
Perhaps most importantly, this analysis has demonstrated a substantial power imbalance 
between the government and the contractor in the contracting process. As argued above, 
the government essentially functioned as a passive recipient of relatively unfavourable 
terms and conditions in the contracts, a situation which is probably attributable to some 
combination o f poor government capacity, and an overestimate of the extent of its 
dependency on this single contractor. This power imbalance is clearly illustrated in all 
aspects o f the contract design and the contracting process, and perhaps most critically, in 
the ability of the contractor to secure highly favourable prices relative to its own costs.
The study also attempted to capture the views o f both government and contractor 
officials on the overall efficiency of the existing contractual arrangements, and on the 
relationship between the contracts and efficiency. As might be expected, the contractor 
was o f the view that the contractual arrangements were generating substantial efficiency 
gains for the government, both in terms of cost and quality of services provided. 
Contractor officials did however concede the problems emerging from the 
fragmentation o f hospital and district PHC services, although they maintained the view 
that they would prefer not to have to manage such services, due to the complexity and 
uneven quality o f such services. In terms of the specific relationship between contract 
design and process and efficiency, contractor officials argued that they face strong 
efficiency incentives due to the close scrutiny of prices exerted by government officials, 
which forces them to focus heavily on containing costs. They did note, however, some 
constraints in achieving their cost targets, namely the need to continually adjust salaries 
to stay ahead o f increasing public sector salaries, and their lack of control over key 
clinical decisions, in the hospitals in which the doctors are not in their employ.
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Officials of the Gazankulu government had a mixed view of the overall efficiency 
effects o f the contracts. On the one hand, they argued strongly that the contractor 
hospitals were more efficient than their public sector counterparts in terms of hospital 
management, maintenance of buildings and equipment, and quality of services. While 
expressing some concerns over the nature of the reimbursement method and pricing, 
they did not take the view that these factors undermined the overall efficiency gains 
achieved by contract management. It is important to note, though, that while all of the 
officials believed that the contractor was able to manage hospitals more efficiently, none 
o f them knew whether or not the contracts were actually generating savings relative to 
direct public provision. This was attributed to their lack of information on public sector 
hospital costs.
Against this background of a generally positive view of contractor efficiency, these 
officials expressed serious concerns about the problems emerging from the 
fragmentation of the hospital and district PHC services, and the general separation of the 
contracted hospital from the remainder of the health service system. They also identified 
the fragmented staffing models, particularly at Shiluvana, as a source of major 
efficiency and staff satisfaction problems. Overall, these officials argued that these 
problems were so severe that they undermined all of the efficiency gains within the 
hospital itself, resulting in a net efficiency loss. This was contrasted with the situation in 
the chronic care institutions contracted out to the same company, in which these officials 
perceived contract management to result in substantial net efficiency gains. In response 
to questions on how the acute care contracts might be improved, specific 
recommendations included elimination of automatic price adjustments, and a shift away 
from per diem payments to some form of global budgeting system. However, their 
overall view was that the government would be better off withdrawing from these 
contracts over time, since they did not believe that some of the critical problems could 
be effectively addressed.
Officials of the Ciskei government had a more uniformly favourable view of the effects 
of contracting. In their view, Hewu hospital was far more efficiently managed than most
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o f the public hospitals under their control, and while recognising some of the 
fragmentation and coordination problems, they did not perceive these to undermine the 
overall efficiency gains.
In the light o f  these views, the responses to questions on the future of contracting were 
predictable. Officials from the Gazankulu government were of the view that contracting 
out o f chronic hospital services was a highly workable model which should be 
expanded, but that government should withdraw from contracts for acute care services 
when this was possible, and should certainly not consider expansion of this form of 
contracting. Officials o f the Ciskei government took a different view, arguing that 
contracting would generate efficiency gains throughout the hospital system, and that it 
should be expanded wherever possible.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RESULTS - ANALYSIS OF 
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND SYSTEMS, AND 
THE ROLE OF HOSPITAL OWNERSHIP
This chapter reports the results of the interviews which examined the management 
structures and systems in place in each o f the groups, the impact of these on hospital 
efficiency, as well as the relationship between hospital ownership and efficiency. 
Interviews were conducted with officials at hospital and corporate146 level in the three 
groups. The chapter begins with an analysis of management structures and functions at 
the hospital level, and then provides a similar analysis o f these structures at corporate 
level, as well as of the interface between the hospital and corporate levels. It then 
examines some specific mechanisms and systems, including information systems, which 
the groups use to encourage hospital efficiency. The final section reports observations 
on the role of hospital ownership structures, and the consequent motivations of 
management staff, on hospital performance.
7.1. Management structures and functions at hospital level
Figure 7.1 provides a schematic illustration o f  the management structures at hospital and 
corporate level in the three groups. One o f  the essential differences between the three 
groups in management structures at hospital level concerns the presence or absence of a 
general management structure, and the corresponding degree of integration (or lack 
thereof) in the senior management team. In  the case of the public hospitals, the figure 
shows the application of what may be termed an ‘hierarchical silo’ management model 
(Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996b), in which there is a complete separation 
between the management of nursing, administrative, and medical services, with no 
general management structure, and very limited integration and coordination between 
these three functional divisions. In this model, the wards are managed by senior nurses
146 The term ‘corporate' is used here to refer to the supra-hospital structures in the three groups. In the public 
sector, this includes the province and regional level offices o f the relevant Department o f Health, which 
administer the hospitals. In the private hospital groups, hospitals are all administered by a  single corporate head- 
office, while in the contractor group, hospitals a re  administered by a  regional manager who reports to the 
corporate head office.
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who report to a nursing service manager, who in turn reports to her superior at corporate 
level, rather than to a general manager at hospital level. Similarly, all administrative and 
domestic staff report to the hospital secretary, while all medical and paramedical staff 
report to the medical superintendent, with both of these officials again reporting to 
separate superiors. While the medical superintendent is nominally regarded as the most 
senior manager in the hospital, in effect he/she has very limited jurisdiction over the 
areas o f responsibility o f  the nursing service manager or the hospital secretary.
Figure 7.1 Management structures at hospital and corporate level
This model is in sharp contrast with that used in all three private hospitals, in which a 
small, tightly integrated general management structure is in place. Here, the wards are 
managed by matrons, who report to a nursing service manager, who in turn reports to a 
hospital manager. Similarly, all administrative and domestic functions are managed by 
an administrative manager who also reports directly to the hospital manager. All 
reporting to the corporate level thus occurs via the hospital manager. As noted earlier, 
the medical staff in these hospitals are not hospital employees, and therefore do not form 
part o f the formal management structure.
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The management structures at the contractor hospitals lie somewhere between these two 
extremes. These hospitals also use a general management structure, with ward matrons 
reporting to the nursing service manager who reports to a hospital manager, and with all 
other functions also ultimately reporting to the hospital manager. There are however two 
constraints on the degree of integration in the top management team: the first is the 
arrangement whereby the nursing service manager in the hospital reports to a regional 
nursing service manager, as well as to the hospital manager, thus undermining the 
authority o f the hospital manager to some extent. The second constraint emerges from 
the integration of these hospitals into public sector management arrangements. At 
Matikwana and Shiluvana, the medical staff report to their superiors in the government, 
rather than to the hospital manager, while at Shiluvana, this affects both medical and 
nursing staff.
In addition to the presence or absence of a general management structure, hospital level 
management structures also differ significantly in terms o f  scale and complexity. The 
m a n a g e m e n t cadre at the public hospitals comprises far more categories of staff within 
each functional area than do both other groups, as well as much greater numbers o f staff 
within each category, even after adjustment for the size o f  the institution. This is in 
sharp contrast with the contractor and the private hospitals, which all have very few 
categories o f management staff, and the absolute minimum numbers o f staff per 
category.147
These differences in management structures are closely reflected in the functioning of 
the management teams. Public officials at both hospital and corporate levels perceive 
the management teams at all three public hospitals to function extremely poorly, and to 
be characterised by minimal coordination between different functions, slow, ineffective 
decision-making, an inappropriate degree of formality, poor implementation, and a 
pervasive lack o f morale and initiative. In this situation, even highly motivated 
individual managers face severe constraints to effective action. This was clearly the case
147 Shiluvana is an exception to this observation, since the nursing management structures at this hospital are those 
o f the public sector.
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at two of these hospitals (Tintswalo and Bisho), where the medical superintendents were 
both recognised by their superiors as highly efficient, motivated and competent, but as 
unable to achieve their full potential within the prevailing managerial structures and 
systems.
By contrast, the management teams at all three private hospitals appeared to function in 
small, tight knit teams, which operate on a relatively informal and flexible basis, 
emphasise a participative approach to management, and are able to take decisions 
rapidly, and to implement quickly and effectively. These teams also seemed to be 
uniformly characterised by a high degree of motivation and job satisfaction.
The picture at the contractor hospitals was more variable, and appeared to be 
significantly determined by the differing management arrangements at the three 
hospitals. At Hewu, for example, where all staff are employed by the contractor, the 
management team appeared to function similarly to those described in the private 
hospitals. In the case of Matikwana, the situation was similar, with a motivated, efficient 
and flexible top management team, which again emphasised participation, and a 
relatively informal style in decision making and management. At both o f these hospitals, 
however, the managers and other officials noted that the nursing management teams 
functioned in a bureaucratic and rigid way, and were actively attempting to address this 
problem. They attributed this problem mainly to the fact that the senior nurses in these 
hospitals had been recruited after long careers in the public sector, and had simply 
imported public sector nursing management systems into the contractor hospitals. These 
managers also acknowledged that the company had not worked sufficiently hard to 
overcome the ‘public sector’ culture among the nursing staff, and that this problem was 
aggravated by the requirement that these nurses report to a regional nursing service 
manager as well as to the hospital manager.
A s discussed in Chapter 6, the ‘dual employment’ situation at Shiluvana hospital creates 
substantial fragmentation, tension and conflict within the senior management team. Both 
the contractor and government officials reported a serious split between the two 
management teams at the hospital, with the hospital manager (employed by the
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contractor) functioning in a close-knit and apparently effective team with the other 
contractor-employed management staff, but with an entirely separate management 
structure, under the control of the medical superintendent and nursing service manager, 
governing the publicly employed nursing and medical staff. In the eyes of the contractor 
officials, the ‘public side’ o f the hospital’s management team functioned in a  typical 
‘public sector' style. The hospital manager attributed his failed attempts to  convene 
daily management meetings with both ‘teams’ to a lack of interest on the part of the 
public sector employees, and also perceived there to be active animosity on the part of 
the public sector management team towards those employed by the contractor. The 
medical superintendent at the hospital made similarly critical observations of the 
management team employed by the contractor, in this case pointing to their apparent 
disinterest in district activities and in patient needs as the main causes of conflict.
7.2. Interface between medical and management staff at hospital level
The interaction between medical and general management staff is a well recognised area 
o f complexity in hospital management, and the interviews sought to identify any 
specific differences between the study hospitals on this issue. This was not identified to 
be a particular problem at the public hospitals, which was not surprising, given that the 
medical superintendent is always designated as the most senior official at these 
hospitals. Thus, while the degree of integration between the medical and other 
management staff is sub-optimal (as discussed above), their seniority clearly left the 
medical staff feeling comfortable in relation to other levels of hospital management.
The medical staff at private hospitals are not employed by the hospital, so that the 
relationship between them and the hospital management is a more distant one. It is also 
one in which the balance o f power is shifted towards the doctors, on whom the hospital 
relies for its flow o f patients.
As might be expected, the situation at the contractor hospitals is more complex. At 
Hewu, where medical staff are employed by the contractor, the interaction between
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medical and general management staff appeared to work very effectively, with daily 
formal meetings between the manager and the medical staff, and with generally close, 
constructive working relations prevailing. Interviews with both the medical and 
management staff provided no evidence of any conflict between the clinical 
responsibilities o f the medical staff and the management prerogative to contain costs 
within the hospital, and both sides appeared to perceive the need for a careful balance 
between these priorities. The interviews also indicated that these successful working 
relationships were in part attributable to the direct links between the medical staff at the 
hospital and the medical consultants at corporate level. These links provided direct and 
rapid support to the hospital doctors, increasing their motivation and loyalty, as well as 
their understanding o f  the wider needs o f the hospital.
At Matikwana, where the medical staff are employed by the government, the 
relationship between the doctors and the management team appeared surprisingly good, 
with no manifestations of the potential divided loyalties nor of the potential conflict 
between clinical and management prerogatives that might be expected. This appeared to 
be attributable to the personalities involved, but also to the systematic efforts made by 
the hospital manager and by the contractor company to engender good relations with the 
medical staff. The situation at Shiluvana was much more complex than at the other two 
hospitals, with significant tensions between medical and management staff. These 
tensions appeared to be generalised, affecting all areas of the hospitals functions, and 
were not specifically focussed on the conflict between clinical and management 
perceptions and requirements.
73. Management structures and functions at the corporate level, and 
the corporate - hospital interface
As would be expected, this analysis identified a high degree of correlation between 
patterns of management structure and functions at hospital level, and those at corporate 
level, with the latter appearing to significantly influence the former. In the case of the 
public sector, Figure 7.1 shows an highly complex corporate management structure.
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This is characterised, firstly, by two management levels, with hospital management 
having to report to a regional office which in turn reports to the head office. At both of 
these levels, the management structures have large numbers of staff, and are highly 
complex and un-integrated, with multiple divisions dealing with different management 
functions. As noted above, hospital management personnel report separately to these 
specific divisions, further entrenching the lack of integration at corporate level. This lack 
o f  integration is compounded by the fact that several o f the critical corporate 
management functions are located entirely outside of the Department of Health, and are 
instead located in other government departments. These functions include the supply 
and maintenance o f ambulances and other hospital vehicles (which is the responsibility 
o f  the Department of Transport); both large and small scale construction and 
maintenance of hospital buildings and equipment (Department of Public Works); and 
the procurement o f hospital supplies (State Tender Board).
This complex, tiered and fragmented bureaucracy creates profound inefficiencies in the 
communication between the corporate and hospital levels. Hospital management 
officials often have to communicate with multiple officials to resolve even simple 
issues, and uniformly complained of often extreme delays by the head office in 
responding to requests for assistance. Interviews suggested that this severe inefficiency 
is attributable to a number o f factors, including the complex organisational structure 
described here, and specifically, the location of key functions outside of the Department 
o f  Health. Other explanations included the lack of skills and capacity among many 
officials, and the fact that many administrative posts in often critical functions remain 
unfilled for long periods (due to inability to find suitable candidates).
These problems are profoundly aggravated by the lack o f autonomy granted to hospital 
management officials within the existing public sector regulatory framework (Hospital 
Strategy Consortium 1996b). This framework places authority for almost all critical 
management functions in the hands o f very senior officials at head office level, severely 
disempowering hospital level management. For example, hospital level officials have no 
authority over any key personnel management functions, including hiring and firing of 
staff, determination of salary or bonus levels, or staff disciplinary issues. They also have
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no authority to procure any goods or services on their own, except for items of 
extremely small value, and have to make all such requests via the head office. The 
situation is perhaps even more serious in regard to financial management. In this case, 
hospital officials have no power whatever to shift resources across budget lines, and 
must simply accept the budgets handed to them. They are also not held accountable for 
overexpenditures, and cannot make use o f any surpluses achieved through efficient 
management Although hospital officials do make submissions regarding the hospital 
budget these are not taken into account, as a result o f which the budget often bears no 
resemblance to the real expenditure patterns of the hospital. If, in consequence, hospitals 
run overbudget deficits are always funded from elsewhere in the Departmental budget. 
This combination of unrealistic budgeting, soft budget constraints and lack o f 
accountability effectively means that hospital level officials play no effective role in the 
financial management of their hospitals.
Public hospital managers thus rely very heavily on head office officials and systems for 
decisions on almost every element of the daily management of the hospital, but for the 
reasons outlined above, they receive extremely slow, and often ineffective responses to 
their requests for assistance. Interviews with hospital managers and head office officials 
also highlight a culture which fails to reward initiative, and instead encourages risk 
aversion and rule bound behaviour. This managerial culture and system effectively 
prevents hospital managers from ‘managing’ their institutions in any real sense of the 
word, and instead they are forced to function as ‘administrators’ of a set of rules which 
are not o f  their making, and which they have no power to influence. Not surprisingly, 
this system is perceived to lead to severe ‘undermanagement’ of public hospitals, and to 
profoundly undermine the morale of hospital managers.
Interestingly, all o f the public sector head office officials interviewed recognised the set 
o f problems described here, and conceded that much greater autonomy for hospital 
managers, as well as a streamlining o f  their own administrations, would significantly 
improve the efficiency of hospital management. However, they uniformly argued that 
existing public sector regulations prevented them from undertaking any such reform 
within their own organisations. Most o f  the hospital managers interviewed expressed
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extreme frustration at their inability to manage their institutions effectively, and felt that 
they received both minimal support and substantial obstacles from the head offices in 
their efforts to manage. These sentiments were strongly echoed by the manager of one 
o f  the private hospitals who had previously served as the senior medical superintendent 
o f  a large public hospital.
The corporate structure and functions in both o f the private hospital companies differs 
substantially from those o f the public sector. In both cases, there is a single corporate 
head office structure, which is lean and simple, with relatively few divisions dedicated 
to specific functions, and with an apparently high degree o f  integration between the 
divisions. Both groups are also characterised by simple, effective lines o f 
communication between the hospital manager and corporate officials. Hospital 
managers in both groups perceived themselves to be extremely well supported by their 
head offices, which they consistently described as responding rapidly and effectively to 
all requests for assistance. In both groups, there appeared to have careful thought as to 
the most effective division o f labour between the corporate and the hospital levels, and 
specifically, as to where scale economies could be achieved by centralising particular 
management functions. Both groups had, for example, developed strong capacity in 
procurement, industrial relations and personnel management, MIS, and the provision of 
medico-legal advice.
Hospital managers and corporate officials also described efforts to create a culture of 
informal, but strong support from the corporate level to the hospital. In both groups, for 
example, hospital managers felt comfortable to communicate directly with the 
Managing Director, or other senior executives at corporate level, in order to address any 
problems, and often did so with positive effect. One hospital manager went so far as to 
argue that he sometimes perceives support from the head office to be ‘too good’, in that 
they tend to take over and resolve any problems that he reports, rather than supporting 
his efforts to resolve them locally.
This efficient support system for hospital managers occurs against a background o f  a 
very high degree of autonomy for managers at the hospital level. In sharp contrast to the
-260-
public service approach described above, officials at both private companies articulated 
an explicit and systematically pursued philosophy of granting hospital managers 
maximum possible autonomy to manage their own institutions, within a context of 
efficient and intensive corporate support and supervision, as well as strong requirements 
for accountability of hospital managers to the corporate level. In all three of these 
hospitals, managers have a high degree of autonomy over critical personnel and 
financial functions, and as a result, managers are highly focussed on issues o f personnel 
productivity, and on sound financial management. In the latter case, managers monitor 
expenditures, cash flow and other financial parameters on a  daily basis. As regards 
capital expenditures, managers in all three hospitals require permission from the head 
office to make expenditures above R3000, but uniformly described the process of 
securing such permission as rapid and simple. Similarly, while there is strong central 
procurement capacity in both groups, hospital managers have full autonomy to purchase 
outside o f central contracts if they can do so more cost effectively.
In the contractor company, the corporate-hospital interface occupies a position 
somewhere between the two extremes defined by the public and private hospitals, but is 
somewhat closer to the private than to the public end of the spectrum. As Figure 7.1 
shows, hospital managers report to a regional manager, and via that line, to the corporate 
head office. Despite this indirect relationship, managers at all three hospitals perceived 
themselves to enjoy substantia] and effective support from the corporate level. In all 
cases, the regional managers were perceived to provide very valuable support to hospital 
managers, through frequent visits to the hospitals, through extensive knowledge of local 
conditions, and through their ability to intercede with corporate level officials. Two of 
the managers also felt that this system did not inhibit them from contacting head office 
officials directly, if  this was required. This view was not shared by the third manager, 
who felt bound to adhere to the normal reporting channels, and felt somewhat restricted 
by this.
The corporate structure, like that of the private hospital groups, is small in scale, simple 
and integrated in structure, and set up to provide maximal support to hospitals in areas in 
which scale economies can be attained. The company thus has extensive expertise in
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procurement, industrial relations and personnel management, and clinical/medical 
support, and is perceived by hospital managers to provide effective and rapid assistance 
in  each o f these areas. Unlike the private groups, however, the managers at these 
hospitals perceived the corporate level to have limited capacity in sophisticated MIS, 
and to have systematically underinvested in this area. Two of the managers also noted 
that that the corporate decision making process can be slow in relation to decisions over 
capital expenditures. This was confirmed by corporate officials, and was attributed to 
the need for decisions by the Board of Directors, which only meets four times per year.
In  regard to autonomy at hospital management level, there appears to be some explicit 
commitment on the part o f  corporate officials to allowing hospital managers substantial 
autonomy, but this is clearly more constrained than was observed in the private 
hospitals. One constraint emerges from the role o f the regional manager, who is 
perceived by some of the hospital level managers to play a more operational role than 
would be ideal. Other constraints are seen in the extent of decision making power 
granted to hospital managers over specific management functions. In the case o f 
personnel management for example, the corporate level exerts somewhat tighter control 
over the size and composition of staff establishments, salary scales and appointments 
than was observed in the private hospital groups. Nevertheless, within these fairly tight 
parameters, hospital level managers do have the authority to make recommendations on 
hiring and firing o f staff, as well as on promotions and bonuses.
Similarly, hospital managers enjoy constrained autonomy over financial management. 
Until the year prior to the study, these managers had not participated actively in the 
development of the hospital budget, but under the current system, these managers do 
make a substantial contribution to the budgeting process. Once the budget is determined, 
they also enjoy some freedom to manage funds across line items, and are held 
accountable for ensuring that expenditure and revenues match budget projections. This 
encourages the managers to monitor financial performance quite closely, but they are 
limited in their ability to do this by the lack o f information provided to them by the 
corporate head office, as well as by the lack of information system infrastructure in the 
hospital (see below). In the former case, much o f the expenditure incurred by the
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hospital occurs at head office level (e.g. staff salaries are paid by the head office, as are 
expenses for many of the supplies and other purchases on behalf of the hospital), but this 
information does not appear to be adequately or timeously shared with hospital 
managers.
In the case o f procurement, managers reported that in recent years, they had begun to 
enjoy more freedom to purchase off head office contracts, provided they could prove 
that this was cost effective. In terms of capital expenditure, as well, there appears to be a 
relatively flexible approach, with no firm guidelines in place. Nevertheless, hospital 
managers usually seek approval from the regional manager and the head office for most 
expenditures above R2000-R3000.
The general picture which emerges in the contractor hospitals is thus one of a theoretical 
commitment to substantial autonomy, but which in practice leads to a higher degree of 
centralised control and less autonomy than hospital managers would prefer. This 
situation did however appear to be a dynamic one, with a general tendency for the 
corporate level to grant increasing levels of autonomy to hospital managers over time. 
One possible explanation for this pattern, elicited from some head office officials, is that 
several of the key managers in the corporate team responsible for the contractor 
hospitals came out of public sector management positions, and that they were more 
comfortable to run an operation that resembled the public sector environment, at least to 
some extent. This was noted to be in contrast with the corporate team responsible for the 
portfolio of private hospitals run by the company. In this case, the team had been drawn 
from various private sector positions, and tended to grant their hospital managers far 
greater autonomy.
7.4. Mechanisms and systems for encouraging hospital efficiency
Over and above the impact o f the structures, systems and management philosophies 
described above, a number of other mechanisms used within the three hospital groups 
impact on hospital efficiency. These include mechanisms for monitoring o f  hospital
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performance, MIS, incentives for managerial and staff efficiency, and specific efficiency 
initiatives or areas o f expertise. Each of these are reviewed in the following sections.
7.4.1. Monitoring o f hospital performance
Monitoring o f public hospital performance by regional and head office officials 
appeared to be unsystematic and inegular in all three public hospitals. While officials of 
both governments clearly recognised the need for systematic monitoring, no systems 
appeared to be in place to allow for this. In general, head office officials from all 
relevant divisions visit the hospitals regularly, and are therefore in touch with 
developments at the hospital level, but have no formalised approaches to assessing 
hospital performance. This is reflected in the inadequate reporting requirements for 
hospital management officials. In all hospitals, the medical superintendent is required to 
submit monthly statistical returns, which reflect patient utilisation patterns, but contain 
no other management or clinical data, and aside from these, no other reports are 
required. All hospital level officials expressed the strong view that the reports they 
submitted were simply filed at head office, and are never used for management 
purposes. Head office officials also appear to monitor budgetary performance, although 
this tends to occur retrospectively, and often two or three months in arrears, thus 
undermining its efficacy.
In all three private hospitals, by contrast, corporate level officials make frequent and 
regular visits to review specific aspects o f hospital performance. These visits 
complement the ongoing, highly systematic monitoring which is built into the 
management system. In all three hospitals, for example, there are live computer links 
with the head office, allowing daily monitoring o f key parameters, such as patient 
utilisation data, and financial performance. Regular patient surveys are also conducted in 
all three hospitals, and information from these is collated and submined to head office 
on a regular basis. Head office staff respond to this information in a similarly systematic 
way. All exceptions to  normal parameters are identified, managers are requested for 
explanations, and where required, interventions or solutions are implemented. In
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addition, relative performance of all hospitals in the group is analysed, and this 
information is passed on to hospital managers on a regular basis.
The contractor company monitors the performance of its hospitals much more closely 
and effectively than is the case with the public hospitals, but somewhat less so than in 
the private groups. Regional managers and head office officials also visit these hospitals 
frequently, complementing the detailed and specific monthly management reports 
submitted by the hospital managers. These reports cover patient statistics, staff and other 
input to output ratios, and budgetary performance, although they do not cover quality of 
care issues, nor do they incorporate information on patient satisfaction. There are also no 
live computer links between the hospitals and the head office, so that monitoring is 
confined to the monthly manual reports. Head office officials clearly utilise the 
information submitted on an ongoing basis, and all variances from expected 
performance are identified and communicated back to hospital level officials for 
explanation and correction. Similarly, the relative performance o f all hospitals in the 
group are analysed and fed back to hospital management staff.
7.4.2. Management information systems
The public hospitals use extremely limited MIS. In all three hospitals, the official MIS is 
entirely manual, and consists of patient records in paper form, and collated statistics 
covering numbers of admissions, patient days, theatre cases and OPD visits only. These 
systems do not collate any clinical or management information at all, and hospital staff 
receive no training in the use of management information, and are unmotivated to 
collect and maintain patient records. As a result, data quality is often poor and 
inaccurate, and patient records are frequently lost, creating severe problems when 
patients make return visits. As might be expected, none o f these data are used in any 
managerial or clinical decision making processes, and are collected simply to satisfy 
official requirements. At Tintswalo hospital, the superintendent has, through his own 
efforts, secured a small number of personal computers, which are linked together in a 
network, and which form the basis of an emerging MIS.
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By contrast, all three private hospitals have sophisticated, computerised MIS, which 
collect detailed management, as well as patient demographic and clinical data.148 Staff 
using the system receive detailed training in its use. The hospital managers make 
extensive use o f the management information provided by the MIS to guide 
management decisions within the hospital, and to provide regular reports to the head 
office. However, the clinical information is collected only for billing purposes, and is 
not used to guide management decisions. The MIS is generally perceived to be an 
essential tool by all of these managers.149
The contractor hospitals appear more like public than like private hospitals in terms of 
the availability and use of MIS. All hospital managers reported that the corporate head 
office uses an outdated, inefficient MIS, which is not standardised with or linked to the 
hospital system, and which continually needs updating and maintenance. At hospital 
level, all systems remain manual, and collect very limited utilisation data, with no 
relevant management or clinical information collected. As at the public hospitals, staff 
are not trained in the use of the MIS, and are not motivated to ensure good data 
collection. As a result, the managers are anxious about the quality o f the data, and in one 
case, the manager has instituted a nightly headcount o f patients to corroborate 
information emerging from the system. A s a result o f the poor data, managers cannot 
incorporate important clinical data into decision making, are unable to provide these 
data to head office, and are unable to contact patients should follow up communications 
be required. At two of the hospitals, managers had purchased personal computers on 
their own initiative, and were in the process of establishing a very basic MIS which 
would assist them in their management tasks.150
I t *  The degree o f detail in the clinical data collected in  these hospitals is driven by billing requirements, since these 
hospitals bill on a  fce-for-servicc basis.
149 O ne weakness in the MIS identified by all three private hospital managers was the inability o f their systems to 
allocate costs to particular cost centres within d ie  hospital, thus limiting their ability to identify and manage 
specific cost problems.
150 A t one o f these hospitals, the manager reported finding a two year old computer lying unopened in its box.
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7 .4 3 . Incentives for managerial and staff efficiency
For several of the reasons outlined above, managers and staff at public hospitals are 
provided with no systemic incentives to improve efficiency. Neither managers nor staff 
have their performance monitored or reviewed on a systematic basis, and there are no 
systems for linking remuneration to performance for any categories o f staff. While the 
public service does in theory have a merit based promotion system, in practice all 
promotions are based only on seniority and tenure. In addition to the absence of positive 
incentives for efficiency, many categories of staff in the public hospitals appear to face 
specific disincentives to efficient behaviour. In the case of management staff, these 
include the extremely bureaucratic restrictions under which they operate, the effective 
lack o f any management authority, and their recognition that even extreme 
‘management failures', such as budget overspends or quality of care problems, are likely 
to go unmarked, and certainly to go unpunished. In the case of other hospital staff, 
disincentives to productivity include the rigid, hierarchical management style within the 
hospital (particularly for nurses), and the lack o f flexibility in the system regarding inter- 
hospital transfers or other employment conditions.
In terms o f remuneration levels and benefit packages, interviews elicited a mixed 
picture. In the case of nursing staff, in particular, take home pay was widely regarded as 
too low, although their non-cash benefits, including housing and education allowances, 
were regarded as acceptable. Similar sentiments were expressed by administrative and 
management staff. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that all interviewees 
regarded morale amongst hospital staff as extremely low, and recognised the intimate 
linkage between these problems of morale and poor hospital efficiency.
Managerial and staff incentives at the private hospitals differed somewhat between the 
two groups. In the case of St. Dominies, a detailed systematic performance evaluation 
system is used, in which the performance of each staff member, including the hospital 
manager, is measured against customised performance targets on a two monthly basis. 
Successful performance against these targets is directly linked to pay increases. 
Interviewees at the hospital viewed this system as highly effective in influencing staff
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morale and productivity amongst all categories of hospital staff.151 While the systems in 
use at the other two hospitals appear somewhat less formalised, there is nevertheless a 
clear linkage in the minds of hospital staff between performance and remuneration, and 
a strong sense that staff performance is evaluated by management on a regular basis. As 
with S t Dominies, morale amongst nursing and other categories of staff was generally 
perceived to be high. In all three groups, nursing and management staff appeared 
generally satisfied with remuneration and benefit levels, which were clearly perceived to 
be superior to those in the public hospital system, which seemed to be the benchmark 
used for comparison, particularly by nurses.
In the contractor hospitals, the managers appeared somewhat confused by the specific 
incentives provided to them. While all were aware that their performance was 
monitored, and that their remuneration was somehow linked to  performance, they were 
unclear on the precise linkages between performance and pay, and one manager 
articulated the specific concern that head office officials would not necessarily know 
whether he had performed well or not. The linkage between performance and pay was 
much clearer for all other hospital staff, for whom an annual performance review 
m e c h a n is m  is used. Most officials perceived this system to assist with morale and to 
improve staff productivity. Interviews with nursing staff elicited interesting concerns in 
relation to conditions of employment. While their cash salaries were higher than those in 
the public sector, non-cash benefits were regarded as inferior to those available in the 
public sector, which was cause for some dissatisfaction. This was in spite o f recognition 
that transfer and promotion policies were much more flexible than in the public sector. 
Another problem, identified by the manager at one of the hospitals, is that the company 
fails to communicate adequately with staff concerning their package of benefits and how 
this is adjusted from time to time. On the basis of the interviews, staff morale and 
motivation at the contractor hospitals appeared to be superior to that observed in the 
public hospitals, but somewhat inferior to that seen in the private hospitals. Shiluvana 
hospital was an exception to this pattern, with nursing and other staff employed by the 
government expressing fairly high degrees of dissatisfaction, both with their conditions
IS I This performance evaluation system is also linked to a wider total quality management programme which is 
applied in all hospitals in the group.
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o f  employment, and with the role of the contractor company in the hospital. This was in 
contrast to the views of the contractor staff, who were generally happy with their 
conditions o f employment, but expressed some frustration at the difficulties of working 
with public sector colleagues, for the reasons outlined earlier.
7.4.4. Other efficiency mechanisms
In addition to the various systems and mechanisms discussed here, the interviews 
identified other approaches used by the three groups to improve hospital efficiency. Key 
mechanisms here include human resource management techniques, staff training, and 
leveraging o f key skills or capacities at central level. As noted above, both the private 
hospital groups and the contractor company pay detailed attention to staffing allocations, 
and monitor staff to output ratios on a regular basis, making adjustments as required. 
T he private and contractor hospitals also maintain relatively low levels of permanent 
staffing, preferring to respond to increases in demand through hiring of temporary staff 
through agencies when this is required. As staff costs account for the majority o f total 
hospital costs, these strategies represent rational efforts to manage staff costs on a 
scientific basis. These techniques are not applied in any of the public hospitals. Here, 
hospital staffing establishments are determined on the basis of standard norms, and are 
reviewed and adjusted very infrequently. There is thus no capacity to adjust staffing 
ratios for fluctuations in demand, and more permanent increases or decreases in staffing 
levels are extremely difficult to achieve.
The private hospitals groups and the contractor company also place substantial emphasis 
on  staff training, and include all staff in their training programmes. These programmes 
include both in-service and more long term training (with the latter reserved for nursing 
staff). Managers and officials in these groups articulated a clear recognition of the value 
o f  investments in training, and of the impact o f this investment on the long term 
productivity of their staff. By contrast, training policy in the public sector was much less 
explicit In these cases, training was focussed almost exclusively on nurses, with no 
training provided for administrative and domestic staff, and with all decisions on
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training in the hands o f the nursing service managers at hospital level. While no 
systematic pattern could be ascertained, some interviews created the impression that 
training opportunities for nurses were used as rewards for friends, or for loyalty, and not 
as part of a systematic approach to staff development.
The leveraging of key skills and economies of scale at central level to improve hospital 
efficiency was noted above. In the case o f the private hospital groups, the main areas of 
central expertise are in procurement (particularly of drugs and expensive equipment), 
negotiation with health insurers and doctors, information systems, and human resource 
management The contractor company demonstrates a similar mix of central skills, with 
some different emphases. In this case, procurement, human resource and industrial 
relations management are also key skills, and in addition, the company has strong 
central capacity in hospital construction and maintenance, which assists with cost 
effective upkeep o f its physical assets. As noted above, central support to the public 
hospitals is fairly limited. The purchase o f drugs and equipment is however one area in 
which economies o f scale are clearly achieved, and the public sector is able to secure 
drug prices substantially below those available on the private market. Head office 
officials in both governments however noted that logistical inefficiencies in drug supply 
and distribution often undermined the benefits obtained from centralising this function.
7.5. The role of hospital ownership structure
Interviews on the impact o f hospital ownership structure on management performance 
and hospital efficiency yielded somewhat predictable insights. In the contractor group, 
and in both of the private hospital groups, corporate level managers had a clear sense 
that they were accountable primarily to the owners of the company, represented by the 
Board o f  Directors, and secondarily to the employees of the company. In the case of the 
contractor company, senior managers also perceived some degree of accountability to 
the government as the purchaser of services, and to the communities served by the 
hospitals. As might be expected from these notions of accountability, the senior 
managers in both of these groups prioritised, among their various responsibilities, the
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need to ensure adequate returns to shareholders, the importance of ensuring the delivery 
o f cost effective, high quality of care in the hospitals, and the need to ensure that 
employees were satisfied and well motivated. There was, however, no consistent pattern 
in the ranking of these various priorities. These managers also all believed that they 
communicated these priorities effectively to hospital level managers, and that this latter 
group had similar motivations to their own.
While the contractor and private hospital groups were therefore similar as regards the 
perceived accountability and motivations of corporate level managers, this was less so 
the case in regard to  hospital managers. Hospital managers at all o f the private hospitals 
were well aware o f  the ownership structure of the company, and of the need to ensure 
good returns to shareholders. For them, this imperative translated into specific 
operational requirements, including the need to maximise revenues through increased 
throughput and occupancy rates, as well as the need to minimise costs wherever 
possible. These managers were also acutely aware of the essential role played by the 
medical staff at the hospital in determining hospital revenues, and devoted substantial 
energies to ensuring good relationships with the medical staff, as well as to attracting 
new medical staff to  the hospital. In all o f the hospitals, the managers were aware o f the 
financial and other indicators applied by the corporate head office in assessing hospital 
performance, and had full access to all information necessary to manage against these 
parameters. It thus seemed clear that in all three o f these hospitals, the private ownership 
structure, and the need to ensure returns to shareholders, were among the primary 
motivators of management behaviour.
The situation was somewhat different in the case of the contractor hospitals. Here, 
hospital managers had minimal information regarding the actual shareholding o f the 
company, and perceived themselves as accountable to their immediate superiors, and 
ultimately to the senior company executives, rather than to the shareholders o f the 
company. This was reflected in the fact that none of these managers cited the need to 
increase returns to shareholders as one of their objectives or priorities, focussing instead 
on the need to control costs, to ensure good quality of care, and to manage and motivate 
the hospital staff. These managers did articulate a clear understanding o f the
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determinants of effective hospital performance, stressing the specific roles of occupancy 
rates and o f  tight cost controls, and were also aware that the corporate head office 
applied specific performance measures to assess hospital performance. However, they 
felt somewhat constrained in their ability to influence these important parameters. As 
noted above, occupancy rates are influenced primarily by the medical staff, and were 
thus perceived to be outside of management control. They did however recognise a 
much greater role for themselves in relation to management of hospital costs, although 
they argued that even this function was constrained by the very limited hospital 
performance data which they collect or receive. The only data regularly used by these 
managers to assess performance are patient days (and hence occupancy rates), and the 
performance of the hospital against its expenditure budget. In none of these hospitals 
were the managers aware o f  more detailed financial information, such as hospital 
profitability, although all o f them argued that they would have been able to manage 
better had more information o f  this type been made available.
In summary, the private ownership structure of the contractor company ensures that its 
senior management is primarily motivated by the need to ensure good returns to its 
shareholders, although this motivation appears to be less effectively and directly 
communicated to the hospital management level than in the private hospitals. As a 
result, hospital managers do appear to be motivated to ensure hospital efficiency, 
primarily through cost containment, although they are provided with less specific 
performance parameters, and less information with which to manage than are their 
private hospital counterparts.
In the case o f the public hospitals, there was some variation among head office officials 
in their perceptions o f their lines of accountability. Some officials perceived themselves 
to be accountable to higher levels in the public sector bureaucracy, and thereafter to 
elected political representatives, while others understood themselves to be accountable 
more directly to the communities which they served. None of the officials regarded 
themselves as directly accountable to hospital staff. These officials also showed some 
degree o f variability in their perceptions of their specific responsibilities. In some cases, 
responsibilities were only vaguely defined in terms o f the orderly running of the
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hospitals, with some mention made o f  quality of patient care. Other officials, however, 
had more detailed notions of their responsibilities, and listed among them, the smooth 
running o f the hospitals, ensuring adequate quality of patient care, ensuring that staff 
were motivated and satisfied, and that budgets were adhered to. None of the officials 
however applied any specific parameters or indicators to assess hospital performance in 
terms o f these responsibilities.
As might be expected, most of the hospital level managers had similarly variable and 
vague notions of their own lines of accountability and responsibilities. In most cases, 
these managers regarded themselves as accountable directly to the head office, and not 
to either hospital staff or the community. One manager provided an exception to this 
pattern, observing that while official structures and systems required that he be 
accountable solely to his superiors at head office, he in fact regarded himself as directly 
accountable to the patients using the hospital, through them to the community, and 
thereafter to his staff. In relation to  their specific responsibilities, most of these 
managers cited a similar list to those o f  the head office officials, including ensuring the 
orderly running of the hospital, maintaining acceptable standards of patient care, 
ensuring that staff were motivated and satisfied, and ensuring that hospital expenditures 
remained within budget As with head office officials, however, none o f the hospital 
managers used any particular indicators or parameters to measure their own performance 
in terms o f these responsibilities.
The public hospitals are thus almost at the opposite extreme from the private and 
contractor hospitals in relation to the impact of ownership structures on hospital 
efficiency. In this case, public ownership results in very diffuse and vague notions of 
accountability and responsibility, reflected in the absolute lack o f any defined 
performance parameters for hospital managers. These factors aggravate the lack of 
management information, and the extreme centralisation o f management authority 
discussed above, creating a situation in which public hospital managers have very little 
sense o f  what is expected of them, and in which they face major obstacles in achieving 
even their own definitions of effective performance.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION
This chapter integrates the findings o f the various components of this study in order to 
address the specific research objectives outlined in Chapter 1. It begins with an 
integrated analysis of the relative efficiency of the contractor and directly managed 
public hospitals, both in terms o f production efficiency192 and total contract costs. This 
is followed by an analysis of the individual and combined impact of the various 
determinants of efficiency, including the nature o f the contract and the contracting 
process, competition, hospital ownership structures, the ‘trading relationship’ between 
public purchasers and contracted hospitals, and management structures and systems.
Prior to discussion of the results, some comments on the legitimacy of the comparisons 
between the three hospital groups, and the role o f confounding factors in these 
comparisons, should be noted. As outlined in Chapter 3, the contractor and public study 
hospitals were selected so as to limit the effect of possible confounding factors, such as 
patterns o f service delivery, scale, or location. As indicated in Chapter 4, statistical 
analysis o f  variance established the legitimacy of ownership, rather than location, as the 
basis for grouping the hospitals. Chapter 4 also indicated relative similarity between the 
contractor and public hospitals in regard to patterns of service delivery and scale, 
although some specific differences in these dimensions were noted. Specifically, the 
public hospitals were noted to be larger than the contractor hospitals, and in some cases, 
to provide specialised services not available in the contractor hospitals. These 
differences were, however, adjusted for in several of the analyses, and these factors are 
thus not regarded as important confounders in the comparison o f the contractor and 
public hospitals. This is less so the case for the private hospitals, which were shown to 
have markedly different patterns o f service delivery and utilisation to the other two 
groups. •
• 32 The term ‘production efficiency’ is used here to denote underlying efficiency o f production, as measured by 
utilisation statistics, production costs, DEA. and quality o f  care, but excluding considerations o f contract price.
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8.1. Production efficiency and total contract costs in contractor and 
directly managed public hospitals
8.1.1. Hospital utilisation statistics
As reported in Chapter 4, one of the key dimensions of production efficiency studied 
here was hospital utilisation, including LOS, average bed occupancy and turnover rates. 
Chapter 4 indicated that, on average, the contractor hospitals had slightly higher 
occupancy rates than the public hospitals, which was attributed to longer LOS in the 
contractor hospitals, overriding the effect of the lower turnover rates in this group. In the 
acute hospital setting studied here, an efficient utilisation pattern would typically be 
characterised by relatively high occupancy rates, attributable to a combination of high 
patient turnover and short LOS (Pabon Lasso 1986). Measured against this 
hypothetically efficient profile, and relative to the public hospitals, the contractor 
hospitals therefore demonstrated a somewhat inefficient utilisation pattern.
A number o f factors influence these utilisation parameters in  the acute hospital setting, 
and some combination o f these might explain the observed differences between the two 
groups. Some o f these factors are external to the hospital, including patterns and levels 
o f demand for hospitalisation (which would impact on turnover rates), the service-mix 
and case-mix o f patients presenting to the hospital (which would impact on both 
turnover rates and LOS), and the availability of post-hospital facilities to which patients 
can be discharged once they are clinically well (which would affect LOS).153 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, these hospitals were selected so as to minimise the extent of 
these particular differences between them, and adjustments for service-mix were also 
carried out. Direct observation and interviews with hospital officials also failed to 
identify any differences in the general demographic or clinical profiles o f the 
populations using these hospitals which might explain the differences in utilisation
■ S3 Public hospitals in South Africa often face difficulties in discharging clinically well patients due to lack o f post 
discharge facilities (for example, for long term or frail care), or because o f  die lack o f facilities in the patient's 
home to  ensure adequate post-hospital care. In this situation, patients often  spend much longer in hospitals than 
is required from a  clinical point of view.
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patterns. Similarly, there were no clear differences in the availability o f post-discharge 
facilities available to the patients using these hospitals.
The analysis did however elicit the important fact that all three of the public hospitals 
serve larger and more densely concentrated populations than do the contractor hospitals. 
This difference might well account for the higher throughput observed in the public 
hospitals, although the lack of accurate data on the catchment populations served by 
each hospital prevented calculation of actual population to bed ratios. To the extent that 
the public hospitals did have higher population to bed ratios than the contractors, this 
would go some way to explaining their higher turnover rates and lower LOS, since the 
pressure of a high admissions rate would likely result in shorter LOS over time. In 
addition, it is possible that differences in case-mix, beyond those compensated for by the 
simple service-mix adjustments carried out, could explain some of the variation in the 
observed utilisation patterns.
In addition to these external factors, a number o f factors internal to the hospitals might 
explain the variations in turnover rate and LOS. One example is the problem of 
logistical delays, due to lack of operating theatre capacity or access to specific 
investigations, which may prolong LOS. Interviews with hospital officials identified this 
to be something o f a problem in all six hospitals, but did not identify any systematic 
differences between the groups. The skill and experience of the medical staff can also 
impact on LOS, since less skilled and experienced staff are more likely to hold patients 
in hospital longer until they are certain of their recovery.154 As noted in Chapter S, the 
skill levels and experience o f the medical staff in the public hospitals were, on average, 
superior to those in the contractor hospitals, and this might provide some explanation for 
the shorter LOS observed in the public hospitals.
A  final factor, o f particular importance in this context, is the impact o f reimbursement 
related incentives on clinical decision making, and hence LOS. As noted in Chapter 6, 134
134 This point was argued by officials o f «he contractor company as an important explanation for the longer LOS at 
the contractor hospitals. While this does not reflect badly on the contractor company itself in the case o f 
Matikwana and Shiluvana hospitals (since the medical staff were appointed by the government), it docs reflect 
poorly on the company at Hcwu hospital, where medical staff are employed by the contractor itself.
-276-
all three o f the contracts rely on a per diem reimbursement method. In theory, this would 
be expected to generate an incentive for the contractor to prolong LOS in order to 
maximise revenues and profits. There are two dimensions to the economic incentive to 
prolong LOS in this situation. As illustrated in the analysis of production costs (Chapter 
4), fixed costs135 account for a very high proportion of total cost in these hospitals, so 
that once the break-even occupancy levels are reached, additional patient days generate 
significant profit margins. In addition, it is well recognised that individual patient costs 
are higher in the earlier than in the later part o f an hospital stay, so that when a fixed per 
diem is paid, the contractor is likely to prefer a total occupancy rate made up o f  fewer 
patients each with a longer LOS, than one composed of more patients with shorter stays. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, both corporate and hospital level officials in the contractor 
company demonstrated a clear understanding of these production economics, 
highlighting the potential impact of this incentive effect.
A number of factors do however mitigate the impact of this incentive effect on LOS in 
the contractor hospitals. As discussed in Chapter 6, two of the contracts (at Matikwana 
and Shiluvana hospitals) contain minimum occupancy clauses, which guarantee the 
contractor revenues at an occupancy rate o f 90%, which is likely to be well above those 
required to break-even. In this situation, it is unlikely that the contractor would act to 
artificially prolong LOS, and the specific production economics in these hospitals might 
even make it rational to ensure that average occupancy rates are at or below the 
minimum specified in the contract. In addition, the medical staff at these two hospitals, 
who have ultimate decision making power on admissions and discharges, are employed 
by the government, limiting the ability o f  the management staff employed by the 
contractor company to influence LOS.
Interestingly, neither o f these mitigating factors apply at Hewu hospital, at which the 
LOS was in between that observed at the other two hospitals. In this case, as discussed 
in Chapter 6, the medical staff argued that they experienced no pressure whatever from 
the contractor company to prolong LOS, although some views to the contrary did 13*
133 A s defined in Chapter 3. fixed costs include all costs which do not vary with the quantity o f outputs o f the
hospital, and include all capital costs, as well as staff costs and other overhead costs.
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emerge from some o f  the interviews with other officials. While the longer LOS at the 
contractor hospitals may therefore be attributable, in part, to the incentive effect of the 
reimbursement mechanism used, this study did not elicit strong evidence to confirm that 
this is the case.
In summary, the somewhat less efficient utilisation pattern demonstrated by the 
contractors relative to  the public hospitals may be attributable to less efficient practice 
patterns applied by the clinical staff working within the hospitals, but could also be 
explained by some combination o f external factors, including differences in the 
catchment populations using the hospitals, and the case-mix of patients arriving at the 
hospitals. Aside from these factors, this study was not able to identify any specific 
explanations for these differences, and it seems unlikely that the per diem 
reimbursement method, given the mininum occupancy clause, is a critical determinant 
o f the longer LOS and lower turnover rates in the contractor hospitals.
8.1.2. Production costs and data envelopment analysis
8.1.2.1. Cost analysis
The general cost analysis, reported in Chapter 4, demonstrated a consistent pattern of 
lower average production costs in the contractor hospitals when compared to the public 
hospitals, but with some important exceptions to this pattern. The differences between 
the two groups were most marked when in-patient days were used as the measure of 
output When admissions were used as the measure of output, the contractor costs 
remained well below those at the public hospitals, although the margin between the two 
groups was somewhat reduced, due to the effect of the longer L O S  in the contractor 
hospitals. It is worth noting here that the relationships between costs per day, costs per 
a d m iss io n  and L O S  can be somewhat more complex than the direct influence o f L O S  on 
costs per admission. For example, since the costs of treating acute care patients are 
almost always higher in the early days of a stay than in the later days, longer L O S  may 
itself reduce average costs per day for the hospital as a whole, and this might in fact
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provide a part explanation for the lower production costs per day observed in the 
contractor hospitals.
The cost analysis therefore demonstrated that the contractor hospitals are able to 
produce many o f the key hospital outputs measured here at lower cost than the public 
hospitals, although the poor performance o f Bisho hospital distorted the picture in the 
case o f OPD visits and operations. The analysis also demonstrated that all of these 
differences were robust to variations in several of the critical assumptions used in 
assessing capital costs and other elements o f the cost analysis, as well as to adjustments 
for service-mix.
Although the general cost analysis incorporated some basic service-mix categories, 
variations in case-mix could still have accounted for some o f  the unit cost variations 
between the two groups, and the tracer cost analysis was designed to address this 
problem. The data obtained in this analysis showed a less consistent picture than that 
obtained in the general cost analysis. In both the caesarean section and NVD cases, costs 
per case were lower in the contractor than in the public hospitals, although these results 
were again biased by the high costs per case at Bisho hospital. In the appendectomy and 
hernia repair cases, on the other hand, costs per case at the contractor hospitals exceeded 
those at the public hospitals.
Further analysis o f  these results shows some consistencies with the general patterns 
observed in the general cost analysis. In the analysis o f the caesarean section cases, for 
example, the contractor hospitals show lower production costs per day, but have longer 
LOS than the public hospitals. In the NVD cases, lower production costs per day in the 
contractor hospitals account for the most o f the observed differences between the 
groups, since LOS is similar across the two groups. In the appendectomy and hernia 
repair cases, the higher costs per case at the contractor hospitals are attributable mainly 
to longer LOS and higher theatre costs per case, which together override the lower 
production costs per day at the contractor hospitals. Together these data therefore 
confirm the lower production costs per day, the longer LOS, and the higher unit theatre 
costs at the contractors compared to the public hospitals, all o f  which were also observed
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in the general cost analysis. These factors also explain the fact that costs per case were 
generally higher at the contractor than at the public hospitals, with the exception of 
Bisho hospital, whose high unit costs led to higher mean costs per case at the public 
hospitals in two of the tracers conditions analysed.
Notwithstanding these similarities between the results o f the tracer and the general cost 
analysis, comparison o f the tracer results with the service-mix specific unit cost data in 
the general cost analysis highlights some noteworthy differences. For example, whereas 
the tracer analysis showed that the mean costs per caesarean section and per NVD case 
were lower at the contractor than at the public hospitals, the general cost analysis 
showed that contractor costs per maternity admission were in fact 3% higher than those 
at the public hospitals. This difference is probably attributable to differences between 
the two groups in the proportions of caesarean section, NVD, and other cases in the 
maternity wards.156 Similarly, the higher costs per appendectomy and hernia repair case 
at the contractor hospitals is in contrast with their generally lower cost per surgical 
admission observed in the general cost analysis. In this instance, the discrepancy is 
almost certainly attributable to differences between the groups in the case-mix of 
patients in the general surgical wards.
Together, the general cost analysis and the tracer cost analysis thus demonstrate some 
c o n s is te n t  trends in the comparison o f  production costs at the contractor and public 
hospitals. Production costs per day were generally lower at the contractor than at the 
public hospitals, often by significant margins. LOS was however noted to be higher at 
the contractor hospitals, and this either reduced and, in some instances, even reversed 
the observed margin between the two groups when costs per admission were analysed. 
In addition, where surgical cases were examined, the higher unit theatre costs at the 
contractor hospitals, themselves attributable to low throughput, also increased the 
overall costs per admission in these hospitals. 136
136 Other cues in maternity wards might include those admitted prior to delivery for medical or gynaecological 
reasons, and those with suspected labour but discharged when found not to be in labour.
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The analysis o f the composition o f production costs in Chapter 4 provides some 
explanations for these observed differences in production costs. This analysis indicated, 
firstly, that unit production costs were lower at the contractor than at the public hospitals 
across all but one of the individual cost categories and sub-categories analysed. 
Secondly, within these various cost categories, clinical staff and domestic services 
(which included domestic staff costs) were clearly the most important determinants of 
cost, jointly contributing almost 70% to the total margin between the two groups.
While these analyses therefore demonstrated that almost all components of production 
costs are lower at the contractor than at the public hospitals, it is clear that lower unit 
staff costs account for most o f the observed differences between the groups. Analysis of 
these staff costs in turn showed that the lower costs at the contractor hospitals are 
achieved primarily through the use o f significantly lower numbers o f staff than are used 
in the public hospitals, and that the control over staffing numbers is sufficiently tight to 
ensure lower overall costs, in spite o f  the fact that the contractors rely on a more 
expensive staff mix, and also provide higher average remuneration for most staff 
categories.
The cost analysis also demonstrated that all categories o f variable costs per day, 
including drugs, consumables, and laboratory tests, were again lower at the contractor 
than at the public hospitals, suggesting more careful management of these resources in 
the contractor hospitals, although the medical staff also influence the use o f these 
resources to some extent.157
These data therefore provide strong evidence that the contractor hospitals are in general 
able to manage resources more efficiently than their public hospital counterparts across 
the full spectrum of hospital production activities, including both the fixed and variable 
cost components. Most importantly, however, the contractor hospitals appear to achieve
157 As noted in Chapter 7, the medical staff at Hcwu and Matikwana hospitals appear to play a significant role in 
cost containment (in the former since they are employed by the contractor, and in the latter, due to a close 
wotking relationship between the government employed medical staff), while at Shiluvana, decision-making 
by the medical staff appeals to be unrelated to  efficiency considerations on the part o f the management staff 
employed by the contractor.
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lower fixed production costs per day through more efficient allocation and management 
o f staff resources, and more specifically, by obtaining higher levels of productivity from 
smaller numbers o f more highly skilled and better paid nurses, than is the case in the 
public hospitals.
It is important to note, however, that the variations in unit production costs observed in 
this analysis are not solely attributable to the observed differences in fixed and variable 
production costs, but also to the variations in the quantity o f  outputs produced by each 
hospital, itself a function o f internal productivity as well o f the levels of external 
demand which the hospital faces. The relationship between these various factors can be 
illustrated with reference to fixed costs per bed, which captures the allocation and 
management of fixed costs, independent of hospital output, and which were on average 
found to be 31% lower in the contractor than in the public hospitals. Thus, while the 
throughput of in-patients (measured by turnover rate) in the contractor hospitals was 
21% lower than in the public hospitals, this was insufficient to  overcome the substantial 
difference in the average fixed cost per bed, explaining the consistently lower fixed  unit 
costs per admission in the contractor hospitals. The margin between the two groups in 
costs per admission was increased by the differences in variable cost per day, where 
contractor costs were on average 172% lower than those observed in the public 
hospitals, more than compensating for the longer LOS at the contractor hospitals, and 
thus explaining the generally lower total costs per admission at the contractor 
hospitals.151
These results should of course be interpreted in the light o f the various methodological 
problems encountered in the cost analysis, and discussed in full in Chapter 3. As noted 
there, one of the key problems was the estimation of the capital element of total hospital 
costs, although sensitivity analysis indicated that all of the results were robust to the 
variations in the assumptions used in these estimations. The second important 
methodological problem was encountered in the step down allocation o f  costs; here the •
•5® Similar analyses could be conducted using in-patient days rather than admissions, although this would be biased 
in favour o f the contractor hospitals due to their longer LOS. and would a lso  confuse the effects o f external 
demand and internal productivity.
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major concern related to the allocation of head office administrative costs to the public 
hospitals, since this required a formula based allocation, while more accurate data were 
available for the contractor hospitals. The difference in approach between the two 
groups is, however, unlikely to have resulted in a systematic bias in the comparison, 
since the allocation formula used in the public hospitals is believed to fairly accurately 
capture the use o f head office resources by those hospitals.
The third major problem encountered in the cost analysis emerged from the poor quality 
o f data on, and inconsistent definitions of, hospital outputs. While this set o f problems is 
clearly relevant to the overall interpretation of the results of the cost analysis, it is again 
unlikely to have resulted in any systematic bias in the comparison of the public and 
contractor hospitals, since most o f the specific problems encountered were common to 
both o f  these groups. The final, and perhaps most important problem emerges from the 
small sample sizes used in this study. As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, this prevented use 
o f parametric statistical tests in most of the analyses (the exception being the tracer cost 
analysis). This is conceded as a major problem in comparing the public and contractor 
hospitals, particularly in light o f  the fact that, in many o f the analyses, the hospitals 
show results falling within overlapping ranges and/or individual hospitals substantially 
bias the mean results for their group. While efforts were made to address these particular 
problems, for example through inclusion o f both mean and median data, it is recognised 
that these do not adequately address the impact o f small sample size on the 
generalisability o f  these results. Although this problem could have been addressed 
through inclusion o f a larger sample o f public hospitals (since the full population of 
contractor hospitals was included in the study), logistical constraints prevented this.
8.1.2.2. Data envelopment analysis
The comparison o f  the relative efficiency o f the contractor and public hospitals using the 
base DEA model showed a very close correlation with the results o f the cost analysis, 
confirming the more efficient allocation and management of production resources at the 
contractor hospitals. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, higher mean scores in the DEA
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indicate a greater degree o f  technical efficiency in the use of inputs to produce outputs, 
with the distance from a score of 1 indicating the extent of inefficiency. Since costs were 
available for all of the input variables, these results can also be interpreted in terms of 
economic, rather than purely technical efficiency. In the analysis of the whole hospital, 
for example, the mean scores obtained by the contractor and public hospitals were 
0.8981 and 0.7860 respectively, indicating that production costs at the contractor 
hospitals could be reduced by  a maximum of 10.2% if the hospitals were functioning at 
maximum efficiency, whereas the equivalent figure for the public hospitals is 21.4%.
The close correlation between the results o f the cost analysis and the DEA was also 
maintained in the application of DEA to the four tracer conditions, again using the base 
model. The base model DEA thus provides further evidence for the superior production 
efficiency o f the contractor compared to the public hospitals. It also highlights some of 
the advantages of DEA relative to other methods of assessing efficiency outlined in 
Chapter 3. In particular, this analysis illustrates the ability of DEA to quantify the extent 
o f inefficiency measured (and hence the potential efficiency gains from a shift to 
maximally efficient production), at least relative to the total study sample, and in this 
case, to express the quantum of inefficiency in terms of production costs. Another 
advantage o f DEA, the ability to use multiple input and output variables, was also 
applied in this case, but w ith limited success, due to the restrictions imposed by the 
small sample size (see below).159
This analysis also however demonstrates some o f the methodological weaknesses of the 
DEA approach. Firstly, all efficiency measures are relative to the sample only, so that no 
absolute measures of efficiency are available. While this limitation is not crucial in the 
context o f this study, which aimed to compare the two groups, some o f the findings of 
the analysis do highlight the shortcomings of the relative efficiency approach. For 
example, the findings o f the tracer analysis, which demonstrated perfect efficiency 
scores in several of the hospitals, are somewhat counterintuitive in the light of other
•5* Another potential advantage o f  this approach is its ability to assess the relative contribution o f different 
components o f production, such  as staff or other cost elements, to the observed levels o f inefficiency. However, 
this specific advantage o f D EA  was not applicable here due to the high level o f  aggregation o f input variables 
used in the base model.
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observations in the study, and it is highly probable that a larger sample, or other 
methods of analysis, would identify inefficiencies in the production o f those specific 
outputs in the same hospitals.
A second limitation concerns the quantification of inefficiency, or more specifically, the 
assumed efficiency gains to be obtained from a shift to maximal productive efficiency. 
These interpretations of the DEA are based on the assumption o f  a continuous 
production possibilities frontier, implying that all hospitals are capable of improving 
their production ‘technology’ to reach the point of maximum efficiency. This 
assumption is probably plausible in the context of the six contractor and public 
hospitals, which do use similar production technologies to produce a similar range of 
outputs. It is however less plausible when all nine of the study hospitals are included, 
since the private hospitals use a very different set o f production technologies to the other 
six hospitals.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, since DEA assumes causal relations between the 
input and output variables, and does not assess the nature or extent o f  causality, it is 
impossible to make judgements as to the relative strength of different model 
specifications. This weakness is well illustrated by the results of the various alternative 
DEA models used in this analysis. One key variation from the base model was the 
specification o f in-patient days, rather than admissions, as the output variable. As might 
be expected, this modification benefited the contractor hospitals due to the longer LOS, 
and hence greater number o f total days per hospital in this group. As a result, the 
contractor hospitals appear more efficient than the public hospitals, by a somewhat 
greater margin than was the case with the base model.
This analysis also demonstrated that, when the sample size is small as was the case here, 
the sensitivity o f the DEA (and hence its ability to detect relative inefficiency) is 
substantially reduced when the number of variables is increased. Similarly, the results 
were shown to be sensitive to assumptions regarding returns to scale. Unfortunately, the 
DEA approach provides no basis for assessing which of the two input models used here 
is objectively preferable.
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A further, closely related problem of the DEA approach is its inability to differentiate 
between genuine determinants of internal efficiency, and external ‘market shocks’ such 
as case-mix, or the quality of care delivered. While the literature provides mixed 
evidence on the impact of these factors on the results o f DEA, the other analyses 
conducted in this study do suggest the important effects of these factors. As discussed in 
some detail in Chapter 3, this analysis therefore made some attempts to adjust for these 
external factors, through inclusion of adjustments for service-mix, the tracer analysis, 
and through the inclusion of some adjustments for quality of care.
In summary, the results o f the base model DEA, which uses a small number of 
variables, and eliminates the effects of scale, are closely correlated with those of both 
the general and the tracer cost analysis, suggesting greater production efficiency in the 
contractor group compared to the public hospitals. However, modifications to the base 
model assumptions, including an increase in the number of variables, and an allowance 
for variable returns to scale, produce important differences in the results, in some cases 
reversing the observations of the base model analysis. Given the overall sensitivity of 
the DEA results to model specifications160, and the absence of objective judgements as 
to the relative validity of alternative specifications, all of these results should thus be 
interpreted with caution.
8.1.2.3. Comparison o f total contract costs with public sector production costs
While the cost analysis and DEA both indicated generally lower production costs for 
most outputs at the contractor hospitals compared to the public hospitals, the more 
important comparison from the government’s perspective is that between production 
costs at directly managed public hospitals and the total contract cost at contractor 
hospitals. The incorporation of total contract cost into the various analyses results in a 
more ambiguous picture of the relative efficiency o f  the contractor and public hospitals
160 The findng that DEA results are sensitive to model specifications is in contrast with the views o f  some o f the 
authors cited in Appendix 4, who argue that DEA results are generally insensitive to model specifications.
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than was observed when production costs alone were compared. The cost analysis data 
show that the government effectively faces higher total contract cost than its own 
production costs in respect of several of the critical hospital outputs studied here, 
including cost per OPD visit and per admission. Similarly, the DEA results suggest that 
contracted hospital production appears less efficient than direct public sector production, 
at least in two o f  the four key analyses conducted. These data lead to the important 
conclusion that the government currently fails to derive meaningful efficiency benefits, 
at least as measured in terms o f lower production costs, from the clearly superior 
production efficiency of the contractor hospitals. Instead, the government appears to 
face higher costs through contracted production than it would in its own hospitals, 
suggesting that, under current arrangements, contracting out may result in net efficiency 
losses.
Further analysis o f these results highlights some important factors contributing to these 
observations. As noted above, costs per in-patient day were lower at the contractor than 
at the public hospitals, even when total contract cost were incorporated into the analysis, 
albeit with much reduced margins. This suggests that the higher effective costs faced by 
the government per admission and per composite output (defined to include admissions) 
are attributable to some combination of relatively long LOS, and high effective total 
contract cost per day. One conclusion from this analysis is therefore that a reduction in 
the LOS at the contractor hospitals to the same levels as those observed in the public 
hospitals would ensure that the effective cost to the government o f  contracted 
production would be consistently lower than the equivalent public sector production 
costs, at least in respect of in-patient services. The same argument does not however 
apply to OPD visits, in which case the high effective total contract cost overrides the 
previously observed margins in production costs.
The effect o f potential changes in LOS notwithstanding, it is also essential to examine 
the various other factors contributing to the high total contract cost observed in these 
contracts. As discussed in Chapter 4, the total contract cost is determined by the 
government’s share o f production costs at each hospital, as well as by the total price of 
the contract. The analysis identified fairly substantial variations between the three
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hospitals in the government’s share of production costs, which were attributed mainly to 
variations in contractual arrangements, including differences in the capital cost burden, 
and in the burden o f staff costs borne by the government. In light of the results of the 
cost analysis, it is highly likely that there are some inefficiencies in the staffing 
component of these costs, particularly at Shiluvana, where the government bears the cost 
o f virtually the entire staff establishment, and to a lesser extent at the other two 
hospitals, where the government is responsible for much smaller staffing components. 
Similarly, the capital cost borne by the government at Hewu hospital is somewhat 
higher than might have been the case had the contractor built the hospital, which is 
illustrated by the fact that the replacement cost per bed at Hewu hospital was 
approximately 15% higher than the equivalent costs at the two hospitals built by the 
contractor. It should be noted, however, that there is no reason to expect that these 
inefficiencies should be any greater than those observed in the public hospitals 
themselves.
Variations in the government’s own costs in the different contracts might also be due to 
variations in the transactions costs incurred, including the costs of negotiating and 
monitoring the contract, as well as of administering any government staff at the 
contractor hospital. As discussed in Chapter 6, none of the government departments 
allocated any dedicated staff to the negotiation and monitoring of contracts, nor were 
they able to provide any reasonable estimates of the proportion of time spent by 
government officials on various tasks related to the administration of the contracts. The 
only quantifiable element of transactions costs was thus the allocation o f an overhead 
cost from the government head office, which was based on the numbers o f government 
staff employed at each hospital. As would be expected, these transactions costs were 
extremely low at Matikwana and Hewu hospital, and slightly higher at Shiluvana, but in 
all three cases, these costs were substantially below those incurred at all o f the public 
hospitals, due to the much higher numbers of government staff employed at the public 
hospitals. While it is recognised that this limited approach to quantifying transactions 
costs is likely to underestimate the true impact of these costs, the absence of data 
provided no alternatives. It is also the case, however, as noted in Chapter 6, that 
government officials devote very limited time and resources to negotiating and
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monitoring the contracts, suggesting that transactions costs make only a small 
contribution to the government’s share of total contract cost.
These observations suggest that while the government’s share of total contract cost is a 
relevant consideration, the total price of the contract is a more important determinant of 
total contract cost, justifying closer scrutiny o f the determinants of contract price. Since 
all three o f the contracts are based on a fixed price per in-patient day (and per OPD visit 
at two o f  the hospitals), the effective annual contract price is determined by the product 
of the per diem rate and the total number o f in-patient days and OPD visits provided 
during the year.
As noted in Chapter 4, the per diem rate (and hence the price per OPD visit) varies 
substantially between the three contracts. One obvious explanation for these variations is 
the different contractual obligations faced by the contractor in the three contracts. While 
these variations in the contractor’s obligations explain some o f the difference in the per 
diem rate, Chapter 4 showed that some o f the price variations are not in proportion to 
the reduced obligations faced by the contractor. This was clearly illustrated by a 
comparison of the contractual arrangements at Shiluvana and Matikwana hospitals, 
where differences in contract price were not in proportion to differences in staff costs. 
The difference in the per diem rates at the two hospitals is also not attributable to any 
differences in capital costs incurred by the contractor in constructing the hospitals, as 
shown by the virtually identical estimates o f replacement cost per bed (R67.644 at 
Matikwana and R67.696 at Shiluvana). These observations provide some suggestive 
evidence that the contractor was generally able to secure favourable per diem rates in all 
three contracts, which is confirmed by the fact that these rates exceeded underlying 
production costs per day by fairly substantial margins in all three cases.
In addition to relatively high per diem rates, the total number of in-patient days (and 
OPD visits) plays a major role in contributing to the high total contract price paid by the 
government. Two separate factors were in turn shown to influence the total number of 
days charged for by the contractor. The first o f these is the relatively long LOS, while
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the second is the minimum occupancy clause in the contracts for Matikwana and 
Shiluvana.
These observations therefore suggest that the high per diem rates, the minimum 
occupancy clauses in two of the contracts, and the relatively long LOS together resulted 
in the relatively high total contract price, and hence the high total contract cost in these 
three contracts. It is also clear that it is primarily these factors which account for the 
failure o f the government to secure the potentially substantial cost savings which this 
study has demonstrated might be obtained from selective contracting out of hospital 
services. This suggests, in turn, that the government’s failure to secure cost savings was 
due to its having entered into contracts containing several unfavourable contract terms, 
suggesting either a lack of understanding of the impact of these issues, and/or a lack of 
negotiating capacity on the part o f the government. By contrast, these observations 
indicate that the ability of the contractor to negotiate contracts favourable to itself 
resulted in its being able to capture a substantial proportion of its superior production 
efficiency in the form of profit. This is clearly illustrated by the substantial profit 
margins obtained by the contractor during the study year (which were shown to range 
from 32% to 70%).
These observations also highlight some of the critical skills and processes which 
government would need to focus on in order to secure the potential cost savings from 
contracting out. These include improvements to the contract negotiation process, as well 
as to the monitoring of contractor performance, and are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 9. In the former case, stronger capacity to negotiate over price would allow the 
government to secure lower unit prices (whether per diem or otherwise), while still 
ensuring that the contractor was able to secure sufficient profits to ensure sustained 
participation in the contract. The high profit margins outlined here demonstrate that both 
parties have substantial room for manoeuvre in price negotiations, and that the 
government could in fact expect to secure significant price reductions. Secondly, a  shift 
away from a per diem reimbursement mechanism would reduce the incentive fo r the 
contractor to prolong LOS; and thirdly, efforts could be made to reduce or eliminate 
completely the minimum occupancy clause, while still compensating the contractor for
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the capital risk assumed. As regards monitoring of contractor performance, these 
observations suggest that closer scrutiny of LOS by the government has the potential to 
reduce the contribution o f  this parameter to the high total contract cost observed.
In summary, this analysis has demonstrated that while the contractor hospitals are able 
to produce most hospital outputs at lower cost than their public sector counterparts, the 
government fails to capture these cost savings, due mainly to contracts which strongly 
favour the contractor, and to a lesser extent, to relatively high government costs at the 
contractor hospitals. A s a result, government currently faces higher total costs in 
contracted than in directly managed public hospital production for several of the key 
outputs measured here. This analysis has however demonstrated that this situation could 
almost certainly be reversed through improvements in contract terms, which would in 
turn require that the government develop stronger capacity to negotiate and monitor 
contracts o f this kind.
8.1.3. Quality of care in  contractor and directly managed public hospitals
While the analyses discussed in the previous section suggest that contracting out 
currently fails to generate cost savings, this discussion has so far omitted any 
consideration of differentials in quality of care between the contractor and public 
hospitals, which might themselves be sufficient to compensate for the observed cost 
differences. This section reviews the results obtained from the various analyses o f 
quality o f care.
8.1.3.1. Structural aspects o f quality o f care
While both the contractor and public groups on average performed relatively well in the 
evaluation o f SQOC, some consistent trends and differences between the groups did 
emerge. In general, the contractor group performed more poorly than the public group, 
obtaining a lower total score, as well as lower scores in all but two o f the functional
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clusters analysed, suggesting that from a structural perspective, quality of care at the 
contractor hospitals could be considered inferior to that observed in the public hospitals. 
However, several factors suggest the need for some caution in the interpretation of this 
general result; firstly, the absolute differences between the two groups were relatively 
small in both the total score, as well as in all but two of the functional clusters. In 
addition, the mean values disguise fairly wide variation between individual hospitals in 
some cases, as well as overlapping ranges of results between the two groups.
Further analysis of the performance of the two groups does however indicate some 
consistent and important differences which bear on judgements about SQOC. The 
functional cluster which contributed most to the observed difference between the groups 
was that of clinical staff, which assessed the numbers, training and qualifications of 
medical, nursing and paramedical or ancillary staff available at the hospitals. In this 
case, the observed difference between the two groups was substantial (an absolute 
difference o f 27 percentage points in the mean scores), and was attributable to 
substantial gaps in all three staffing categories, although the largest was in the 
paramedical staff category, followed by nursing and medical staff. Examination of the 
individual criteria scores reveals several factors behind these patterns: in the case of 
medical staff, the contractors were inferior to the public hospitals in terms of the supply 
of specific specialist skills, and in the general experience of the medical staff. In the case 
o f nursing staff, the major contributor to the observed difference was the much smaller 
total supply o f nurses in the contractor hospitals, which was sufficient to overcome the 
impact of the more highly qualified mix of nurses in these hospitals relative to the public 
hospitals; in the paramedical staff category, the observed difference was due to 
inferiority of the contractors in terms of the supply of the full range o f skills required in 
this category. The contractors were therefore assessed as generally inferior to the public 
hospitals in terms o f  the provision of staffing, which was in turn attributed to a 
combination of low staff numbers in some categories, and to inadequate skills and 
experience in others.
Similar patterns were also observed in the aggregated analysis o f the categories within 
each of the functional clusters. In the aggregated analysis of non-clinical staff, for
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example, the contractors demonstrated substantially and consistently poorer 
performance, again due to a combination o f  lower numbers and skills of staff. In the 
aggregated services/functions and equipment/supplies categories, the contractors again 
performed somewhat more poorly than the public hospitals, although the differences in 
these two cases were smaller than in the case o f the staffing category. In these latter two 
categories, the differences were attributable to general inferiority on the part of the 
contractors in the performance of specific functions or services, and to poorer 
performance in terms of the availability, quantity, and quality of various supplies and 
equipment regarded as essential for adequate quality of care. The opposite pattern was 
observed in the case of the aggregated buildings category, however. Here, the contractor 
hospitals were consistently and substantially superior to the public hospitals, a pattern 
attributable to a combination of better provision of space, ablution and other facilities, 
and more importantly, to superior physical condition and cleanliness o f  all of the 
hospital buildings which were evaluated.
In summary, while the overall differences in scores between the two groups on this 
evaluation were relatively small, and should be interpreted cautiously, this evaluation 
did demonstrate important and consistent differences between the two groups in some 
key structural elements o f quality of care. More specifically, the contractor hospitals 
appear to limit the quantity and quality of key inputs to the hospital production process, 
including critical staffing and equipment and supplies, to the point of failing to meet 
what this evaluation defined as realistic public sector standards. On the other hand, the 
contractors demonstrated clearly superior provision and maintenance o f hospitals 
buildings and amenities, suggesting closer attention to these aspects of SQOC than was 
observed in the public hospitals, where these aspects were generally found to be very 
poor.
As discussed in Chapter 3, these results should also be interpreted cautiously in the light 
o f  the important methodological limitations o f this evaluation, in particular, the role of 
subjectivity in the design of the evaluation instrument, in the rating o f the hospitals, and 
in the implicit judgements as to the relative importance of the different components of 
SQOC evaluated here. Equally importantly, the power of these results is limited by the
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uncertain relationship between structural aspects of quality o f care and overall quality of 
patient care, as well between patients’ subjective assessments and more objective 
assessments of quality of care.
8.1.3.2. Quality o f nursing care
The instrument based evaluation of the quality of nursing care showed a somewhat 
different picture from that observed in the evaluation of SQOC, with the contractor 
hospitals demonstrating superior performance in most of the analyses.
This evaluation also highlighted some important and consistent differences in the quality 
of nursing care between the two groups. The superiority of the contractors in the nursing 
care cluster was evidenced in all four of the categories which comprised this cluster. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, this assessment was based on a particular model o f nursing care, 
which recognises critical aspects of nursing care as distinctive from the medical care of 
the patient, and which requires of nurses to play an active role in assessment, diagnosis, 
monitoring and control of the patient. The performance o f the nurses in the contractor 
hospitals according to these criteria was uniformly and consistently superior to those in 
the public hospitals, indicating that this model of care was followed relatively well in 
the contractor hospitals, while nurses in the public hospitals tended to be much less 
active, following medical orders more passively, and keeping patient records in a 
generally poor condition.
In the case o f the nursing management cluster, the evaluation showed a more mixed 
picture, with the contractors demonstrating superior performance in such areas as 
benefits and service conditions, but with the public hospitals showing superiority in the 
case o f staff-patient ratios (which is consistent with the observations made in the 
evaluation o f SQOC), in-service training and career development. Overall, these results 
therefore indicate a fairly consistent picture o f superior quality of nursing care at the 
contractor hospitals, with a more even picture in the case o f the management of nursing 
staff.
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The findings o f the subjective evaluation of nursing care were generally consistent with 
those o f the instrument based evaluation, and with many o f  the observations of the 
evaluation o f SQOC. In the evaluation of nursing care at the ward level, for example, the 
evaluators judged the public hospitals to be inferior to the contractors in most of the 
parameters assessed. A less consistent picture emerged in the evaluation o f  nursing care 
process, where the evaluators did not identify any systematic differences between the 
two group«.
The evaluation of nursing management again highlighted important consistencies with 
previous observations. While staffing numbers and skill levels were generally judged to 
be adequate in both groups, the evaluators argued that contractor staffing levels were 
just adequate to copie with current patient demand and acuity levels. These findings are 
again consistent with the previous observation of the tendency of the contractors to 
supply inputs at or even below minimum acceptable levels.
In summary, both the instrument based and the subjective evaluations produced a fairly 
consistent set o f conclusions concerning the quality of nursing care in the two hospital 
group«. These are, firstly, that, with some exceptions, the quality of nursing care at ward 
level was generally sup>erior in the contractor hospitals, despite the fact that numbers and 
skill-mix o f  nursing staff in these hospitals were judged as ju st adequate to copie with 
current activity levels; secondly, the two groups present a more even picture in the case 
o f nursing management at hospital level, with each group having piarticular strengths 
and weaknesses, noticeable differences in nursing management style, and with generally 
low staff morale at all hospitals beside one o f the contractor hospitals. A third, implicit 
conclusion is that nursing management appears to be less relevant than ward level 
nursing care in influencing overall quality of nursing care, as shown by the strong 
subjective judgement that overall quality of pratient care in the contractor hospitals was 
suprerior to that observed in the public hospitals. These conclusions should of course be 
interpreted in the light o f the various methodological cautions noted in the previous 
section, which also apply to these evaluations.
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8.1.3.3. Evaluation o f clinical record keeping
The evaluation o f clinical record keeping focussed on the medical aspects of patient 
records, and complemented the assessments o f records carried out as part of the 
evaluations of SQOC and of the quality of nursing care. This evaluation demonstrated a 
fairly similar pattern of problems in the two groups across most of the indicators 
assessed, and did not identify any statistically significant differences between them in 
most cases. For two of the most important indicators, however, the contractors were 
shown to perform worse than the public hospitals, in both cases by statistically 
significant margins. The first of these was the proportion’of cases in which the evaluator 
could not interpret the diagnosis and/or treatment from the patient record. This indicates 
extremely poor record keeping by the medical staff, and would be particularly important 
from the perspective of continuity of care between different medical staff working in the 
hospital. The second parameter was the proportion of cases in which there was no 
evidence of a visit by the doctor in the past 48 hours. These latter data almost certainly 
indicate compromises in quality of care in both groups, and a more severe problem in 
the contractor group, although it should be recognised that the poor performance noted 
here might have been artificially exaggerated by poor record keeping per se (i.e. doctor 
visits taking place but not being recorded). A similar pattern emerged in the evaluation 
o f record keeping for NVD cases, as indicated by the absence or incompleteness o f the 
partograph.
These data are only partially consistent with those obtained from the record reviews 
undertaken in the analyses of SQOC and o f the quality of nursing care. In those 
analyses, both groups showed relatively similar performance, with the performance of 
the contractor group noted to be marginally superior. These discrepancies are however 
c o n s i s te n t  with the observed trends in overall quality of nursing and medical care in the 
two groups. The generally superior nursing care in the contractor hospitals would 
account for the somewhat better performance in those aspects of record keeping for 
which nurses are responsible, which were measured in the analysis of SQOC, although 
the completion o f the partograph, which is the responsibility of the nurse-midwives in
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the labour ward, is an exception to this pattern. In the case o f medical care, however, the 
contractors were shown to have fewer, less skilled clinical staff than the public hospitals, 
which may well account for their worse performance in terms of clinical record keeping, 
for which the medical rather than the nursing staff are generally responsible. It is 
important to recall, however, that the medical staff posts at Matikwana and Shiluvana 
are established and filled by the government authorities, so that inadequate provision of 
medical staff cannot be attributed to the contractor.
8.1.3.4. Evaluation o f outcomes o f  care
The analysis of the sample cases o f all four of the tracer conditions did not identify any 
statistically significant differences between the groups, in either the prevalence of 
indicators o f poor outcomes, or in the expert analysis of the avoidability o f poor 
outcomes. This general conclusion notwithstanding, the analysis did identify some 
variability within and between groups, as well as some particularly disturbing evidence 
o f  poor quality o f care at individual hospitals within both groups.
The evidence of poor quality o f care at individual hospitals, while limited to very small 
numbers o f cases, is disturbing, and suggests some general problems in the quality of 
medical treatment in both of the groups studied, particularly in comparison with the 
private hospitals. In the hernia repair cases, for example, there was evidence of lengthy 
delays between admission to hospital and operation at one each of the contractor and the 
public hospitals, with some indication that these were attributable to logistical problems, 
such as lack of staff and/or theatre time. While delays of this kind are not particularly 
serious in most cases of chronic hernia repair, some cases can require urgent 
intervention, as was the situation with one o f the cases at one of the contractor hospitals 
(Matikwana), where the delay o f 7 days noted from the record is unacceptable. 
Similarly, a very high proportion o f cases at both hospitals showed no recorded evidence 
o f  adequate pre-operative assessment, which is disturbing since most patients presenting 
with this condition are likely to be in higher age groups, and therefore at higher risk 
from anaesthetic complications.
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The analysis of appendectomy cases also revealed 8 instances, all at the contractor 
hospitals, in which long delays between initial presentation and admission to the 
hospital, or between admission and operation, strongly suggest poor quality of care, 
since delays of this kind can have serious medical complications. In the former instance, 
the main problem appears to have been poor initial diagnoses, while the delays between 
admission and operations were again due to a combination of logistical problems at the 
hospitals involved. Both groups also demonstrated fairly high rates of wound infection 
relative to that observed in  the private hospitals, providing further evidence o f  avoidable 
quality of care problems.
The analysis of peri-natal and maternal mortality rates showed a generally similar 
pattern to that observed in the tracer case analysis, with disturbing evidence of poor 
quality of care in both contractor and public hospitals, but with only limited statistically 
significant differences between the two groups. In the case of peri-natal mortality, for 
example, both groups showed very high rates (with the public group showing a higher 
rate than the contractors), relative to the rate observed in the private hospitals. No data 
on national peri-natal mortality rates are available in South Africa, preventing 
comparison of these hospitals with the broader public sector. It is worth noting, 
however, that recent data for the African continent suggest an average rate of 75 per 
1000 (WHO 19%), which is substantially higher than the rates observed here, although 
rates in South Africa would be expected to be lower than those for other regional 
countries, due to its higher per capita income and better developed health care system.
While many factors aside from the quality o f  hospital care, including socio-economic 
and other characteristics of user populations, strongly influence peri-natal mortality 
rates, there is no explicit evidence to suggest that the populations using these 6 hospitals 
are particularly more predisposed to peri-natal mortality rate than the majority of the 
South African population. This suggests that the high rates identified here can, at least 
partially, be attributed to  the quality of health care delivered by the local health services, 
including the study hospitals. This is borne out by the expert analysis of the peri-natal 
cases, which showed a  very high prevalence o f avoidable factors in the peri-natal deaths
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analysed in both of the groups, with a statistically significant difference between the 
prevalence o f 74% in the contractors and 50% in the public hospitals. Further analysis of 
these factors indicated that over 75% of these avoidable factors in both of the groups 
were o f such a nature that the death could probably have been avoided, had different 
actions been taken. As disturbing is the conclusion that over 80% o f the total avoidable 
factors identified in both groups were attributable to hospital related factors, including 
problems in medical management and administrative problems, as distinct from factors 
related to the patient or to other administrative factors beyond the hospitals.
In the analysis of maternal mortality rates, both the contractor and public groups showed 
similar, high mean rates relative to those observed in the private hospitals, although here 
again there was no statistically significant difference between the two groups (with this 
result almost certainly attributable to the very small total number o f  cases evaluated). 
While national data on maternal mortality is poor, indirect estimates suggest a very high 
national rate o f 250 per 100,000, which substantially exceeds the rates observed here 
(Fawcuse ta l. 19%).
These various evaluations o f the outcomes o f care therefore lead to two main 
conclusions: the first is the lack of any sustained or systematic differences between the 
performances of the contractor and public hospitals, except in the single instance of the 
proportions o f avoidable factors in the analysis of peri-natal deaths, where quality of 
care in the contractor hospitals appeared to be worse than in the public hospitals. This 
provides further evidence of the inferiority of medical care in these hospitals relative to 
that in the public hospitals. Secondly, this analysis provided a range of evidence 
suggesting serious problems with the quality of care delivered at some o f the hospitals in 
both the contractor and the public groups.
Both o f these conclusions should be interpreted in the context o f a number of important 
methodological concerns. Many of the analyses, particularly those concerning the 
surgical tracer conditions and the maternal mortality cases, relied on small sample sizes, 
the reasons for which were discussed in Chapter 3. A second problem emerges from the 
fact that many o f the sampled records contained inadequate information, as a result of
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very poor record keeping in many of the hospitals. This hampered both stages of the 
outcome analyses, contributed to the small total sample sizes, and almost certainly led to 
an underestimate of the true prevalence of poor outcomes, as well as to an inadequate 
assessment o f their causes. As discussed in Chapter 3, there may also have been a 
perverse negative correlation between the quality of record keeping and the quality of 
care evaluated in this way, since it would have been easier to identify instances of poor 
outcomes in those hospitals which keep better records. Finally, this analysis assumes a 
causal relationship between poor outcomes and poor quality o f care within the hospital, 
thus ignoring the impact of non-hospital factors on the outcomes measured. Such factors 
would include, among others, patient socio-economic and demographic factors, access 
to health services, and the quality of local primary health care services. As discussed 
above, there is no obvious evidence that any of these factors differ systematically 
between the hospitals in the contractor and public groups, although it is conceded that 
these were not studied in any depth, so that some material differences may well have not 
been identified. The use of expert analysis, which aimed to identify instances of poor 
quality o f care directly attributable to the hospitals, was also included to address this 
problem.
8.1.3.5. Overview o f quality o f care in the contractor and directly managed public 
hospitals
One major conclusion of the various evaluations discussed here is the lack of any 
consistent or sustained difference in measured quality o f care between the contractor and 
public hospital groups. This is seen in the fact that the contractors showed a worse 
average performance in the evaluation of SQOC, but a better average performance in the 
evaluations o f  quality of nursing care and in the subjective evaluations o f overall patient 
care conducted by the nursing experts. Similarly, the evaluations of clinical record 
keeping and o f clinical outcomes identified few sustained and significant differences 
between the groups, although the contractors did demonstrate worse performance than 
the public group in some limited aspects o f  both of these evaluations, including some 
evidence o f  poor record keeping by medical staff, and a significant difference in the 
number o f avoidable factors contributing to peri-natal mortality.
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These observations highlight one of the limitations of using multiple evaluations of 
quality of care, namely the lack o f any way of integrating these various findings into an 
overall assessment of quality of care, which might have been possible, for example, 
through the attachment of relative weights to the different evaluations. While this would 
have been less important had there been a consistent pattern of differences between the 
two groups, the mixed picture observed here emphasises this problem. As discussed 
further below, this limitation is attributable to the more fundamental problem of 
uncertainty as to the nature and strength of the causal links between these various 
aspects of quality o f care and the overall quality o f  patient care.
Despite the generally mixed picture observed here, these evaluations did identify some 
consistent themes and trends which are material to the evaluation o f the relative 
efficiency o f  the two groups. One of these is the observation that the contractor hospitals 
constrain the quantity, and sometimes the quality, of inputs to the production process to 
a greater extent than the public hospitals. At the same time, however, the contractors 
appear to manage several of these resources more efficiently than the public hospitals. In 
some instances, the superior management of resources appears to be sufficient to ensure 
adequate and even superior quality of care in the contractor hospitals, despite the lower 
intensity and/or quality of inputs applied. This was demonstrated in the case of the 
buildings, equipment and facilities aspects of the SQOC evaluation, as well as in the 
evaluation o f  the quality of nursing care. Here the numbers of nurses in the contractors 
were observed to be generally lower than those in the public hospitals, and in spite of 
this, the quality o f nursing care at the contractor hospitals was consistently judged to be 
superior to that in the public hospitals. This suggests that key aspects o f management, 
such as staff allocations, the application o f nursing processes and systems, and 
motivation o f  staff, may play a crucial role in ensuring high quality of nursing care.
This analysis also suggests that there are some instances in which superior management 
is insufficient to overcome the negative impact of lower intensity and/or quality of 
inputs on quality o f care. This seems to be particularly the case in respect of medical and 
paramedical staff, in which the relatively fewer resources in the contractor hospitals
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does appear to have resulted in inferior performance in some aspects of the evaluations. 
This was seen, for example, in the poor relative performance o f  the contractor hospitals 
in some key aspects of record keeping by the medical staff, in the evidence that medical 
staff visit patients less frequently in the contractor than in the public hospitals, and 
perhaps most importantly, in the higher rate of avoidable factors contributing to peri­
natal mortality in the contractor hospitals.
These differences in the impacts o f  resource constraints and management on the quality 
o f  nursing and medical care make sense in the context of the quite different patterns of 
work organisation between nursing and medical staff in the hospital setting. In the case 
o f nurses, the large numbers o f  staff involved, and the large number of different 
functions which they perform, suggest that factors such as efficient allocations, ward 
and hospital wide nursing systems, and staff motivation, will impact significantly on the 
performance of nurses, and hence on quality of nursing care. The picture is somewhat 
different for medical staff, primarily due to their fewer numbers and relative functional 
flexibility. In this situation, while management functions such as such as allocations and 
motivation are clearly important, factors such as the available number and skills of the 
individual medical staff, especially the doctors, are likely to have a much greater impact 
on quality of care.
These observations raise obvious questions as to the relative importance o f the quality of 
nursing and medical care on overall quality of patient care and specifically, the 
outcomes of care. It is arguable that, at the margin, the quality o f medical care is more 
important than that of nursing care, since interventions by medical staff will often be 
more important than those o f nursing staff in changing the outcome where patients are 
extremely ill and negative outcomes are likely. It is recognised, though, that the opposite 
argument could well apply in several situations. As also noted several times above, the 
linkages between these specific dimensions of quality of care and overall quality of care 
are not clear, and it is thus not possible to make firm judgements as to the relative 
importance of these two elements of care. In the context of this study, such judgements 
might have been possible had there been sustained and significant differences between
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the contractor and public hospitals in the various evaluations of the outcomes o f care, 
but the absence of these prevents firm judgements of this kind.
A second general observation emerging from these analyses concerns the disturbing 
evidence o f  poor quality of care in individual hospitals in both groups. While much of 
this evidence should be considered anecdotal, in view of the small numbers o f cases 
identified, the evidence of very poor medical management is nonetheless extremely 
disturbing. In addition, some of the evidence is more systematic, particularly that 
relating to the observed mortality rates, and to the contribution of potentially avoidable 
factors to the  peri-natal mortality rates.
These general conclusions should be interpreted in the context of the important 
methodological limitations discussed above, many of which are common to most or all 
o f the individual evaluations. While efforts were made to address many o f these 
limitations in the context o f each o f the evaluations, it was not possible to entirely 
mitigate their individual or combined effects. The study design adopted here had two 
inherent structural limitations, which also suggests the need for caution in the 
interpretation of these results. The first of these is the small total sample o f hospitals, 
which prevented statistical analyses o f differences between the groups except in some 
limited instances, while the second is the lack of certainty as to the absolute and relative 
causal associations between these various dimensions of quality of care and the overall 
quality o f  patient care.
8.2. The relative efficiency of contractor and directly managed public 
hospitals: an integrated overview
Integration o f these various analyses allows some overall conclusions as to the relative 
efficiency o f contracted and directly managed public production. Given that the 
observed margins between the costs o f  contracted and public hospital production were 
relatively small when total contract costs were incorporated, it remained theoretically 
possible that differences in quality o f care could have compensated for the observed cost
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differences, thus still allowing the possibility o f net efficiency gains from contracted 
production. However, as discussed above, the evaluations of quality of care produced a 
somewhat mixed picture o f the performance of the two groups, and failed to 
demonstrate any sustained or systematic differences between them.
These results therefore suggest, firstly, that under current arrangements, contracted 
production o f hospital services does not generate consistent efficiency gains relative to 
directly managed public provision. Instead, the data suggest that contracting out m ay in 
fact be inefficient relative to directly managed public provision, although this conclusion 
depends to some extent on which outputs are considered most relevant from the 
government's perspective. Where OPD visits and in-patient admissions are considered 
the relevant outputs, as was assumed in this study, contracted production clearly results 
in net efficiency losses relative to directly managed public provision. On the other hand, 
the use o f in-patient days as the measure o f output would suggest that contracted 
production is more efficient than directly managed public provision.
Secondly, this study has provided convincing evidence that contracted production has 
the potential to generate substantial efficiency gains relative to direct public provision, 
provided that suitable contractual conditions are in place. This conclusion is based on 
the view, for which this study has provided strong evidence, that contractors are 
currently able to produce hospital services more efficiently (i.e. at lower cost, and at the 
same or at higher quality) than public hospitals, but that they are able to capture the 
majority o f these efficiencies in profit, due to highly favourable contracts, and to poor 
monitoring o f contractor performance by the government. These issues are discussed 
further in the following section.
A third conclusion, closely related to the first two, concerns the relationships and trade­
offs between cost and quality o f care observed in the various components of this study. 
As discussed above, the contractor hospitals are able to produce hospital outputs at 
lower cost than the public hospitals as a result o f much stricter control over the use of 
both fixed and variable cost resources, and primarily through reductions in the numbers 
o f  staff, but also o f other resources, used per unit of output. In some instances, these
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reductions in the input intensity translated directly into poor quality of care as measured 
in this study; this was seen for example, in the case of the evaluation of SQOC, where 
the contractors were judged to  be providing sub-optimal levels of key inputs required in 
the hospital production process. Similarly, the lower intensity and skill levels o f medical 
staff in the contractor hospitals were judged to contribute to some extent to the some of 
the poor quality of record keeping, and of patient outcomes identified in the contractor 
hospitals. This inverse relationship between input intensity (and/or quality) and quality 
o f care was however noted to be less o f a problem where the management of the 
resources involved was so efficient as to more than compensate for the reduced levels of 
inputs, as was well illustrated in the case of nursing services.
It is important to reiterate here that the relationship between quality of care and actual 
quality o f patient care remains uncertain, and is also likely to vary substantially across 
the different quality of care evaluations conducted here. Reductions in different inputs 
are likely to impact differentially on the actual quality of patient care, although both the 
direction and extent of these differences remain uncertain. While it thus probable that 
reduced quantity or quality o f structural inputs such as buildings and facilities will 
impact to a lesser extent on  quality of care than fewer nurses or medical staff, these 
relationships remain conjectural, and it is difficult to make firm judgements as to the 
relative impact of differential input reductions on overall quality o f patient care.
These complex relationships notwithstanding, these observations reiterate the 
importance of both contract design and monitoring in ensuring efficiency gains from 
contracted production. Where contractors operate on a for-profit basis, as is the case 
here, there will often be a tendency to reduce inputs so as to maximise profit margins. 
However, different reimbursement mechanisms will encourage this tendency to a greater 
or lesser extent, as will the absolute level o f  the contract price. Similarly, the freedom 
the contractor faces to manipulate input and output levels can also be restricted through 
both detailed specifications of the contract, and close monitoring o f contractor 
performance. These issues are discussed in more detail in the following section, as well 
as in Chapter 9.
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83 . The determinants of efficiency in contractor and directly 
managed public hospitals
In addition to comparing the relative efficiency o f contracted and directly managed 
public hospital production, this study aimed to assess the impact of various determinants 
o f efficiency in the two hospital groups. This section integrates the findings on 
efficiency with the analyses of the various postulated determinants of efficiency, 
e x a m in in g  both their individual and collective impact.
83.1. Contracts and the contracting process
As illustrated in Chapter 6, a number of specific features o f the three contracts 
contribute to the failure o f government to secure the potentially substantial efficiency 
gains that this study has suggested might be achieved by contracting out of hospital 
services. This was noted, firstly, in the serious inefficiencies in service delivery and 
organisation which emerged from some of the contract specifications relating to the 
contractor's service and staffing obligations. While it is not possible to quantify the 
extent o f these inefficiencies, and thus to assess their impact on the overall efficiency of 
the contractor hospitals, it is worth noting the view, expressed by some of the 
government officials, that these inefficiencies were so great as to undermine any other 
efficiency gains from contracted production.
Over and above the general problems of coordination and integration, these contractual 
arrangements also led to other more specific inefficiencies. The split between hospital 
services and the rest o f the health service, for example, was noted to create incentives for 
inefficient contractor behaviour, such as increasing the number o f OPD visits at the 
hospital (as opposed to in district PHC clinics), and for unnecessary referrals to higher 
level hospitals. Similarly, the dual employer situation at Shiluvana hospital prevented 
the contractor from managing the majority of fixed cost resources at the hospital, thus 
undermining its capacity to achieve maximum efficiency gains.
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The analysis o f the historical context of these contracts in Chapter 6 indicated that none 
o f these specific contractual arrangements were either essential or unavoidable, but 
rather that they had been introduced by either the government (e.g. the retention of 
medical staff in government employ), the contractor (limitation of service obligations to 
the hospital itself), or were the product of historical circumstance (the ‘dual employer’ 
situation at Shiluvana). This suggests that some or all of these contractual conditions 
could be altered in order to enhance contractual efficiency. Recommendations in this 
regard are discussed in Chapter 9.
A second set of efficiency problems were noted to be attributable to the fact that the 
current contracts are heavily biased in favour of the contractors in a number of 
dimensions. This was demonstrated, firstly, in the ability of the contractor to obtain high 
unit prices relative to underlying production costs, to secure its margins against cost 
increases through the inclusion of automatic price escalation clauses, and to translate the 
high unit prices into high total contract prices. When considered in combination, it is 
these specific factors, perhaps more than any others, which account for the ability of the 
contractor to capture its superior production efficiency in profit, thus undermining 
potential efficiency gains for the government.
The bias in the contracts towards the contractor was also demonstrated in the extent to 
which risk in the contracts was shifted away from the contractor and towards the 
government From an efficiency perspective, this maldistribution of risk is critical since 
it results in the contractor facing weak incentives for efficiency. If, for example, the 
contractor obtained a lower unit margin, and had no automatic price escalation clauses, 
it would be forced to pay more attention than it does to management o f costs. Similarly, 
i f  it faced shorter contract terms, the threat o f  competition would also encourage greater 
vigilance and cost efficiency, as would more detailed specifications o f input and output 
requirements.
The limited specifications o f the quality and quantity o f both inputs and outputs required 
from the contractor also created the space, at least in theory, for the contractor to exploit
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the contract, and to increase its profit margins by reducing input costs, even if this 
resulted in compromises on quality o f care. As noted above, this study did not produce 
hard evidence o f such exploitation by the contractor, but there is little doubt that some of 
the problems o f quality of care identified in this study are due to the tendency o f the 
contractor to cut production costs by reducing the numbers and quality o f  key inputs, 
such as nursing and medical staff, and hospital equipment. Poor specification o f the 
contract also aggravates the potential for exploitation by making it very difficult for the 
government to monitor contractor performance with any precision, since there are no 
measurable parameters or performance criteria to against which performance can be 
measured.
The negative efficiency effects o f these contractual problems were aggravated by two 
critical implementation issues: the generally poor monitoring o f contractor performance 
by government officials, as well as the absence of competitive bidding in the contracting 
process. As noted in Chapter 6, informal monitoring of contractor performance by 
government officials was generally regarded as satisfactory by both parties, but, despite 
this, it seems clear that several elements of contractual efficiency could have been 
improved by more formal and rigorous monitoring.
The absence o f competitive bidding in all three contracts (with the exception o f the 
initial award o f the Hewu contract) almost certainly allowed the contractor to obtain 
higher per diem rates than would have been the case in the face o f competition. 
Similarly, the use o f direct negotiation allowed the contractor to influence the contents 
o f the contracts to a much greater extent than would have been the case with a formal, 
competitive tendering process. This is illustrated by the fact that all three o f  the contracts 
were originally drafted by the contractor prior to the direct negotiations. In a formal 
competitive tender, the detailed tender specifications would have been drawn up by the 
government, and these would have formed the basis o f the subsequent contract.
In summary, this analysis indicates that several problems in the design o f  the contracts 
and in the contracting process contributed to the failure of the government to secure the 
potential efficiency gains from contracting out o f hospital services. More specifically,
several features o f the contract design have contributed to contracts which shift risk 
away from the contractor and towards the government, and which provide the contractor 
with opportunities to exploit the contract. These problems are attributable to, and are 
also aggravated by, serious flaws in the contracting process, including the absence of 
competition, and the very poor monitoring of contractor performance by the 
government
Problems o f this magnitude in the contractual environment raise important questions as 
to how they came about and why the government was unable to negotiate more efficient 
contracts. As discussed in Chapter 6, the fundamental explanation for this situation 
appears to be a deep imbalance in the power relations between the contractor and the 
government which resulted in the government functioning as a passive ‘taker’ of 
unfavourable contract terms and conditions, rather than as the party empowered to 
dictate such terms and conditions. This power imbalance is in turn attributable to 
substantial imbalances in the relative capacities of the two parties. On the government 
side, this study highlighted very poor understanding of the intricacies o f contract design 
and the contracting process, as well as of the relationship between these factors and 
contractual efficiency. Similarly, the government’s understanding o f the role of 
competition in ensuring efficient contracts appeared to be very limited, and the 
government demonstrated very limited capacity to negotiate favourable contracts, as 
well as to monitor contractor compliance. Conversely, this study suggests that the 
contractor has a very clear understanding of its own risk profile, of the relationships 
between contract design and risk, as well as strong contract negotiation capacity. In this 
situation, it is not surprising that the contracts which emerged from a direct negotiation 
process so strongly favoured the contractor, with all the consequences outlined here.
S J i .  The impact o f hospital ownership and management structures and systems 
on efficiency
The analysis of hospital ownership and motivations, and o f management structures and 
systems, reported in Chapter 7, provided several explanations for the superior
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production efficiency of the contractor hospitals. In the contractor company and within 
the hospitals themselves, the emphasis on efficiency was pervasive, and can be traced 
back to  the impact o f the for-profit ownership structure on the perceptions and 
motivations of corporate officials and hospital managers. Corporate officials perceived 
themselves as motivated primarily by the need to ensure profitability and delivery o f 
high quality and cost effective care. While these motivations were not consistently 
communicated to the hospital managers, this group nevertheless perceived themselves as 
directly accountable to their superiors, and as responsible for ensuring control of costs 
and good quality of care. These hospital managers also demonstrated a clear 
understanding o f the key determinants o f hospital cost, and of the extent and limits of 
their capacities to influence such costs.
These clearly articulated motivations of ensuring profitability and hence low costs, were 
reflected in (and in part attributable to) the corporate structure and capabilities of the 
contractor company, and in the corporate-hospital interface at all three hospitals. The 
corporate structure, for example, was shown to be small, to function very efficiently, to 
have highly developed capabilities in critical support functions, and to focus heavily on 
efficient management o f staff resources. This intense level of corporate support to the 
hospitals was accompanied by close and systematic scrutiny o f  hospital performance. 
Despite the strong central support and monitoring of hospital performance, hospital 
managers were also noted to be given fairly substantial autonomy over several key areas 
o f managerial decision making, although within fairly tight constraints.
In summary, officials o f the contractor company appeared to be highly motivated to 
maximise production efficiency, due to the combination o f the well articulated corporate 
goal o f  maximising profit, and the corporate management structures and systems which 
have been designed to give effect to this goal. The study also identified some instances, 
however, when the emphasis on cost containment in these hospitals appeared to be taken 
too far, with detrimental effects on efficiency. This was seen, for example, in the poor 
management information infrastructure available at both corporate and hospital levels, 
and in  the tendency to compromise quality of care through provision o f sub-optimal 
quantities and/or quality o f key hospital inputs. The potential interaction between these
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pressures and those o f the contractual environment should also be noted here. Had the 
contracts placed more pressure on the contractor, for example through a lower contract 
price, it is arguable that they would have faced further pressures to increase production 
efficiency, and that this might have further aggravated the tendency to compromise 
quality o f  care.
By contrast with the situation in the contractor company, the motivations, management 
structures and systems in the public sector head offices and hospitals were shown to 
mitigate strongly against efficient production at every level. Public ownership was 
shown to result in diffuse and vague notions of accountability, responsibility and 
objectives at all levels. Reflecting this, the corporate structure and head office-hospital 
relationships were shown to reflect a range of bureaucratic imperatives, rather than those 
o f efficient production of hospital services. Perhaps most importantly, the public sector 
management structures and systems were characterised by a high degree of 
centralisation, with hospital managers enjoying virtually no autonomy over most key 
management functions, thus ensuring that even motivated and competent hospital 
managers were unable to compensate for the extremely weak central support provided to 
them.
This analysis thus suggests two relevant conclusions. The first concerns the close 
linkage between ownership structure and motivations on the one hand, and management 
structures and systems on the other, with the former appearing to strongly influence the 
latter in the case o f the contractor company, while in the public sector, the absence of 
any clearly defined goals and motivations appears to have resulted in management 
structures and systems which respond to bureaucratic imperatives, rather to any defined 
hospital performance requirements. The second conclusion concerns the sharp contrast, 
in terms o f  motivations, systems and structures, between the contractor company and the 
public sector. As has been shown here, these factors drive in almost opposite directions 
within the two organisations, strongly promoting efficiency in the contractor hospitals, 
while actively hindering it in the public hospitals.
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8 J J . The impact of the ‘trading relationship’ and competition on efficiency
Whereas the differential impact o f ownership and the associated management structures 
and systems on hospital efficiency was clear-cut, the analysis o f  the impact of the 
‘trading relationship’ between public purchasers and contracted providers suggests 
somewhat more subtle linkages with hospital efficiency.
On the one hand, the interview data did provide some evidence that, in combination 
with the profit motive, the existence o f a contractual or ‘trading relationship’ did 
encourage efficient contractor behaviour. This was seen, for example, in the fact that the 
contractor faces a defined contract price, as well as government scrutiny of price 
increases, and in order to  meet profit objectives, must ensure that its costs fall below 
these prices by some defined margin. In response to this environment, the production 
process within the contractor hospitals is transparent to the company’s own managers, 
who were clearly aware o f the determinants of costs, and of input/output relationships, 
and who apply this information to manage costs wherever possible.
On the other hand, there are several reasons to believe that the impact o f the ‘trading 
relationship’ on hospital efficiency under the current contracts is far weaker than it 
might otherwise be, and that this contributes to the failure of the government to realise 
the potential efficiency gains from contracting out. This study has indicated that the 
government functions as a relatively crude and unsophisticated purchaser of services, 
with purchasing decisions based on crude measures o f need, rather than on any measures 
o f cost effectiveness, and with evidence o f poor negotiation, specification and 
monitoring o f contracts. As a result, production in the contractor hospitals remains 
completely opaque to the purchaser, and the contractor faces relatively weak pressure 
from the purchaser’s side to behave efficiently.
Several o f the contractor’s behaviour patterns make sense as responses to this 
contractual environment. As indicated above, the contractor is motivated to reduce costs 
and hence to maximise margins within the ruling contract price. The tendency to reduce 
costs through reduction in the quantity and/or quality of inputs is encouraged by the lack
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of specification in the contract, as well as by the lack of systematic monitoring of 
contractor performance, and is subject only to the contractor’s own quality constraints.
This analysis therefore suggests that the simple existence of an arms-length ‘trading 
relationship’ certainly has some positive effects on production efficiency in the 
contractor hospitals, at least in contrast with the directly managed public hospitals 
studied here. However, it is also clear that the potential efficiency gains to the 
government from this form o f relationship are not being realised, primarily due to the 
lack of transparency within the contractual relationship, and that this is in turn due to the 
current inability of the government to act as a sophisticated and informed purchaser.
As with the ‘trading relationship’, this study has demonstrated that competition has far 
less of a positive impact on hospital efficiency than it might potentially have. At the 
time o f the study, public sector hospitals faced no actual or potential competition, and 
this was arguably an important contributor to the inefficiency of these hospitals. Perhaps 
more importantly, the absence of effective competition from the contracting process 
contributed to the unfavourable contract terms discussed in Chapter 6.
The impact of competition on the contractor’s perceptions and consequent behaviours 
appears to be more mixed. On the one hand, its position as an effective monopoly 
supplier over several decades is likely to have created some degree o f complacency, and 
to have undermined its incentives for efficient production. Where government is an 
unsophisticated purchaser, as was the case here, actual or potential competition would 
be expected to constrain the ability o f the contractor to reduce costs at the expense of 
quality, since perceptions o f low quality in its hospitals would undermine its competitive 
position. Conversely, the absence of competition removed this additional constraint on 
the contractor, making it easier to exploit the contract. The study also however elicited 
evidence that contractor officials are increasingly taking the threat of competition 
seriously, particularly in the light of the threat of increased international competition, 
and o f the growing competitiveness and rivalry within the private hospital market in 
South Africa.
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This study has therefore provided suggestive evidence that competition, whether actual 
or potential, is important in encouraging production efficiency, as well as in ensuring 
that government is able to secure overall efficiency gains from contracting out. 
However, the study design used here does not allow firm conclusions as to the relative 
importance o f  actual versus potential competition, nor as to the relative importance of 
competition and the other determinants o f  efficiency. For example, it is not possible to 
judge definitively whether or not competition is a necessary condition for securing 
efficiency gains from contracting out, or whether it would simply bolster the effects of a 
well designed contract and contracting process. It is probable that the extent to which 
competition itself is a necessary condition for the achievement of efficiency gains is 
contingent on other factors in the contractual environment, such as the capacity of the 
government to act as a sophisticated purchaser. Where government has this capacity, 
competition is probably not a strictly necessary condition for achieving efficiency gains. 
Where government does not have this capacity, as was the case here, competition has 
the capacity to enhance the effects of a well designed contract, specifically by ensuring a 
reasonable price, and by constraining the ability of the contractor to exploit the contract. 
In these conditions, competition is thus more likely to be a necessary condition for 
achieving efficiency gains from contracting out.
8J.4. The determinants of efficiency: an integrated overview
This study has demonstrated clear linkages between the various determinants of 
efficiency studied here and production efficiency in the study hospitals. Firstly, there is 
strongly suggestive evidence that the relatively inefficient production patterns observed 
in the public hospitals can be explained by the lack o f clearly articulated organisational 
goals and motivations, which may itself be attributable to public ownership, and to the 
inefficient management structures and systems in place at all levels. By contrast, the for- 
profit ownership of the contractor company led to clearly articulated efficiency goals 
throughout the organisation, as well as to  management structures and systems geared 
towards efficient production. The existence o f a ‘trading relationship’ was also argued to 
encourage efficiency in the contractor hospitals to some extent, mainly through the
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linkage o f  hospital outputs to a defined contract price, although the extent of this was 
argued to be limited by the governments lack of capacity to function as a sophisticated 
purchaser. This situation was again in contrast to that in the public hospitals, in which 
the absence of any linkage between costs and outputs further constrained efficient 
production.
The study also demonstrated that some of these factors acted to constrain production 
efficiency, despite their potential to enhance it. The most important manifestation of this 
was the tendency o f the contractor to reduce costs to the point where aspects of quality 
o f care were compromised, by reducing the quantity and/or quality of inputs. While a 
tendency towards this behaviour would be expected from a profit-maximising 
contractor, this behaviour should in theory be constrained by the combined effects of a 
well designed contract and contracting process, transparency in the ‘trading 
relationship', and competition. However, most o f these circumstances did not apply in 
the contracts studied here, resulting in the contractor facing weaker incentives for 
efficiency than it ought to have, as well as in it having opportunities for exploitation of 
the contract. This study also demonstrated that the specification of contract obligations 
in all three contracts undermined production efficiency by separating the provision of 
hospital services from those of the district PHC services, thus imposing substantial 
coordination costs, and creating perverse referral and treatment incentives.
In addition to considerations of production efficiency, this study also examined the links 
between these various factors and the failure of government to secure the demonstrated 
potential efficiency gains from contracting out o f hospital services. Perhaps the key 
issue in this context was the high total contract price paid by the government in all three 
contracts; again this was shown to be attributable to key failings in the contracting 
process.
The impact of total contract price on overall contractual efficiency is partly contingent 
on the cost/quality trade-off discussed here, since high total contract prices could still be 
compatible with overall efficiency gains from contracting out, provided that quality of 
care was sufficiently good to justify the margin between total contract cost and public
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sector production costs. As was shown, however, quality o f care in the contractor 
hospitals was not sufficiently superior to that in the public hospitals to account for the 
margin between total contract cost and public sector production costs.
These observations therefore indicate that contracting out, the consequent ‘transparency 
o f trading’ and competition have the potential to enhance production efficiency within 
hospitals, and also to ensure that the government captures a sufficient proportion of 
these increased production efficiencies, thus ensuring overall efficiency gains from 
contracting out. This study has shown, however, that the combination o f the current 
contracting process, the design o f the contracts, and the lack of actual and/or potential 
competition for the contracts, prevented the government authorities from achieving 
these potential efficiency gains. This suggests that significant changes to these various 
elements o f the contracting process are required to ensure efficiency gains from 
contracting out. These are discussed in Chapter 9.
8.4. Efficiency in the private hospital group
This section briefly reviews the efficiency of the private hospitals studied here, 
focussing specifically on differences between the private hospitals and the other two 
groups, and on the determinants of these differences. A  fuller discussion o f the 
performance o f the private hospital group is provided in Appendix 24. As discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 7, the private hospitals differ substantially from the other two groups in 
terms o f the characteristics o f their user populations, the level of financial resources 
available, the economic incentives faced by managers and medical staff, and the patterns 
o f care provided. As a result, direct comparisons of relative efficiency between the 
private and the other groups are unlikely to provide meaningful results. Instead, it would 
seem more useful to analyse the efficiency of the private hospitals in their own terms, 
and to draw conclusions from those observations which might be applied to the other 
two groups.
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In this perspective, the study provided substantial evidence o f a highly efficient 
production pattern in the private hospitals. This was seen, firstly, in the very high 
throughput and capacity utilisation, in the hospitals as a whole, as well as in specific 
functional areas such as the operating theatres; secondly, in the consistently high 
standards o f  quality of care observed in these hospitals across almost all o f the 
evaluations conducted; and thirdly, in the fact that the private hospitals emerged as more 
efficient in production cost terms in most elements of the tracer cost analysis and the 
DEA, as well in some components o f the general cost analysis, despite the use of much 
more expensive inputs. The maintenance of relatively low costs and high standards of 
quality in the face of expensive resource usage, very high capacity utilisation and rapid 
turnover implies highly efficient allocation, coordination and management o f  all 
production resources. Direct observations in these hospitals provided confirmatory 
evidence of the overall efficiency o f resource allocation and management.
It is crucial to distinguish here between hospital level production efficiency as discussed 
in this chapter, and a broader concept o f social efficiency, which takes into account the 
societal implications of resource allocation decisions by health sector institutions. On 
th is view, the private hospitals could be argued to be highly inefficient, since there is 
evidence from this and other studies that patients are admitted unnecessarily to these 
hospitals, that they frequently provide unnecessary services, and that they use excessive 
quantities o f  often very expensive inputs in the production process (Broomberg et al. 
1992, Price and Broomberg 1990). From a social perspective, these hospitals can thus be 
seen as contributing to a misallocation o f resources, which is problematic in a context of 
constrained resources, as occurs in South Africa at present.
The analysis o f ownership structures, as well as management structures and systems in 
these hospitals, provides convincing explanations for these various observations. As 
noted in Chapter 7, managers at both corporate and hospital level were strongly 
motivated by the objective o f profit maximisation, and were also clearly aware o f  the 
operational implications o f this primary objective. This was illustrated by the fact that 
hospital managers were explicitly motivated to maximise revenues, by minimising costs 
where this would increase margins, and by encouraging the use o f expensive resources
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where their costs could be passed on with a mark-up, thus increasing revenues. 
Importantly, corporate and hospital managers in the private hospitals were given both 
the autonomy and the support required to act effectively on these motivations. 
Managerial efficiency was also enhanced by the use of small and flexible management 
teams at the hospital and corporate levels, and by short and responsive lines of 
communication between the two levels. Overall, therefore, these hospitals demonstrated 
explicit and close connections between private for-profit ownership, the motivations of 
managers, and management structures and systems.
A comparison between these patterns and those observed in the contractor and public 
hospitals raises a number of interesting questions. As described above, corporate 
managers in the contractor company seem similarly motivated to maximise profits and 
returns to shareholders, and management structures and systems are similarly set up to 
ensure maximum production efficiency. However, as noted in Chapter 7, these 
motivations are less well communicated to hospital level managers than in the private 
hospitals, and hospital managers in the contractor hospitals appeared somewhat less 
aware o f the detailed connections between operational efficiency and company 
performance, and are also somewhat less empowered than their private sector 
counterparts. Similarly, the information systems and monitoring of hospital performance 
by the corporate level was less sophisticated in the contractor than in the private 
hospitals, presumably because the contractor company did not regard investment in a 
sophisticated MIS as economically justifiable.
While these differences between the contractor and private hospitals are almost 
irrelevant when these two groups are compared with the public sector hospitals, it is 
nevertheless interesting to explore the reasons for these differences, which must, by 
definition, go beyond the for-profit motivation which both groups have in common. One 
important explanation for these differences is that the two groups differ significantly in 
terms of the complexity o f production and revenue generation. As described above, the 
private hospitals have to provide a broad range of services within a complex, fee-for- 
service billing environment, and to engage in complicated relationships with their 
associated medical staff. By contrast, the contractor hospitals deliver a smaller, simpler
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range o f services, are paid on a fixed per diem rate, and have limited influence on 
throughput. These differences may also, however, be attributable to some elements of a 
‘public sector culture’ within the contractor hospitals, despite the fact that the company 
is privately owned and operates for-profit. This would be explained by the fact that the 
contractor hospitals operate within a public sector context, respond to public sector 
requirements, and that several of the key senior corporate managers had been drawn 
from the public sector.
Perhaps more importantly in the context of this study, these observations o f managerial 
motivations and efficiency in the private hospitals raise questions about their 
applicability within the public sector. More specifically, they raise the question of the 
extent to which the profit motive is itself a necessary condition for achieving superior 
managerial and hence hospital efficiency, or whether efficiency gains might be achieved 
through the use of substantial managerial autonomy and the other managerial structures 
and systems seen in the private hospitals, in the absence of the profit-motive.
The study design used here, which compared two for-profit companies with the public 
sector, does not allow firm conclusions on this question, which would have been more 
easily answered by comparing private for-profit, private not-for-profit and public 
hospitals. Some o f the data from this study do however give some indications of 
possible answers to this question. In both for-profit companies, there appears to have 
been a clear link between profit maximisation objectives, the management structures and 
systems in place, and managerial behaviour, suggesting that for-profit ownership is an 
important, if  not a necessary, condition for production efficiency. This conclusion is 
strengthened by the almost extreme opposite situation which prevails in the public 
sector, where the absence of a profit-motive was correlated with highly inefficient 
structures and systems, and by correspondingly inefficient managerial behaviour.
On the other hand, there was also suggestive evidence that much of the improved 
managerial efficiency observed in the private and contractor hospitals was attributable to 
the management structures and systems themselves, including such measures as 
managerial autonomy, strong and responsive support horn the corporate level, and
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effective methods o f human resource utilisation. This raises the question of whether 
such structures and systems could emerge or be implemented in the absence of for-profit 
ownership, and what incentive structures would be required to ensure that this did occur. 
While this study cannot provide clear answers to these important questions, it is 
arguable that at least some of these structures and systems could be implemented within 
hospital systems, regardless of ownership, and that they could improve efficiency to 
some extent This would constitute an argument for internal public sector managerial 
reform, for example through decentralisation of hospital management and/or the 
creation o f fully autonomous hospital organisations which remain under public 
ownership, but which operate under ‘performance contracts' as discussed in Chapter 2. 
In these situations, incentives unrelated to profitability would be required to ensure the 
emergence of appropriate structures, systems and efficient managerial behaviour.
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS, POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH PRIORITIES
9.1 Conclusions
This study has assessed the relative efficiency o f contracted out versus directly managed 
public hospital services under three specific contracts, and has provided some empirical 
evidence on which to base policy decisions regarding the use of private providers in the 
provision o f publicly funded hospital services. A further objective was to assess the 
impact of a series of determinants on the efficiency of contracted out hospital services, 
thus allowing conclusions as to the necessary conditions for ensuring efficiency gains 
from contracting out, or other forms o f  selective contracting, if indeed such efficiency 
gains are possible. This section examines the key conclusions o f the study in relation to 
these objectives, while the policy implications o f these conclusions, and suggestions for 
further research, are examined in some detail in the subsequent sections. As discussed 
further in Section 9.3 below, the generalisability of the conclusions of this study are 
somewhat constrained by the small samples o f public and private hospitals studied here, 
since, unlike the contractor hospitals, they cannot be taken to be fully representative o f 
the populations from which they were drawn. As discussed in Chapter 3, the public 
hospitals are in fact broadly representative o f rural district hospitals in South Africa, 
although it is conceded that they may differ, in important respects, from the total 
population o f public hospitals.
One o f the fundamental conclusions o f  this study is that the contractor hospitals were 
able to produce most hospital services more efficiently than their public sector 
counterparts. This was illustrated by the substantially lower unit production costs for 
most outputs in the contractor hospitals, and by the lack o f any systematic or consistent 
differences in quality of care between the two groups. Importantly, the lower contractor 
production costs were shown to occur in spite of lower capacity utilisation in these 
hospitals, suggesting that with higher throughput and capacity utilisation, the efficiency 
differential between the contractors and the public hospitals could have been even
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greater than that observed here. This conclusion is important since it demonstrates the 
potential for efficiency gains from contracting out of hospital services under optimal 
circumstances.
The superior production efficiency in the contractor hospitals was shown to be 
attributable to more effective management structures and systems in these hospitals. 
These were shown to motivate, support and empower local managers to achieve much 
greater efficiency in the allocation and utilisation of human resources and other inputs 
than was found in the public hospitals. The study also provided suggestive evidence o f  a 
close linkage between the for-profit ownership structure of the contractor hospitals, and 
these more effective management structures and systems. This was in sharp contrast 
with the public sector, in which the absence of any clearly defined goals and motivations 
appears to have resulted in inefficient and disorganised management structures and 
systems which created severe inefficiencies at hospital level. It should be noted, 
however, that the study was not able to draw strong conclusions on the extent to which a 
for-profit ownership structure is itself a strictly causal and/or necessary condition for 
efficiency o f  hospital management.
The existence of a ‘trading relationship’ between the contractor and the government was 
also shown to contribute, to a limited extent, to the greater production efficiency in the 
contractor hospitals. This was suggested by the clear awareness, on the part o f the 
contractor managers, o f the influences of external factors (such as the contract price), 
and factors under their own influence (such as outputs and costs), on hospital and 
company revenues and profit margins. By contrast, public hospital managers had access 
to extremely limited and crade information on costs, outputs or revenues, and their 
behaviour was not influenced in any way by these data. The impact o f the ‘trading 
relationship’ on the efficiency o f the contractor hospitals was however also shown to be 
substantially constrained by the inability o f the government authorities to act as 
informed and sophisticated purchasers of hospital services.
The second, and most important conclusion o f this study is that, despite the superior 
production efficiency o f the contractor hospitals, government purchasers failed to realise
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consistent efficiency gains from contracting out. Instead, the data suggest that under 
current arrangements, contracting out may in fact be less efficient than directly managed 
public provision, when costs, quality of care and other dimensions o f service efficiency 
are considered together. Looked at another way, this study suggests that the contractors 
are currently able to capture the majority o f their superior production efficiencies in the 
form of profit, thus undermining the potential efficiency gains available to government.
This pattern is illustrated by the study’s conclusions regarding both costs and quality of 
care. In terms of relative costs, this study showed that contracting out is more costly than 
public provision where in-patient admissions and OPD visits are considered the relevant 
outputs from the government’s perspective. In terms of quality of care, the study failed 
to demonstrate any consistent differences between the two groups, eliminating superior 
quality as an explanation for the higher total contract costs per unit output in the 
contractor relative to the public hospitals. Perhaps more importantly, the study also 
showed a tendency on the part of the contractor to reduce the quality and or the quantity 
o f key inputs, at times to the point of compromising quality o f care. The existing 
contractual arrangements were also shown to result in a  number of service related 
inefficiencies, including the separation of hospital and district PHC services, and the 
problems emerging from two employers within the contracted out hospitals. These 
problems were shown to lead to often serious coordination and morale problems, which 
further undermined the overall efficiency o f the contracting arrangements.
The study demonstrated a number of interlinked factors which explain the disturbing 
conclusion that contracting out led to overall efficiency losses in spite o f superior 
production efficiency in the contractor hospitals. The most important o f these is the poor 
structure and design o f the current contracts, which were shown to contribute directly to 
the high total contract cost faced by the government, to the problems o f service delivery 
discussed above, as well as to undermine efficiency incentives for the contractor by 
shifting the risk in the contract substantially towards the government. These problems 
were aggravated by poor monitoring of contractor performance, and by the inefficient 
allocation and management of government staff and other resources used in the 
contractor hospitals.
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Together, these observations suggest that perhaps the most critical explanation for the 
lack o f efficiency gains in these contracts was the imbalance between the government 
and the contractor in relation to contracting skills. More specifically, the government 
authorities demonstrated severe lack o f capacity to design, negotiate, maintain and 
monitor efficient contracts, while the contractor demonstrated substantial skill in 
designing and negotiating contracts favourable to itself. While this imbalance might 
alone be sufficient to undermine efficiency gains from contracting out, this study also 
showed that problems in the contracting process, and specifically lack of competition, 
further aggravated the inefficiency o f the contracts, in this case by allowing the 
contractor to obtain a higher contract price than might otherwise have been possible, and 
by allowing it substantial influence over the structure and terms o f the contract. It is also 
worth noting that poor government capacity itself influenced the extent of competition 
for the contracts, since the government’s poor understanding o f the dynamics of the 
private health care market led it to underestimate the extent of actual or potential 
competition, and hence to overestimate the extent of its dependence on the incumbent 
contractor.
This study has also provided substantial detail on the specific contractual problems 
which emerged from this imbalance o f capacity and power between the government 
authorities and the contractor. One o f the key problems in the contracts was shown to be 
the high total contract costs, due to a combination of the high per diem rate secured by 
the contractor, and the high total patient days billed under the contracts, this latter 
parameter itself due to the long LOS, as well as to the minimum occupancy clause in 
tw o of the contracts. Total contract cost was also shown to be inflated by the 
inappropriately high costs of government resources used at the contractor hospitals.
Another critical problem in contract design was the lack o f incentives for contractor 
efficiency, due to an inappropriate shift of contractual risk towards the government. 
Contract terms contributing to this were the minimal specification of inputs and outputs 
in  the contract, the long contract terms, the high per diem rates (guaranteeing a 
substantial margin for the contractor), automatic price adjustment clauses (reducing
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incentives to hold costs down over time), and the per diem reimbursement method 
(which eliminated incentives to reduce LOS). It should be noted, though, that contracts 
which shifted a greater share to the risk to the contractor might also have required the 
government to pay a higher price. More efficient contracts would thus need to  address 
all o f these individual problems o f contract design, and approaches to this are discussed 
further below.
These observations lead to the third conclusion o f this study, namely that contracting out 
o f  hospital services has the potential to generate substantial efficiency gains relative to 
direct public provision, provided that suitable contractual conditions are in place. While 
this study has provided fairly strong suggestive evidence to support this conclusion, it 
relies on two further assumptions which this study did not explicitly test. The first of 
these is that the ‘surplus’ or savings generated by contracting out of hospital services 
will be sufficiently large to allow the government to achieve lower total costs (for 
similar quality) than those o f direct public production, while still allowing contractors to 
generate sufficient profits to attract adequate bidders for contracts. The large contractor 
profit margins demonstrated in this study do suggest that contract prices and total 
contract cost could be reduced to the point where genuine efficiency gains would result, 
without driving profit margins so low as to deter bidders from competing for contracts.
The second assumption is that government authorities, in South Africa or in similar 
countries, could create and maintain adequate capacity to design, let, negotiate and 
monitor contracts which maximise contractual efficiency. While this study showed 
current government capacity in these areas to be very poor, and did not explicitly 
examine the prospects o f improving it, it is likely that strong government commitment 
on these issues would result in either the development and/or the outside procurement of 
such capacity in the foreseeable future. This specific issue is discussed further below.
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9.2 Policy implications
The findings of this study have several implications for health policy makers in middle 
and low income countries, with regard to the specific issue of selective contracting of 
clinical services161, as well as to the organisation o f  publicly managed health services. 
These two sets of implications are discussed in some detail below.
9.2.1. Implications for policy on selective contracting of clinical services
There are several reasons why government authorities in South Africa, or in other 
middle or low income countries might consider selective contracting o f hospital 
services, or of other clinical services. These include the potential for efficiency gains, 
and the fact that contractors may possess skills, capacity or resources not available to the 
government, but which are regarded as essential to the fulfillment of health policy 
objectives. The government may also wish to free up its own administrative resources in 
order to focus them on  its major priorities, and to use contractors to carry out non­
priority functions. Under circumstances of severe resource constraints, as occur in the 
health sectors of South Africa and numerous other middle and low income countries, 
more than one of these reasons for selective contracting will often co-exist.
While the potential efficiency gains from selective contracting may therefore be fairly 
broadly defined, and need not necessarily require cost savings in cash terms, this study 
has nevertheless shown that a number o f conditions must be in place in order to ensure 
that the desired efficiency gains are achieved, and to avoid efficiency losses through 
exploitation by contractors. In the following paragraphs, each o f  these broad sets of 
conditions is reviewed with specific reference to the problems in attaining such 
conditions in a middle or lower income country context, and to possible solutions to 
these problems. Thereafter, consideration is given to the broader question of which
161 While icvend of the policy implications o f  this study apply equally well to contracting out o f  clinical and non- 
dinical services, this discussion confines itself to questions relating specifically to  the contracting out o f clinical 
services.
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minimum set o f these conditions is essential before selective contracting of clinical 
services can be recommended as an appropriate policy in the health sector.
9.2.1.1. Design and monitoring o f efficient contracts
Governments face a number o f choices in relation to specific form of selective 
contracting available to them. As discussed in Chapter 2, these choices relate to the 
range of bidders allowed to bid for contracts (e.g. internal contracting, competitive 
tendering and contracting out to either for-profit or not-for-profit providers), and to the 
ownership o f  assets (e.g. contracting out to private providers who own the hospitals, or 
m a n a g e m e n t  contracts for publicly owned facilities, or ‘build, operate and transfer’ 
contracts). Chapter 2 also highlighted the growing importance o f long term, trust based 
contractual relations in the health sector as distinct from short term, competitive, ‘spot 
contracts’. The appropriate choice o f contractual form in any situation will thus depend 
on a number o f factors, including the government’s needs and policy objectives, the 
supply o f potential contractors in the public and private sectors, and the broader social 
and political environment.
Whichever form of contracting is applied, it will be essential to design efficient 
contracts in order to avoid all o f the shortcomings identified in the three contracts 
analysed in this study. Firstly, governments should seek to minimise total contract cost 
by obtaining the lowest feasible contract price (while not shifting all risk to the 
contractor, and thus risking exploitation of the contract), and by ensuring that the total 
number o f  outputs paid for under the contract corresponds to the government’s needs, 
and cannot be artificially inflated by the contractor. Several mechanisms can be used to 
achieve these specific objectives: the output quantities can be specified within the 
contract, with some margin on either side to allow for variations in demand; alternatives 
to per diem reimbursement methods could be used in order to eliminate incentives for 
the contractor to increase outputs unnecessarily; and contractor performance can be 
carefully monitored to ensure compliance with these requirements. In addition, contracts 
should exclude minimum occupancy clauses or other similar provisions which force the
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government to pay for services which are not actually provided, although once again, 
the impact of these modifications on the distribution of the risk in the contract must be 
taken into account.
In addition to controlling total contract costs, efficient contracts will need to ensure that 
the distribution o f risk between the parties is such that contractors face sufficient risk to 
encourage efficient performance, while also ensuring that risk to the contractors is not so 
onerous as to deter them from bidding for the contract. In addition, the contract should 
be designed so as to limit opportunities for the contractor to exploit the contract for its 
own ends. To these ends, contracts should, if possible, exclude automatic price 
adjustment clauses, instead fixing prices for the duration of the contract, with some 
provision allowing interim adjustments only under specific circumstances. Contracts 
should also specify, in some detail, the required quantity and quality of both inputs and 
outputs, as well as performance indicators by which the government can monitor 
contractor performance. Contract terms should also be of more reasonable length than 
was the case here, and should definitely not be so long as to remove all threat of 
competition from the contract. The reimbursement method could also be shifted from a 
per diem to a budget or per case based system, in which the contractor bears more risk 
than under current arrangements.
The contract specifications should ensure the optimal allocation of roles between the 
government and the contractor. More specifically, contracts should probably cover both 
hospital and district PHC services, rather than only one of these, and the current dual 
employer situation should probably be avoided, allowing contractors to meet their 
obligations using an integrated team under their control. To the extent that the 
government does allocate staff or other resources to contracted out hospitals, this should 
also be done with careful attention to efficiency considerations.
In addition to the design and negotiation of efficient contracts, this study has also 
demonstrated that government capacity to monitor contractor performance is integral to 
the achievement of efficiency gains. Such monitoring would need to focus on basic 
utilisation parameters such as LOS and turnover rates to ensure compliance with output
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requirements, as well as on contractor performance relative to specified performance 
indicators. The ability of government to act as a sophisticated purchaser o f health 
services would also stimulate greater efficiency on the part of the contractor through a 
stronger impact o f ‘transparency o f trading’. Given the complexity of hospital service 
production, detailed monitoring of contractor performance could potentially be very 
complex and costly. Contract design should therefore focus on the inclusion o f easily 
measurable input, output and performance indicators. Similarly, the overall monitoring 
process should be designed so as to balance the costs and benefits of this component of 
the contracting process.
9.2.1.2. Government capacity to manage the contracting process
This study has clearly demonstrated that adequate government capacity to manage all 
aspects o f  the contracting process is a fundamental requirement for the achievement of 
efficiency gains from contracting out or other forms of selective contracting, and that at 
a minimum, government must be able to match the skills and experience o f private 
sector contractors in contract design and negotiation. Such capacity would include 
having the necessary data and skills to make the appropriate decision to contract out, to 
design and negotiate efficient contracts, to design and execute often complex 
competitive tendering processes, and to monitor contractor performance. More 
specifically, the government would need to understand and specify its own needs in 
some detail, and be able to integrate contracted with directly managed services. It would 
also need to understand the structure o f production costs in its own hospitals, as well as 
in those o f potential contractors, and the potential quality and quantity problems 
involved in contracts o f this kind, so as to specify contracts which reduce these risks. It 
would also need to have a detailed grasp of the competitive dynamics in the contracting 
market, as well as of the factors which affect risk and reward for potential contractors. 
In addition to these content based skills, the government will also require strong general 
negotiation and legal skills.
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This study has also shown that the two South African government authorities studied 
here clearly lacked almost all of these capacities, and this problem is almost certainly 
generalisable to the most of the remaining government authorities in South Africa, as 
well as in many other middle and low income countries. In this situation, there is a 
serious risk that selective contracting will fail to realise efficiency gains, and may even 
result in inefficiencies, due to inappropriate decisions to contract out, or poor contract 
design and monitoring, resulting in poor contractor performance, or even frank 
exploitation of the contract by for-profit contractors.
While adequate government capacity is therefore an essential prerequisite for efficient 
contracting, governments or government departments lacking this capacity could utilise 
a number of different mechanisms for accessing and developing this capacity. One 
approach would be for government to develop sophisticated internal expertise in 
contracting and procurement at central level. This model is currently applied in South 
Africa, where provincial administrations and the central government each have 
centralised procurement authorities (Tender Boards), which serve line function 
departments. However, as currently organised, this model fails to provide line function 
departments with the required skills or support, and instead functions as an extremely 
rigid and inefficient bureaucracy, hindering rather than assisting the contracting process. 
The South African experience highlights an important risk o f this model, namely that 
the very problems of government inefficiency which a government may be attempting to 
address through contracting, may interfere with the efficiency of the contracting process 
itself. This is obviously not a necessary consequence of such a model, and could be 
avoided through careful allocation of the roles and skills between the central authority 
and other departments.
In addition to bureaucratic and other problems with this model, some governments may 
even lack the capacity to develop the required expertise at central level. In these 
circumstances, governments may look to outside sources for procurement expertise. 
Such sources could include international agencies, or private sector organisations, from 
within or without the country. The role of such organisations may be limited to specific 
elements of the contracting process, for example, design of the contract and
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management of the tendering process, or may be more extensive, including long term 
monitoring of contractor performance. This model is commonly applied in large scale 
infrastructure development projects in middle and lower income developing countries 
(Ferreira and Khatami 1996).
Each o f  these models could be regarded as permanent, or as an interim measure while 
permanent capacity is developed, with this decision being strongly influenced by local 
circumstances, such as the likely success o f capacity development efforts. However, 
factors such as economies of scale and the need to eliminate corruption lend support to 
the development of permanent capacity at the central level.
9.2.1.3. Competition
This study has shown that some element o f competition between contractors, whether 
actual or potential, is an important factor in ensuring efficiency gains from selective 
contracting. Actual competition for contracts substantially strengthens the bargaining 
power o f government in the contracting process, particularly by contrast with direct 
negotiation with a monopoly supplier, as was the case in the contracts studied here. This 
increased bargaining power allows the government much greater influence over the 
terms and conditions o f the contract, including contract price, which will also be driven 
lower by the competitive process itself than would be the case in a direct negotiation.
Where no actual competitor exists at the time of awarding the contract, the threat of 
potential competition for the next contract round is also likely to stimulate greater 
efficiency and compliance with the contract on the part of the contractor, who will need 
to demonstrate value to the government in order to ward off the threat of losing the 
contract at the next round. The duration o f the contract also plays an important role in 
the effects of competition on contractual efficiency. Where the contract term is long, as 
was the case in this study, the threat o f future competition is weak, and will have 
minimal impact on contractor performance, until close to the expiry date of the contract.
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Where the contract term is short, however, competition will have a much greater impact 
on contractor performance.
It is important to note, as discussed above, that this study did not draw firm conclusions 
as to the relative importance of actual versus potential competition, nor was it able to 
judge definitively whether or not competition is a necessary condition for securing 
efficiency gains from contracting out, or whether it would simply bolster the effects o f a 
well designed contract and contracting process. The study has suggested, though, that 
where government functions as a sophisticated buyer, competition is probably no t a 
strictly necessary condition for achieving efficiency gains, but that where government 
lacks this capacity, competition is a more important factor in achieving such efficiency 
gains.
In South Africa, the historical pattern of contracting out of hospital services has led to a 
situation in which a single contractor currently dominates the contracting market in 
respect o f hospital services. However, there is substantial potential competition fo r this 
contractor from several other local organisations which currently own and/or manage 
private hospitals, as well as from some international hospital management companies 
which have expressed interest in bidding for South African hospital management 
contracts. This suggests that it would not be difficult to ensure a competitive situation in 
the awarding of future hospital management contracts in the South African context. The 
situation is likely to be similar in other middle income developing countries, which have 
relatively well developed private health sectors, and which are also attractive to 
international contract management companies.
However, it may be more difficult to ensure competition in low income countries, which 
have small private health sectors, which are usually dominated by not-for-profit 
providers. In these situations, governments consider letting management contracts for 
publicly owned facilities, to either not-for-profit or for-profit providers. However, not- 
for-profit providers, often mission hospitals, may not be interested in competing for 
hospital management contracts, and even if they were so, might face capital and other 
constraints to entering this market. One possible solution for such countries might be the
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use o f international contract management companies to manage public hospitals, a 
practice that has been attempted in Kenya in recent years, and is currently being 
explored in other Southern African countries, including Swaziland, Lesotho and 
Botswana (Haddon 1995). There are however some constraints to this alternative. 
Governments may not wish to hand over management of their hospitals to foreign 
companies, preferring to keep them in local hands; and international contract 
management companies may not find the opportunities in these countries particularly 
attractive. It is also possible that competitive and/or contestable conditions may pertain 
more in the PHC sector than in hospital services, making the PHC component of the 
health services more suited to  selective contracting.
9.2.1.4. For-profit versus not-for-profit contractors
This study did not explicitly examine the role of not-for-profit providers as contractors, 
and thus no firm conclusions can be drawn on the potential for such contractors to play a 
role in the delivery of hospital services. The study did provide some indicative evidence 
that for-profit ownership was linked to efficient management structures and systems and 
hence to efficient production, suggesting that the for-profit ownership structure may be 
an important determinant o f  efficiency in a contractual situation.
However, the study was not designed to produce firm evidence on the causal 
associations between these factors, and thus cannot exclude the possibility that not-for- 
profit contractors could function equally efficiently under well designed contracts. This 
possibility is strengthened by the evidence in this study that contracting out can lead to 
more efficient hospital production, even in the absence o f the for-profit motive, through 
the impact o f an arms-length ‘trading relationship’ between the purchaser and the 
contractor. Similarly, competition itself is likely to encourage greater efficiency on the 
part o f contractors, even if  this competition is between not-for-profit providers 
competing for government funding. These observations suggest that availability o f for- 
profit providers is not a  necessary condition for successful implementation of 
contracting out, and that, provided there is adequate government capacity to manage the
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contracting process, contracting out o f services to not-for-profit providers may generate 
significant efficiency gains.
In addition to issues of government capacity, successful contracting out also requires 
that the contract is designed to reflect the for-profit or not-for-profit nature of the 
contractors involved. More specifically, contracts should take into account the different 
motivations and responses to contract incentives that might be expected from such 
providers. As discussed previously, contracts with for-profit providers need to prevent 
exploitation by profit maximising contractors who might reduce costs to the point of 
compromising quality o f care, or fail to comply with contract requirements in other 
ways.
While contracts with not-for-profit providers may have to deal with exploitation o f this 
kind, it is less likely to be a problem than with for-profit contractors. Contracts with not- 
for-profit contractors may however have to deal with other, more specific problems. In 
South Africa, for example, contracts with a not-for-profit provider of TB hospital 
services are uniformly characterised by inefficient service delivery, resulting in poor 
quality o f care, and often substantial budget overruns. Since the organisation concerned 
is a charitable one, government’s response has historically been to meet these budget 
deficits and to accept the relatively poor quality o f services, resulting in higher effective 
contract prices than implied in the original implicit contract, and in net efficiency losses. 
This illustrates the importance o f ensuring that contracts with not-for-profit providers 
are as strict as those with for-profit providers in respect o f issues such as input and 
output specifications, quality of care and contract price. Failure to adopt this approach 
may well result in net efficiency losses from such contracts.
9.2.1.5. Political and economic conditions
While this study did not explicitly examine the impact of political conditions on the 
prospects for selective contracting, the political environment is likely to be an important 
determinant o f  whether a government succeeds in its efforts to secure efficiency gains
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through contracting. Conducive political conditions include those in which the social, 
judicial and political environment encourage and support trust-based cooperative 
contractual relations, or at a minimum, ensure compliance with contracts and remedies 
for lack o f  compliance.
A more specific political problem may occur in resistance to current and new contracts 
from trade unions and/or individual workers at institutional level. In many cases, 
contracting out may be perceived as a threat to jobs, or as a mechanism by which the 
government is seeking to reduce employment levels and/or wages over time. This has 
been the experience with South African government efforts to contract out clinical and 
non-clinical services within the health sector, and is also experienced by private health 
sector organisations attempting to contract out ‘non-core' services, such as catering.
In order to forestall or to minimise these problems, it will be essential for senior 
government officials to consult with worker representatives prior to the decision to 
contract out a service. This dialogue would provide an opportunity for the government 
to convince workers that that the decision to  contract out has been taken in the best 
interests o f  efficient service delivery, and may also alert management to the specific 
views and needs of workers, which could then be built into the contract, if feasible.
In some instances in South Africa, government has responded to worker objections to 
contracting out by using approaches which compromise the efficiency o f the contract. 
For example, some contracts for catering or laundry services specify that the contractor 
must take over and manage existing public sector staff working in the laundry or 
kitchen. Similarly, the contract at Shiluvana hospital, which was studied here, required 
that the contractor manage a full complement of public sector staff. While these 
compromises do address worker concerns regarding job security, they also create a 
situation in which these workers have dual loyalties, and seriously constrain the ability 
o f the contract manager to achieve efficiency gains. It is therefore important to ensure 
that compromises developed to address political obstacles to contracting do not 
ultimately undermine the efficiency gains obtained from the contracts.
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An appropriate economic environment is also essential to the achievement of efficiency 
gains from selective contracting. Where resources are constrained, contract prices may 
be too low, encouraging exploitation, or even failing to attract bidders for the contract. 
In addition, selective contracts can lock public resources in for long periods, preventing 
necessary reallocations during the contract term. Selective contracting is thus unlikely 
to succeed in highly resource constrained environments.
9.2.1.6. Negative effects o f  selective contracting
Decisions as to the advisability o f selective contracting should also take into account 
some o f the potentially negative effects o f this approach to service delivery. As this 
study has demonstrated clearly, poor implementation o f contracting, for whatever 
reason, may result in overall efficiency losses for the health system. Even if the contracts 
themselves produce efficiency gains, however, there may be other important negative 
effects on the health care system as a whole. One example of these, also demonstrated in 
this study, is the potential for contracting to create a lack o f coordination between 
different components o f the health services. Similarly, contracting may generate the 
complex problem of differential levels o f remuneration between staff employed by 
contractors and the public sector, as was again demonstrated here. Lack o f coherence 
may also occur at the policy level, where the values and incentive structures inherent in 
formal contracts with providers may not fit easily with those that prevail in the public 
sector as a whole.
There is also a risk that contracting may undermine the broader social objectives o f  the 
health care system, particularly when it is widespread, and where for-profit contractors 
are introduced into the system. This might occur, for example, through public providers 
starting to function like for-profit providers, eliminating essential but unprofitable 
services. Chapter 2 highlighted the risk that widespread introduction of contracting may 
lead to reduced levels o f employment and wages, leading to an increase in the costs of 
unemployment insurance and other social costs, and potentially undermining any 
efficiency gains achieved by the contracts themselves.
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As importantly, contracting out may lead to a situation in which government becomes 
substantially dependent on one or more contractors for the delivery of essential services. 
Where government becomes dependent on a monopolistic contractor, as has occurred in 
South Africa, this can severely limit the government’s bargaining power in negotiating 
future contracts, thus limiting the extent of efficiency gains from contracting. Such 
dependency can and should be avoided by ensuring competition for contracts, either 
from local and/or from international organisations. Contracting may also however create 
a more general dependency on contractors, with the government becoming unable to 
deliver certain services itself. This form of dependency limits the government from 
conducting ongoing reassessment of the costs and benefits o f contracting out, and may 
well lead to situation in which contracting persists, even when the government would 
choose to provide services itself. One possible solution to this problem is for 
governments to maintain at least some capacity to deliver services should this be 
required, for example, through the use of management contracts at publicly owned 
hospitals. This would, in theory, allow governments to take over service delivery 
themselves should this be necessary, although government’s lack of functional capacity 
could prove as powerful a constraint as its lack of physical assets in preventing it from 
undertaking service delivery.
Finally, the experience of other countries demonstrates that selective contracting or 
other similar reforms lead to substantial transactions costs, which may themselves be 
sufficient to undermine any efficiency gains from contracting. This suggests that 
potential transactions costs, both one-off and recurring, should be estimated prior to 
decisions to contract for clinical or non-clinical services.
9.2.1.7. Overview: should governments contract out the delivery o f hospital services 
and/or other clinical services?
While this study was limited in its scope, it has provided some evidence that 
governments can achieve efficiency gains from contracting out the delivery o f hospital
services to private organisations (and by implication, from other forms of selective 
contracting), provided that a number of important conditions are in place. These include 
the presence of some degree of contestability, government capacity to act as a competent 
purchaser and regulator, the availability of management capacity on both the purchaser 
and provider sides, and a conducive social, economic and political environment. Perhaps 
most importantly, governments should carefully specify and quantify the need for such 
outside assistance, the net benefits expected from it, and the likely time period over 
which outside assistance is required. Governments will need to ensure that political 
obstacles to selective contracting are overcome, and that the potential negative effects o f 
this approach to service delivery are anticipated and prevented. Assuming that these 
fairly rigorous conditions are met, selective contracting may well allow governments to 
improve the efficiency o f service delivery, at least in the short term.
Where the need for contracting, and the overall gains to be expected are less clear, 
however, the complexity and problems associated with selective contracting suggest that 
alternative approaches, including internal public sector reforms, should be strongly 
considered. This would be more so the case where government capacity to manage the 
contracting process is weak, where there is limited or no actual or potential competition 
for the contract, where government faces strong political obstacles to contracting out, 
and where the risk of negative consequences, such as dependency or inequity, are high.
There is thus no unconditional answer to the question o f  whether or not governments in 
middle or low income developing countries should contract out hospital or other 
elements of service delivery. Instead, this study has made it clear that the success or 
failure o f  contracting out is fundamentally contingent on a number o f  environmental 
factors; it has also indicated that, given the complexity and risks of contracting out, this 
decision should always be taken carefully, and should, if possible, be implemented 
incrementally and subjected to continuous review. While this study was limited to the 
contracting out o f  hospital services, similar considerations would apply to other forms of 
selective contracting, and to other clinical services, such as PHC, as well as to many 
other non-clinical services.
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9.2.2. Implications for organisation of publicly managed health services
Some of the findings of this study also have policy implications for the internal 
organisation o f publicly managed services, irrespective o f policy decisions on 
contracting. These implications are examined here in the context of South Africa’s 
public hospital system, but could also apply, with suitable modification, to public 
hospital systems in other developing countries.
9.2.2.1 Development o f ‘performance contracts' between hospitals and government 
authorities
The study demonstrated that an arms-length contractual or ‘trading relationship’ 
between government purchasers and hospital providers may have some positive effect 
on efficiency in its own right. This suggests that more widespread introduction of this 
form of relationship within the public hospital system may improve efficiency, even in 
the absence of formal contracts with private providers. In this situation, hospitals would 
enter into some form of ‘performance contract’ under which they would agree to deliver 
a specified quantity and quality of outputs, and the hospital budget would be linked to 
performance against the ‘contract’. This would, in theory, improve efficiency by 
creating greater awareness by hospital management and staff of the expectations o f 
them, as well as of critical input-output relationships in the production process. This 
approach, with or without provider competition, is a key element in the ‘internal market’ 
reforms in several developed countries, and is being attempted in some developing 
countries, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, its feasibility in a developing country 
context remains unclear. Such arrangements require sophisticated administrative 
systems and staff capacity, and have high administration costs. In many developing 
countries, such reforms might thus be unfeasible. In South Africa, however, where 
administrative capacity is sufficient or could be developed to an adequate level, the 
creation o f some form o f contractual relationships based on ‘performance contracts’ 
between publicly owned hospitals and government authorities may present an attractive
-339-
alternative to full-scale contracting out to private providers, and may well lead to 
efficiency gains.
9.2.2.2. Competition between public hospitals
Where such contractual relationships are feasible, it is also possible that some element 
o f internal competition between publicly owned hospitals might further enhance 
efficiency. In this context, competition might take the form of public hospitals 
competing for publicly funded patients, with budgets being determined in part by the 
numbers of patients attracted by the hospital. There are o f course several limitations to 
this approach in developing countries, including the fact that hospitals are monopoly 
suppliers in most geographic areas aside from the main urban centres, as well as the 
significant administrative requirements o f  this approach. These problems clearly apply 
to many parts o f the South African public hospital system, with competition between 
public hospitals being feasible only in a few metropolitan areas of the country. In these 
areas however, it may be possible to utilise an element o f competition between public 
hospitals, most of which are large, well funded teaching hospitals which are generally 
regarded as inefficient, and which could benefit from the need to compete for patients 
and hence for budgets.
9.2.2.3. Decentralisation o f management authority to hospital level
The management structures and systems applied in the private and contractor companies 
and hospitals studied here also suggest some mechanisms to improve the efficiency of 
public hospitals, even in the absence o f  the more substantial reforms discussed above. 
One such mechanism is the decentralisation of substantive management authority to the 
hospital level. Such authority could extend to most of the key management functions, 
including financial and personnel management and procurement. This would overcome 
the numerous problems attributable to overcentralisation of authority in the South 
African public hospital system (Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 1996b), and
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would almost certainly lead to much greater initiative on the part o f  local managers, as 
well as to speedier and more appropriate resolution o f the numerous problems which are 
currently handled at the head office level. In the South African context, such a policy 
shift would require significant legislative reform, as well as substantial investment in 
developing adequate managerial capacity. Notwithstanding these obstacles, 
decentralisation o f hospital management authority is currently identified as a critical 
policy issue in the South African context, and is receiving significant attention (Hospital 
Strategy Project Consortium 1996b). As discussed in Chapter 2, however, 
decentralisation without substantial changes in the balance o f  power between the 
hospital and the centre, is unlikely to impact significantly on efficiency. Decentralisation 
reforms o f this kind should thus be implemented within a broader framework of a shift 
in the traditional power relations in public sector bureaucracies.
9.2.2.4. Improving hospital management structures and systems
Since formal decentralisation of managerial authority involves fairly substantial policy 
reform which may take some time to be successfully implemented, some o f the other 
mechanisms identified in this study, including changes to the structure and functioning 
o f  management teams at both hospital and head office level, could be more rapidly and 
effectively applied in South Africa as well as in other developing countries. As 
demonstrated by the contractor and private hospital companies studied here, 
management teams at both levels should be small, simple in structure, and should 
function in an integrated manner, with a single locus of executive authority, and with 
multi-skilled individuals carrying out many different functions. In  addition, the role of 
the head office team should be explicitly defined as providing support and leadership, on 
an explicitly defined set o f issues, to hospital level management. These changes will 
require careful selection of appropriate officials to lead and operate within these 
management teams, substantial improvements in the skills of officials at all levels, and 
the development of adequate information systems. These latter requirements need not 
necessarily be fully in place prior to implementation of these management reforms,
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sirice the reforms themselves should be expected to contribute substantially to 
development of managerial capacity and systems.
In addition to the development of new organisational structures, attention should be paid 
to the incentives facing hospital and head office managers. As discussed above, the 
current South African public service strongly discourages any risk taking initiatives, and 
encourages rule bound, inefficient behaviour (Hospital Strategy Project Consortium 
1996b). This situation could be changed by the introduction of performance based 
contracts for senior management, in which reimbursement is linked to performance, as 
well as by the development of systematic performance review mechanisms, as was seen 
in the private hospital companies, and to a lesser extent in the contractor company.
Together, these various reforms to management structures and systems would go a long 
way towards addressing the severe fragmentation, duplication of functions, and general 
inefficiency which currently characterise the public hospital systems o f  South Africa and 
numerous other middle and low income developing countries. As such, they may be an 
important forerunner to the introduction o f  more comprehensive and complex reforms, 
such as decentralisation o f management authority, competition between public hospitals 
and hospital ‘performance contracts’.
9.23. Overview of policy implications
This study has identified a number of approaches to improving the efficiency o f public 
hospital systems in a developing country context. These can be viewed as occupying a 
spectrum o f  political and administrative complexity, with formal contracting out to 
private providers being the most complex, reorganisation of management structures and 
systems the least complex, and with internal ‘performance contracts' and 
decentralisation of authority lying in between these two extremes. Governments wishing 
to address inefficiencies within public hospital systems thus have a range of alternative 
policy options to choose from, and the appropriate choice will be highly contingent on
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local conditions, including such factors as government managerial capacity, and political 
attitudes to the use of private providers in the delivery o f publicly funded services.
Where formal selective contracting is not feasible, for either administrative or political 
reasons, this study has identified a number of other ‘internal reforms’ to the public 
sector, most o f which are less politically controversial, and some of which are less 
administratively demanding. While these reforms may go a long way towards 
addressing the inefficiency of current public hospital systems, it remains to be seen 
whether they are capable of overcoming all of the critical problems faced by publicly 
owned and managed hospitals, or whether the more radical approach of selective 
contracting, and specifically of contracting out to private providers, will come to be seen 
as an essential component in efforts to improve the efficiency of public hospital systems.
93. Priorities for further research
As noted in Chapter 2, there remains relatively limited empirical analysis of the impact 
o f  contracting out, or other forms of selective contracting of publicly funded clinical 
services in either developed or developing countries. While this study has provided 
some insights into these questions in the context o f  a middle income developing 
country, its limited scope and scale constrain the generalisability o f its results to other 
countries as well as to contracting of non-hospital services. An obvious and urgent 
research priority is thus to extend the scope of research on these issues to include 
analysis o f experiences with selective contracting in other developing countries, as well 
as for other non-hospital clinical services, such as PHC and clinical support services 
(e.g. laboratory/pathology services etc.).
Analysis of selective contracting in a range o f other countries is critical since it will 
allow more systematic analysis of the impact on contractual efficiency of different 
contracts and contracting processes, as well as of the various environmental factors 
highlighted by this study. Similarly, extending the analysis to non-hospital services 
would assist in identifying those specific features of particular clinical services which
-343-
either support or undermine contractual efficiency. For example, the theory o f contracts, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, would predict that contracts for more complex services would 
be more likely to lend themselves to exploitation by contractors than would be the case 
with less complex services. While this theoretical argument would suggest that 
exploitation, and hence inefficiency, would be more likely in  contracts for hospital 
services than those for PHC services, it would be useful to  test this prediction with 
sound empirical evidence.
In addition to extending the scope of empirical analysis o f  the impact o f selective 
contracting, further research is also required on the impact o f the  particular determinants 
o f  contractual efficiency highlighted by this study. More specifically, it would be very 
useful to examine the impact on contractual efficiency of such factors as competition for 
contracts, the ownership structure (for-profit versus not-for-profit) of contractors, and 
government capacity to manage the contracting process. I t  might be possible to 
undertake such analyses through comparative, retrospective analysis of contracting in a 
range of different countries where different environmental conditions prevail. In this 
situation, however, it is often difficult to isolate the specific impact o f  particular 
environmental conditions, as was the case in this study. It m ight thus be more useful, if  
somewhat more logistically complex, to assess the impact of these factors in 
prospective studies which can be designed to isolate the impact of these various 
individual factors.
Over and above these relatively theoretical analyses, it might also be useful to undertake 
‘action research’ to evaluate the effect of specific interventions designed to achieve 
greater efficiency within a contractual environment. For example, where a government 
is engaged in selective contracting of some form, or plans to  let a new contract, an 
intervention to strengthen government capacity to manage the entire contracting process 
could be designed and evaluated on a prospective basis. Similarly, more limited 
interventions, for example to improve the monitoring o f contractor performance, or to 
assist not-for-profit providers to bid for contracts, might also be implemented and 
evaluated where the environment is appropriate.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, governments in both developed and developing countries are 
increasingly experimenting with various forms of selective contracting in efforts to 
improve the efficiency of publicly funded health services. In this context, the 
experiences of countries further along the road with these reforms will be very important 
for those at earlier stages of the policy debate, as will the availability of extensive and 
detailed information on the successes and failures o f various approaches to contracting, 
and on the determinants of success or failure. In this context, the research approaches 
outlined here, as well as others, will become increasingly relevant and urgent.
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